AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002500100008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 24, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT : Aerial Reconnaissance
24 September 1954
I attach herewith the two papers that I mentioned in our conversa-
tion in your office. The first is a brief reca endation, together with
supporting documents, on the project of a preliminary, small Earth Satellite
Vehicle of limited utility which might be launched within two years > The
other is an interesting general status report on air reconnaissance pro-
gram , prepared- fcr me by a young Air Force officer trainee currently assigned
to my office. I especially rec end your~a attention to the section on
"Stripped or Specialized Aircraft" which begins on page 3.
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IND.
ion C a j2 :n LfaUS. ^
! 1 a ~;i,SDjf$.t
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 of
effort to
Unim and the .ted States of placing In orbit a sate ite to
esileet basis scientific data is ocroximateiy the same.
2, arse the satellite v M be the greatest scientific
advanoomant since the 1Idrogen bomb, tan 'netted States should de
everything possible to gain the west .ge of this schievse t. The
first satellite should be launched in a poseeful setting not ally
to provide the greatest p logicsl mertsre potential but also
to facilitate the launching of futures Dare mate satellites,
lnternaaticmal Osophysical Team 195748,, offers a
old
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.tlre an intuaational. setting, worldwide
It would provide the United States tdth mad.
! a clearly' established peaceful motives
m d. a reaffirmation of free World scientific values and methods.
It we are to han a satellite by 1957 the requirement
must be establ ed in the next month or two, if you concur,
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Dr. Von Braun has given coneidsrable thought to the use of the
RI S` missile to launch an 12Y3F and has in mind several possible
versions. Only recently, howver,r has be been authorized by the Army
to make detailed design studies. It is v '` : eely that Dr. Von Dram's
wcrk will lead to the first actual possibility' although it will be
active R8? prop, nt. He has been in contact with Ogg On this Work,
but his studies have been, carried out :'largely on his own initiative
u n d e r the nam Project and c o n t e m p l a t e the use of the RMTONS
very small,
Dr. vred singer of the University of
25X
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actual, requirement for is development and launching of an ESQ`
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has not existed until recently. The Air Force has now established an
official requirement, however, by action of the Air Force Reguireasnts
oaaittee:. The Air Force effort will probably be a 2=946M progra*
based on the ATLAS and
projects
ONR has also established a atu r very re oentl y,+ which incorporates
a series of satellite projects of increasing complexity. Their work
on the initial satellite proposals, either a slug or small package
capable of telemetering basic scientific data, would very likely form
a suitable basis for the International Geophysical Year plan. The
Navy recently obtained consent from the Ar y' to use the REDS TONE missile
in their research.
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 4-- FORM NO. 10.101 JAN 1952
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STAT
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2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.
January 6, 1959
Mr. Loftus Becker
Department of State
4264 New State
Washington 25, D. C,
Dear Lofty:
Several weeks ago when you were in Mr. Allen W. Duties I
office, you expressed some interest in a draft "open" fetter to be sent
to the Soviet Government. Shortly thereafter I sent you a copy of this
draft, which had been prepared by Mr. F_ I He has now
redone his draft and seems to me to have improved it. I have no idea
whether you are at alt seriously interested in it, but I am sending along
a copy of this paper herewith.
Very sincerely yours,
STAT
STAT
Enclosure:
Draft Letter (ER 9-9878)
(3 Jan 58)
1-Forward
1-SA/P/DCI Chrono
1-SA/P/DCI Subject (w/draft)
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2-6- O -2 cQ 7
STAT
ST
 MEMORANDUM FORbENERAL CABELL
proposed communication to the Soviet Govern-
ment. He asked that I pass this to you for what-
ever interest it may have. I am sending a copy
also to Lofty Becker who expressed interest in
an earlier draft.
Herewith is another draft of
6 January 1956
(DATE)
Attachment - As Stated.
US10-101
FORM I AUGH 54 IOI WHICH RELACES FORM
ED.
:?Z_1.,"7
STAT
STAT
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Boston 1_5, Mass*
December 30, 1957
I
ashington, C.
Enclosed are three copies of my latest redraft of
that letter. I believe some of the changes considerably
strengthen it.
If you have no objections, would you be good
enough to pass a copy along to General Ca4ell.
Sincerely,
STAT
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Draft No. 3
30 December 1957
A Suggested Letter from President Eisenhower
Dear Marshall Bulganin:
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Your letter of December 10 brings particularly to mind that since our ex-
change of letters a year ago, two highly significant events have commanded
the attention of the world. One is felicitous for mankind -- the other, ominously
foreboding.
The happy event is the successful launching of the Russian satellites. I
would be glad if, in my behalf, you would extend sincere congratulations to
those responsible for this important achievement.
The tragic event is the failure of the disarmament negotiations to achieve
any concrete success. Though differences have been narrowed, agreement
still eludes us. And the arms control problem, difficult enough in itself, is
now badly compounded by failures to agree even on procedures for future
negotiations.
The implications of a continued technological arms race are quite evi-
dently as clear and of as heavy concern to you as they are to us. The future
will be tragic for humankind if technology remains harnessed to serve War,
rather than Peace and the noble purposes of Man.
In this letter I would like to deal with specific actions pertaining to both
these events. Some of these actions the U. S. Government is now taking.
Others I would like to suggest for your consideration.
With regard to satellites and space flight, it would seem important that
our scientists and engineers work together on specific projects wherever pos-
sible. Such measures will help achieve an end we both prayerfully seek --
that space may be used by men only for peaceful pursuits. Indeed, your letter
also notes the benefits from peaceful collaboration by scientists of our two
countries.
To this end, I would like to offer Soviet scientists, for use in Soviet
launchings, some of the satellite instrumentations which our scientists have
built for the I. G. Y. I believe such collaboration would produce certain scien-
tific answers sooner than could either of our programs separately. It would
also start joint endeavors between us for the peaceful exploration of space.
There is a second step which we should take immediately. As you know,
during the recent disarmament negotiations, the U. S. Government suggested
that an international scientific group be convened immediately to study the
technical problems involved in controlling the use of space for peace. Could
we not' take prompt action, and thus embark immediately on yet another joint
effort in space affairs?
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I note that .sue-, .e? your satellites ' still passing over all countries of the
world. It will surely be unusual in the future not to find one vehicle or another
over national air spaces. In this nuclear age, we cannot assume that overflights
are always for peaceful purposes. I therefore suggest that we immediately
work out an arrangement to provide for the prior registration and inspection
of all, overflight vehicles above those air spaces which most nations can today
control themselves and which therefore can clearly be considered sovereign
namely, the practical operating height of defensive military aircraft of the type
broadly distributed among nations of the world.
On the horizon lies the exploration of the moon and planets. The U. S.
Government would be pleased to examine with the Soviet Government the possi-
bility of pooling our resources for interplanetary exploration, and thus to de-
velop yet another area.for peaceful scientific collaboration.
By over -flying the U. S. with satellites, the Soviet Government has raised
the legal question of national sovereignty in the upward direction. It has been
pointed out that the situation may be analogous to that which led to the establish-
ment of the 3 -mile sovereignty limit for international waters in relation to the
range of coastal gun fire at the time. The Soviet vehicles suggest that there
now may be limits to national sovereignty vertically toward the open skies,. as
well as toward the open seas. Undoubtedly an international group should be
convened to begin technical discussions on this subject. Such deliberations
would represent still another area of collaboration in the pursuit of the peace-
ful use of space. .
Turning now to the subject of arms controls, you know from my sugges-
tions when we met at Geneva in July 1955, that I deeply believe mutual over,
flying of each other's territory can very beneficially serve the interests of
Peace. Thus, in no way does the U.S. Government intend to protest non-
aggressive overflights by the Soviet Government, regardless of whether your
vehicles are used primarily for scientific observations of space, or for ob-
servations of the earth's surface as in aerial inspection. It has been intimated
that observation of U. S. military activity is or will be accomplished by Soviet
satellites. If so, I welcome this initiative by the Soviet Government as a con-
crete step toward "open skies" inspection.
Despite patient expositions by the U. S. Government throughout recent
disarmament negotiations, the Soviet Government still evidences misunder-
standing of the U. S. position regarding aerial inspection. There continue to
be statements that the U. S. proposal is but a screen for U. S. intelligence
activities. Because this matter, insofar as the U. S. is concerned, lies at
the crux of the arms control problem, I would like to try to correct these
misunderstandings and to clarifv once again the U. S. position.
It should be evident that military intelligence and arms inspection are but
two faces of the same coin. Although one implies secrecy and the other openness
and agreement, they both represent information about military affairs and arms.
Certainly one of the major problems which both our governments face in the
construction of any rational world security system is the steady conversion of
our reliance on secret intelligence activites to a reliance on open inspection
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activities. The Soviet Government must understand that to the U. S. , arms
inspection is not the servant of military intelligence, but rather the crucial
means for decreasing the fears and insecurities now feeding the- arms race.
The second point I would reiterate about inspection bears on your repeated
assertions that the U. S. is pursuing "a position of strength. " I would reply
with a simple question. Unless the U. S. has reliable information on Soviet
military capabilities, how else can the U. S. , in darkness, insure that it does
not fall into a position of decisive military weakness? I think that sometimes
you in the Soviet Union forget that the innate secrecy of your Communist system
denies us the sort of arms information openly available in free countries --
information that we must have to bring about a stabilized, military stand-off
in place of an arms race that feeds so much on fears of the unknown. Military
stability between us demands a sufficient exchange of arms information to
provide warning to both sides of any approaching military inferiority.
A relatively open exchange of arms information is the key to decelerating
the arms race between our two countries, whether we do so tacitly, or ex-
plicitly by agreement. Subsequently, it will become the basis for reducing and
controlling the possession of arms. There is no substitute for a major amount
of mutual inspection.
When I suggested mutual aerial inspection at Geneva as the key to dis-
armament, I had in mind not only the greater efficiency of this modern means
of inspection, but also the desire to make inspection politically acceptable
within the USSR. The U.S. Government recognizes that an exchange of ground
inspectors sufficiently great in number to stabilize mutual deterrence between
us would be politically unacceptable within the USSR. The "open skies" sug-
gestion, which harnesses technology to serve the cause of Peace rather than
the arms race, represents in my considered view a practical resolution of this
matter.
There is one other key requirement for stabilizing mutual deterrence
between us. There must be a mutual system both to warn of surprise attack
and also to prevent an accidental war between us, caused by an inadvertent or
unauthorized act which might be misunderstood by one of our Governments as
the start of a general war. Your suggestion about exchanging ground inspec-
tion posts at major military and transportation centers, if supplemented by
mutual aerial inspection, can usefully deal with these threats to security.
Having reemphasized the crucial nature of aerial inspection in the reso-
lution of the disarmament deadlock, I would like now to set forth certain actions
being taken by the U. S. Government, and to suggest others for our mutual
consideration.
To facilitate the development of aerial inspection, Air Base
in Alaska has been designated the port of entry for Soviet aeria nspection
aircraft. Whenever you wish to begin, if you will notify us of the route from
Siberia and estimated arrival times of your inspection aircraft, we will arrange
for refueling and maintenance of your inspection aircraft while over U. S. ter-
ritory; for their inspection and the boarding of a U. S. monitoring official, and
for the priority clearance of your flight plans through our air traffic control
system, to enable them to fly where you may like over the U. S.
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Regarding "open skies" inspection by the U. S. of USSR territory, we are
able today to conduct our aerial inspection of the USSR at altitudes much higher
than those defended today by Soviet military aircraft. Both the powered vehicles
and free balloons we have built for this peaceful purpose are of course unarmed,
and fly much higher than your normal military or commercial air traffic. We
do not believe that you will be caused any trouble whatsoever by these inspection
flights. If they should have unforeseen difficulties, I am confident that the Soviet
Government will provide for their safe conduct and return.
If you would prefer to put our aerial inspection of the USSR on the same
basis we have offered to you -- namely, flights from a Soviet port of entry at
lower altitudes that are clearly within Soviet sovereign air spaces -- we will
be pleased to operate our aerial inspection in this manner. But the above. in-
terim system will suffice until hopefully you may be able to designate a port of
entry and arrange other particulars for normal aerial inspection.
Additionally, the U. S. has under construction space satellites for "open
skies" inspection, to supplement inspection aircraft. We intend to commence
test flights in 1959. Assuming that a U. N. Arms Control Agency is then in
operation, we expect to make results from this inspection satellite available
to that agency. In this connection your government might wish to collaborate
with us in making the best possible satellite inspection system available to the
U. N.
Mutual inspection by space satellites, as you are aware, is inevitable.
What I am proposing is that it be established in such a way that its full poten-
tialities are used to facilitate international arms control agreements.
I would like to tell you now of the other actions the U. S. Government is
taking to break the disarmament deadlock and bridge the gap that unfortunately
,failed of negotiation in the recent talks. You will find much in the following
that meets the Soviet position, and in particular the suggestions in your letter
of December 10.
1. The U. S. Government is temporarily suspending all tests of nuclear
weapons. The continuation of this suspension depends on certain actions of
the Soviet and others Governments, and I would like to state these provisos
clearly.
First and foremost, if the Soviet Government objects to, or interferes with
the conduct of mutual aerial inspection as set forth above, the U. S. Government
will immediately resume its nuclear test program. In the absence of reliable
information about Soviet military arms, the U. S. Government has no choice
but to pursue its security through continued development of modern arms.
Second, the U. S. will immediately resume its test program if we discover
through inspection or otherwise that any other nation in the world has conducted
nuclear bomb tests.
Third, within two years there must be an international agreement to limited
nuclear tests and an inspection system in being to control the agreed limitations.
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At the present moment, it would appear that such an agreement could best be
a limitation rather than 'a total ban on all tests. The possibilities for undetected
testing, deep underground or high in outer space, are such that a total ban may
be impractical to enforce. Also, it may actually contribute more to a rationally
constructed, world security system to permit a few limited and U. N. super-
vised tests by the present nuclear powers, so they may develop nuclear bombs
with a little or even no radioactive effects. Both the Soviet and U. S. Govern-
ments recognize that inspection for nuclear bombs is no longer reliable, and
that a rational world security system must perforce be based at first on mutual
nuclear deterrence. Until the distant future when means may be found to elim-
inate present national arsenals of nuclear weapons, it would clearly be better
to convert these arsenals into a less radioactive variety.
Thus, while I can foresee an enforceable test limitation agreement that
would prevent the further build-up of radioactive materials in the world, I am
not sure that a total test ban would best serve the interest of rational world
security. But this matter can readily be studied and negotiated within two years.
Meanwhile the U. S. will suspend its tests.
Fourth, the continuation of our test suspension beyond two years is con-
ditional on reaching international agreement and installing inspection controls
within that period, to permit future production of nuclear materials only for
peaceful purposes.
2. With regard to the question of inspection at ground control posts which
you urged upon me at Geneva, we are prepared to receive immediately up to
500 Soviet inspectors in the U. S. for two years and arrange for their posting
to watch our military movements at airfields, ports, railway centers and other
such points of your choice. The arrangement can be extened if within this
period, we can install a similar number in the USSR, or hopefully negotiate a
more complete international agreement that would extend the area and objects
of such control, and would also provide for mobile ground inspection opera-
tions.
3. Within six months the U. S. Government will reduce the number of its
military effectives to 2, 500, 000. If the Soviet Government takes similar action,
if we can install a mutually satisfactory inspection system to verify conventional
force levels, and if certain outstanding world political problems can be resolved,
then the U. S. is prepared to make further reductions.
4. With regard to renouncing the use of nuclear weapons, the U. S. has
already renounced their use except in self-defense. However, we stand pre-
pared to clarify in an international convention just what is meant by their use
in self-defense against both conventional and nuclear aggressions.
The U. S. Government rejects categorically the implications in your letter
of December 10 that it may no longer be feasible to limit local wars. Since
World War II, there have been fifteen local military actions of substantial pro-
portions. These have been limited geographically and with regard to the
weapons employed. While such wars are deplorable, we cannot count on their
absence in the future, particularly as they may occur from causes completely
beyond the control of our two Governments. Thus, our Governments face two
types of problems with regard to local wars. First, we must contribute to
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collective security arrangements to deter the initiation of local wars. Second,
and even more important, we must take all possible measures to limit the
spread of local wars that may be started through circumstances beyond our
control.
International understanding and, if possible, explicit agreement on the type
of weapons and manner of their use in self-defense and in support of local de-
fensive actions could go far to limit the spread of local military actions. But
regardless of what can be done to clarify weapons used for collective security
and for self-defense, your Government and my own must, in our mutual inter-
est to avoid self -destruction, reject any notion that local wars cannot be limited.
We must jointly address ourselves both to the problem of deterring and to the
problem of limiting local conflicts.
5. Regarding your suggestion that nuclear arms be withheld by the U. S. ,
British and Soviet Governments from the Governments of Germany, Poland
and Czechoslovakia, we agree to this action for a period of two years. We
will continue with this measure, provided that within this two year period an
agreement satisfactory to all governments concerned can be reached to con-
tinue a controlled limitation of this sort.
6. Further to advance disarmament action, I am today writing the Presi-
dent of the U. N. General Assembly to tell him of our plans to construct an
inspection satellite and to offer its results to a U. N. Arms Control Agency.
I will also tell him that the U. S. Government is willing to organize immediately
an aerial inspection force and place it under the control of such a U. N. Agency,
to cover areas of the world not inspected under mutual arrangements. I shall
also point out that all results from U. S. inspection efforts will be made avail-
able to that U. N. Agency, on request.
I feel sure you will regard sympathetically these actions to break the dis-
armament deadlock and to move concretely to free technology better to serve
mankind in his peaceful pursuits. If our collaboration to this end can be ad-
vanced by meeting to discuss the above, or other arms control measures, I
will be delighted at an appropriate time to meet under U. N. auspices with you
and with the heads of such other U. N. Governments .as may be indicated.
Sincerely yours,
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