MORNING SESSION...THE BOARD RECONVENED AT 1010HOURS, 23 FEBRUARY 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002200080009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 23, 1962
• Content Type: COURTFILE

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MORNING SESSION
. . . The board reconvened at 1010 hours, 23 February 1962 . . .
. . . A motion picture entitled "The Powers Trial" by the
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Central Documentary Film Studio in Moscow was then shown ..,. . .
MR. HOUSTON: I would like to make the order appointing the Board
of Inquiry a part of the record.
JUDGR FRta''TT' MP.1 : I think it should have a number on it. It
is much too late to read it unless we want to read it into the record at
this point and make it an inte ral part of the record itself.
MR. HOUSTON: I can do that if you wish. We could call it not an
exhibit but Attachment A and place it physically at the beginning. The
memorandum will be identified as Attachment A and placed at the opening of the
official record,
JUDGE PRkTTYMAN: Mark it Attachment A and put your initials on it.
. . . . Document entitled "Board of Inquiry" dated 19 February
1960, signed by John A. McCone, Director was then marked as Attachment A and
made a part of the record . . . .
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the record and 7mW position?
i function as Special Assistant
to the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Staff.
MR. ROt1.9i'0 is What are the responsibilities and fanatic" of
that Staff,in connection with the Powers episode, generally.
well, with the occurrence on May 1, 1960, I
was assigned by the Chief of Counter Intelligence Staff to participate in
the assessment of possible damage to the Agency and the operations resulting
from the incident and to follow the Powers ease from that point forward
in terms of Soviet activity, possibility of defection, sabotage, and the
MR. HOUSt'OI: Can you take these areas and report on them
separately? Ibr instance on the question of possible defection, did you make
studies in regard to the possibility of defection?
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Well, with the happening -- with the event itself --
from a counter intelligence point of view it was i=ediately regarded as a
point that had to be resolved -- was the incident the result of defection?
In getting at the answers on a question like that you of necessity can't
sit back and wait for charges and reports and allegations and rumors to come
in. You have to go out and attempt to resolve this. Well, how to go about
that? You consider the possibility of defection. It can only occur in two
ways. One, it's spontaneous on the part of the individual, or it's been
induced by some other activity. Well, with regard to the possibility of
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spontaneous defection on the part of Powers we went to work On gathering
information on Powers himself. Tiot in terms of the type of information that
was gathered when he was recruited for this job to see if he was suited to do
it, but what kind of life he was living?`: What i4s:,his life in terms of
events in his life that might cause him to defect spontaneously. We came
up with very reasonable negative on that.
nothing that would lead us to believe that they were of such magnitude that
he would .;dust fly his plane over and land it in Russia, plus he had given no
manifestation that we could dig; up of any unsettled thinking that would lead
people to believe that he was troubled. There was another factor in a
matter of spontaneous defection, and that had to do with this: If he did fly over
there and decide to defect he picked an awful hard way to do it. Getting shot
down and coming down in the parachute is not the easiest way to defect in our
opinion.
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MR. iiOUSTON: You feel you explored all avenues of possibility
for a defection and came to the conclusion that none were consistant with
known or established facts.
That is right and we have continued to watch this
thing throughout the behavior of the man, and our statement that he
successfully withheld material information from the Soviets strengthens
our position against defection.
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