[ARTICLE BY GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER ON THE UNITED STATES PURPOSE AND POLICY IN APRIL ISSUE OF AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002500130004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 22, 1960
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOR RELEASE IN THE MORNING PAP RS OF TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1960
ROBERT L. MCMANUS, P SS SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR
STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
ALBANY
EC
The following article by Governor Rockefeller on the United
States' "Purpose and Policy" appears in the April issue of the
American quarterly review, FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
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s
PURPOSE AND POLICY
By Nelson A. Rockefeller
T TS the nature-and the challenge-of a revolutionary period
Jj that, as it unfolds, witnesses view it as a series of seemingly
unrelated crises. The essence of the challenge, for a respon-
sible people or a great nation, is to discern the meaning of the
period and its implication for the future, and to shape the emerg-
ing forces in the light of its purposes. In our particular period
Cone revolution is piled on another-the political .revolution giving
birth to new nations, the population explosion, the chain of sci-
entific discoveries. And now, before man ,has learned to live in
harmony. and freedom on earth, he already must face the, prob-
lems of conquering space.
Two world wars have shattered a system of political order that
had governed most of the earth for more than a century. And
as:fhe, great empires have retreated or fallen, hundreds of millions
of. people clamor and fight for fulfillment, of new needs and wants,
from food to freedom. All this-and not the tyranny of Soviet .
imperialism-is what stamps ours as an age of revolution, mark-
ing the end of a great historic era: ,
A revolutionary, period is always composed of two parts-de-
struction of the old and creation of the new. Our grave danger in
such a time is to fall into a purely defensive posture: a fending off
of perils, a kind of fretful and hesitant sparring with history. The
.risk is that a people can become so obsessed with what they are
against that they may fail to articulate-perhaps even to know-
what they are for. Nothing is more important than that free na-
tions escape.this snare and display conviction about the historic
direction they propose to take. The question before America is
not whether new patterns should evolve,, but who will be their
author, with what principles and values, and toward what ends.
The great conflict of our time is,not capitalism against.Com-
munism; it is freedom against tyranny. The future direction of
the world depends on whether the values of human dignity and
the brotherhood Of men, whose expression in America has in-
spired so many new nations, can be given a meaning relevant to
our time. Here lies our task and our opportunity.
Our history suggests a certain capacity for the task. America
was a promise before it was a nation. It represented a purpose be-
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fore it became a; reality. The people who came here to tame a
wilderness were engaged in a venture not merely material but
essentially intellectual and spiritual. The authors of this nation's
freedom were men and women bound together by one quality:
a preference for even a precarious dignity over the shallow safety
of the familiar, the complacent acceptance of the old.
We, too, jive at the end of an historical period. During that
period we have often risen to heights of striving and sacrifice. But
a nation that lives merely on the memory of past achievements is
going to stifle constructive responses. We cannot mechanically
apply old patterns, however well they may have served us in the
past. The freedom we have inherited must be reclaimed, redefined,
rewon and extended by each generation.
The task is not merely philosophic: it is practical: Without
strong values, we shall not be able to distinguish our fears from
our hopes, our opportunities from our dangers. Without a sense
of purpose,. all our values could become increasingly irrelevant
to this time of revolution.
We have sometimes acted as if we, as a nation, thought that
a"normal state of world affairs" meant a static one, as if we
imagined that all upheavals-were temporary and each sporadic
crisis called for only an essentially technical. response. Even our
mostcreative acts-such as the Marshall Plan-tended to be
undertaken in this spirit, suggesting that we imagined that, once.
the immediate need had been rpet, the world would return to
sdme passive and accommodating state requiring, no. further cre-,
ative?effort on our part.
.All this bears seriously upon the nature of our debate on for-
eign policy. This debate cannot be allowed to concern itself
merely,with specific technical solutions. The national life cannot
be preoccupied. indefinitely with devising tactical responses to
this or that emergency. From a debate of this sort the answers
we receive can be no better thart the questions we ask.
In order to achieve our national purpose, we must be sure to
state correctly the nature of the political alternatives before us.
If these are false, so will be our decisions. And I fear that we have
too often posed to ourselves just such false choices-as if our
alternatives, for example, lay between negotiation and military
strength, between the economic development of new nations and
the fiscal stability of our own nation; between arms control and
an armament program; between making commitments to other
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nations and preserving our own independence of action.
This, then, is probably our first task: to get the choices straight,
and not to confuse things complementary with things competi-
tive.
I shall try to apply this to five specific areas of foreign policy:
the problem of negotiation with the Soviet Union; the problem of
military security; the challenge of arms control; the economic
goals of the free world; and the values of the new world which is
emerging.
The debate on East-West negotiations has been largely domi-
nated by two schools of thought. One-perhaps optimistic-has
argued that a basic transformation of Soviet society is probably
taking place. The peaceful protestations of Khrushchev are in
general taken to be sincere, reflecting the power of a new Soviet
bureaucracy, industrial, intellectual and governmental, as well
as the pressures of an ever-more-demanding consumer public
and possibly the well-founded fears of a giant China. The second
school of thought-perhaps pessimistic-has held the contrary
view. Dismissing the changes in Soviet society as largely super-
ficial, it has insisted that Soviet ambition remains unaltered and
unlimited, with only the tactics modified to serve a stubborn
and constant strategy.
I suggest that we, as a nation, do not have to make some theo-
retical choice between these abstract alternatives-the so-called
"soft" or so-called "hard" interpretation of events. Our national
task is to shape our national conduct to serve our purposes, not
merely to defeat someone else's. Thus, because peace is a basic
national purpose we should pursue policies striving to encourage,
and to enable, Soviet leaders to end the political conflict that
they have imposed upon the world-if, they" wish, in all political
seriousness, to do so. At the same time, effective negotiation pre-
supposes an understanding on the part of the free nations of the
nature and elements of a peaceful world. Without this, we will
never know whether Soviet offers are "sincere." We will confuse
bargaining technique with purpose. If we are clear about our na'-
tional goals we can move boldly to establish the framework of
negotiations by developing a concrete and imaginative program.
Instead of passively awaiting Soviet initiatives, we will thereby
place the Soviet leaders in the position of 'having to respond to
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ours.
Similarly, we must realize that, since the cold war is essentially
a Soviet creation, it can end only by substantive change in Soviet
conduct. A change in Soviet manners or Soviet tone is hardly
enough. And thus there are two attitudes of mind, equally empty,
equally to be avoided. One is pretending that the conflict can be
ended simply by a wish. The other is imagining that the pro-
longation of political conflict is an end in itself.
It is important to be equally clear on some related propositions.
Diplomatic flexibility and military readiness are not alternatives.
Quite the reverse: they are vital and indispensable -aids to one
another.
In; our diplomacy, we obviously need flexibility-as this re-
flects imagination and initiative and creativity. We cannot, and
we do not, believe that the oldest political formula or diplomatic
.proposal is necessarily the best. At the same time, a strong de-
fense, far from constricting or contradicting a flexible diplomacy,
is,essential to support it. There is no such thing as an effective
and imaginative diplomacy to serve a nation which is helplessly
weak. The weak can only beg. Only the strong can negotiate
seriously.
These reflections have direct relevance to the most immediate
issues involved in the "relaxing" of world tensions. To date, the
Soviets have largely defined this "relaxation" in terms that can
only lead to piecemeal erosion of the free world. These terms are:
no right for the free nations to be concerned with affairs in Soviet-
ruled areas but unlimited right for Soviet Communism to pene-
trate and intervene anywhere in the free world. Sometimes, it has
been said that the Soviets desire almost nothing from us-except
our recognition, of the status quo in Eastern Europe and in Ger-
many. But it is difficult to assign any concrete political meaning
to this phrase. We have diplomatic relations with the satellites,
excepting East Germany-a rump regime imposed by force which
we can never accept. We have even extended economic aid, as,in
the case of Poland. What then do the Soviet leaders specifically
want?
No doubt the Soviet leaders would like us to give up what we
regard as vital moral values: our belief that each nation has a
right to define its own destiny, and that within each nation man
should be the master, not the servant, of the state. Here we can-
not accommodate them. We cannot stand for self-determination
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in Asia and Africa-as we do and must-while denying it in
Europe. Our values are a threat to Soviet rule only in so far as
they reflect the universal aspirations of people and only in so far
as Soviet policy disregards such aspirations. And whatever re-
`assurance we can and may give the.Soviets against any military
threat to themselves, they cannot ask us to protect them from
the moral.and political consequences of their own acts of op-
piession.
Effective negotiation with the Soviet Union depends, of course,
upon many things other than military power and our sense of
world purpose. It requires, for example, ever greater cohesion and
the development of common programs in the free world...
This is well illustrated by the problem of East-West trade.
.Since about 1954 there has. been. a manifest increase in Soviet
efforts to, promote such interchange and to win general accept-
ance for it. The U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia particularly have
mounted exhibits in trade fairs throughout the world on a scale'
that dwarfs American participation over the same period. Extoll-
ing the benefits of enlarged trade has become as ritualistic a part
of the pronouncements of all Soviet bloc visitors to the free world
as has proclaiming their zeal for peace.
So;far this effort has been more impressive in trend than in
size. In 1952 only 2 percent of the total trade of free-world na-
'-tions consisted of imports from or exports to Communist bloc
countries. In 1958 and 1959 trade with the bloc accounted for
about. 3.5 percent of total free-world trade. The trend is obviously
on the rise, although it should be noted that the 1958-59 level
represents merely a return to the relative weight of East-West:
trade in 1947 and 1948.
Even if the upward trend continues, the problem will hardly be
one of domination by volume. The potential for disruption lies
rather in the fact that, unlike free-world trade, Soviet bloc trade
is conducted entirely by state trading monopolies operating under
close foreign office direction. It. is no accident, then, that such
trade. tends to be highly concentrated upon a relatively few coun-
tries, which, by location or political vulnerability, appear to offer
promising opportunity for Communist penetration. In 1958, for
eight countries-Egypt, Afghanistan, Iceland, Syria, Jugoslavia,
Iran, Finland and Turkey -trade with the Soviet bloc represented
from 25 to 45 percent of their total foreign trade. Since in the
Soviet bloc economic decisions are dominated by political moti-
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vations, it is obvious that the countries so involved are vulnerable
to pressures, even to a kind of political blackmail.
I have outlined elsewhere, in some detail, cases in which Soviet
trade has been conducted upon terms that constituted a serious
threat to the stability of the world price structure in fields such
as tin and aluminum. I have cited also numbers of other ways in
which the .monopolistic Soviet bloc trading agencies have vio-
lated the regulations painfully built up over the years to assure
equitable working of the free-world trading system, and incorpo-
rated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
These have included cases like the Soviet purchase, with much
fanfare, of Egyptian long-staple cotton, only to dump it in
Egypt's normal European markets at less than Egyptian prices;
cases demonstrating that. discriminatory prices charged to various
customers is the general rule of Soviet bloc trade transactions.
. This issue involves far more than the impropriety of allowing
a very small trading interest to dictate terms of exchange. Even
at its present meager levels, Soviet bloc trading methods have
demonstrated a considerable capacity to disrupt-selectively-
the orderly functioning of free-world markets. If we were to stand
by passively, the eventual result could be a serious undermining
of our trading system, far surpassing the relatively minor annoy-
ances that have been experienced to date.
This is the challenge of expanding East-West trade. Neverthe-
less, if the free world is clear about its goals and sufficiently
cohesive, it can make expanding East-West trade work for the
free world. If we insist that expanding East-West trade is con-
ducted according to the rules for trade to which the free nations
adhere, we can make sure that the Trojan Horse. of Communist
commerce carries no lethal weapons through our gates, and we
can trade. with the Soviet bloc to the benefit of all our peoples.
Specifically, there are four principles for the conduct of East-
West trade that we must abide by to protect our interests and
,those of the free world as a whole.
First, we must insist that all trade with the Soviet bloc conform
to the regulations against price discrimination and dumping sub-
.scribed to. by the 36 nations in GATT.
Second, we should seek agreement among the nations belonging
to NATO, SEATO and the Rio Pact to apply to. East,-West trade
the GATT rules designed to prevent discrimination and dumping.
Third, Congress. should- give .the Executive Branch adequate
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funds and power to deal with any Soviet bloc disruptions or domi-
nation of free-world markets.
Fourth, the whole question of Soviet compliance witl~t free-
world trading rules should be on the agenda of any forthcoming
summit conference as an essential condition of the expansion of
'.East-West trade.
This, it seems to me, is the way to deal with East-West trade.
Increased. East-West trade can be valuable if it conforms to rules
designed to strengthen the integrity and freedom of the economies
of nations. But it can be disastrous if we let the Communists
use trade to penetrate and disrupt the economies of free countries.
The economic issue reflects the political. In both fields diplo-
matic flexibility depends on the purpose and cohesiveness of the
free world. We can take the initiative to the extent that we are
able to define clear goals. We can negotiate with confidence to the
degree that the free world can develop a sense of direction spring-
ing from the values and aspirations of our peoples, and not simply
from a desire to counter the Soviet menace. Only then can we give
meaning to events, instead of becoming their prisoner.
From all of this, a few principles of policy follow:
We'must not confuse tactical improvement in diplomatic table
manners with a serious political. settlement.
We must not be weak or timid about our principles and about
the rights of peoples to pursue their own destinies in freedom.
We must not weaken our own national security in the mere
hope that the Soviet Union may soon reduce its own political
ambitions.
And there are equally important things that we can do.
We can stand ever ready to welcome and encourage any Soviet
steps that -move in the direction of a just peace.
We can and must be imaginative and creative in devising pro-
posals for a stable and developing world.
We can and should stand ready, even while Soviet policy con-
tinues committed to a notion of peace that does not seem just,.
to negotiate about measures to slow and discipline the' race in
arms.
We can negotiate only from a position in which the security of
our nation is assured. We do not have the choice between nego-
tiating and putting forth the efforts necessary to assure our secu-
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rity. On the contrary, we must * be equally concerned to pursue
constructive negotiation and to assure the safety of our nation.
There are, indeed, few areas in which new developments chal-
lenge our imagination more severely than in the field of security.
No area of national life is changing more rapidly.. In the past, a
weapons system would be valid for a generation at least. Today
(as the result of an uninterrupted revolution in weapons tech-
nology since World War II) such a system is'often outdated when
it has barely left the blueprint stage.
With each change, weapons have become more complex and
costly. Scientific achievement, crucial as it is, is meaningless un-
less it can. be translated rapidly into operational weapons, and
unless these weapons are adequate to the challenges to our secu-
rity. We face, therefore, problems of efficiency, of lead-times and
,'of doctrine as our security policy forever must seek to prevent
aggression, large or small, by posing unacceptable risks to the
aggressor.
Here, as everywhere in our revolutionary world, the rate of
obsolescence-even of strategies-is enormous. At the end of
World War TI, we had an atomic. monopoly. For a considerable
period afterwards we possessed a decisive strategic superiority.
In these circumstances, deterrence could reasonably be equated
with offensive striking power. We could wairn any potential ag-
gressor that an attack would unleash a powerful retaliatory blow.
All these conditions have drastically changed. Three new de-
velopments force us to reassess our security: a) the Soviet devel-
:opmen.t of a stockpile of thermonuclear bombs; b) the existence
of manned.Soviet aircraft capable of attacking the United States;
c) the growth of a Soviet russilecapability, both interconti-
nental and intermediary, some of them installed in submarines.
Asa result of these events, the Soviet Union is now able to attack
any place in the United States in a matter of minutes. There are
no secure areas. And this Soviet capability' is growing. . '
Thus deterrence, henceforth, can no longer be achieved by
offensive striking power alone. It must depend on these factors:
a) capacity to retaliate; b) capability of protecting allies;- c)
willingness to use these capabilities; and d) knowledge on the part
of the '.Potential aggressor that both our retaliatory force and our
civilian population have the protection to survive an attack.
411 these elements are essential. The lack !of` any one imperils
the peace. If our strength is inadequate, it cannot deter. If our
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will to. resist seems uncertain, our power will be paralyzed. If
an aggressor doubts the capacity of either our retaliatory force
or our civilian population to survive an attack, he may be
tempted to seek to destroy us. Hence, in the i96os we need to
give urgent concern to three areas: protection of our retaliatory
force, civil defense and forces designed to meet. all forms of
Communist military thrust or threat, including local or limited
menaces.
As"for guarding our retaliatory force: this, through the 195os
was concentrated on some 4o SAC bases, There was little danger,
for. the Soviet capacity for surprise attack was low. But in the
d96ps, such a concentration will represent an invitation to. attack.
Our retaliatory force must be dispersed and protected, and, it
must, be made as mobile as possible. The only significant part of
our retaliatory force is. the portion that can survive surprise at-
tack. To magnify this portion is the primary purpose of any strat-
egy of deterrence. This requires hardening of bases, mobility of
retaliatory systems, a determined effort to close the missile gap
and, for the interim period before we develop solid-fuel missiles
in quantity; an increasing airborne alert of our bomber force.
As for civil defense, there are two basic reasons why it becomes
ever more important. The first springs from our national values.
The second is based on strategic considerations. Let me say a
word about each.
The Moral Problem: To us each human life is intrinsically
valuable. We who believe in the strength of the human. spirit, and
who take, pride in the initiative and resourcefulness of our people,
cannot. adopt a passive attitude in the face of mortal dangers.
We must be prepared to face the implications of the world in
which we live. We properly recoil before the horrors of nuclear
war. But we cannot afford to assume that it could not happen-
all the less so as our whole strategy is based on the threat of it.
With nuclear weapons multiplying, our security is dependent on
the credibility of our willingness to resort to our deterrent. It is
our heavy responsibility as public officials and as citizens to save
the lives and to protect the health of our people. A lagging effort
cannot be excused by our conviction that nuclear war is a tragedy
and that we must strive by all honorable means to assure peace.
The Strategic Problem: An aggressor who thought himself
capable of destroying our most valuable asset-our people-
may be tempted to risk an all-out war. Or, more likely, he may
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believe that he can threaten our allies without risk-can practice
nuclear blackmail against them, and against us, to gain his own
ends. Anything that weakens our resolve to resist will seem to
our, allies to jeopardize their safety. Conversely, any measures
that strengthen our resolve will help assure peace and give cour-
age to all the nations of the free world. The report of the New
York State Task Force on Fall-out, as well as Federal studies,
indicates that casualties from fall-out alone could be negligible if
preparations are made in advance, if the public is educated, and
if simple precautions are observed in the event of attack.
Thus both the moral and the strategic necessities are equally
plain and compelling.
At the same. time, if we succeed in making our retaliatory
forces invulnerable, it is wise to suppose that the Soviet Union
can. and. will succeed in,similar efforts. The consequent mutual
invulnerability of the two retaliatory forces will, then, create an
entirely new situation. Invulnerability for our retaliatory force
means that whatever level of surprise attack we may suffer, we
would still be able to inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor.
Mutual invulnerability means that the same condition applies to
both sides. When.that situation is reached-and we must remem-
ber that it will require great efforts to achieve and even more
massive efforts to maintain it-neither government, if 'rational,
would deliberately risk all-out retaliation in response to less than
an all-out attack. Then the aggressor could be tempted to believe
that he could engage in limited aggression with safety to himself..
He may calculate that a threatened area will not seem "worth"
the price of all-out-war to us. And it does not matter whether the
aggressor is right in this assumption. Deterrence would fail if he
thought he could with impunity confront us with the choice of
either abandoning our friends or being ready to sustain a war that
would inflict appalling devastation. The Berlin crisis, like that of
Korea, is a warning illustration of this difficulty.
.The problem .is equally grave for our allies. Their major con-
cern is to avoid occupation by the Red Army. If we cannot pre-
vent the Soviet Army from over-running them, they will face an
almost impossible dilemma. If their only protection lies in a re-
taliatory force beyond their own direct control, and if they fear
we are going to become increasingly reluctant to use such a force,
their.. position becomes precarious, if not hopeless.
To prevent such political and moral despair, 'and to continue
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to deter.Soviet and Chinese pressure, it will therefore be increas-
ingly necessary in the i96os for America to maintain substantial
.forces to resist aggression locally. Without such forces it may be
difficult to maintain 'the peace. Our allies would be subjected to
the. kind of blackmail of which Berlin is an augury. Negotiations
would be made difficult because of the Soviet conviction that the
strategic balance is in their favor. It is for this reason that I have
been concerned that we continue to develop nuclear weapons
with greater discrimination and suitable for limited operations.
At the same time, we must recognize the world-wide repugnance
against using them.
The danger is that countries may prefer surrender to being de-
fended if they become convinced that any resistance inevitably
involves nuclear devastation. While we cannot. give an under-
taking that we shall never resort to these weapons-they are, after
all, the basis of our retaliatory strength-we must make sure that
we will need to employ them only under great provocation and
that we will have alternative means to cope with less than all-out
threats. As the 196os progress, the free world will have to supple
ment, its nuclear, power with greater emphasis on conventional
capability than during the period of our atomic preponderance
and make provision for strategic mobility of that force.
From even this swift survey, a few major conclusions follow:
Our security program is inconstant need of planning far ahead
and will require great efforts of imagination. The strategic re-
quirements of the next decade make alliances of ever greater im-
portance. We can no longer defend the free world entirely from
our shores, as in the days of our atomic monopoly. Henceforth,
more than'ever, the security of the free world will depend on the
safety of each of its parts. This means that forces capable of resist-
ing local Soviet pressure will have to be strengthened. This is a
particular requirement in the case of NATO.
With weapons systems proliferating and with choices multi-
plying, efficient management of our defense establishment be-
comes more than ever essential. We must constantly reassess the
organization of our Defense Department. Modern weapons have
made an increasing number of traditional missions obsolete, and
they have caused duplicating; and wasteful competition. These
must be reduced to the minimum-by realistic reorganization
and classification of the structure of our defense establishment.
A particular challenge is the problem of lead times: the inter-
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vals between conception and development and between develop-
ment and procurement.. Our survival may be jeopardized if our
opponent should be more successful in this field than the free
world.
IV
While making'every effort to assure our security militarily, we
must be aware that the nature of the world in which we live is
without precedent. War presents perils without parallel. Tech-
nology develops at an explosive rate. The traditional effort to
achieve security entirely through strategic means can, in such
circumstances, become self-defeating. In the past when a balance
of power was achieved, it tended to be stable for a generation at
least. No sudden breakthrough was likely to put societies at the
mercy of an opponent. The arms race then dealt only with nui`n-
bers. Whatever the causes, of war, the instability of technology
was a minor factor.
Today, however, an.element of tenseness in the international
situation stems from the volatile nature of technology.' Each new
development opens up the possibility of several others. Even if
we do everything correctly and make the major efforts described
above, the'danger is still very real that some new 'and unforeseen
technological development will put us in mortal' danger. Since
the same is true for the other side, the temptation to use a tempo-
rary advantage and to launch a surprise attack may be over-
whelming.
Whatever their differences, every country shares an obvious
concern in avoiding a conflict of mutual annihilation. Every
country must seek to escape a conflagration which breaks out
simply because of the unstable nature of modern technology. ' In
the past disarmament efforts have usually failed as long as the
underlying political tensions continued. Under current condi-
tions, an effective arms-control system may itself remove a sig-
nificant cause of world tensions. Arms control must be-and is
-a major goal of our national policy.
The field of arms control is technically so complex, and still so
incompletely understood, that it would be irresponsible to make
specific proposals. It may be useful, however, to state a few basic
considerations:
I. One of the great difficuties in understanding the problem is
that there does not exist within the government a center of re-
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sponsibility with resources and staff adequate to the importance
of the subject. Dr. James Killian, when he served as Scientific
Advisor to the President, and Dr. George Kistiakowski, the in-
cumbent, have done outstanding service in this respect. But they
would be the first to admit that their efforts have been on an
essentially fragmentary and ad _hoc basis. What is needed is a
permanent staff, a permanent center of concern and a systematic
study. Only in this manner can we begin devising and defining
responsible proposals.
.z. The essence of successful arms-control negotiations is that
neither side seek, a unilateral advantage. If agreements are to
contribute to stability, they should reduce, if possible, the offen-
sive power of both sides, particularly for surprise attack.
3. The vital key to an effective arms-control plan is the possi=
.bility of inspecting it. Without inspection, arms control can be
exploited as a chance for aggression, thus serving the very con-.
trary of its purpose. 1
4. Time is pressing. It is important to start on soft e measures
as soon as possible, so that, both sides can learn by experience
with control systems. This is why sweeping proposals like Mr.
Khrushchev's plan for total disarmament may be as much a de-
vice to prevent arms control as to foster it. If it took us more than
two years to understand the much simpler problem of inspecting
a nuclear test ban, it is unlikely that so sweeping a plan could be
negotiated in time to overcome the perils of the next five years-
even assuming good will on both sides. For example, what is to
be done about the huge Soviet reserve forces and stockpiles of
equipment? Are the Chinese communes a military or a civilian
organization or a combination of both? What are the sanctions
for: violations?
5. An arms control scheme, to be really effective, should not be
confined to the United States and the Soviet Union. It should
include NATO, the countries of the Warsaw Pact and indeed the
rest of the world. It cannot be effective without Communist China.
And Communist Chinese adherence to serious arms control
schemes could be an important test of their readiness to become
a responsible member of the community of nations.
6. In any negotiation on arms control we must take care that
our NATO allies participate as equal partners. We must not give
rise to the impression, however unwittingly, that our friends can
become objects of bargaining. An important contribution would
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be 'to have a single negotiating team for the Western allies under
a single chairman and with a single position on critical issues.
7. We must recognize that arms control, particularly in its
early phases, is not a device to save money. In fact, inspection
mechanisms and the possible realignment of forces required by
control schemes may cost more money than we are now spending
for military security. This, of course, scarcely makes arms control
less important or necessary.
8. Arms control is not an alternative to-but a critical element
of-a coherent policy for national security. Thus, what we do in
the military field= can importantly affect the very feasibility of
arms-control negotiations. For example, if we protect our retalia-
tory force and develop a civil defense program, we would then
remove a Soviet incentive for surprise attack: Hence we increase
the, likelihood of fruitful negotiation to eliminate or at least
reduce this danger. Similarly, if we are serious' about controlling
nuclear weapons, we must be prepared to have adequate conven-
tional forces. And if we are interested in limiting the distribution
of ever more destructive weapons, we must give our allies ever
plainer political assurances, and create ever closer political ties
with them.
In the previous section I have dealt with issues in which prog-
ress depends substantially on Soviet cooperation. But we must
not become so obsessed with the Soviet challenge that we neglect,
the areas where achievement depends primarily on our own crea-
tivity, dedication and imagination.
The central fact of our time is the disintegration of the nine-
teenth century political system, which for all its failings provided
order, economic exchange and a means for settling disputes. One
of the main tasks of this period is undoubtedly to fulfill the aspira-
tions of peoples in the underdeveloped countries for economic
and social growth. But the problem is not purely economic. We
must help to create a new political order which. meets human
ideals and practical necessities. The great opportunity of our time
is not the idea of competition but of world cooperation. The free
nations, while respecting diversity, must create a community
based ,on shaved values and common goals. Basic to any specific
solutioas to the economic problem is political understanding and
the sustained attitude and spirit with which we approach our task.
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We already have important roles in two great, essentially new,
international systems, the North Atlantic Community and the
Inter-American system. These institutions indicate the pattern
of relationships toward which we must strive. European unity
should be fostered and extended into a concept embracing the
North Atlantic Community as a whole.
In the Organization of American States we have an historic
opportunity. Here we can work out relationships still reasonably
free from the immediate pressure of Soviet Communism. Here
we can demonstrate what freedom can achieve, when left free to
pursue its own devices. This requires a determination by the peo-
ple of the. United States that the unity of the Western Hemi-
sphere is essential to the well-being of all its people. Only as the
people of Latin America become convinced that this is really our
permanent policy can we expect them to join us in building a truly
strong Western Hemisphere structure.
These institutions, continually' strengthened, define a frame-
work and a direction for our relations with the rest of the world.
They enable us to turn with confidence and imagination to the
economic problems of the free world. Here the responsibilities of
the United States have undergone massive changes during the
past decade, and even greater challenges lie ahead. At the end of
World War II, the United States was the strongest nation of the
free world, leading a group of countries that were weak, depend-
ent on us, and laxly united in their principal aims. While the
United States has become more powerful still, it now participates
in a coalition of nations, many of which have become strong,
partly due to our aid. The Western European economy has moved
up from about one-fourth the size of ours in 1946 to more than
one-half today. Growth in Japan has been even more rapid than
in Europe.
Rapid economic growth in the industrial nations has not been
matched in the underdeveloped areas. While there are exceptions
=such as much of Latin America and India-the economic ad-
vance in most underdeveloped nations has not exceeded the rise
in population, so that there has been no growth in the real sense.
Moreover, both Latin America and India face difficult problems in
maintaining or increasing the rate of economic growth.
These shifts in relative, economic strength have vastly altered
the role of the United States. On the one hand, they have made
.things easier: Europe no longer needs economic support and can
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in fact absorb a larger part of the burden of military defense and
of economic aid to less developed nations. But there is a funda-
mental challenge to our leadership in maintaining cohesion
among free-world nations as we approach the tremendous tasks
of developing the institutions of the world along lines that will
promote freedom, prosperity and human dignity. The necessary
policies can be grouped under these headings: trade policies; the
problem of the balance of payments; regional economic systems;
financial arrangements; and international economic and social
development.
A major contribution would be the continuation and expansion
of a liberal U. S. trade policy. It is the essence of trade that
everybody benefits. A liberal trade policy not only assists devel-
oping countries; it also benefits our economy. In other words, by
'following trade policies that are definitely in our own interests,
as well as those of other nations, we can also contribute impor-
tantly to our general objectives of world-wide prosperity and
growth. Our readiness to make a firm and long-term commitment
to freer trade is of the utmost importance.
Maintaining the prosperity and growth of the United States
economy is essential to the growth and stability of the free world.
A protracted recession here could have tragic effects on the entire
free world, while a soundly prosperous and expanding economy
here means that we can furnish markets, supplies and investment
capital. Indeed to realize the opportunities before us, it is not
sufficient to maintain even our historic rate of growth. Only by
increasing productivity at a faster rate will we be able to achieve
our goals.
The importance of the United States as, a market and a .source
of supply is fundamental. While other industrial nations can fur-
nish a part of the capital required to promote growth in the less
.developed areas, we have the greatest capacity to generate capital
on the scale required to launch these areas towards rapid growth.
To transfer capital and technology to the less developed areas
and to support its vast responsibilities throughout the world, the'
United States must achieve and maintain a viable balance in its
international payments. This means that we must :have a sub-
stantial surplus of exports over imports to finance the transfer of
.goods-and services--to other nations in the form of economic and
military aid.
in the'past two years we have faced the problem that the ex-
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port surplus has shrunk while other foreign commitments have
remained at the previous level. Thus, the deficit in international
payments increased from less than $1.5 billion a year in the
1950--57 period to more than $3.5 billion in 1958 and x959.
Part of this rapid rise .in the United States deficit is explained
by trends in the business cycle here and abroad. Exports picked
up sharply in the second half of 1959 and, with economic activity
moving ahead rapidly once more in the industrial nations, the
gain in,exports should continue. In addition, restrictions against
our exports are being removed in many nations. These develop-
ments could reduce the deficit to $1-$1.5 billion in the next year
or so.
While short-term prospects of restoring a viable balance-of-
payments position are promising, the longer term problem re-
mains. The dollar has become the world's leading currency. We
have become the world's banker, and continued confidence in the
dollar is essential in order to prevent a run bn the bank and the
ensuing forced liquidation and deflation.
One of our, great responsibilities is to provide the liquidity
needed by the world in the form of a sound currency that will
provide the medium for financing an expanding volume of world
trade. We can measure up to this responsibility by following
sound national economic policies-policies to contain inflation,
deal with recessions and promote more rapid economic growth.
' One of the most hopeful expressions of the effort to create a
new international system is the move towards common markets.
The United States represents an example of the wide benefits of a
free-trading' area. Since its existence, the United States has been
the greatest free-trading area in the world.
We must therefore encourage the formation,of similar trading.
areas elsewhere providing. they pursue liberal trading practices
towards each other designed to contribute to the growth and
cohesion of the free world, and to a higher standard of living for its'
peoples. We now face this problem in very specific terms, with
Western Europe forming two trade blocs-the Common Market
and the Free Trade Area. Such an economic division in Europe
serves the long-term interest of neither the United States nor
Europe. By our actions on the trade front, we could press both
groups to. adopt liberal policies in their external trade. We can also
promote the idea of an Atlantic Community, as Under Secretary
Dillon has been doing, and thus underline the responsibilities of
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Western Europe to orient its economic policies towards freer
trade throughout the free world.
While the economic unity of Europe has been the result .largely
of European initiative, we face a great opportunity in the West-
ern Hemisphere to help establish cooperative arrangements which
will be a major benefit to all the peoples of the Americas and
which might serve as a pattern for other areas. No other part of
the world has greater resources. Nowhere is the potential for
growth more dramatic. If the current rate of population increase
is maintained, the population of the Western Hemisphere will
exceed one billion people by the turn of the century. The estab-
lishment within the Hemisphere of a free flow of goods, capital
and manpower would result in the creation of the greatest free-
trading area in the world. It would contribute immeasurably to
economic growth and a rising standard of. living of the peoples of
all Western Hemisphere nations, including Canada. It.would en-
compass more than half the productive capacity of the world and
would be a tremendously important bargaining unit in the face
of the growth of similar units in other regions. I have no illusions
about the difficulties of achieving such a grand design. The first
step. has already been taken by seven South American countries
together with Mexico. This movement deserves our increasing
support and encouragement. But to speed attainment of the
interim stages, and to assure, attainment of the ultimate goal, we
must set our sights now on the final objective of a Pan.Americau
Economic Union.
The regional arrangements of Europe and the Hemisphere
should be used as patterns for the economic organization of other
parts of the world. For the key fact is that no nation is capable of
realizing its aspirations by its own efforts. Regional groups pur-
suing ever more liberal trade policies towards each other could
thus be a step towards the ultimate goal of a free-world trading
system.
Another challenge of the r96os is to erect a financial structure
that will preclude crises and contribute to world-wide economic
advance. Just as the United States invented the Federal Reserve'
System to provide needed flexibility and confidence in the cur-
rency, so the world may need to invent new financial mechanisms.
To be' sure, existing knowledge and experience are not adequate
to the complex task of operating a world-wide money and credit
system, nor are, national governments as yet willing to submit to
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the disciplines involved. Yet it would be wise to realize that' our
ultimate objectives may require a world central bank and to point
financial policies in that direction. Thus, the role, of the Inter-
national- Monetary Fund can be broadened in that direction,
without necessarily implying that the Fund will eventually be-
come the central bank.
Such measures would make a considerable contribution to-
wards the goal of promoting world-wide economic development.
Yet we and other industrial nations can and must do more.
Our past efforts, while large in absolute terms, have been too
small relative to the task. The existing mechanisms-such as the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the Export-Import Bank-have been useful in dealing with many
specific problems. But they are inadequate, for the major chal-
lenge of setting in motion the cumulative forces of self-sustaining
economic growth throughout the less developed areas.
This field may well provide the area of major conflict between
East and West in the 196os. We should not shun the conflict, for
this is ground on which the West 'has great advantages. The
Soviet system can produce growth,'but only at the heavy cost of
sacrificing freedom, human dignity and the values the West holds
dear. The West can, if it mobilizes its resources and knowledge;
produce growth while expanding the area of freedom. Moreover,
the West should ' not conceive the economic development of the
new nations in terms of opposition to Communism. Quite to the
contrary, our traditions and our concern for human dignity would
impel 'us in this direction even if Communism had never been
heard of. We could make this fact dramatically apparent by in-
viting the'Soviet Union to join us in a number of specific programs
designed to promote the growth of the developing areas.
. The general economic problem is to transfer investment capital
and technical knowledge to the lesser developed nations at a more
rapid pace than in recent years. This will involve a larger effort
in terms of loans, grants and private capital flows on our part and
on that of other industrial nations.
More money in the form of investment capital, however, is
only part of the answer. Improved mechanisms-mainly multi
national-are needed. Technical assistance efforts should be ex-
panded as rapidly as we can develop a corps of trained personnel
dedicated to the challenging task of world development. Consul-
tation to develop common objectives and joint programs will in
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itself contribute a sense of direction. But above all we need a
broader understanding of the problems, a national willingness to
face up to the challenge and a receptive attitude towards new
ideas.
Economic development is not simply a problem of capital
formation. Industry requires trained manpower at all levels.
Without research facilities, even the most advanced plants will
soon become obsolescent, but the process of developing trained
manpower is slow, lengthy and expensive. It may take only.a. few
years to build a dam, ,a steel mill or a textile factory. It takes
much longer to produce a competent engineer or administrator.
Technical assistance must be one of the major contributions of
the industrialized to the developing nations.
. The challenge to the industrial nations (or, as Sir Oliver
Franks puts it, the North-South problem) is to make their con-
tribution to bridging the gap between the industrialized and' the
developing nations---a gap which is still widening. The less devel-
oped nations must be helped, to the point of self-sustaining'
growth' and must be encouraged to persevere in policies that will
nurture growth.
Economic development does not occur in a vacuum. The new
nations must grow socially if their economic growth is to be sus-
tained. The task of building educational institutions consonant
with modern requirements is not appreciably less difficult in its
cost and time requirements than that of launching successful eco-
nomic development programs. It is particularly difficult in the
field of higher education. Many of the smaller and poorer nation's
of the world simply lack the financial resources and pools of
trained personnel to build, with the rapidity that is needed, first-
class universities with their specialized departments of humanities
and natural and social sciences, together with specialized schools
in medicine and its allied disciplines, the multiple branches of
engineering, agriculture and law, and the numerous other applied
professions essential to the servicing of modern societies.
A much higher degree of creative imagination than has hitherto
been brought to bear must be marshalled to solve this vitally im-
portant problem. One line that deserves particular attention is
the-possibility of developing regional universities open without
discrimination to students from the several nations joined in a
.regional economic accord. This would not necessarily imply either
the building of entirely new, centralized, regional institutions or
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the abandonment of existing national universities or their'profes-
sional schools. It would be entirely possible to organize regional
university structures under central administration but with the
graduate and professional schools decentralized-each built upon
the existing national school within the area that already had
attained the highest status in its given field. Each such school
might retain its affiliation with its national university, while qual-
ifying for regional status, receiving central support and super-
vision, and providing equal opportunity for students from any
part of the region. In this fashion education as well as economic
development programs might benefit from, and serve better, the
movements toward regional collaboration that are part of the
evolution that seems.likely to characterize the second half of the
Twentieth Century.
A people subject to the ravages of diseases and famine cannot
achieve increased skills and productivity. Improved sanitation
and health services are a pre-condition for economic growth.
Again, the movement from rural to urban areas, a typical by-
product of economic deveiopment, raises the danger that unless
modern economic methods are introduced, the rural population
will not be able to increase its productivity to keep pace with
urban development. This may require an expansion of govern-
ment s,rvices; it'will certainly involve rural credit and above all
demonstration of improved methods. The advanced countries
must help in these important fields.
Whatever technical program we consider, whatever solutions
we offer to, achieve expanded economic development, we must,
never lose sight of the fact that efficiency, progress and techniques
are not ends in themselves. They have meaning only if they can
enhance the.dignity of the individual. Our ulti matte test as a
nation is whether we succeed in enabling the individual human
being to fulfill himself and to realize his potentialities-spiritual,
moral and material-in freedom. This is why our period is not
only dangerous but also exciting. For freedom is not a possession
acquired once and for all. It is an adventure which each genera-
tion must discover for itself anew.
Our historic role is clear. It is not defined by our ability to find
this or that expedient to deal with a particular crisis. Rather it
depends on our ability to muster the intellectual and spiritual
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resources to enable us to deal confidently with the challenges of
our time.
Sometimes it is argued that the future will be settled by the
productive capacity of the two opposing systems. Obviously, we
are deeply concerned about increasing the well-being of men
everywhere.. But we are not interested only in material advance-
ment, either for ourselves or for other peoples. The real issue of
our time is that two principles of political order are in fateful con-
flict. One maintains that the citizen is the creature of the state
and that the collective is more important than the individual.
The other insists upon the intrinsic value of each human being.
This is the true basis of the contest, not the relative productive
capacity of two systems.
We hear a great deal in `these days about competition. We are
told that Communism will soon surpass us. We are warned by Mr.
Khrushchev that war has become unnecessary-because he will
defeat us peacefully. It would be wrong to be complacent about
this. But it would be equally dangerous, to gear all our actions to
our opponent's threats or ambitions. The essential American task
does not consist in matching the devices perfected by another
system. Our essential task is to design and to pursue our own
goals, appropriate to our values and circumstances.
It is possible; indeed probable, that Communism is showing its
true inner weakness in the obsessive reiteration of its. notion of
competition. It may mean that-for all its monolithic appearance
-the Communist state has difficulty in generating its own posi-
tive and distinctive goals.
In any case, we face tasks which would be essentially the same
even if Communism had never existed. We are required to work
with the peoples of the world to develop a real world community.
Without such a shared purpose no nation of the world is doing
more than buying time from adversity or misfortune-and this
means little more than paying blackmail to history. Only when
we re-dedicate ourselves to work for the dignity of men. in free-
dom will we begin to feel and act less the victim of circumstances,
more and more its master.
For the greater part of its history, this continent drew inspira-
tion from what came to be known as the frontier. The geographic
frontier no longer exists. Yet frontiers continuously come into
existence through discovery, not only physical but intellectual.
Wherever people strive for freedom and human dignity, there a
frontier is drawn. We have an historic contribution to make, to-
gether with the other nations of the free world, by the courage
with which we see that the opportunities stand larger than the
perils; by the imagination with which we devote ourselves to tasks
of political construction; by the fervor-and humility-with
which we may make ourselves worthy of the larger community
of mankind, whose life, in dignity and security and freedom, is our
supreme national purpose.
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 t.
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STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
ALBANY
March 14, 1960
Thank you for your thoughtful letter
of March fourth and the information regard-
ing the Latin Americanmatter.
With warm regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
Mr, Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
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Dear Allen:
February 29, 1960
This is to tell you again of my great appreciation
for yo, makii Dr. Scoville available to talk to our State
enssl Council last Tuesday. His presentation was clear and
0 U~?ectiv. I2 furnished the sound basis for a proper
cva s9: ion of the proposal3 comprising our fallout shelter
P2~-ems.
I fully understand your reluctance to have
,)r. Scoville appear before our larger body of legislators
lost week, and though I regret his non-availability, this
in no w:ay detracts from the great value of his earlier
contribution.
I met with me berg of both of the house of the
gislatesre on Wednesday for a two-hour discussion. The
legislators were tros7 ndouoly interested in the McHu3h
Report, n:ad it was a most interesting meeting.
With warm roger ds
Sincerely,
The t o oxcble Allen W. DSlles
Director,, Central Intelligence Agency
24 a street, R. W.
Was hit tom 25, D. C.
P. S. I a attaching a copy of the resolution which was
pesood by t ho State Defense Council, c:nhich I think you
will find 3r atifyingo
STATE Oa NEW YORK
EXECUTiVE. CHAMBER
ALBANY
~'3c4
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ER 40-1513-a
Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of New York Static
Albany, New York
Many thanks for your letter of Z9 February concerning
Pete Scoville's presentation to the New York State Defense
Council on 43 February.
Fete is most appreciative of your kind remarks. He had
already reported to me what excellent progress your Council
is making and how much he enjoyed meeting with you and the
other Council innembers. I appreciate your sending me a copy
of the resolution passed by the council which I am sending on
to Pete and others here who will be interested in reading it.
With regard to the Latin American matter you mentioned
to me on the telephone, we here would see no objection to the
procedure proposed.
th best wishes.
STAT
G/DC1 3 Mar 60
Retyped: 4 Mar 60
STAT Distribution:
Grig - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 -: FMC
1 - Dr. Scoville w/basic
---I = AII!Ip W29
Faithfully yours,
SIGNED
Allen W. Dulles
Director
?~pU
P80B01676R002ff V
0130004-9
 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles:
For your information, I am attaching a
copy of the 29 February letter from Governor
Rockefeller and a copy of your reply.
AAB
21 March 1960
(DATE)
FORM NO. 101 RELACES 10-101 1 AUG 54
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norable Nelson # . Rockafalierr,
Gt vernor of New Tar
P lbarty, New Ycrk
Dear Nelson:
i oliowing up our telephone co,-Weraation of yesterday,
I should like to suggest that Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.,
most with you and your Council In