U.N. JUDGMENT DAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002500020007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: PAPER

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U.N. Judgment Day
by
ALICE WIDENER
American Coalition
AN ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATE THE EFFORTS OF PATRIOTIC, Civic
AND FRATERNAL, SOCIETIES TO KEEP AMERICA AMERICAN
1025 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
Washington 6, D. C.
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U.N. JUDGMENT DAY
by
ALICE WIDENER
There was great surprise and indignation in the United States
when the Administrative Tribunal, final legal authority of the United
Nations, declared on September 1, 1953, that the dismissal of eleven
American employees of the U.N. Secretariat had been "illegal." Under
questioning by a Federal Grand Jury and a Senate subcommittee
about Communist affiliations, subversive activities and/or espionage,
the eleven Americans had taken refuge in the Fifth Amendment.
But the fact is that owing to legal and political maneuverings about
which the American people apparently were kept in ignorance and
deceived, the Tribunal could scarcely have acted otherwise. For a
study of the record seems to make it evident that the now famous
case of the so-called "Red Eleven"-as it is described in the press-
was lost by the U.N. Secretary General and the U.N. Legal Depart-
ment well in advance of the open hearings held before the Tribunal
in July.
The actual date of this loss, it seems, can be traced back to the
end of 1952 when Secretary General Trygve Lie, presumably sur-
rendering to behind-the-scenes political pressure, began to renege on
his public announcement of December 5th that he would abide by the
legal findings of an internationally eminent Commission of jurists,
and thus bar from present and future employment in the United
Nations any American national who is disloyal to the United States,
the "host country."
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The urgent need for such an agreement was brought to American
public attention in the fall of 1952, when a New York Federal Grand
Jury and the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary revealed startling evidence of
Communist activities and/or espionage conducted by a group of Amer-
ican employees of the United Nations.
Outraged at this situation, the American people and their Congress
clamored for its rectification. But Secretary General Trygve Lie and
the late U.N. General Counsel Dr. Abraham Feller seemed unable to
determine whether certain provisions of the United Nations Charter
and Staff Regulations, which guarantee privileges, immunities and
rights of tenure for international civil servants in the Secretariat, pre-
clude the dismissal of Americans from U.N. employment on grounds
of disloyalty to their own government. Presumptive evidence of this
disloyalty was recorded in their refusal to answer questions under
oath on the basis of their right to refrain from self-incrimination.
In a quandary, Mr. Lie publicly announced that he would seek
definitive advice concerning the complex U.N. personnel problems from
a Commission of jurists chosen by him from among Member States
Of the United Nations. The three lawyers who served on this Com-
mission were Sir Edwin Herbert, former Director of Censorship in
the United Kingdom, Mr. William D. Mitchell, former United States
Attorney General, and Professor P. Veldekens, Belgian professor of
international law.
Their forty-five page Report-as analyzed by the New York Times
-"boils down" to the conclusions:
The United States, as host to the United Nations, had the right
to insist that no person it considered disloyal or subversive be kept
on the staff in this country. That went for non-Americans as well
as Americans, except for nationals of Soviet bloc countries.
All active members of the Communist Party in the United States
should be dismissed, as well as anybody who had been or was
"likely" to be subversive.
No employee of the United Nations had the right to refuse to
answer questions on the ground of possible self-incrimination ; if
he did, he should be dismissed. Mr. Lie had the right to dismiss
any staff member on the loyalty issue.
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On December 5, 1952, according to U.N. document A/2364, page 9,
Secretary General Lie informed the governments of Member States
that he had made the following statement to the staff concerning the
opinion of the Commission of jurists:
I have carefully studied the opinion they have presented. I have
decided to use the conclusions and reeominendations of this opinion
as the basis of my personnel policy in discharging the responsibilities
entrusted to me by the Charter and Staff Regulations of the United
Nations . . .
It is my earnest hope that on this basis it will be possible for the
United Nations and the host country by mutual efforts to maintain
harmonious relationships on matters affecting the staff of the Secre-
tariat which, in the words of the opinion, `depend mainly upon a
good understanding as to the necessities of the international organi-
zation and its staff on the one hand, and the necessities of the host
country on the other'. [Italics added.]
Not only Mr. Lie but also Assistant Secretary General Byron Price,
an American in charge of U.N. Administrative Services, formally
accepted the principal thesis of the jurists' Report. In document
52-29713, dated December 11, 1952, Mr. Price informed the United
Nations staff : ". . . decisions will be reached in an orderly way on
the principles embodied in the report of the Commission of Jurists."
More important still, U. S. Assistant Secretary of State John D.
Hickerson declared in an official statement issued to the Senate
Internal Security subcommittee:
. . Up to very recently, the Secretary General has not believed
that he could discharge United States nationals on the grounds of
their being disloyal to the United States.
According to the press, the Secretary General has notified
the staff of the Secretariat that he has accepted and will be governed
by the recommendations contained in the jurists' report.
The Department of State believes the report points the way to
a satisfactory solution of the whole problem. [Italics added.]
Thus it may be seen that the American people, the press, and high
officials of the United States Government believed that a "satisfactory
solution" of the U.N.-U.S. personnel problem in the Secretariat was
effected in December 1952 on the basis of the jurists' Report.
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Its acceptance was thereafter incorporated in the preamble to
President Truman's Executive Order 10422 of January 9, 1953,
establishing the procedures, techniques and rules to be followed by the
Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation in security
and loyalty matters concerning U. S. citizens employed by the United
Nations.
And so, when Secretary General Lie and the U.N. Administration
subsequently reneged on acceptance of the jurists' Report, the Ameri-
can people were confronted with a Yalta-like situation in regard to
U.S.-U.N. personnel security agreements. For American faith in Mr.
Lie's word seems to have been betrayed-though apparently nobody
warned the American people of the grave consequences. As a result,
the assurance that the U.N. Administration team would play the game
according to rules set by an internationally acceptable umpire has
proved to be false.
Once again there is a bitter truth concerning an international agree-
ment entered into by the United States that is unknown to most
Americans. This truth is that within four months after announced
acceptance of the Jurists' Report, its main principles were repudiated
by Secretary General Trygve Lie presumably on the advice, or with
the consent or knowledge, of the United Nations Legal Department.
Therefore, the U.N. Administration actually discarded the theory
that our country, as the host nation, can control the employment of
its nationals in the U.N. Secretariat ; and today the United Nations
considers itself entirely free to exercise its own discretion in hiring
and retaining any American employee.
Naturally, these facts had to be taken into account by the U.N.
Administrative Tribunal last July when it heard the appeals from
dismissal of twenty-one 5th Amendment American employees of the
Secretariat. Ten of these had held only temporary or temporary-
indefinite contracts with the U.N., and therefore could be dismissed by
the Secretary General under existing Staff Regulations at his sole
discretion if he deemed their dismissal "in the interest of the United
Nations." But the facts concerning the repudiation of the jurists'
Report weighed heavily in the Tribunal's decision to order reinstate-
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ment of, or indemnification and payment of damages to, the eleven
5th Amendment Americans who had held permanent employment
contracts with the United Nations.
Concerning the Tribunal's decision, the New York Times reported:
Four of the eleven were ordered reinstated with full back salary.
Seven others, who asked for payment in lieu of reinstate-
ment, were awarded sums of $6,000 to $40,000. The payment of
compensation, together with a token legal fee of $300 in each of
the eleven cases, will cost the United Nations at least $135,000.. .
Since the United States' share of the regular United Nations
Administration budget is 35.12%, our country may be in the fan-
tastic position of having to pay more than a third of the total sum
awarded by the Tribunal to Americans about whom there is presump-
tive evidence of disloyalty to the United States.
At this time of-writing, implementation of the Tribunal's order is
on the agenda of the current session of the U.N. General Assembly.
And the whole subject of U.S.-U.N. personnel security agreements
is scheduled for debate by the U.N. Advisory Committee on Adminis-
trative and Budgetary Questions.
The United States Delegation, in presenting its views, would be
wise to heed the opinion of the editors of the New York World
Telegram and The Sun who stated:
. . . since the United Nations headquarters is located in New
York, U.N. employees suspected of espionage activities against the
United States are the legitimate concern of our government.
Satisfactory adjustments must be made between the U.N. and
the United States government if the organization expects to main-
tain its headquarters in this country, and if the United States is
to remain a member of that body.
The United States cannot tolerate a Communist cell in the heart
of its greatest city . . .
Urgently, the American people need to be on the alert during the
debate in the U.N. General Assembly and the Advisory Committee.
The issues involve the sovereignty of the United States, its national
and international security, the defense of its judicial system, and the
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relationship of the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of
Investigation to United States citizens in the employ of the United
Nations.
Whatever is the result of this vital debate, Americans must know
that the main provisions of the jurists' Report lie at the heart of
U.S.-U.N. personnel security matters. Americans must also grasp
the fact that their belief concerning acceptance of the Report was
founded on a delusion imposed on us by Secretary General Lie and
the U.N. Administration. Also, it is necessary to realize that this
delusion appears to have been fostered and heightened by our own
State Department which seems to have misled or misinformed both
ex-President Truman and President Eisenhower who incorporated
the misconception in executive orders issued from the White House.
THE JURISTS' REPORT
The main thesis of the Report issued November 29, 1952 is that
a peculiar relationship exists between the United Nations and the
United States as "the host country." In reply to Secretary General
Lie's five legal questions concerning U.N. staff members of U. S.
nationality, the three lawyers declared that these questions "all arise"
out of the special U.S.-U.N. relationship. A brief illustration of
this is that except for the United States, all Member States of the
United Nations can control their nationals' travel to its headquarters
in New York City through the issuance of passports. But because
the headquarters are where they are, Americans don't need passports
to go there.
For obvious reasons, this circumstance greatly handicaps U. S.
security control, a fact officially recognized by the U.N. Administra-
tion, which informed the State Department, December 23, 1952:
. . . the Secretary General was keenly aware of the serious-
ness of the problem presented by the presence in the Secretariat,
within the borders of the United States, of American citizens which
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their Government felt it had grounds to suspect of subversive
activities.
This would be a serious matter for the United Nations in any
country where its Headquarters chanced to be located. It has
been customary in all countries where personnel is stationed to
seek as much information as possible from the national authorities.
For example, several hundred French nationals were employed
temporarily in Paris during the 1948 and 1951 sessions of the
General Assembly there, and in every case a prior check was made
with the French authorities.
Another principal decision taken by the jurists was based on their
consideration of the Constitution of the host country. They ex-
plained that the 5th Amendment provides that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The
lawyers further expressed the opinion: "If in reliance upon this
privilege a person refuses to answer a question, he is only justified
in doing so if he believes or is advised that in answering he would
become a witness against himself. In other words, there can be no
justification for claiming this privilege unless the person claiming
the privilege believes or is advised that his answer would be evidence
against himself of the commission of some criminal offense." [Italics
added. ]
A third main principle embodied in the Commission of Jurists'
Report is that no termination indemnities need be paid to permanent
or temporary jobholders in the U.N. Secretariat whose dismissal is
based on a charge of breach of duty to the United Nations or a charge
of "serious misconduct."
In disregard of this third principle, however, and in violation of a
U.N. Staff Regulation expressly forbidding payment of termination
indemnities to employees guilty of serious misconduct, Mr. Lie dis-
missed eleven 5th Amendment Americans holding permanent U.N.
contracts (against whom there is presumptive evidence of involvement
in the commission of some criminal offense) but awarded them in-
demnities.
This outrageous award, which the U.N. Legal Department later
described with a straight face as "an act of grace," was made by Mr.
Lie on December 5th, the very same day he publicly accepted the
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Jurists' Report. And whether or not he acted on the advice or with
the consent or knowledge of U.N. legal counsel, the fact is that he
thus brought into question the entire validity of the charges against the
eleven Americans that they were guilty of a breach of duty to the
United Nations involving serious misconduct.
As a result, the questions may be asked : "If these people were
guilty, then why pay them indemnities? And if it was right to pay
them indemnities, then were they really deemed guilty?"
Soon there was more obfuscation of the Jurists' lucid report.
On December 16, 1952, only eleven days after the Secretary Gen-
eral accepted it, several high officials of the United Nations engaged
in what appears to be a crossed-fingers, tongue-in-cheek interpreta-
tion of his action. For on that day-according to U.N. Document
A/2364, page 9-the Chairman of the U.N. Fifth Committee, Carlos
P. Romulo of the Philippines, informed its members on behalf of
himself, of President of the General Assembly Lester Pearson of
Canada, and of the Secretary General that Mr. Lie "did not bind him-
self to every argument or every single word contained in the [jurists']
opinion."
It shortly became plain that Mr. Lie didn't bind himself to the
opinion. Period. For on April 1, 1953, he rejected its main principle
during an intra-mural debate at the 421st Plenary Meeting of the
General Assembly, a meeting accorded scant attention by the press be-
cause no votes on the Report were taken and no decision was reached.
There, according to U.N. Document A/PV/421, the Secretary
General said: "Some delegations have opposed the notion advanced by
the Commission of Jurists that special consideration should be given
to the host country in determining the employment of its nationals .
I should like to point out that . . . this is one of the recommendations
of the jurists which I did not accept."
Astonishingly, the United States Delegation made no comment on
Mr. Lie's remark. It is reliably reported that our Delegation was of
the opinion it was not "proper" for the United States to comment on a
matter that was sub judice, i.e., on a matter in which U. S. citizens
were involved in an appeal to the "court," the Administrative Tribunal.
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"Apparently straining to be specious," said a realistic-minded mem-
ber of a Latin American delegation, "the United States fell over back-
wards."
Strange as that attitude may seem, what is utterly incredible is the
fact that after the Fifth Committee discussion, the United States Mis-
sion to the U.N. did not issue a press release notifying the American
people of Mr. Lie's repudiation, and the State Department did not
issue a formal protest. To draw the full implications from this fact, it is
necessary to understand that American officials and employees of the
United Nations Secretariat are paid by and responsible to the U.N.
Organization itself. But officials and employees of the United States
Mission to the United Nations are paid by the United States Govern-
ment and are members of our own State Department. Therefore, in
the case of Mr. Lie's action, American diplomats neglected to inform
the American public about a matter vitally affecting their national
interest and security.
Is it surprising that the United Nations Administration then played
a game of follow-the-leader?
In an interview with a U.N. official, September 9, 1953, this writer
inquired whether the Legal Department, or Secretary General Lie,
or the U.N. Department of Public Information had ever issued to the
press or to the President of the United States formal notification that
the main principles of the jurists' Report had been repudiated by the
international organization.
"1vVhy on earth would we call attention to it?" the U.N. official
said. "Why not just sneak away from it?"
Evidently, this sneaking away was accomplished right under the
nose of the United States Delegation while responsible officials in our
State Department were taking or pretending to take a catnap.
But regardless whether there was a public disavowal of the Report
or merely an intra-mural rejection of it, the fact is that only a
month after Mr. Lie was succeeded as Secretary General by Mr.
Dag Hammarskjold, there appeared in the New York Times under
the headline "U.N. CHIEF QUERIES CURB ON AMERICANS" the follow-
ing account of a remark he made at a U.N. press conference:
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Mr. Hammarskjold said a report by three lawyers whom the
former Secretary General Trygve Lie appointed last year to study
the personnel question had been "superseded" . . .
"By what?"-the American public has a right to know.
That the Report was superseded is undoubtedly Mr. Hammar-
skjold's belief. But evidently a large section of the American press
misunderstands his view. On September 4, 1953, for example, the
New York Herald Tribune stated in an editorial on the U.N. and the
U. S.:
An eminent group of international jurists has elaborated on the
special and peculiar relationship which the U.N. bears to ourselves,
the host country in this case; and Mr. Hammarskjold has followed
their broad directive.
Infinitely more important, Mr. Hammarskjold's belief that the
Jurists' Report has been superseded is evidently not shared by Presi-
dent Eisenhower. For less than a month after Mr. Hammarskjold
uttered his passing remark, our President issued an Amendment
relating to certain U.S.-U.N. loyalty and security procedures and
investigations set forth in Truman's Executive Order 10422, but
President Eisenhower did not rescind or alter the original preamble
of the Truman Order in which three main paragraphs begin with the
phrase "WHEREAS THE COMMISSION OF JURISTS HAS ADVISED .
and a fourth paragraph states :
Whereas the Secretary General has declared his intention to use
the conclusions and recommendations of the opinion of the said
Commission of jurists as the basis of his personnel policy in dis-
charging the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Charter and
. . .
staff regulations of the United Nations;
Thus the grand finale of this United Nations hocus-pocus with the
legal findings of an eminent Commission of jurists, who were chosen
by the U.N. Administration itself, has left the American people off-
stage in a dark theatre trying to solve a riddle that has no answer.
On September 11, 1953, this writer was told by an informed legal
scholar closely allied with the United Nations:
"Nobody will ever in 2,000 years be able to determine whether
or not the jurists' Report is in force."
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Like the riddle of the Report, there are riddles concerning many
aspects of the United Nations Secretariat. Some of them can't be
solved. But some of them can be answered-at least from the American
point of view-by taking a look at the record.
At the San Francisco Conference on the Organization of the United
Nations in 1945, Alger Hiss presided as Acting Secretary General.
Looking on him today as a traitor who committed perjury about his
activities as a Soviet agent, the American people sometimes forget that
Hiss was a brilliant lawyer who apparently exerted extraordinary
influence over Secretary of State Stettinius and other top-ranking
American and foreign statesmen and diplomats.
What Hiss and some of his associates and the Soviets seem to have
aimed at in San Francisco was the adoption of a United Nations
Charter suitable for the Kremlin practice of what Communists call
"revolutionary parliamentarianism."
Few Americans can define this term; yet for their own protection it
ought to be as familiar to them as any household expression. In
Communist Party literature, the term is defined as "the use of a legal
framework for `illegal' actions ;" i.e., actions deemed illegal in a non-
Communist society. But devotees of Anglo-Saxon parliamentary
traditions define the Communist term as "the use of a legal framework
as a cloak for subversive activities."
The subversion that Communists wish to accomplish in the U.N.
is perhaps best described in a Communist pamphlet, "The United
Nations," issued in English by The People's Publishing House,
Bombay, India, in September 1945. Acting as usual on the precept,
"Tell people the truth about what we're going to do-they won't
believe it," the Communists told about how and why the Soviet Union
joined the U.N., and made the three main points: 1-"Great power
unanimity with the right to veto in the Security Council" was insisted
on "to prevent the Organization from being used against the Soviet
. . . for the Soviet would vote against such action "automatically" ;
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2-"The international peace organization had to be the best possible
organization through which . . . the peoples . . . particularly of
Britain and the U. S. A." could learn to "fight" capitalism and to
"checkmate" their own foreign policy ; 3-the "Trusteeship Council"
should be used for "liberation from British and American imperialism,"
and the underdeveloped areas of the world aided "economically, socially
and culturally" according to the policy of Joseph Stalin. This policy-
as students of Communism know-called for "a single world economic
system which is so essential for the final triumph of socialism."
For future achievement of these definite objectives, it was to the
Kremlin's best interests that the United Nations should adopt a vague
Charter and set up a Secretariat operating under vague rules and
regulations.
"Sometimes, when a smart lawyer wants to be really shrewd," said
a former deputy U. S. Assistant Secretary of State, "he is intentionally
obscure."
Along with many Communists, Socialists and impractical idealists,
Alger Hiss-who in 1946 acted as Principal Adviser to the U. S.
Delegation at the first session of the U.N. General Assembly in
London-seems to have been a master at inducing our government
to go along with "planned vagueness."
Certainly, there does not appear to be any record of his having
advised the State Department to put up a strong fight against the kind
of reasoning embodied in a Secretariat personnel policy that had been
decided on at meetings of the Preparatory Commission by American,
British and other diplomats who evidently were in what has been
described as "a London mental fog."
According to the Summary Record, U.N. Document PC/AB/14,
19 and 20 December 1945, they actually took the position :
It was common sense that the [United Nations] staff should, as
far as possible, be acceptable to the member governments and also
that the Secretary General would often require information regard-
ing candidates from governments or private bodies, but it would be
extremely undesirable to write into the text anything which would
give national governments particular rights in this respect . . .
[Italics added.]
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United States' concurrence in this absurd decision is a perfect
example of how the American people got into that kind of United
Nations mess which was recently described as "international rhubarb."
In preparing a text, if something is "common sense" then why
would it be "extremely undesirable" to write down "anything" specific
about it? Understandably, there were certain points best left open
for negotiation and discretion. But surely it was not in accordance
with grass-roots American tradition for U. S. diplomats and lawyers
to agree to the elimination of "anything" conceded to be common
sense!
Immediately after we abandoned our national rights in respect to
U.S. citizens employed by the Secretariat, we joined with all other
members of the Preparatory Commission-the day before Christmas
-in presenting to the Soviet Union a gift beyond compare. A U. S.
vote was included in the unanimous adoption of the Soviet-proposed
United Nations staff rule:
"No persons who have discredited themselves by their activities
in connection with fascism or nazism should be appointed to the
staff of the United Nations organization."*
Since there was no definition of the word "fascism," we thus
adopted a rule that could be used to impute guilt by association,
through use of the word "connection," to persons who are not Com-
munists or pro-Communists and bar them from U.N. employment.
For in Soviet terminology, anybody who is not a pro-Communist is a
"fascist."
Minds in a fog, the enthusiastic supporters of the Soviet proposal
known as "Rule 56" evidently didn't stop to think that it was in
absolute contravention of U.N. Staff Regulation 1.4 which states
that members of the Secretariat "are not expected to give up their
national sentiments or their political and religious convictions."
Of course, it was desirable not to have a potential Hitler or
Mussolini on the U.N. Staff. But in London, it seems, nobody found
* This rule was abrogated by Secretary General Trygve Lie effective January
1, 1953.
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it undesirable to employ a potential Joe Stalin in the Secretariat.
And since there was no mention of Communism in Rule 56, it left
the U.N. Administration's Personnel Department door wide open to
the employment of Communist nationals from non-Communist
countries.
Naturally, Alger Hiss and Soviet agents in other countries, lost no
time in sending a stream of applicants to the U.N.
An Associated Press report from Washington, March 23, 1953,
stated:
HISS PICKED AMERICANS FOR U.N. JOBS
A State Department official testified today that Alger Hiss made
unofficial reports to the United Nations in 1946 on Americans
seeking U.N. jobs.
William L. Franklin, special assistant to the department's secur-
ity director, told a House judiciary subcommittee that department
files show Hiss sent lists of names to U.N. Secretary General
Trygve Lie despite a "hands off" policy adopted by then Secretary
of State James F. Byrnes.
In 1946 .Hiss was Director of the State Department's Office of
Special Political Affairs. . . .
Undoubtedly, many of the Red-sponsored applicants were turned
away at the U.N. door. But it appears that the cleverest of the
American group not only got through, they eventually maneuvered
themselves into secure positions at Lake Success, and later rode an
escalator all the way to top level positions in the U.N. Headquarters
in New York City. Their efforts were twofold: 1-to undermine
the morale and subvert the efforts of the Secretariat in which the
majority of employees are hardworking, capable and loyal; 2-to
engage in worldwide espionage, subversion and dissemination of Red
propaganda.
Repeatedly, such high American dignitaries as former Secretary
of State Acheson and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt have made statements
implying there are no secrets at the United Nations, and therefore
at the international organization there is neither a reason for con-
ducting espionage nor an opportunity to impair our national security.
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In See Magazine, November 1952, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote:
One purpose of the U.N. is to gather and distribute information
on practically every subject and for the free use of practically any-
body. A spy would feel professionally foolish, when people are so
eager to tell things.
It is interesting to compare this naive or not so naive statement with
the official REPORT OF THE STAFF COMMITTEE, U.N. Document
SCC/152 1 December 1952. On page 4 there is the explanation :
The staff regulations provided . . . for transfer of staff within
the Secretariat, by which means the few posts which gave access
to secret information could legitimately be filled, if not already
held, by persons whose political beliefs precluded the likelihood of
their making improper use of such information. [Italics added.]
This sentence proves, of course, that there is secret information
at the United Nations, and that though the employees are "inter-
national civil servants" they are human beings who are bound to hold
"political beliefs" of one kind or another.
Other documents prove that top U.N. officials deal with extremely
important information not to be generally divulged. Official records
of discussion in the U.N. Technical Assistance Committee concerning
the appointment of an Executive Chairman for the Technical Assis-
tance Board contain references to the "highly confidential" nature of
the Chairman's work, and to his monthly "private" conferences with
the directors of U.N. specialized agencies, including the managing
director of the International Monetary Fund. This Fund handles
assets of between 7 and S billion dollars, and its longtime Secretary,
Virginius Frank Coe, was dismissed only in December 1952, a few days
after he refused to tell the McCarran Committee whether he was at
that time a member of a Soviet espionage ring.
The present Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board, Mr.
David Owen of the United Kingdom, seems to have exercised ex-
tremely poor judgment about the likelihood whether or not a person
working under his direction would make proper use of information.
In 1952, when Mr. Owen was U.N. Assistant Secretary General for
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Economic Affairs, he had as a principal assistant Mr. David Wein-
traub, an American whose testimony before the Senate Internal
Security subcommittee revealed :
. . . that he was the person responsible for the employment within
the United Nations of five officials who subsequently refused on
Constitutional grounds to tell the subcommittee whether they were
Communists and in two cases, involved in espionage.
Other of Mr. David Owen's American assistants-all of whom in-
voked the 5th Amendment before the subcommittee-were :
1. Mr. Joel Gordon: refused to answer: "Are you
now engaged in any subversive
activities against the United
States Government?"
2. Mr. Sidney Glassman : refused to answer whether he
was a member of the Commu-
nist Party when he was "em-
ployed by the United States
Government."
3. Mr. Herbert S. Schimmel : refused to answer : "Did you
ever attend a Communist meet-
ing with Mr. Weintraub?"
4. Mrs. Marjorie Zap: refused to answer: "as to this
time you are a member of the
Communist Party ?"
5. Mr. Irving Kaplan : refused to answer : "virtually
all questions relating to Com-
munist activity, subversion,
and espionage."
Subsequent to Mr. Kaplan's refusals in 1952, Mr. Owen gave him
a letter of reference for future employment. When Mr. Kaplan's attor-
neys appeared on his behalf before the U.N. Administrative Tribunal
in July 1953, they quoted Mr. Owen's letter which states in part that
during 52 months Mr. Kaplan :
. . . maintained a high standard of professional competence as
economist engaged upon analysis of factors influencing the economic
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development of under-developed countries. . . . he made a valuable
contribution in the organization of basic research, the analysis of
the material, as well as in the formulation of the conclusions. . . .
Mr. Kaplan's accurate analysis of economic questions of this type
enabled him to render very useful assistance in the work of the
Department of Economic Affairs. [Italics added.]
In fairness to Mr. Owen, however, it must be said that his seeming
sponsorship of, indifference to, or lack of knowledge about, the real
background of some American employees in his department at the
United Nations merely was typical of other high U.N. officials'
attitude.
In July and October 1948, the New York Times and the New York
Herald Tribune published reports of testimony given by a State De-
partment official and other witnesses before a Senate Subcommittee
concerning possible subversive activities and espionage at the United
Nations. But, as was pointed out by attorneys for the so-called "Red
Eleven" at hearings before the Administrative Tribunal:
Initially, the attacks met with vigorous opposition from high
administrative officers of both the United Nations and the U. S.
Government. The responsible American press also tended to dis-
count the charges as unfounded and irresponsible.
A press release from the U.N. Department of Public Information
dated 23 July 1949 (SG/11) stated :
Acting Secretary-General Byron Price today made the following
statement with regard to a release issued by the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee covering testimony of an unnamed witness with re-
spect to personnel policies in the U.N. Secretariat :
"This is the nuttiest story I have heard yet.
"I am in a position to know that the charges relating to the
administration policies of the U.N. are fantastically untrue. I
am sure that no fair-minded person will attach significance to the
statement of a mysterious so-called `official' who attempts whole-
sale character assassination of his colleagues but refuses to give
his name."
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In a statement to the U.N. staff (Document SG/13), Mr. Price
said:
Some of the recent charges have involved vague hints or open
allegations of espionage. . . . It is part of his [the Secretary Gen-
eral's] responsibility to reject attempted terrorization by gossips
and marplots . . .
Four days later, the U.N. Department of Public Information re-
leased the text of a letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson from
Mr. Price, who wrote:
I am compelled to point out that the internal administration of
the Secretariat is the responsibility of the Secretary General and the
General Assembly.
If the Secretary General were to be answerable to Committees
of the national legislatures, all possibility of the successful existence
of the UN as an international organization would be destroyed.
At the end of his letter to the Secretary of State of the United States,
I\Ir. Price-an American-said he would appreciate knowing the
views of "your government." Probably Mr. Price expressed himself
according to customary diplomatic protocol ; but he might have written
"the United States Government" or "the American Government."
At any rate, it is illuminating to interpret the term "your government"
in relation to the Commission of jurists' view that "it is equally clear
that the United Nations is in no sense a super state. It has no sover-
eignty and can claim no allegiance from its own officers or employees.
Membership of its staff, in our opinion, in no way abrogates, limits, or
qualifies the loyalty a person owes to the state of which he is a
citizen."
In view of the confused attitude taken by many high ranking
U.N. officials toward the real status of Secretariat civil servants and
their loyalties and obligations, informed sources were not at all sur-
prised when an article by Craig Thompson appeared in the Saturday
Evening Post, November 1951, stating there was strong evidence that
a group of Communist wreckers had penetrated the U.N. staff.
One of the persons active in U.N. staff affairs was a Canadian,
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!I1~k
Mr. Hugh Lukin Robinson. And evidently the wrecking activities
in the staff grew so acute that Secretary General Trygve Lie said on
November 26, 1951: "If the staff in New York want to make trouble
the issue will be a simple one, it will be a question of either loyalty
to Mr. Robinson or loyalty to me."
That same month, the term of Mr. Robinson's contract with the
United Nations was completed. It was not renewed by Mr. Lie,
who dismissed Robinson on grounds of "considerations of suitability."
Mr. Robinson-described in the press as a "pro-Communist"-
protested against his dismissal and retained counsel to present his
case to the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. In Geneva
during the summer of 1952, the tribunal awarded Robinson $3;990 as
salary due from the expiration of the contract till its decision, $2,000
damages and $1,000 legal costs.
Everywhere, the Communist press hailed this decision as a great
victory for "progressives" and as a defeat for "witch-hunters and
red-baiters." Though Robinson is not an American, a large part
of the leftwing and "liberal" press in Europe and Asia used the
judgment rendered in his case (presented to the Tribunal on his
behalf by Mr. Paul J. Kern, who was Mayor LaGuardia's Civil
Service Commissioner) as a hate-America weapon to try to discredit
United States laws, government agencies, Congressional bodies and
private citizens combating Communism.
While the Robinson case was sub judice, and after Secretary Gen-
eral Lie had dismissed from the United Nations several American
employees whose Communist affiliations were publicly exposed by the
Senate Internal Security subcommittee, the internationally known
"conservative" London magazine the Economist carried in its July
12. 1952 issue an article, "Staff Tro:zbles in U NO," signed "By a
Correspondent" who wrote that our Federal Bureau of Investigation
"in its pursuit of Communist sympathizers beats any bush for fresh
game." The Economist further declared: "Since a U. S. District
Attorney successfully prosecuted Alger Hiss and was rewarded with
a judgeship, the road for the ambitious in the justice Department has
been clearly marked."
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In 1953, the foregoing statements were quoted in a joint legal
brief presented to the United Nations Administrative Tribunal on
behalf of nineteen of the twenty-one dismissed 5th Amendment Ameri-
can U.N. employees.
The inclusion of this material-described as "scurrilous" by the
U.N. Legal Department-appears to have been in full conformity
with the Communist Party line. The fact is that from beginning
to end, the conduct of more than a score of 5th Amendment American
U.N. employees and their attorneys-before the Federal Grand Jury,
the Senate subcommittee, and the U.N. Administrative Tribunal-
seems to have been strictly in line with directives in the Communist
pamphlet "Under Arrest!" issued many years ago by the subversive
International Labor Defense, 80 East 11th Street, New York City.
"Even though capitalist law makes what you have done a crime,"
declared the Communist Party, "you must plead Not Guilty."
It further instructed : "You either answer your own way, or not
at all. MAKE THE COURT YOUR FORUM!"
It seems reasonable to conclude that the twenty-one 5th Amendment
U.N. Americans went before the Administrative Tribunal of the
United Nations-its final legal authority-to make the Court of that
international body a forum for a world-wide propaganda campaign
against the United States.
THE DECISION
On the afternoon of April 15, 1953, the Administrative Tribunal
of the United Nations held preliminary hearings at U.N. Head-
quarters in New York City to narrow the legal issues relating to
the appeals from dismissal in the Secretariat,of twenty-one 5th Amend-
ment Americans.
Ten of them had held temporary or temporary-indefinite U.N.
contracts and were subject to dismissal by the Secretary General at
his sole discretion "in the interest of the United Nations." Eleven of
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the Americans held permanent U.N. employment contracts with right
of tenure under the U.N. Charter and the Staff Regulations adopted
by the General Assembly. In the legal briefs, the employees are
described as "the Applicants," and they appealed as a result of action
taken by the U.N. Secretary General who is described as "the
Respondent."
Adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, the Statute establishing
the United Nations Administrative Tribunal declares it "shall be
composed of seven members, no two of whom may be nationals of the
same State. Only three shall sit in particular case. [Plus an alternate
member.]" Article 10 of the Statute orders:
1. The Tribunal shall take all decisions by a majority vote.
2. The judgments shall be final and without appeal.
3. The judgments shall state the reasons. on which they are based.
Regrettably, the United States is not a current member of the U.N.
Administrative Tribunal which is at present composed of representa-
tives from the United Kingdom, France, Ecuador, Egypt, Sweden,
Czechoslovakia and Iran. Thus no American was even eligible to
render judgment in a United Nations cause celebre concerning twenty-
one United States citizens. And it is extremely interesting to note that
the Tribunal members who rendered judgment in this case in 1953
also judged the Lukin Robinson case a year earlier. These members
were Madame Paul Bastid of France, President of the Tribunal ; Mr.
Sture Petren of Sweden, Vice-President; and Lord Lloyd Crook,
Vice-President, who is also a veteran British trade union leader. The
alternate member in 1953 was Omar Loutfi, of Egypt.
Prior to the opening of the preliminary hearings, the Tribunal had
addressed several questions to the Applicants and to the Respondent
concerning the briefs already submitted. The brief for the Respondent
was written by C. A. Stavropoulos, Principal Director in charge of
the Legal Department, and Counsel: Bruno Schachner, Axel Serup
and Gurdon W. Wattles. The briefs for the Applicants were written
by Andrew D. Weinberger, Frank J. Donner, Arthur Kinoy, Leonard
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B. Boudin, and Morris J. Kaplan. The last four belong to the National
Lawyers Guild, an organization currently being investigated for possi-
bility of subversion by United States Attorney General Brownell.
On the morning of April 16th, Mr. Bruno Schachner, Counsel for
the Respondent [the U.N. Secretary General] (U.N. Document
AT/PV.24) answered the first question put by the Tribunal in which
the final sentence was: "Does the fact that the reply [Secretary
General'.s] omits any mention of the host State mean that the
Respondent does not adopt that theory ?"
In his reply to this question, Mr. Schachner, an American, stated:
"The Respondent has not relied in these cases on the theory of the
three jurists concerning the special rights of the host State." Then he
declared that the problems in these cases would be the same if they
related to a member state which was not the host country, but later
said: "The Tribunal also inquired concerning our position as regards
the theory of the three jurists about the special relation which the
United Nations has to tile host country. We feel that, for the purposes
of these particular cases, it is not necessary to consider the special
position of the host country." Then, in a final statement concerning
the Tribunal's first question, Mr. Schachner said: "However, I repeat,
for the purposes of these particular cases it does not seem to us to be
important to go into the question of the relation between the United
Nations and the host country."
Thus, at the outset of the case, the U.N. Legal Department rejected
the very foundation of the jurists' Report on which rested U. S.
Presidential Executive Order 10422, presumably based on the State
Department's understanding that "the Secretary General has accepted
and will be governed by the recommendations contained in the jurists'
Report."
Mr. Donner, counsel for the Applicants, immediately declared:
"Now this, of course, startles me in a way. This is a shocking revela-
tion to me in the light of the fact that I understood that the Secretary
General precipitately acted on one sorry day in December of 1952
against my clients on the thesis of the three jurists as expressed in
their report issued at the invitation of the Secretary General. If one
consults General Assembly Document A/2364 . . . we find that the
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Jurists made this statement: `The difficulties to which your questions
relate all arise out of the peculiar relationship which must exist between
an international body such as the United Nations and the Member
State within whose borders that international body works
(Italics added.)
Then Mr. Boudin, counsel for the Applicants, affirmed : "The `host'
concept is, of course, the basis of the jurists' report. . . . it's the heart
of the report. . . . the `host' concept is also part of the action taken
by Mr. Lie, and as late as December 3, 1952, in his letter to Mr.
it
Austin [Ambassador Warren R. Austin of the U.S. Mission]. .. .
is
So we see that only at the point where Counsel . . . has arrived,
here to disclaim the `host country' concept, do we find somebody taking
that particular position contrary to the actions that were previously
taken."
Next Mr. Donner said on behalf of the Applicants : "One does not
change one's theory unless one loses one's faith in the theory which
one discards."
The discussion on this point continued nearly all morning on April
16th. That afternoon, Madame Bastid announced that the Tribunal
would proceed to Question V. posed by the Tribunal to the Respond-
ent. The core of this question is: "He [the Secretary General] main-
tains that the Applicants by refusing before the Senate Subcommittee
to reply to certain questions concerning their connection with the Com-
munist Party have incurred the suspicion that they have committed
crimes against the security of the United States. By placing them-
selves in this position they have laid themselves open to charges of
`unsatisfactory services' within the meaning of Regulation 9.1 (a) of
the Staff Regulations and `serious misconduct' within the meaning of
Regulation 10.2. . . ."
Commenting on Question V, Mr. Donner, counsel for the Applicants,
quoted as follows from Secretary General Trygve Lie's speech of 10
March 1953, document SG/281:
Although the jurists recommended dismissal, I decided that the
staff members concerned should be given a second chance. First of
all, I notified the entire staff of my acceptance of the recommendation
of the jurists in this respect. Then I notified the staff members
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concerned that I would be compelled to dismiss them for a funda-
mental breach of the obligations laid down in Staff Regulation 1.4
unless, within three days, they informed me that they had notified
the appropriate U.S. authorities of their intention to withdraw the
plea of privilege and answer the pertinent questions put to them.
This they refused to do. Their refusal of my request constituted, in
my opinion, a clear case for dismissal for misconduct under Article
10 of the Staff Regulations. Nevertheless, I chose a less severe
method of termination, one that would entitle them to the normal
indemnities and severance pay, so that they might have a less diffi-
cult time in the transition period while seeking other employment.
[Italics added.]
It was not necessary, of course, for Mr. Donner to comment on
this speech. He confined himself to the single sentence : "That is all I
have to say on this question."
The American people might inquire, however, precisely why Secre-
tary General Lie was so eager to ease the difficult time that U.N.
American employees dismissed for misconduct would have in finding
future employment.
Mr. Schachner made a very long statement interpreting U.N. Staff
Regulations and rules, remarking : "I think we are still in the ex-
ploratory stages of the law pertaining to international civil servants."
Later he said that the peculiar problems concerning staff members
who conceivably may be held to have been dismissed summarily "are
better described in our brief."
On page 30, in the official United Nations STATEMENTS AND BRIEFS
FOR THE RESPONDENT, there appear the following opinions:
It needs no lengthy exposition to prove that the violation of a
fundamental obligation constitutes misconduct within the meaning
of Article X. . . . Again, it is obvious that the Applicants' conduct
amounts to `serious misconduct.' Any action which shows a staff
member to be unworthy of trust and reflects on the United Nations
as a whole is obviously serious, and misconduct. And while ordi-
narily the termination indemnity is not payable on dismissal for
"serious misconduct," the Applicants are certainly not in a position
to complain because they received payments to which they might not
have been entitled.
The public interest imperatively called for the immediate dis-
missal of the Applicants. . . . Under these circumstances the Secre-
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tary General invoked all of his powers, but . he resolved all
doubts in favor of the Applicants and accorded them the treatment
most favorable to them. It would be absurd to urge that this act
of grace estops him from relying on his power of summary dis-
missal to justify the action which he took." [Italics added.]
It is enlightening to compare the foregoing legal view with the
official document GENERAL ST/AFS/SGB/94, 1 December 1952:
Chapter X title "Disciplinary Measures, Regulation 10.2: The Secre-
tary General may impose disciplinary measures on staff members,
whose conduct is unsatisfactory. He may summarily dismiss a mem-
ber of the staff for serious misconduct. Rule 110.3(b) Except in
cases of summary dismissal, no staff member serving at Headquarters
shall be subject to disciplinary measures until the matter has been
referred for advice to the joint Disciplinary Committee:
Termination Indemnity Annex III: (d)
No indemnity payments shall be made to: A staff member who is
summarily dismissed."
In view of the foregoing, it was to be expected that the Administra-
tive Tribunal would declare concerning several of the applicants'
cases as it did on September 1, 1953: (document AT/DEC/32, page
9)
The nature of serious misconduct appeared so disputable to the
Secretary General that he granted termination indemnities, which
are expressly forbidden by the Staff Regulations (Annex III) in
cases of summary dismissal.
It was also to be expected that after the U.N. Legal Department
abandoned the "host country" concept, the Tribunal would not recog-
nize the special relationship between the United Nations and the
United States, even though it was emphasized in the Commission of
Jurists' Report. As a result, the Tribunal appears to have reached
the conclusion that it was also unnecessary to pay special attention to
the Constitution of the United States. Therefore those persons who
have carefully studied the record of the preliminary hearings before
the Tribunal did not find it at all surprising that its members felt-
according to the New York Times-"that the claim of privilege
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[5th Amendment] was not sufficient reason in itself to warrant sum-
mary. dismissal."
Nevertheless, it seems clear that in addition to the U.N. Secretary
General and the U.N. Legal Department, the members of the Admin-
istrative Tribunal were inclined to accord the dismissed Americans
"the treatment most favorable to them." For example, it appears
the Tribunal gave the highest award of '$40,000 damages to Jack
Sargeant Harris, who seems to be-in the opinion of highly informed
sources-the "worst offender." Harris' own lawyer stated that dur-
ing World War II : ". . . he [Harris] was entrusted with various
secret missions and was designated special assistant to the U. S.
Minister to the Union of South Africa in charge of American
Intelligence in that country." Before the Senate Subcommittee, how-
ever, Harris refused to state whether he was a member of the Com-
munist Party while occupying a post of such high trust affecting the
security of the United States.
The fact that Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold chose to
award indemnification to four of the eleven 5th Amendment Ameri-
cans, instead of reinstating them, is not really relevant to the main
issues at stake as a result of the Administrative Tribunal's decision of
September 1, 1953. According to U.N. regulations adopted by the
General Assembly, the Secretary General always has had the right
to exercise his personal discretion in the matter of indemnification
rather than reinstatement of dismissed U.N. Personnel.
Concerning the entire matter of U.S.-U.N. personnel security rela-
tions, the London Tiiiies reported on December 2, 1952, that when
Secretary General Trygve Lie consulted the Commission of jurists
he "raised some questions that might better have been left unformu-
lated in the world as it is today."
A different view, however, was presented to the Administrative
Tribunal by the attorneys for the Applicants. Their legal brief
states:
. . . the issues which are posed by these cases are indeed far
more weighty than the controversies which brought them into
being. It is not an exaggeration to say that involved here are the
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integrity of the principles upon which the meaningful function
and future of the United Nations depends.
This writer submitted to an eminent American attorney for analysis
all the material presented in this article. His legal opinion concern-
ing the present situation regarding United States-United Nations
personnel security relations today is:
Among whatever conclusions the reader may come to as a result
of his own interpretation of the material herein presented, one con-
clusion seems inescapable:
As the United Nations organization now inteprets its Charter
and its rights, it is entitled to employ, for work within the City
of New York and elsewhere, Americans who are disloyal to the
United States or subversive in whatever degree, and to cloak such
employees with whatever immunities are granted to United Nations
employees.
In a special cable, the New York Times reported from Geneva,
September 15, 1953:
The executive committee of the Federation of International
Civil Servants Associations has recommended that no international
civil servant should give information "prejudicial to any interna-
tional civil servant" to the police of any national government.
This recommendation . . . is directed specifically to inquiries
made by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation among
officials of the United Nations. Seven thousand to 8,000 employees
of the United Nations and its agencies are members of the federa-
tion.
Thus it appears that the findings of a New York Grand Jury on
evidence presented by former Assistant U.S. Attorney Royl M. Cohn,
and the findings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee with
Robert Morris as Chief Counsel, and the Executive Order of ex-
President Truman, January 9, 1953, and the Amended Executive
Order of President Eisenhower, June 2, 1953, all may be-from the
United Nations' point of view-null and void.
As it is stated in the Report on Activities of United States Citizens
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Employed by the United Nations, issued January 2, 1953 by the dis-
tinguished Senators Pat McCarran, James O. Eastland, Herbert R.
O'Conor, Willis Smith, Homer Ferguson, W. E. Jenner and Arthur
V. Watkins:
"The people of America have a right to know the facts with
regard to this matter."
Additional
copies
are available at the
f
ll
i
t
o
ow
ng
Single
ra
es:
copies
........ .20
50 copies ............ 7.50
100 copies ............ 12.00
1,000 copies .......... 70.00
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