STANDING GROUP AGENDA 28 MAY MTG

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Approved For R e l e 2,0 03/17 CIA-RD 8 01676R002400050008-5 SIA-N?ING 01t UP AGENDA 28 May Mtg.: "Cuba sugar paper of Department of Agriculture. Cuba After Castro" Possible Courses of Action in Cuba. Related papers: 1. Cuban attacks Reconnaimaxn Wi4..s.... Conting ency Plan NSC review(s) completed. State Department review completed I On file DOC & USDA release instructions apply Approved For Release 20'06/03/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC Standing Group Members This memorandum, provided for your information, was prepared as a result of the 30 April Standing Group Meeting in which CIA was asked to develop a list of possible actions which might be undertaken against Cuba. The first attachment is a list of possible additional actions against Cuba. They are listed without regard to present policy limitations. As indicated in the remarks, CIA does not favor all of the actions listed. The second attachment contains a list of possible additional actions which have been considered in the past but which CIA does not favor for the reasons noted in the remarks. i.rector f Central Intelligence Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/0 MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC Standing Group Members The attached memorandum was prepared by CIA following the 30 April Standing Group Meeting in which CIA was asked to report on the Cuban oil situation. (L)ir ectY of Central Intelligence Approved For ReleaseJ20f6/03/17 : CIA-RDPgOB01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 20a 6/03/17 : CIA-RDP80 01676R002400050008-5 SECRET CUBAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED P TROLEUM S 1. Cuba's total supply of petroleum, crude and refined., for 1962 was a total of 93,000 barrels per day (bpd). This was supplied by the Soviet Bloc, principally the Soviet Union. A. The above 93,000 (bpd) breaks down to a daily average of 77,000 (bpd) of crude which when refined by the three Cuban refineries (formerly Esso, Shell and Texaco) produced 70,000 bpd finished products, which at USSR crude conversion rates produces 28% gasoline, 27% gas oil and kerosene, and 45% fuel oil, or 19,600 bpd gasoline (about 58 octane), 18,900 bpd gas oil and kerosene, and 31,500 bpd fuel oil. B. The remaining 16,000 bpd are of refined products. The May 1963 planned delivery is a good example of an average month: Delivery - May 1963 Tons A 98 High Octane Auto gas 10,000 A 83 Medium Octane Auto gas 11,000 T 1 Jet fuel 5,7500 MS 20 Aviation Oil 1,300 Vapor (industrial oil) 1,200 Machine oil (slow machinery) 3,000 Spindle oil 1,800 Kerosene and gas oil 16,000 Fuel oil 23,200 TONS FOR MAY 73,000 Approved For Release 2006/03/I IA-RDP80B01676R0024000500C Approved For Releas 2006/03/17 : CIA-R P80BO1676R002400050008-5 "r )U.RET 2. The consumption of petroleum products in Cuba in 1959 (the last year of U.B. corporation records) was between 58,000 and 60,000 bpd. Why Cuba is now consuming 86,000 bpd of finished and refined petroleum products is a confusing question both to those working on Cuba petroleum consumption statistics and also to the U.B. petroleum industry. 3. Despite the increase in Cuba's supply of petroleum products over 1959 consumption, our effort to account for the increased consumption or locate new storage areas has been unsuccessful. Aerial photographs disclose only slight increase in above ground storage facilities since 1959. The largest expansion is three new crude storage tanks at the Texaco refinery in Santiago consisting of about 60,000 barrels each and four crude storage tanks at the Esso refinery in Havana of also about 60,000 barrels each. 4. Present storage facilities in Cuba, using a consumption rate of 60,000 bpd, would store a sufficient quantity to supply: (a) gasoline for at least six months; (b) fuel oil for at least six months; and (c) gas oil and kerosene for at least 41 months. 5. The only petroleum products the Bloc probably cannot supply Cuba, without reducing their own needs, are Bright and additives for lubricating oil. These Cuba has been trying desperately to obtain from the West. Approved For Release' 6/03I1'I: GIA RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release - P80B01676R002400050008-5 Executive Registzyl T I ~ I MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Cuban Supply and Demand of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products 1. This memorandum is in response to your request for information on the above subject and is for your use at the next meeting of the Standing Group. 2. The attached paper has been coordinated with DDI/ORR. Sufficient copies are provided should you desire to distribute the attachment to members of the Standing Group. Ric ar He ms Deputy Director (Plans) Approved For Relo -RDP80B0I671 RgQ 00$0008-5 a 1!!icatinn SEE.ET Approved For Release 2006138Y4W : C1A1RDP%0f W676R002400050008-5 F777 I TS #185620 C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 13 May 1,63 DRAFT MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Developments in Cuba and Possible US Actions in the Event of Castro's Death* We believe the odds are that upon Castro's death his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control. However, there is a good chance that a power struggle would ensue, and a lesser chance that such a struggle would spread, either into a many-sided conflict or with the Moscow-oriented Communists lined up on one side and those who are essentially Cuban nationalists on the other. In any case * This memorandum is a general analysis of the situation and prospects for US action after Castro's death. We have not sought to work out in detail Latin American, Western European, or other third party reactions in the various contingencies adverted to in our examination of the problem. In paragraph 13 we consider very generally the problem of Soviet reactions. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification S-E-C-R-E-T (EXECUTIVE rSA L~Y rr W 9 r Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : C)A-RDP80B01676R0024000500d-5`% lr-e Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T the loyalties of the military commanders, now committed to Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly influence the outcome. Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive US help in order to win, and probably US military intervention. T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T F- I _i c2 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 T-O-F S-E-C-R-E-T S. CU 3A WITHOUT OASTRO Factors in the Sititi.on 1? The course of events in Cuba after Castro's death would depend upon a wide range of variables and unknowns, which are unlikely to be made manifest until, after the event. Yet we can make some advance assessment of the importance of certain factors. a. The Le.dersh%. Castro's personal predominance has overshadowed the rest of the leadership. The two most prominent and powerful political leaders under Fidel are his brother Raul and Che Guevara. Rau]. is Deputy premier and the designated successor. Furthermore he is Minister of the Armed Forces and Commander in Chief. He has by far the best chance of taking over after his brother's death, but he has a cold and unattractive personality with little of Fidel's appeal to the public. On the other hand, Che Guevara is a more colorful figure, a man of ability and drive, and therefore a likely contender for power, If these two were to cooperate, together with President Dorticos they would have a good chance of consolidating control. Among the old line Communists the position and attitude of Carlos Rafael Rodriquez would be the most important, since he enjoys T-O-P S -rE -C -R-E -T F Approved For Release - 0B01676R0024000S0 0. -5 61,;7 :-a per, Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 T-O-P S-E- F777 2i some respect among the Fidelis{as and has authority among the Moscow-oriented Communists. b. Differenz es within the Regime. The top leadership of the regime seems to live in more harmony than after the Escalante affair in the spring of 3.962 or after the October 1962 crisis. However, we believe that there is still a basic cleavage between the Fidelistas and the Moscow-oriented Com*sunists and that it might widen in situations of stress. c. The A? x+ r and Security Forces. The armed forces and security services have been molded into instruments highly responsive to Fidel himself. After his departure, both the army and the security forces are likely to become more important and more active in politics. Their allegiance in a power struggle would depend to a major extent on the circumstances then current. We have little trustworthy information on the majority of the individual military commanders, but we do know that popular leaders have been moved from post to post, presumably to prevent their attaining too great power.. A sizeable minority of the top military commanders are persuasively reported to be opposed to the present close ties with the USSR; they have been restrained so far by their personal loyalty to Fidel and by the regime's T-O-P S??E-C-R-E-T 25X1 Approved For Release 200 - 676R00240005q S56 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 infcrraant system. A few cormanders would probably lend themselves readily to support of another Moscow-oriented leader; most have demonstrated no political loyalty except to Castro. Thus we would expect dissension within the armed forces in the event of a struggle for power. The loyalty of the commanders rather than the attitude of the troops would probably govern the behavior of the military forces in such a struggle. d. The Cuban Public. The enthusiasm of a sifostantial portion of the population for the changes wrought by the Castro revolution, the departure or imprisonment of many potential T-O-P S-E-- -g- Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 T-O-P S-E- F___ i~_~ leaders of opposition, the general passivity of the remainder of the population, the weaiuiess of the resistance, and the strength of the security organizations all argue against the likelihood of a popular uprising after Castro's death. e. The Soviet Role. Castro's death would deprive the Soviets of the only Communist leader with Charisma in Latin America and at, the some time relieve them of the difficulties of doing business with a spiny independent character. Castro's successor might be far easier for the Soviets to deal with, but is sure to lack Castro's wide emotional appeal. Upon Castro's death the Soviets would move rapidly to the support of Raul Castro or what- ever other friendly contender for power seemed likely to win out. They would be able to offer significant help to their chosen instrument, and such support might be decisive in any struggle for power among the top leadership. f. The US Role. If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the US would be widely charged with complicity, even though it is widely known that Castro has many enemies. US inter- vention would be anticipated by many supporters and by many opponents of the regime. In this state of affairs, not only the nature but also the timing of US actions would have great importance, and US T- 0-P S- _ _ 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 T-O-P S-E-G-R..~?- silence or inaction would also have far-reaching consequences. These will be dealt. with in more detail in the following paragraphs. 51;.s of the C~abccn Reaction to Castro * s Death 4. If the US did not intervene immediately, Raul, Castro or one of the top echelon of Castro'.s follotmrs would probably be able to consolidate a working regime acceptable to the Soviets. However, we believe that there would be a substantial, though less than even chance, of a struggle for power among the top leaders. Such a struggle for parser might be resolved by the emergence of a single leader, but there is a chance that the conflict would ultimately take on the characteristics of a civil war. a. Initial. Period of 82 Lida- it. We believe that the most probable development after Castro' s death would be a rallying of a regime around the designated successor, Raul Castro. The opposition would take heart, but would wait for a move from the US and the Latin American opponents of the Castro regime before ccMitting itself to more than token efforts. After an initial period of consolidation and solidarity the new leaders might go on to Ep.L to ?ir position vim'. \ :Jtillizh yu / j LI,-~11 end control. On the other hand? it is equally likely that a _x. Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 T-O-P S?-I!-C-R-E- I struggle for pave-r wi3J. develop. 'D-"ring this early phase we believe that pressoxe from the US would be more likely to inorease the solidarity of the refine them promote a power struggle. b. l ;E o PrArcx. If some individual or group decided to contest R .,,tis leiwdershtp, the auteme would depend upon a number of factors, the most important of which would probably be i;+hether Raul had gained or alienated the loyalty of the armed forces. It is possible that, as in the U TRO the struggle for power could be confined to the inner circles and that a single figure would eventually gain control. In Cuba, however, such a struggle would be likely to break into the open, throwing up see,*eral arYbitious contenders for place and power. c. Widened (onfliet. It Is also possible that a struggle for power would not ead, after the strongest of the in- dividusl leaders had asserted himself but that alliances wouul.d be formed and lines be drawn between the Pidelistas on the one hand and the Moscow-oriented Communists on the other. Such a split could extend into the Army and security forces and develop Into s+oanething like a civil war. Perhaps even more likely than a two sided civil war would be a conflict in which many groups - 6- T-O-P S-E- -R- - 25X1 F_ I Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 T-O-P S-F'- emergedd, all, striving for dninsnce, forming alliances and breaking off into new splinter groups and factions. In such a situation the ewrrgence of a non-Communist Pidelista group, claiming to be the rightful heirs of the original revolution, would be a possibility, but unlikely without US support. d. Ultimate Resolution. Whatever the outcome of an upheaval, like that described above, certain elements in the present situation seem certain to survive. The social and economic changes brought about by Castro's revolution are unlikely to be reversed, whether or not Castro's ultimate successor be a Ccamunist. Cuba is likely to be a socialist state and probably to require for scene time an authoritarian government. 'Whoever the leader of Cuba is, he will probably be critically dependent upon the support of armed forces. II . US CC))R.Sk S OF ACTION 5? No Specir ll. US Initiatives. Tice posture of the US in the immediate aftermath of Castro's death viii be of critical importance. If the US took no position and no action after Castrots death the new regime would move rapidly to consolidate -7- T-O- Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 T-O-P S-E-" -'' - its hold and the likelihood of an (anti-Communist force emerging would be greatly reduced. If such an anti-Coaanzunist group did emerge without the encourement or intervention of the US its position might be less vulnerable to charges of being the creature of the US. We think it much more likely, however, that any anti-C i st group that emerged in Cuba would need and might openly seek assurances and :Eelp from the US. The most likely circumstances for such an .aped, would be those in which a nationalist group was openly in conflict with a Communist- directed and supported group. 6. US Support for the "True: Heirs" of the 26th of gLi~ P Crrement. The emergence of an effective anti-C ast force in Cuba will depend primarily on Cuban initiative and would probably require the defection of important elements of the existing regime. With proper timing, however., US encouragement might stimulate such a development. Once the internal political forces in Cuba have pro- duced a split between the nationalists and the Moscow-oriented Ccm=mists US initiatives would be of utmost importance. At the right moment they might produce a merging of nationalists within the regime and those in opposition. This seems to us the combina- tion most likely to upset the forces seeking a Ca monist succession. -8- T-O-P Is_ Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : GIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 r_ _,_ If US offers are to have an appeal to such a coalition they must make clear the willingness of the US to cooperate with former members and supporters of the Castro regime whose aim is to achieve Cuba's independence of the Soviets and the Communist Bloc. It will also be necessary for the US to make a convincing assertion of its readiness to accept most of the social and economic changes instituted by the Castro regime. 7. The problem of timing will, of course, be one of great importance. It seems likely that there would be a period during which a public announcement of US willingnness to support a nationalist group would be disadvaxtageous. A too rapid announce- ment might serve to consolidate resistance to these people; a too long delay could cause them to despair. Meawwrhile, it woald be essential to transmit an offer of support clandestinely to the right people at the earliest possible moment. One problem will be the relative timing of a US announcement and of activities designed to preposition forces in anticipation of fulfilling promises. It will be extremely difficult to move any US forces without publicity by the US press, but such prepositioning as can be carried out inconspicuously probably ought to take place as soon as a general course of action has been decided upon. A public statement of -9- T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-?T Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 US intentions should probably be made before military preparations directed toward Cuba become widely known. 8. Once a nationalist group had emerged and entered into conflict with the Moscow-oriented Communists, the assistance which it would require from the US would depend largely on circumstances. It might be that arms and ammunition delivered rapidly and in such a way as to ensure its victory would be the only aid called for. It is possible that such a group would ask for US air support and perhaps for US ground forces as well in the early stages of conflict; sooner or later it would almost certainly require such support. In a later stage if a US supported nationalist group had won dominance, the US would face a new set of problems. Almost any such group would be likely to insist that no political or social changes made under Castro be reversed except at its own initiative. Compensation for expropriated US property might be agreed to, but not at a realistic figure. The US would almost certainly be obliged to undertake an aid program at least the rough equal of the present Soviet program. 9. Action Through a Goverrment in Exile. It is highly unlikely that any Cuban exile group could effectively influence the course of events in Cuba after Castro's death, with or without US support. Furthermore, the association of exiles with US T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2906103111 9 - 1676R002400050008-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 T-O-P -+- initiatives would probably reduce their chances of success. It is possible that certain groups in Cuba would prefer to deal with the US through a Cuban government in exile, but we think it unlikely. 10. Quarantine and Blockade. If in consonance with various policy pronouncements the US were to quarantine Soviet attempts to reinforce its military and technical personnel in Cuba and to introduce additional armaments, the US-oriented revolutionaries would probably be enspirited. If on the other hand the US declared a blockade the reactions in Cuba would be mixed: our friends would be greatly heartened to realize that the US had indicated its willingness to bring down the Communist regime in Cuba, even at the risk of war with the Soviet Union. The regime would be apprehensive. Unless the blockade were swiftly challenged by the Soviets and the focus of the confrontation drastically shifted, the chances of the fall of the successor Cuban regime would rise. 11. Invasion. If the US declared its readiness to support the Cuban nationalists and true heirs of the Castro revolution and if such a group emerged, the chances are at least even that it would require the intervention of US forces before it could Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 gain control of the island. Of the various guises under which invasion might be undertaken the least palatable and probably the least effective would be that of a Cuban exile force. An undisguised US invasion would cause political problems inside and outside Cuba, but we do not believe that they would be unacceptable to the Cu' p-iti-Communist movement. Much would depenu, of course, on the authenticity of the Cuban movement. 12. Joint Action by Hemisphere States. Joint OAS action would be unlikely to have any great appeal to Cubans, even the Cuban nationalists. However, steps to bring the OAS in some way or another into any action contemplated by the US might help avoid many diplomatic problems in Latin America and elsewhere. 13. Soviet Reaction. Castro's departure from the scene would not lessen the Soviet concern to preserve the Communist base in Cuba. They would certainly try to influence the situation, particularly if a power struggle developed. For a time they ould operate behind the scenes and publicly would not have to go beyond reaffirmation of their vague commitments to protect a Communist Cuba. Once the struggle reached open Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 conflict, or if the u3 took strong action against the new regime, the USSR would have no choice. They would have to decide how far to go in support of a Communist faction. What they would do outside Cuba is beyond the scope of this paper, but within Cuba we believe the Soviets would be cautious about engaging in open conflict. S-E-C-R-E-T I I Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 ,UNCLASSIFIED w,8-Fa'pl'p~}3$~QI[2ppdSttisaily downgraded to SECRET when fir n orm is de ac a rom controlle o e CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT !.DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE 4 CIA CONTROL NO. 7-5, , DOC. NO. "'-""-- DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED DOC. DATE / IfFewe 3 COPY NO. 2_1 "7 LOGGED BY NUMBER OF PAGES 13 NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns. REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELE ASED SEEN BY OFFICE DATE TIME DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV, DATE }ig7/,1 __ /aa 6s 93 NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. DOWNGRADED DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO 'Wamw BY (Signature) TO BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY (Signature) OFFICE App DATE ved For Rel OFFICE ase 2006/03/17 : CIA- DATE DP80B01676 OFFICE 002400050008-5 DATE TOP SECRET FORM 9^60 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET (40) Execul?..-e :e9=5tiy Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80B0 7R0(2 >00650008-5 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 27, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR National Security Council Stancing G ou Attached is a paper which. will be discussed at the Standing Group meeting on May 28, 3:03 ?M. Bromley Smith Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 25 April i963 MEMORANDUM ON CUBAN POLICY (Random thoughts developed by ICI on various as,)ects of the Cuban problem and the discussion at Standing Grcup ore pared for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on tins subie t during his absence from the country. ) 1. Castro's position - I agree with the 0:\;?: estimatte that Castro's political position will improve within the next year (barring assassination). His image among liberals anc insurgent groups in the Western Hemisphere will improve, though this will not be the case with the !--leads of State. Economic hardships and other difficulties, such as insurgency, raids, etc. within Cuba, will complicate his problems bit, on balance, it seems to me Castro's situation has improved since about December and will continue to improve. The Cuban people will become 'resigned" to his presence and will go about their business exi~res~ ng their resentment in apathy rather than in active belligerence. 'i'h.s trend can be slowed and possibly reversed it United States action is taker with determination, continuity and consistency. 2. Economic situation - Undoubtedly, the Castro Government is seriously hurt by US economic actions. These actio-is alone, however, cannot bring Castro down although they will continue to give him trouble and to increase Soviet problems and costs in supporting him. The economic blockade must be kept up and intensified. Great ettort must be exercised to shut off supply of parts tron_ Canada, which is now Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 I flowing in small but very important quantities. Continuing effort must be exercised with all Western European countries. , Moreover, a con- tinuing effort must be exercised with major U. S. corporations, as has been done with International Harvester on tractors from Spain, and with the oil companies in controlling the "bright stock" supply. Trade with Latin America plays a minor role in Cuba's export-import economy, but the Latin American countries should continue their economic boycott which has been effective. The principal and most effective means of "hardening" Castro's economic situation will come through Canada, Western Europe and Japan. Intensified efforts might be effective, but I would expect that the passage of time and the "acceptance" of Castro and his Communist government, the pressures of trade, the seeking of markets, the taking advantage of business opportunities, etc. , will cause a decided weakening of Canadian-European support of our program of economic sanctions. This has been true of other U. S. efforts of this type in the past, such as trade with the Soviet Union, Chinese Communists and others. 3. The sugar market - Castro's problems and the Soviet cost of supporting Castro is offset to a considerable degree by the dramatic increase in the price of sugar. The increase in the last year, when applied to 75% of estimated 1963 production of sugar, about equals the estimated economic aid the Soviets are required to give Cuba in 1963. Therefore, Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Releas zVI 1/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 it might be said that the Free World is supplying the money with which the Soviets are supporting Castro. Careful exploration should be made as to why the ,sugar market has gone up so dramatically (2-3/4~ in 1961 - 6-1/2 to 7~ now). The United States should break the sugar market if possible. This is a sensitive trmrket and is "made" by middlemen and can be manipulated. An upward movement of a cent a pound would decrease the Soviet/Cuban dollar Although there are some indications that the demand for sugar exceeds supply it is hard to believe that this factor in itself is totally responsible, for thepresent price of sugar. 4. To use shipping as a weapon is not very effective. There are lots of idle bottoms and the Soviets can employ them for their non-Cuban trade and use their tankers and dry cargo ships for Cuban trade. While our efforts with the Free World countries should be continued, we should not consider this as a very important and effective means of hurting Castro. In fact, to the extent that non-Bloc ships could be conveyors of agents and various sabotage devices, their occasional transit into Cuba might be an advantage rather than a disadvantage from our standpoint. NOTE: In summary, actions against Castro's economy should be continued and hardened and might make things more difficult for him. But these will not bring him down. Furthermore, it will become in- creasingly difficult to secure Free World cooperation as the world public gets used to Castro. Approved For Release 7 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 V to ET Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 5. The Soviet presence in Cuba continues. There has been no appreciable exodus in recent weeks; there are no large passenger ships enroute to Cuba now. Indications are that Khrushchev has met his commitment of removing "several thousand Soviets", and may have called a. halt to the exodus. It may be resumed as Cubans become proficient in handling the equipment. Castro apparently expects this, to judge from his statements to Donovan. I really have no assurance this will take place and we should not be deterred from any actions of any kind necessary to slow down Ca-qtra's growth or to overthrow him on grounds that this would cause a Kremlin decision not to remove its troops. 6. The Soviet threat. Finally, the presence of the several thousand Soviets in Cuba does not pose a threat to this country. The Soviets would probably not engage themselves in any internal situation within Cuba. Nevertheless, there is no reasonable explanation for the presence of so many Soviets or for the retention in Cuba of a variety of very sophisticated military equipment, most important of which are the SAM sites. One can. only conclude that the SAMs are there to be used at the Soviets' will _ in depriving the United States of aerial surveillance and our source of knowle of what is gdng on in Cuba. The SAMs are not useful in the defense of Cuba. They can be destroyed quickly by low-level attack. Therefore, they are there for some other purpose and this is not adequately explained, in my opinion, by "Khrushchev's pride or lose of face or the -4- Approved For Release 2006/03/17 CIA-RDpa0B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 20 /03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Khrushchev/ Castro relationship" and other such explanations. As long as the SAMs are there, there is always the possibility they will be used, or we will be threatened with their use, and this will be done at a time when they are willing to take the risk of another confrontation with the United States. I therefore feel that we must not, under any circutnsstance, dismiss the possibility of a second confrontation of a type encountered last October. I have the same feeling about the presence of the SAMs in Cuba now as I did last Fall. In our thinking andrplanning concerning Cuba, we must not lose sight of the fact, however remote, that the Soviets can reintroduce missiles in Cuba, accept the risk of confrontation, and confront us with the prospect of war (which would present a difficult decision to us) or negotiations at higher price than was Khrushchev's original objective. If the situation were reversed, there would be pressure in this country from certain "extremists" to take such a risk of confrontation and I feel that rushchev might very well be under exactly the same pressure. For this reason this possibility must not be discounted and all measures of protection against this surprise must be taken. 7. From the above it seems to me that a high priority should be attached to developing measures directed toward removal of Approved For Release 2006/0311' : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 .Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B0l676R002400050008-5 Soviet troops and larger items of equipment from Cuba. All possible diplomatic maneuvers should be. made. If an opportunity for a "trade" on reasonably favorable terms devol,ops, this should be explored, harrassment of installations encouraged, and feints or, for that matter commando raids to steal Soviet KOMAR vessels or SAM missiles, should be considered. Warnings of this posai-, bility might be one means of suggesting to the Soviets that some of their senpitive scientific equipment is exposed and hence they might consider 25X6 DOS, also 25X1 removing it. CIA -RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 20^3S DOS, also 25X1 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 10. The most extreme measures which would be directed against the population are feasible, but I am against them on humane and moral grounds. They would be attributable to the United States. They would stand-as a black mark on our record for all time. They would cause untold hardship to thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals who are Approved For Release 2006/03/,17.: CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 200 CIA-RDP80BOl676R002400050008-5 4 not re:ipo}tsible ,for Castro and can do nothing about him, and they would not necessarily answer the "Castro-Communist problem". It seems to me that if the problem is, so serious that we must resort these measures, then we should face up to a direct confrontation, Bringing Castro down: Measures discussed above will create for Castro and his regime great hardship but as mentioned will xiot being -hi zia down. However, they will cause distress and dissension within his organization and will tend to destroy its monolithic feature This would present the opportunity of splitting his regimb at the top and catalyzing a revolt on the part of all, or a substantial eegment pf, his military. The result could be a military take-aver typical of Latin America, the establishment of a military dictatorship friendly to the United States and to the Western Hemisphere nations, unfriendly to the Soviets and it would be non-Communist. If successful, the military regime could then force the with4,rawal of Soviet military personnel and a great deal of equipn ent. It could solve this problem but would present us with serious problems of economic aid, sugar quotas, resolving the problem of confis#cated property and all the rest. A combination of economic sanctions and harras ament on the one hand, and a Approved For Release 2006/031 7 :,.CIIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006103/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 successful effort to disenchant his military leadership and cause a revolt and military takeover on the other seems to be the only course open to bring Castro-Communism d. and remove the Soviet threat. The prospect of an effective uprising of the people against Castro _seemp remote if he retains control of his military and security forces., Small uprisings would be suppressed as they are now. Large uprisings would probably result in a blood bath. Therefore, I conclude we must split Castro's military organi- z4tiou to insure the success of a revolt against him.' U. Splitting Castro from Moscow -- This might be done. Perhaps Cas'tra'a proclamation8 and embrace of Communism is really a recent development. He is nown to have been a radical, a liberal, a revolutionary, but not shard-core Communist. Be disclaims being such at the present time but he has embraced Con-Am=. lam ppbliely. He claims he is not a satellite, that he is independent, that he will 4lspoie of the Soviets at his convenience, and that he seeks a rapprochement w h the United States. Whether this should be done or could be done remains' obscure. It is not in the American tradition ever to trust a man who has been adeceitful, ambitious, apEi an avowed enemy. On the other hand, Commulists have changed their Stripes, e. g. , Chiang Kai-shek and Betancourt; and dictators have changed their orientation, e. g. Nasser. All of the problems of sugar quotas, aid- etc., would immediately arise under this plan and would be far less acceptable to the American people and to the Congress than would be the case if Castro were disposed of. Nevertheless consideration should be given to a highly Approved For Release 20 CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006LQ$%iJit' 4-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 compartmented; carefully planned and managed program to defect Castro from Moscow. An existing channel might, be used for this purpose and this effort might be made concurrently with all other 13. Relations with the people of Cuba. Constructive, dynamic and positive programs must be developed and implemented to breathe hope into the Cuban people. This is not for the purpose of creating an.uprtefhg among the people for it appears to me that as long as Castro controls the military and the internal security forces, a popular uprising that assumed serious momentum might result in a blood bath. The program should be designed to let the people of Cuba know that they have a future and that the United States is determined to provide that future for them. There are many ways of developing such a program and many convincing thoughts which can be projected to the Cuban people by various means of transmission. All of this is essential to the success of any long range dynamic United States program for the removal of Castro and Communism Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 A'61tlts.1.0Eld.IAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE@J~CRETARY OR%Ap roved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 ?WALIINGTCM 21, to C. 3: DEPARTMENT OF STATE a7 27, 1953 roll The Honorable John A. McCone Director, Central Intelligence Agency 1'S' to House tan requ*ete4 the Stat* to distribute the actached ran- t o rh t er of t" 1 SC Standin-4 Grot:D na?e r to the may 23 =sting. : utive crztary .ttact - y No. g May 27~amc~r*ndum on Possible fiat Initiatives to Bad US Aerial --rnaissanoe Over Cuba ?P SFGI AT 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 TOP SECRET - -ty 27, 1963 A RANDUM FOR THE NSC STANDING GROUP SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Initiatives to End US Aerial Reconnaissance Over Cuba I~r,_blem: To evaluate considerations involved and the various options available to the USSR and Cuba in seeking to end US aerial reconnaissance over Cuba. Dt9cussion: The Soviet Union, and still more Castro's Cuba, wish the cessation of US overflights of Cuba. The issue at present is only in the background, and the Communists evidently do not feel it is desirable to raise their objection prominently until they think there is something they can do about it. They evidently recognize that the shooting down of a reconnaissance plane would probably provoke active countermeasures to which they could not effectively respond, and moreover not end the surveillance. Assuming that they continue to believe that they cannot with impunity use direct action to end the overflights, they may nonetheless turn to other measures in an effort to compel us to stop further reconnaissance. Moreover, they GROUP 2 Exem by fowngrading TOP SFCRETj 25X1 ; 25X 25X! T Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 TOP SECRET may believe that some such other measures may, even if unsuccessful in themselves, create a better foundation-for shooting down a.olane later. A-1ternativg Cour 3z of Act on: There appear to be six possible lines of political action open to the Communists in attempting to get us to call off the aerial reconnaissance of Cuba; (1) Cuba could protest in the United Nations General Assembly and/or Security Council, calling for condemnation of the US action and for a cessation of the flights. (2) Cuba could bring action before the International Court of Justice, or seek UN action requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ, calling for cessation of the flights. (3) The Soviets could initiate pressures elsewhere-such as Berlin, privately or publicly tying the new pressure to the continuing overflight of Cuba, and offering to relax the new point of tension in exchange for cessation of aerial reconnaissance of Cuba. (4) The Soviets could privately offer to withdraw all Soviet military personnel from Cuba in exchange for quiet dropping of aerial surveillance by the US. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 25X1 F 25X' r Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 'rop SECRET - I (5) The Cubans could publicly propose a trade-off mowing ground inspection in exchange for an end to aerial inspection, but we are sure they would not do this unless they also added in demands for ground inspection in Florida or elsewhere in the Caribbean. (6) The Cubans could, with discrete Soviet assistance, initiate aerial reconnaissance of some other area in the Caribbean--say, Guatemala or Nicara.gun--on tha 5.oounds that offensive military action was being prepared in those countries (as it had been before tre Bay of Pigs attack), justifying and requiring Cuba to undertake this peaceful aerial inspection. Then, the Cubans could offer to call off their surveillance if we call off ours. Action in the United Nations: A Cuban protest in the United Nations, vigorously supported by the other Communist powers, would open up an issue which most people have forgotten. They would r- o':,ibly gain some support for the idea that indefinite aerial overflight and reconnaissance was an undue infringement of sovereignity a~nd should he stopped. The US defense would rest on two bases: The OAS Pe-solution of October 23 authorizing such action, and the d3 facto rs,-olu':.ior. of the October crisis in which with forbearance the US settled fo: unobtrusive aerial reconnaissance r" op S'-11172 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 "lop ^ECRS"-' instead of insisting on ground inspection. Therefore, it would not be necessary to rest our case on a general right to reconnaissance. and this should hold in line many states which would he unwilling to agree to any position which justified aerial reconnaissance over their own countries. It seems unlikely that the Cubans could get the necessary two-thirds of the General Assembly or a majority of the Security Council to support them (in the latter case, of course, we would veto). In fact, we believe that the Cubans, and the Soviets, would not expect an initiative in the UN to end the overflights, and probably not even to garner enough votes to be useful propaganda against the US action. Action by the ICJ: Cuba has not agreed, and is not likely to agree, to compulsory adjudication by the International Court. If she did, there are a number of counter-suits which the US could initiate (expropriations of US properties, etc.). However, while the Cubans could not be sure of winning their case on the overflights, we could be even less sure of winning. Our defense would be the OAS Resolution of October 23, but if Cuba announced its complete severance from the OAS (which it has not yet done), it is doubtful that we would win. TOP SECRET - 25X10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 TOP SECRET - On balance, we think it unlikely that Cuba would submit its case to the ICJ, but if they did and we conceded jurisdiction to the Court, we could be in trouble. Ccunterpra-,surpa: The Soviets could initiate pressures elsewhere. In particular, they could attempt to gain support from our European Allies by making an end of reconnaissance over Cuba the price for warding off a new Berlin crisis. There are certain precedents for the Soviet policy of counterpressures, which would be more likely in a situation where the Soviets could better control the degree of tension than they could, for example, when there was a real crisis over Cuba. Nonetheless, it would appear unlikely that the Soviets would expect, or would succeed in rallying, much support in the West for a sellout on Cuban reconnaissance in exchange for relaxation of artificially generated tensions elsewhere. Inducements If the Soviets and Cubans are sufficiently desirous of ending the overflights, they might approach us privately with an offer of some expendable quid ore 2UQ. In particular, if they should decide that the continued presence of Soviet military personnel was not TOP SECRET 25X1 I 25X: Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 TOP SECRET essential, they could offer the complete withdrawal of such 'Personnel in exchange for an end of the overflights. They would, of course, have to consider that if the US refused, they would have tipped their hand on the negotiability of the continued Soviet military presence. Nonetheless, if they are sufficiently concerned, and do not believe they can force their way, they may attempt to buy it. Presumably, our response would be insistence that the overflights continue until there was also active on-ground inspection, and that Soviet offers to withdraw their military only reflected growing awareness of the untenability of their position in having military men in Cuba in the first place. Bw gaJ nin,q The Cubans could announce with much fanfare their readiness to accept ground inspection if aerial surveillance were ceased and if ground inspection were made of places which they believed were being used to mount offensive action against Cuba: the Bahamas, Florida, erto Rico, and perhaps others. If this approach followed protests by Cuba or in the UN, it might persuade some that the Cubans had a reasonable solution as well as a justified complaint. TOP SECRET -l 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 TOP SECRET The US defense would be acceptance in principle of the encouraging Cuban indication of readiness to substitute effective ground inspection for aerial coverage, but reje:tion of any tie-in of the extraneous matter of alleged support for offensive actions against Cuba, and noting (in backgrounding) US clamp-down on Cuban exile activists. The OAS members would probably hold firm with us, but some might be willing to entertain the Cuban offer nlus inspection against subversive training and export by Castro. All in all, the Cubans would be less likely now than in November to stir un rm_tch support for their position, and would probably not effectively create an impression of reasonableness sufficient to provide political justification for unilateral action to stop the overflights. Sauce fqr the Goose: The Cubans could tacitly embrace our on concept for justification, and turn it against us. They could announce that they were mounting aerial reconnaissance over some area where offensive forces had previously been mounted against them. Conceivably, they could carry reciprocal action to the point of announcing in advance their n]ans to overfly Dade County or Puerto Rico, but recognizing the greater risk in this initiative it seems more likely that they would pick TOP SECRE'T' - 25X1 25XU- Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 TOP SECRFT - Nicaragua, Guatemala, or the Dominican Republic for HIG-17 or B-26 overflight. They would probably announce their intention in advance in order to undercut our use of uresumptive bombing attack as iustif ication for immediate interception. If the United States undertook or supported the interdiction of Cuban reconnaissance flights, the Cubans would have a much stronger basis for an appea.1 to the UN cmmnlaining over Yankee attempts to apply a double standard. If we did not interfere, there would be substantial repercussions outside of Cuba and some nrflssures to agree to mutual cessation of reconnaissance overflights. Again in this case, the chief US defense would be the OAS Resolution of October 23. Conclusions:. This quick survey of possible Communist initiatives to end US aerial surveillance of Cuba is not exhaustive, but includes the half-dozen most feasible courses they might consider. None of them appears so sure of success as to be immediately attractive, but such decision is also a product of the intensity of their desire to end the overflights, which it is difficult to measure. The possible courses of action are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The Communists could concert a carrot and stick combination TOP SECRII' 25X1e III Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 R~ y4CRr,1 =D of UN action and pressures, for ex_amnle. They could tr,r several courses in turn. A counterpressure on our access to Berlin would pose greatest danger of direct confrontation with the USSR and Would be the course most involving pressures on our I iTO Allies. Attached is an illustrti.ve scenario, couched in terms of a memorandum to Khrushchev from his "staff," outlining one way in which the Soviets might combine some of the Possible options described above. I IOP SECRET 25X1 I 25XI Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050008-5 T Or SFCRTE7 ME?DRANDUM FOR COMRADE KHRUSHCH EV SUBJECT: Considerations Involved in Fliminatinn US Reconnaissance Over Cuba 1. F,roblem. To evaluate the considerations involved in a sugtrested course of action which seeks to eliminate US reconnaissance flights over Cuba. 2. Background. a. When our miscalculations of US reaction to our emplace- ment of missiles in Cuba led to a critical confrontation in October 1962, common sense and ideological doctrine dictated immediate tactical retreat. Your decision to remove the missiles and aircraft from Cuba, tocether with the promise that adequate verification of removal and safeguards against re-entry would be provided, defused the critical aspect of the situation. Subsequently, it was necessary, as the talks of Comrade Mikoyan with Castro proceeded, to restore our image and win Fidel's reluctant acceptance of our unilateral decisions, by agreeing that we would not insist on on-site or in-port inspections. The only way in which this could be accomplished was to work out, tacitly, with the capitalists in Washington, an arrange- ment whereby we took no further action on US reconnaissance flights and the US did not press, through force, its demand for on-site inspection. Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : - 01676R002400050008-5 25X1! 25X1., Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050008-5 TOF SECR T - b. This arrangement solved our immediate tactical problem. =sow, however, the question arises whether the time has come to seek to eliminate the US surveillance flights which continue to exacerbate our relations with Fidel and which set P. dangerous precedent by creating the impression before the world that capit&list nations have the right to protect themselves by conducting; espionage operations through socialist skies. 3. onsideratons.