STANDING GROUP AGENDA 28 MAY MTG
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SIA-N?ING 01t UP AGENDA
28 May Mtg.: "Cuba sugar paper of Department of Agriculture.
Cuba After Castro"
Possible Courses of Action in Cuba.
Related papers:
1. Cuban attacks Reconnaimaxn Wi4..s....
Conting ency Plan
NSC review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
I
On file DOC & USDA release instructions apply
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MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC Standing Group Members
This memorandum, provided for your information, was
prepared as a result of the 30 April Standing Group Meeting in
which CIA was asked to develop a list of possible actions which
might be undertaken against Cuba.
The first attachment is a list of possible additional actions
against Cuba. They are listed without regard to present policy
limitations. As indicated in the remarks, CIA does not favor all
of the actions listed.
The second attachment contains a list of possible additional
actions which have been considered in the past but which CIA does
not favor for the reasons noted in the remarks.
i.rector f Central Intelligence
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MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC Standing Group Members
The attached memorandum was prepared by CIA following
the 30 April Standing Group Meeting in which CIA was asked to
report on the Cuban oil situation.
(L)ir ectY of Central Intelligence
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SECRET
CUBAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF CRUDE OIL
AND REFINED P TROLEUM S
1. Cuba's total supply of petroleum, crude and
refined., for 1962 was a total of 93,000 barrels per day
(bpd). This was supplied by the Soviet Bloc, principally
the Soviet Union.
A. The above 93,000 (bpd) breaks down to
a daily average of 77,000 (bpd) of crude which
when refined by the three Cuban refineries
(formerly Esso, Shell and Texaco) produced
70,000 bpd finished products, which at USSR
crude conversion rates produces 28% gasoline,
27% gas oil and kerosene, and 45% fuel oil, or
19,600 bpd gasoline (about 58 octane), 18,900
bpd gas oil and kerosene, and 31,500 bpd fuel
oil.
B. The remaining 16,000 bpd are of refined
products. The May 1963 planned delivery is a
good example of an average month:
Delivery - May 1963 Tons
A 98 High Octane Auto gas 10,000
A 83 Medium Octane Auto gas 11,000
T 1 Jet fuel 5,7500
MS 20 Aviation Oil 1,300
Vapor (industrial oil) 1,200
Machine oil (slow machinery) 3,000
Spindle oil 1,800
Kerosene and gas oil 16,000
Fuel oil 23,200
TONS FOR MAY 73,000
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)U.RET
2. The consumption of petroleum products in Cuba
in 1959 (the last year of U.B. corporation records) was
between 58,000 and 60,000 bpd. Why Cuba is now consuming
86,000 bpd of finished and refined petroleum products
is a confusing question both to those working on Cuba
petroleum consumption statistics and also to the U.B.
petroleum industry.
3. Despite the increase in Cuba's supply of
petroleum products over 1959 consumption, our effort to
account for the increased consumption or locate new
storage areas has been unsuccessful. Aerial photographs
disclose only slight increase in above ground storage
facilities since 1959. The largest expansion is three
new crude storage tanks at the Texaco refinery in
Santiago consisting of about 60,000 barrels each and
four crude storage tanks at the Esso refinery in Havana
of also about 60,000 barrels each.
4. Present storage facilities in Cuba, using a
consumption rate of 60,000 bpd, would store a sufficient
quantity to supply: (a) gasoline for at least six
months; (b) fuel oil for at least six months; and
(c) gas oil and kerosene for at least 41 months.
5. The only petroleum products the Bloc probably
cannot supply Cuba, without reducing their own needs,
are Bright and additives for lubricating oil. These
Cuba has been trying desperately to obtain from the
West.
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Executive Registzyl
T I ~ I
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Cuban Supply and Demand of Crude Oil
and Refined Petroleum Products
1. This memorandum is in response to your
request for information on the above subject and is
for your use at the next meeting of the Standing
Group.
2. The attached paper has been coordinated
with DDI/ORR. Sufficient copies are provided should
you desire to distribute the attachment to members
of the Standing Group.
Ric ar He ms
Deputy Director
(Plans)
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
13 May 1,63
DRAFT MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Developments in Cuba and Possible US Actions in
the Event of Castro's Death*
We believe the odds are that upon Castro's death his brother
Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing
and help, take over control. However, there is a good chance that
a power struggle would ensue, and a lesser chance that such a
struggle would spread, either into a many-sided conflict or with
the Moscow-oriented Communists lined up on one side and those who
are essentially Cuban nationalists on the other. In any case
* This memorandum is a general analysis of the situation and
prospects for US action after Castro's death. We have not sought
to work out in detail Latin American, Western European, or other
third party reactions in the various contingencies adverted to in
our examination of the problem. In paragraph 13 we consider very
generally the problem of Soviet reactions.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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the loyalties of the military commanders, now committed to
Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly
influence the outcome. Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would
require extensive US help in order to win, and probably US
military intervention.
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S. CU 3A WITHOUT OASTRO
Factors in the Sititi.on
1? The course of events in Cuba after Castro's death would
depend upon a wide range of variables and unknowns, which are
unlikely to be made manifest until, after the event. Yet we can
make some advance assessment of the importance of certain factors.
a. The Le.dersh%. Castro's personal predominance
has overshadowed the rest of the leadership. The two most
prominent and powerful political leaders under Fidel are his
brother Raul and Che Guevara. Rau]. is Deputy premier and the
designated successor. Furthermore he is Minister of the Armed
Forces and Commander in Chief. He has by far the best chance
of taking over after his brother's death, but he has a cold and
unattractive personality with little of Fidel's appeal to the
public. On the other hand, Che Guevara is a more colorful figure,
a man of ability and drive, and therefore a likely contender for
power, If these two were to cooperate, together with President
Dorticos they would have a good chance of consolidating control.
Among the old line Communists the position and attitude of Carlos
Rafael Rodriquez would be the most important, since he enjoys
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some respect among the Fidelis{as and has authority among the
Moscow-oriented Communists.
b. Differenz es within the Regime. The top leadership
of the regime seems to live in more harmony than after the Escalante
affair in the spring of 3.962 or after the October 1962 crisis.
However, we believe that there is still a basic cleavage between
the Fidelistas and the Moscow-oriented Com*sunists and that it
might widen in situations of stress.
c. The A? x+ r and Security Forces. The armed forces
and security services have been molded into instruments highly
responsive to Fidel himself. After his departure, both the army
and the security forces are likely to become more important and
more active in politics. Their allegiance in a power struggle
would depend to a major extent on the circumstances then current.
We have little trustworthy information on the majority of the
individual military commanders, but we do know that popular
leaders have been moved from post to post, presumably to prevent
their attaining too great power.. A sizeable minority of the top
military commanders are persuasively reported to be opposed to
the present close ties with the USSR; they have been restrained
so far by their personal loyalty to Fidel and by the regime's
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infcrraant system. A few cormanders would probably lend
themselves readily to support of another Moscow-oriented
leader; most have demonstrated no political loyalty except
to Castro. Thus we would expect dissension within the armed
forces in the event of a struggle for power. The loyalty of
the commanders rather than the attitude of the troops would
probably govern the behavior of the military forces in such
a struggle.
d. The Cuban Public. The enthusiasm of a sifostantial
portion of the population for the changes wrought by the Castro
revolution, the departure or imprisonment of many potential
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leaders of opposition, the general passivity of the remainder of
the population, the weaiuiess of the resistance, and the strength
of the security organizations all argue against the likelihood of
a popular uprising after Castro's death.
e. The Soviet Role. Castro's death would deprive the
Soviets of the only Communist leader with Charisma in Latin America
and at, the some time relieve them of the difficulties of doing
business with a spiny independent character. Castro's successor
might be far easier for the Soviets to deal with, but is sure to
lack Castro's wide emotional appeal. Upon Castro's death the
Soviets would move rapidly to the support of Raul Castro or what-
ever other friendly contender for power seemed likely to win out.
They would be able to offer significant help to their chosen
instrument, and such support might be decisive in any struggle for
power among the top leadership.
f. The US Role. If Castro were to die by other than
natural causes the US would be widely charged with complicity, even
though it is widely known that Castro has many enemies. US inter-
vention would be anticipated by many supporters and by many opponents
of the regime. In this state of affairs, not only the nature but
also the timing of US actions would have great importance, and US
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silence or inaction would also have far-reaching consequences.
These will be dealt. with in more detail in the following paragraphs.
51;.s of the C~abccn Reaction to Castro * s Death
4. If the US did not intervene immediately, Raul, Castro or
one of the top echelon of Castro'.s follotmrs would probably be able
to consolidate a working regime acceptable to the Soviets. However,
we believe that there would be a substantial, though less than even
chance, of a struggle for power among the top leaders. Such a
struggle for parser might be resolved by the emergence of a single
leader, but there is a chance that the conflict would ultimately
take on the characteristics of a civil war.
a. Initial. Period of 82 Lida-
it. We believe that the
most probable development after Castro' s death would be a rallying
of a regime around the designated successor, Raul Castro. The
opposition would take heart, but would wait for a move from the US
and the Latin American opponents of the Castro regime before
ccMitting itself to more than token efforts. After an initial
period of consolidation and solidarity the new leaders might go on
to Ep.L to ?ir position vim'. \ :Jtillizh yu / j
LI,-~11
end control. On the other hand? it is equally likely that a
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struggle for pave-r wi3J. develop. 'D-"ring this early phase we
believe that pressoxe from the US would be more likely to inorease
the solidarity of the refine them promote a power struggle.
b. l ;E o PrArcx. If some individual or group
decided to contest R .,,tis leiwdershtp, the auteme would depend upon
a number of factors, the most important of which would probably
be i;+hether Raul had gained or alienated the loyalty of the armed
forces. It is possible that, as in the U TRO the struggle for
power could be confined to the inner circles and that a single
figure would eventually gain control. In Cuba, however, such a
struggle would be likely to break into the open, throwing up
see,*eral arYbitious contenders for place and power.
c. Widened (onfliet. It Is also possible that a
struggle for power would not ead, after the strongest of the in-
dividusl leaders had asserted himself but that alliances wouul.d
be formed and lines be drawn between the Pidelistas on the one
hand and the Moscow-oriented Communists on the other. Such a
split could extend into the Army and security forces and develop
Into s+oanething like a civil war. Perhaps even more likely than
a two sided civil war would be a conflict in which many groups
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emergedd, all, striving for dninsnce, forming alliances and
breaking off into new splinter groups and factions. In such a
situation the ewrrgence of a non-Communist Pidelista group,
claiming to be the rightful heirs of the original revolution,
would be a possibility, but unlikely without US support.
d. Ultimate Resolution. Whatever the outcome of an
upheaval, like that described above, certain elements in the present
situation seem certain to survive. The social and economic changes
brought about by Castro's revolution are unlikely to be reversed,
whether or not Castro's ultimate successor be a Ccamunist. Cuba
is likely to be a socialist state and probably to require for
scene time an authoritarian government. 'Whoever the leader of Cuba
is, he will probably be critically dependent upon the support of
armed forces.
II . US CC))R.Sk S OF ACTION
5? No Specir ll. US Initiatives. Tice posture of the US in the
immediate aftermath of Castro's death viii be of critical
importance. If the US took no position and no action after
Castrots death the new regime would move rapidly to consolidate
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its hold and the likelihood of an (anti-Communist force emerging
would be greatly reduced. If such an anti-Coaanzunist group did
emerge without the encourement or intervention of the US its
position might be less vulnerable to charges of being the
creature of the US. We think it much more likely, however, that
any anti-C i st group that emerged in Cuba would need and
might openly seek assurances and :Eelp from the US. The most
likely circumstances for such an .aped, would be those in which
a nationalist group was openly in conflict with a Communist-
directed and supported group.
6. US Support for the "True: Heirs" of the 26th of gLi~ P Crrement.
The emergence of an effective anti-C ast force in Cuba will
depend primarily on Cuban initiative and would probably require
the defection of important elements of the existing regime. With
proper timing, however., US encouragement might stimulate such a
development. Once the internal political forces in Cuba have pro-
duced a split between the nationalists and the Moscow-oriented
Ccm=mists US initiatives would be of utmost importance. At the
right moment they might produce a merging of nationalists within
the regime and those in opposition. This seems to us the combina-
tion most likely to upset the forces seeking a Ca monist succession.
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If US offers are to have an appeal to such a coalition they must
make clear the willingness of the US to cooperate with former
members and supporters of the Castro regime whose aim is to
achieve Cuba's independence of the Soviets and the Communist Bloc.
It will also be necessary for the US to make a convincing
assertion of its readiness to accept most of the social and
economic changes instituted by the Castro regime.
7. The problem of timing will, of course, be one of great
importance. It seems likely that there would be a period during
which a public announcement of US willingnness to support a
nationalist group would be disadvaxtageous. A too rapid announce-
ment might serve to consolidate resistance to these people; a too
long delay could cause them to despair. Meawwrhile, it woald be
essential to transmit an offer of support clandestinely to the
right people at the earliest possible moment. One problem will be
the relative timing of a US announcement and of activities designed
to preposition forces in anticipation of fulfilling promises. It
will be extremely difficult to move any US forces without publicity
by the US press, but such prepositioning as can be carried out
inconspicuously probably ought to take place as soon as a general
course of action has been decided upon. A public statement of
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US intentions should probably be made before military preparations
directed toward Cuba become widely known.
8. Once a nationalist group had emerged and entered into
conflict with the Moscow-oriented Communists, the assistance which
it would require from the US would depend largely on circumstances.
It might be that arms and ammunition delivered rapidly and in such
a way as to ensure its victory would be the only aid called for.
It is possible that such a group would ask for US air support and
perhaps for US ground forces as well in the early stages of conflict;
sooner or later it would almost certainly require such support. In
a later stage if a US supported nationalist group had won dominance,
the US would face a new set of problems. Almost any such group
would be likely to insist that no political or social changes made
under Castro be reversed except at its own initiative. Compensation
for expropriated US property might be agreed to, but not at a
realistic figure. The US would almost certainly be obliged to
undertake an aid program at least the rough equal of the present
Soviet program.
9. Action Through a Goverrment in Exile. It is highly
unlikely that any Cuban exile group could effectively influence
the course of events in Cuba after Castro's death, with or without
US support. Furthermore, the association of exiles with US
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initiatives would probably reduce their chances of success.
It is possible that certain groups in Cuba would prefer to
deal with the US through a Cuban government in exile, but we
think it unlikely.
10. Quarantine and Blockade. If in consonance with
various policy pronouncements the US were to quarantine Soviet
attempts to reinforce its military and technical personnel in
Cuba and to introduce additional armaments, the US-oriented
revolutionaries would probably be enspirited. If on the
other hand the US declared a blockade the reactions in Cuba
would be mixed: our friends would be greatly heartened to
realize that the US had indicated its willingness to bring
down the Communist regime in Cuba, even at the risk of war with
the Soviet Union. The regime would be apprehensive. Unless the
blockade were swiftly challenged by the Soviets and the focus
of the confrontation drastically shifted, the chances of the
fall of the successor Cuban regime would rise.
11. Invasion. If the US declared its readiness to support
the Cuban nationalists and true heirs of the Castro revolution
and if such a group emerged, the chances are at least even that
it would require the intervention of US forces before it could
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gain control of the island. Of the various guises under
which invasion might be undertaken the least palatable and
probably the least effective would be that of a Cuban exile
force. An undisguised US invasion would cause political
problems inside and outside Cuba, but we do not believe that
they would be unacceptable to the Cu' p-iti-Communist
movement. Much would depenu, of course, on the authenticity
of the Cuban movement.
12. Joint Action by Hemisphere States. Joint OAS action
would be unlikely to have any great appeal to Cubans, even
the Cuban nationalists. However, steps to bring the OAS in
some way or another into any action contemplated by the US
might help avoid many diplomatic problems in Latin America
and elsewhere.
13. Soviet Reaction. Castro's departure from the scene
would not lessen the Soviet concern to preserve the Communist
base in Cuba. They would certainly try to influence the
situation, particularly if a power struggle developed. For
a time they ould operate behind the scenes and publicly would
not have to go beyond reaffirmation of their vague commitments
to protect a Communist Cuba. Once the struggle reached open
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conflict, or if the u3 took strong action against the new
regime, the USSR would have no choice. They would have to
decide how far to go in support of a Communist faction.
What they would do outside Cuba is beyond the scope of this
paper, but within Cuba we believe the Soviets would be
cautious about engaging in open conflict.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 27, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR
National Security Council Stancing G ou
Attached is a paper which. will be discussed
at the Standing Group meeting on May 28, 3:03 ?M.
Bromley Smith
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25 April i963
MEMORANDUM ON CUBAN POLICY
(Random thoughts developed by ICI on various as,)ects of the
Cuban problem and the discussion at Standing Grcup ore pared
for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on tins subie t
during his absence from the country. )
1. Castro's position - I agree with the 0:\;?: estimatte that Castro's
political position will improve within the next year (barring assassination).
His image among liberals anc insurgent groups in the Western Hemisphere
will improve, though this will not be the case with the !--leads of State.
Economic hardships and other difficulties, such as insurgency, raids,
etc. within Cuba, will complicate his problems bit, on balance, it seems
to me Castro's situation has improved since about December and will
continue to improve. The Cuban people will become 'resigned" to his
presence and will go about their business exi~res~ ng their resentment
in apathy rather than in active belligerence. 'i'h.s trend can be slowed
and possibly reversed it United States action is taker with determination,
continuity and consistency.
2. Economic situation - Undoubtedly, the Castro Government is
seriously hurt by US economic actions. These actio-is alone, however,
cannot bring Castro down although they will continue to give him trouble
and to increase Soviet problems and costs in supporting him. The
economic blockade must be kept up and intensified. Great ettort must
be exercised to shut off supply of parts tron_ Canada, which is now
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flowing in small but very important quantities. Continuing effort must
be exercised with all Western European countries. , Moreover, a con-
tinuing effort must be exercised with major U. S. corporations, as has
been done with International Harvester on tractors from Spain, and with
the oil companies in controlling the "bright stock" supply. Trade with
Latin America plays a minor role in Cuba's export-import economy, but
the Latin American countries should continue their economic boycott which
has been effective. The principal and most effective means of "hardening"
Castro's economic situation will come through Canada, Western Europe
and Japan. Intensified efforts might be effective, but I would expect that
the passage of time and the "acceptance" of Castro and his Communist
government, the pressures of trade, the seeking of markets, the taking
advantage of business opportunities, etc. , will cause a decided weakening
of Canadian-European support of our program of economic sanctions. This
has been true of other U. S. efforts of this type in the past, such as trade
with the Soviet Union, Chinese Communists and others.
3. The sugar market - Castro's problems and the Soviet cost of
supporting Castro is offset to a considerable degree by the dramatic increase
in the price of sugar. The increase in the last year, when applied to
75% of estimated 1963 production of sugar, about equals the estimated
economic aid the Soviets are required to give Cuba in 1963. Therefore,
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it might be said that the Free World is supplying the money with which the
Soviets are supporting Castro. Careful exploration should be made as to
why the ,sugar market has gone up so dramatically (2-3/4~ in 1961 - 6-1/2 to 7~
now). The United States should break the sugar market if possible. This is a
sensitive trmrket and is "made" by middlemen and can be manipulated. An
upward movement of a cent a pound would decrease the Soviet/Cuban dollar
Although there are some indications
that the demand for sugar exceeds supply it is hard to believe that this factor
in itself is totally responsible, for thepresent price of sugar.
4. To use shipping as a weapon is not very effective. There are lots
of idle bottoms and the Soviets can employ them for their non-Cuban trade
and use their tankers and dry cargo ships for Cuban trade. While our
efforts with the Free World countries should be continued, we should not
consider this as a very important and effective means of hurting Castro.
In fact, to the extent that non-Bloc ships could be conveyors of agents and
various sabotage devices, their occasional transit into Cuba might be
an advantage rather than a disadvantage from our standpoint.
NOTE: In summary, actions against Castro's economy should be
continued and hardened and might make things more difficult for him.
But these will not bring him down. Furthermore, it will become in-
creasingly difficult to secure Free World cooperation as the world
public gets used to Castro.
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5. The Soviet presence in Cuba continues. There has been no
appreciable exodus in recent weeks; there are no large passenger ships
enroute to Cuba now. Indications are that Khrushchev has met his
commitment of removing "several thousand Soviets", and may have called
a. halt to the exodus. It may be resumed as Cubans become proficient in
handling the equipment. Castro apparently expects this, to judge from his
statements to Donovan. I really have no assurance this will take place and
we should not be deterred from any actions of any kind necessary to slow
down Ca-qtra's growth or to overthrow him on grounds that this would cause
a Kremlin decision not to remove its troops.
6. The Soviet threat. Finally, the presence of the several thousand
Soviets in Cuba does not pose a threat to this country. The Soviets would
probably not engage themselves in any internal situation within Cuba.
Nevertheless, there is no reasonable explanation for the presence of
so many Soviets or for the retention in Cuba of a variety of very sophisticated
military equipment, most important of which are the SAM sites. One can.
only conclude that the SAMs are there to be used at the Soviets' will _
in depriving the United States of aerial surveillance and our source of knowle
of what is gdng on in Cuba. The SAMs are not useful in the defense of
Cuba. They can be destroyed quickly by low-level attack. Therefore,
they are there for some other purpose and this is not adequately explained,
in my opinion, by "Khrushchev's pride or lose of face or the
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Khrushchev/ Castro relationship" and other such explanations. As long
as the SAMs are there, there is always the possibility they will be used,
or we will be threatened with their use, and this will be done at a
time when they are willing to take the risk of another confrontation
with the United States. I therefore feel that we must not, under any
circutnsstance, dismiss the possibility of a second confrontation of a
type encountered last October. I have the same feeling about the
presence of the SAMs in Cuba now as I did last Fall. In our thinking
andrplanning concerning Cuba, we must not lose sight of the fact,
however remote, that the Soviets can reintroduce missiles in Cuba,
accept the risk of confrontation, and confront us with the prospect
of war (which would present a difficult decision to us) or negotiations
at higher price than was Khrushchev's original objective. If the
situation were reversed, there would be pressure in this country
from certain "extremists" to take such a risk of confrontation
and I feel that rushchev might very well be under exactly the
same pressure. For this reason this possibility must not be discounted
and all measures of protection against this surprise must be
taken.
7. From the above it seems to me that a high priority should
be attached to developing measures directed toward removal of
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Soviet troops and larger items of equipment from Cuba. All possible diplomatic
maneuvers should be. made. If an opportunity for a "trade" on reasonably
favorable terms devol,ops, this should be explored, harrassment of installations
encouraged, and feints or, for that matter commando raids to steal Soviet
KOMAR vessels or SAM missiles, should be considered. Warnings of this posai-,
bility might be one means of suggesting to the Soviets that some of their
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10. The most extreme measures which would be directed against
the population are feasible, but I am against them on humane and moral
grounds. They would be attributable to the United States. They would
stand-as a black mark on our record for all time. They would cause
untold hardship to thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals who are
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4
not re:ipo}tsible ,for Castro and can do nothing about him, and they
would not necessarily answer the "Castro-Communist problem".
It seems to me that if the problem is, so serious that we must resort
these measures, then we should face up to a direct confrontation,
Bringing Castro down: Measures discussed above will
create for Castro and his regime great hardship but as mentioned
will xiot being -hi zia down. However, they will cause distress and
dissension within his organization and will tend to destroy its
monolithic feature This would present the opportunity of splitting
his regimb at the top and catalyzing a revolt on the part of all, or a
substantial eegment pf, his military. The result could be a
military take-aver typical of Latin America, the establishment of
a military dictatorship friendly to the United States and to the
Western Hemisphere nations, unfriendly to the Soviets and it would
be non-Communist. If successful, the military regime could then
force the with4,rawal of Soviet military personnel and a great deal of
equipn ent. It could solve this problem but would present us with
serious problems of economic aid, sugar quotas, resolving the
problem of confis#cated property and all the rest. A combination
of economic sanctions and harras ament on the one hand, and a
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successful effort to disenchant his military leadership and cause a revolt and military
takeover on the other seems to be the only course open to bring Castro-Communism
d. and remove the Soviet threat. The prospect of an effective uprising of the people
against Castro _seemp remote if he retains control of his military and security forces.,
Small uprisings would be suppressed as they are now. Large uprisings would probably
result in a blood bath. Therefore, I conclude we must split Castro's military organi-
z4tiou to insure the success of a revolt against him.'
U. Splitting Castro from Moscow -- This might be done. Perhaps Cas'tra'a
proclamation8 and embrace of Communism is really a recent development. He is
nown to have been a radical, a liberal, a revolutionary, but not shard-core
Communist. Be disclaims being such at the present time but he has embraced
Con-Am=. lam ppbliely. He claims he is not a satellite, that he is independent, that
he will 4lspoie of the Soviets at his convenience, and that he seeks a rapprochement
w h the United States. Whether this should be done or could be done remains'
obscure. It is not in the American tradition ever to trust a man who has been
adeceitful, ambitious, apEi an avowed enemy. On the other hand, Commulists
have changed their Stripes, e. g. , Chiang Kai-shek and Betancourt; and dictators
have changed their orientation, e. g. Nasser. All of the problems of sugar
quotas, aid- etc., would immediately arise under this plan and would be far less
acceptable to the American people and to the Congress than would be the case if
Castro were disposed of. Nevertheless consideration should be given to a highly
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compartmented; carefully planned and managed program to defect
Castro from Moscow. An existing channel might, be used for this
purpose and this effort might be made concurrently with all other
13. Relations with the people of Cuba. Constructive, dynamic
and positive programs must be developed and implemented to breathe
hope into the Cuban people. This is not for the purpose of creating
an.uprtefhg among the people for it appears to me that as long as
Castro controls the military and the internal security forces, a
popular uprising that assumed serious momentum might result in a
blood bath. The program should be designed to let the people of
Cuba know that they have a future and that the United States is
determined to provide that future for them. There are many ways
of developing such a program and many convincing thoughts which
can be projected to the Cuban people by various means of transmission.
All of this is essential to the success of any long range dynamic
United States program for the removal of Castro and Communism
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A'61tlts.1.0Eld.IAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
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?WALIINGTCM 21, to C. 3:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
a7 27, 1953
roll The Honorable John A. McCone
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
1'S' to House tan requ*ete4 the Stat*
to distribute the actached ran-
t o rh t er of t"
1 SC Standin-4 Grot:D
na?e r to the may 23 =sting.
: utive crztary
.ttact
- y No. g May 27~amc~r*ndum on Possible
fiat Initiatives to Bad US Aerial
--rnaissanoe Over Cuba
?P SFGI AT
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-ty 27, 1963
A RANDUM FOR THE NSC STANDING GROUP
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Initiatives to End US
Aerial Reconnaissance Over Cuba
I~r,_blem:
To evaluate considerations involved and the various options
available to the USSR and Cuba in seeking to end US aerial
reconnaissance over Cuba.
Dt9cussion:
The Soviet Union, and still more Castro's Cuba, wish the
cessation of US overflights of Cuba. The issue at present is only
in the background, and the Communists evidently do not feel it is
desirable to raise their objection prominently until they think there
is something they can do about it. They evidently recognize that
the shooting down of a reconnaissance plane would probably provoke
active countermeasures to which they could not effectively respond,
and moreover not end the surveillance. Assuming that they continue
to believe that they cannot with impunity use direct action to end
the overflights, they may nonetheless turn to other measures in an
effort to compel us to stop further reconnaissance. Moreover, they
GROUP 2
Exem
by
fowngrading
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may believe that some such other measures may, even if unsuccessful
in themselves, create a better foundation-for shooting down a.olane
later.
A-1ternativg Cour 3z of Act on:
There appear to be six possible lines of political action open
to the Communists in attempting to get us to call off the aerial
reconnaissance of Cuba;
(1) Cuba could protest in the United Nations General
Assembly and/or Security Council, calling for condemnation of the
US action and for a cessation of the flights.
(2) Cuba could bring action before the International
Court of Justice, or seek UN action requesting an advisory opinion
from the ICJ, calling for cessation of the flights.
(3) The Soviets could initiate pressures elsewhere-such
as Berlin, privately or publicly tying the new pressure to the
continuing overflight of Cuba, and offering to relax the new point
of tension in exchange for cessation of aerial reconnaissance of
Cuba.
(4) The Soviets could privately offer to withdraw all
Soviet military personnel from Cuba in exchange for quiet dropping
of aerial surveillance by the US.
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(5) The Cubans could publicly propose a trade-off
mowing ground inspection in exchange for an end to aerial inspection,
but we are sure they would not do this unless they also added in demands
for ground inspection in Florida or elsewhere in the Caribbean.
(6) The Cubans could, with discrete Soviet assistance,
initiate aerial reconnaissance of some other area in the Caribbean--say,
Guatemala or Nicara.gun--on tha 5.oounds that offensive military action
was being prepared in those countries (as it had been before tre
Bay of Pigs attack), justifying and requiring Cuba to undertake
this peaceful aerial inspection. Then, the Cubans could offer to
call off their surveillance if we call off ours.
Action in the United Nations:
A Cuban protest in the United Nations, vigorously supported by
the other Communist powers, would open up an issue which most people
have forgotten. They would r- o':,ibly gain some support for the idea
that indefinite aerial overflight and reconnaissance was an undue
infringement of sovereignity a~nd should he stopped. The US defense
would rest on two bases: The OAS Pe-solution of October 23 authorizing
such action, and the d3 facto rs,-olu':.ior. of the October crisis in which
with forbearance the US settled fo: unobtrusive aerial reconnaissance
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instead of insisting on ground inspection. Therefore, it would not be
necessary to rest our case on a general right to reconnaissance. and this
should hold in line many states which would he unwilling to agree to any
position which justified aerial reconnaissance over their own countries.
It seems unlikely that the Cubans could get the necessary two-thirds
of the General Assembly or a majority of the Security Council to support
them (in the latter case, of course, we would veto). In fact, we
believe that the Cubans, and the Soviets, would not expect an initiative
in the UN to end the overflights, and probably not even to garner enough
votes to be useful propaganda against the US action.
Action by the ICJ:
Cuba has not agreed, and is not likely to agree, to compulsory
adjudication by the International Court. If she did, there are a
number of counter-suits which the US could initiate (expropriations
of US properties, etc.). However, while the Cubans could not be
sure of winning their case on the overflights, we could be even
less sure of winning. Our defense would be the OAS Resolution of
October 23, but if Cuba announced its complete severance from the
OAS (which it has not yet done), it is doubtful that we would win.
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On balance, we think it unlikely that Cuba would submit its
case to the ICJ, but if they did and we conceded jurisdiction to
the Court, we could be in trouble.
Ccunterpra-,surpa:
The Soviets could initiate pressures elsewhere. In particular,
they could attempt to gain support from our European Allies by making
an end of reconnaissance over Cuba the price for warding off a new
Berlin crisis. There are certain precedents for the Soviet policy of
counterpressures, which would be more likely in a situation where the
Soviets could better control the degree of tension than they could,
for example, when there was a real crisis over Cuba. Nonetheless, it
would appear unlikely that the Soviets would expect, or would succeed
in rallying, much support in the West for a sellout on Cuban reconnaissance
in exchange for relaxation of artificially generated tensions elsewhere.
Inducements
If the Soviets and Cubans are sufficiently desirous of ending
the overflights, they might approach us privately with an offer of
some expendable quid ore 2UQ. In particular, if they should decide
that the continued presence of Soviet military personnel was not
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essential, they could offer the complete withdrawal of such
'Personnel in exchange for an end of the overflights. They would,
of course, have to consider that if the US refused, they would
have tipped their hand on the negotiability of the continued Soviet
military presence. Nonetheless, if they are sufficiently concerned,
and do not believe they can force their way, they may attempt to
buy it.
Presumably, our response would be insistence that the overflights
continue until there was also active on-ground inspection, and that
Soviet offers to withdraw their military only reflected growing
awareness of the untenability of their position in having military
men in Cuba in the first place.
Bw gaJ nin,q
The Cubans could announce with much fanfare their readiness to
accept ground inspection if aerial surveillance were ceased and if
ground inspection were made of places which they believed were being
used to mount offensive action against Cuba: the Bahamas, Florida,
erto Rico, and perhaps others. If this approach followed protests
by Cuba or in the UN, it might persuade some that the Cubans had a
reasonable solution as well as a justified complaint.
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The US defense would be acceptance in principle of the
encouraging Cuban indication of readiness to substitute effective
ground inspection for aerial coverage, but reje:tion of any tie-in
of the extraneous matter of alleged support for offensive actions
against Cuba, and noting (in backgrounding) US clamp-down on Cuban
exile activists. The OAS members would probably hold firm with us,
but some might be willing to entertain the Cuban offer nlus inspection
against subversive training and export by Castro. All in all, the
Cubans would be less likely now than in November to stir un rm_tch
support for their position, and would probably not effectively
create an impression of reasonableness sufficient to provide political
justification for unilateral action to stop the overflights.
Sauce fqr the Goose:
The Cubans could tacitly embrace our on concept for justification,
and turn it against us. They could announce that they were mounting
aerial reconnaissance over some area where offensive forces had
previously been mounted against them. Conceivably, they could carry
reciprocal action to the point of announcing in advance their n]ans
to overfly Dade County or Puerto Rico, but recognizing the greater
risk in this initiative it seems more likely that they would pick
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Nicaragua, Guatemala, or the Dominican Republic for HIG-17 or B-26
overflight. They would probably announce their intention in advance
in order to undercut our use of uresumptive bombing attack as iustif ication
for immediate interception. If the United States undertook or supported
the interdiction of Cuban reconnaissance flights, the Cubans would have
a much stronger basis for an appea.1 to the UN cmmnlaining over Yankee
attempts to apply a double standard. If we did not interfere, there
would be substantial repercussions outside of Cuba and some nrflssures
to agree to mutual cessation of reconnaissance overflights. Again
in this case, the chief US defense would be the OAS Resolution of
October 23.
Conclusions:.
This quick survey of possible Communist initiatives to end US
aerial surveillance of Cuba is not exhaustive, but includes the
half-dozen most feasible courses they might consider. None of them
appears so sure of success as to be immediately attractive, but such
decision is also a product of the intensity of their desire to end the
overflights, which it is difficult to measure.
The possible courses of action are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The Communists could concert a carrot and stick combination
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=D
of UN action and pressures, for ex_amnle. They could tr,r several
courses in turn. A counterpressure on our access to Berlin would
pose greatest danger of direct confrontation with the USSR and
Would be the course most involving pressures on our I iTO Allies.
Attached is an illustrti.ve scenario, couched in terms of a
memorandum to Khrushchev from his "staff," outlining one way in
which the Soviets might combine some of the Possible options described
above.
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ME?DRANDUM FOR COMRADE KHRUSHCH EV
SUBJECT: Considerations Involved in Fliminatinn US Reconnaissance
Over Cuba
1. F,roblem.
To evaluate the considerations involved in a sugtrested
course of action which seeks to eliminate US reconnaissance flights
over Cuba.
2. Background.
a. When our miscalculations of US reaction to our emplace-
ment of missiles in Cuba led to a critical confrontation in October 1962,
common sense and ideological doctrine dictated immediate tactical retreat.
Your decision to remove the missiles and aircraft from Cuba, tocether with
the promise that adequate verification of removal and safeguards against
re-entry would be provided, defused the critical aspect of the situation.
Subsequently, it was necessary, as the talks of Comrade Mikoyan with Castro
proceeded, to restore our image and win Fidel's reluctant acceptance of
our unilateral decisions, by agreeing that we would not insist on on-site
or in-port inspections. The only way in which this could be accomplished
was to work out, tacitly, with the capitalists in Washington, an arrange-
ment whereby we took no further action on US reconnaissance flights
and the US did not press, through force, its demand for on-site
inspection.
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b. This arrangement solved our immediate tactical problem.
=sow, however, the question arises whether the time has come to seek to
eliminate the US surveillance flights which continue to exacerbate our
relations with Fidel and which set P. dangerous precedent by creating
the impression before the world that capit&list nations have the right
to protect themselves by conducting; espionage operations through
socialist skies.
3. onsideratons.