ATTACHED MEMORANDUM ENTITLED POSSIBILITY OF AN EARTH SATELLITE BEING LAUNCHED FROM COMMUNIST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002600110038-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: June 7, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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N144V URANDUM FOR: The Undersecretary of State
N1
SUB,I.+::CT : A h d Memorandum i ntitleed
" Possibility of an Firth satellite
Being Launched from Communist
China"
As per your request. here are the views of the board
of National.:stlxnatrs on the possibility of as earth satellite
being launched from Communist China. I forward it to you
with my concurrence. I am also sending copies to members
of the Operations Coordinating Board for their is formation.
ALLEN W. DULLk.S
Director
SK:bpc
Executive '
Distribution
0 & . - Addrssee
- DCefile - w7 c~ a~.4
2 - AD/NE
ONE Memo
1 - DDCI (Cy/furnished directly by AD/IrE)
1 - ERw/eyatt
1 - Mr. Parrott, BA/OCB - ;r/ cy att.
NOTE FOR RECORD: ONE handling distribution of Menio to IAC members.
Mr. Parrott handling distribution to OCB members.
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
6 June 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGEME
SUBJECT: Possibility of an Earth Satellite Being Launched from
Communist China
1. Communist China cannot itself launch an earth satellite in the
near future. However., the USSR probably has the capability at present
to place in orbit from Chinese Communist territory a Soviet earth
satellite of up to about 500 pounds in size. As an ad hoc operation,
this could be done at any time on short notice (about six months from
initiation of the project)., at relatively little cost, and probably
without prior detection by US intelligence, With direct Soviet
assistance in providing vehicles and equipment and in the training of
Chinese personnel, the Chinese Communists could probably perform
a successful earth satellite launching,, under Soviet guidance and
direction,, in about one or two years from the initiation of the project.
This memorandum has been prepared with the assistance of representatives
of 0/SIB O/RR,, and ,O/CI.
SECRET
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$ECRET
2. Should the USSR and Communist China launch an earth satellite
from Chinese territory, considerable propaganda advantage would accrue
to them even though most informed world opinion would appreciate that
the launching had been largely a Soviet show. We have no evidence
concerning either such a Sino-Soviet policy decision, the construction
of a launching site in Communist China, or the imminence of an attempted
launching.
3. According to Peiping broadcasts, Kuo Mo-3o, head of the Chinese
Communist Academy of Science, recently stated that Communist China's
scientists were studying Soviet science and technology so that Communist
China could launch its own earth Satellite "in the near future."*
# Peiping broadcast in English Morse to Northeast and Southeast Asia,
16 May 1958, and published in similar form by Pravda, 18 May. A
slightly different version was broadcast by Peiping on 18 May, supposedly
a recorded statement by Kuo (Mandarin to North America) : "The Chinese
scientists are determined to get China's artificial earth satellite into
the sky at an early date. In order for this to materialize, we have
to expend very great efforts. However, there will be a day when the
artificial earth satellite of China will go into the sky. The earlier
that day comes the better." It is not clear whether these two Chinese
broadcasts, of the 16th and 18th, were intended to refer to the same,
original statement by Kuo, or whether the second broadcast was meant
to modify the first. A third, and most recent, Chinese broadcast
(22 May, English Morse to Asia) simply states that a forum of Chinese
Communist scientists at Nanking "approved the statement made by Kuo
Mo-jo that China's scientists have the determination to go ahead with
launching an artificial earth satellite. at an early date." It will be
recalled that Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated on 11 May that Communist
China presently has "neither atomic bombs nor rockets . . . but we will
have some in the future."
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Those broadcasts give no conclusive indications as to what the Chinese
Communists consider "the near future," or what degree of Soviet
assistance and involvement might be involved in such an undertaking.
4. Communist China presently has no capability itself to put an
earth satellite into orbit, and probably could not itself develop such
a capability within the next five-ten years.
5. However, with a great amount of Soviet assistance -- the supply
of the earth satellite and its launching vehicle, the construction of
launching facilities in China, the equipping and activation of
instrumentation and data handling facilities, the training of Chinese
technicians, and technical direction of the launching -- this time period
could be markedly shortened. In these circumstances, a launching from
a permanent installation of some kind in Communist China, with Chinese
personnel predominating, would require from one to two years from the
initiation of the project. Extremely fragmentary evidence indicates
that the Chinese may have had some association with Soviet missile
and space research programs in the past year or so, and may be making
a considerable effort to begin the development of a missile and earth
satellite program in China. It should be stressed, however, that we
presently have no firm evidence indicating the construction of a
permanent launching installation in China, although we would expect to
get some fragmentary indication of such activity once begun,
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6. Should the primary Communist consideration be the psychological
effect of launching an ostensibly Chinese earth satellite at the
earliest praAicable date, the USSR could launch a satellite from
Communist Chinese territory at any time with relatively short prepara-
tion (about six months from the initiation of the project) and at
relatively little cost. Currently available Soviet 350 or 700-mile
range ballistic missiles, fitted with two additional stage rocketsq
could be transported without great difficulty to Manchuria or possibly
to Sinkiang-Northwest China. There they could be fired from previously
selected and prepared sites, without theme necessarily being extensive
down-range guidance and tracking. Such vehicles could orbit a satellite
of up to about 500 pounds. An operation of this type could probably
be accomplished without prior detection by US intelligence, especially
if the launching occurred in Sinkiang or Northwest China. We presently
have no evidence that such an attempt is planned or is imminent.
7. The USSR and Communist China would almost certainly consider
that they could not palm off such an undertaking to all the world as
being "Chinese'" at any time in the near future. Rather, their intent
would probably be to (a) dupe those whom they could; (b) highlight
Chinese participation in the project and the developing potential of
Chinese Communist science and weaponry; and (c) stress the generosity
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of the USSR's assistance to its friends. Such an undertaking would
result in considerable psychological benefit to the USSR and Communist
China.
8, While such a launching will remain a constant possibility,
it is also possible that the emphasis of Sino-Soviet policy may bej,
instead, to develop a broader Chinese Communist program over the longer
run which combines space research with an emerging missile capability.
We presently have no evidence as to which, if either, of these courses
has been, or will be, adopted.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director.,
National Estimates
w 5 w
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