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May 23, 1963
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Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R00280028000618 . 23 May 1963 Dear Mr. Stratton: Mr. John McCone has asked rr, to ac- knowledge your Inter of ad May and to thank you for your note and the tear sheets from the Congressional Record of 16 ay. Mr. McCone had noted your analysis with interest and is grateful to you for bringing this matter to his attention. Sinc*rely, alter lde+r Executive Assistant The Honorable Samuel S. Stratto rjvuse os .Mepresentattves Washington 25, D. C. Distribution: C-rig... Addressee 1 EA/ICI, I4YASO. (3OVbe3 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R0 280028000 5~' SAMUEL S. sTRAAppooved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 Congreo of the Vniteb &tateo Louge of 1 epregentatibeg waIbington, 0. C. May 20, 1963 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES I am enclosing tear sheets from the Congressional Record of Thursday, May 16, containing my analysis of the Stennis Subcommittee report on Cuba. I thought you might be interested in seeing it. Honorable John A. McCone Director Central Intelligence Agency 2430 E Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 21 8296 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE May 16 In 1949, after much legal haggling, Los report of the Special Preparedness Sub- Alamos became a county, and its citizens be- committee of the other body, summariz- came legal residents of New Mexico with vot- frig its findings in its recent investigation ing privileges in local, State and national this whole matter. elections. In 1957, the gates came down and into anybody who wanted to could come a ;;d go Mr. Speaker, now that this report has in the town. been released I feel constrained to say Today, except for its rugged mountain set- that I find myself baffled, mystified, and ting, the community of bright green lawns disappointed by it. Last January and and brilliant gardens looks just about like February we found ourselves with a vio- any suburban town. Its more than 13,000 residents lent, almost hysterical attack being made enjoy an outstanding school sys- tem, a fast-growing shopping facility and upon both the integrity and the compe- tence of our Nation's intelligence of recreation. The housing has never ver gene agen- caught up with the demand and often seems cies. Either they cannot find out the to be losing ground, but the big hope for im- real facts about Cuba, we were being provement lies in two burgeoning subdi- told, or else they are deliberately cover- visions, where land and homes are being ing up. This attack became so severe b the ought and built by private individuals for and so potentially damaging that on project. first time in the history of the Federal February 6 to quiet it, the Secretary of But, If Los Alamos is still not quite a Defense went on nationwide television "normal" community, it soon will be. Last for 2 hours with material that only a fall, President Kennedy signed a bill making few hours earlier had been classified as possible the shift of commercial and residen- secret or top secret-a truly unprece- tial property of the Hill from Federal to dented undertaking, which, incidentally, private ownership. Although the long pro- cess was of platting, planning and appraisal has It was against this background, Mr. begun, actual sales are not expected to be- Speaker, that the subcommittee moved gin before mid-1964. Meanwhile, the AEC is planning more than $8 million worth of to try to find the real answer to these construction and maintenance to put munic- grave and very disturbing questions. ipal facilities in good, salable shape, and Were the intelligence people right-or the busy members of the Los Alamos Coun- were they not? The Congress ought to ty commission are tackling the monumental know, and the people ought to know, too. job of preparing the community for self- This was the task to which the distin- government. Many changes have taken place on Pajarito guished subcommittee set itself. Plateau during the past two decades. Now the verdict is in, Mr. Speaker, and Changes which have affected not only the I must say I am flabbergasted to see it: community itself, but changes which have ai- All charges have been factually dis- tered mankind's whole outlook on the world proved, but somehow the defendant has in which he lives. But, one thing will not still not been acquitted. Instead he re- change: the Laboratory's adventurous spirit mains under suspicion, if he is not in- and the unmatched natural beauty of the .deed actually which provides much of the ins irs_ y found guilty at least on p With an impressive record of accomplish- 1 realize tnat the legislative process ments behind it, and its hometown becom- involves compromise, but surely when it ing what the AEC hoped in 1947 would be comes to a question as gravely serious "a community satisfactory to scientists," the as the one that originally led to the sub- Laboratory can look to a promising future. committee's inquiry, do not we deserve a Many technological and scientific advances more specific answer than that, if the are predictable-achievement of flyable nu- facts at all warrant such an answer? clear rockets and investigation of more so- phisticated yet here is a jury verdict with some- sion; practical ical types systesm for r nuclear rocket obtaining pro power' thing for everybody, a strange amalgam from controlled fusion; fast breeding fission of both fact and fancy which comes out reactors; explorations in the field of muolecu- clearly and positively exactly nowhere. lar biology. Quite unpredictable, however, Surely if the facts point one way, Mr. are scientific and technological break- Speaker, then we have a right, do we throughs. There were plenty of these dur- not, to expect that the conclusions will Ing the Laboratory's first 20 years-there are follow them in the same direction? ,Jrrtain to be many more in the future. Surely when the integrity and the com- petence of our top intelligence services THE ROLE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE have been so viciously attacked, the AGENCIES DURING THE CUBAN American people have a right to expect MILITARY BUILDUP: WHAT ARE a more specific and forthright answer THE REAL FACTS, AND WHAT CAN from this great subcommittee. Let us look at this report. As I see WE PROPERLY CONCLUDE? it, every single one of the grave charges The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under -made against, our intelligence services previous order of the House, the gentle- last February-both on and off of the man from New York [Mr. STRATTON] is floors of Congress-have been specifical- recognized for 45 minutes. ly and conclusively disproved by the (Mr. STRATTON asked and was given subcommittee's report. permission to revise and extend his re- Let me just run down some of their marks.) findings, mostly in their own words:. Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, as a The subcommittee has uncovered no evi- member of the Armed Services Commit- dence to substantiate changes and specula- tee and as a former intelligence officer lion about a photography gap having existed in the Navy I have been from September 5 to October 14. The evi- in con- dence before the subcommittee leads to the e cerned since last January with the conclusion that such charges are unfounded. sweeping and serious charges that have - - been made against our established Gov- The news reports of an alleged conflict be- ernment intelligence agencies in connec- tween the CIA and SAC with reference to lion with their performance in the Cu- .the operation of U-2 high-altitude recon- naissance flights prior to October 14 were ban crisis. For this reason I have await- also closely inquired into and found to be ed with great interest the release of the without merit. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5,000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation. A net of 4,000 to 5,000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say. . That, Mr. Speaker, is a direct quote, as are the others, from the subcommittee's own report, and that adds up to a total estimated withdrawal of from 9,000 to 10,000 Soviet personnel. The report does not mention a single word about any evi- dence to support the charge, made in some quarters, that a comparable num- ber of Soviet personnel-whether called troops or technicians-have newly ar- rived in Cuba. Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. STRATTON. ?I yield to the gen- tleman from Massachusetts. Mr. MORSE. How many Soviet troops, according to the estimates of our intelligence sources, now remain in Cuba? Mr. STRATTON. If the gentleman will permit me to develop my point of view as I have prepared it, I think that we can then discuss that subject a little later. Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, if the gen- tleman will yield further, will the gen- tleman agree that the presence of Soviet troops rather than the number of Soviet troops is the critical factor? Mr. STRATTON. Well, I would say to my good friend from Massachusetts that I certainly agree with him that the pres- ence of Soviet troops is a matter of con- cern, but what I am directing myself to, however, is a specific item with respect to the quality of our intelligence and with respect to certain suggestions that have been made in certain quarters that certain individuals have a different kind of intelligence from that available to our top intelligence agencies. Such a sug- gestion was made, for example, to the effect that as many troops or techni- cians, or whatever you want. to call them, had moved back into Cuba in recent months as had been withdrawn earlier, and I am simply calling to the atten- tion of the House the fact that the re- port of the subcommittee says that a total of 9,000 to 10,000 troops were with- drawn from Cuba since October. And that there is not a shred of evi- dence in the report-I am not quoting- but there is nothing in the report to sug- gest that any number of troops or tech- nicians or Soviet personnel ever went back into Cuba. Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will yield further, would the gentleman agree that there are still thousands of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba today? Mr. STRATTON. Yes; and the re- ports substantiate that. Mr. MORSE. Would the gentleman restate his quotation with reference to the "photography gap"? Mr. STRATTON. Well, I do not mind debating with the gentleman, and I am always happy to talk with him, but my time is somewhat limited. Mr. MORSE. I just missed the dates. Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE 8~8s -ate. those who shared Bradbury's faith in Los Nerva rocket engine program. Nerva's first an increasing store of knowledge and high Alamos. planned application is as a nuclear third hopes. Their faith was confirmed often through- stage for the, Saturn C-5 manned lunar land-. Aiding and abetting all Laboratory proj- out the palance of 1946. In the spring, Gen- ing operation, and will make possible a sin- ects is the work of the chemistry and metal- eral Groves approved plans for construction gle launch capability. for lunar landing and lurgy division. Chemical and metallurgical of "The Hill's" first permanent housing, and return. Once engine tests have begun, hope- investigations of reactor materials, and the prefabricated units were added as quick re- fully sometime next year, Los Alamos' efforts development of new fabrication techniques, lief for the critical housing shortage. will be shifted to Investigations of more ad- are of prime importance in Project Rover, The biggest 'roost came In August, when vaned propulsion reactors. power reactor work and the plasma ther- Congress passed the McMahon Act, establish- The Rover reactor project, however, is only mocouple. Fundamental studies of urg- ing the Atomic Energy Commission and put- part of a varied reactor research program nium and transuranium elements have ting atomic energy under civilian-control. that began before the Laboratory was a year added significantly to the world's knowl- As 1947 began, the Commission took over old. The world's first homogeneous reactor, edege of such materials. A pioneer in the and the University of California agreed to the Water Boiler, produced its first chain re- field of plutonium processing, Los Alamos continue operating the Laboratory. With the action in May 1944, and continues to oper- developed an electro-refining process that Commission establishing as its first priority ate, at higher power, in a deep Los Alamos has been called "the biggest advancement "the stabilization and revitalization of the canyon. Following the Water Boiler came in plutonium process technology in a dec- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory," it became the world's first fast reactor, Clementine, so ade." A batch of plutonium refined by this clear that Los Alamos would continue to play named because it operated in a cavern in a process has been accepted by the National a key role in the Nation's atomic energy canyon and used plutonium, whose code Bureau of Standards as the Nation's first program. word was "49." Clementine operated from and only recognized standard of pure metal. Although the Laboratory continued devel- 1949 to 1953. Still another research reactor, Research in low temperature physics, by opment of advanced fission weapons, it Omega West, went into low power operation the cryogenics group, has produced signifi- shortly embarked upon its second major in July 1956. cant work in measurements of the Moss- mission-development of the hydrogen bomb. In the midfifties the Laboratory entered bauer effect, and in a temperature scale Theoretical possibilities for a thermonu- another field of reactor research with the based on the vapor pressure of helium 3 that clear weapon, an idea born during a lunch- formation of a division to investigate power has been adopted as a worldwide standard. time discussion in early 1942, had been under reactor development. To date, three unique Biomedical research,. a program that grew study since the earliest days at Los Alamos reactor concepts have been tested, and a out of early concern for the amount of by a special group headed by Edward Teller. third experiment is under construction. Also plutonium being absorbed by personnel, has Theoretically, the scientists knew, a fusion in the works: a fast reactor core test fa- become a program of great importance in reaction was possible, but It required tem- cility in which various fast reactor core de- the Laboratory. The health research group peratures far higher than any previously signs can be readily interchanged without recently completed a 6-year study of radio- created by man. With the success of the going to the effort of building an entire re- activity in milk and in humans, the most fission bomb, these high temperatures had actor for each core. extensive project of its kind ever under- been achieved. The thermonuclear bomb Another of the Laboratory's major achieve- taken. This, along with the group's en- was now in the realm of practical possibility. ments, growing out of its reactor research, lightening findings on the harmful effects But, major barriers were still unsur- was the first direct conversion of nuclear of radiation, have made Los Alamos scien- mounted. Once the cooperative efforts of energy into electrical power. Though many tests among the foremost authorities on fall- Teller and Stanislaw I71am made the neces- scientists had been fascinated by the pos- out in the world. sary conceptual breakthrough, the Labora- sibility since the first nuclear pile went All of the Laboratory's practical programs tory was able to launch an elaborate theoret- critical, it remained for a group of Los Ala- are supported by basic and independent re- critical, and experimental research program. mos men to come up with the plasma thermo- search. The history of the Laboratory af- The famous electronic brain, Maniac, was couple. Working on the principle of the fords dozens of examples of original research' built to handle the complex calculations of conventional two-metal thermocouple, the projects which have resulted in unique con- the thermonuclear process, and the Labora- plasma device substitutes an easily ionized tributions to mankind's knowledge of the tory went on a 6-day week to get the job gas for one of the metals. It obtains its physical universe. To accomplish this, the Laboratory is done. In November 1952, 2 months before heat from the neutron flux of the Omega well equipped with research the Laboratory's 10th anniversary, the West reactor. After more than 70 in-pile tools. In addition to two research reactors world's first full-scale thermonuclear explo- tests, scientists now are thinking of a power and many critical assemblies, Los Alamos sion shook - the Pacific atoll of Eniwetok reactor built of many of these cells, pro- has one of the world's highest voltage elec- with the detonation of the Los Alamos de- ducing a high power level and capable of variable tic accelerators, two smaller ones, a vice, "Mike." operating for thousands of hours. varia energy cyclotron, a Cockcroft Wal- Since that time, several dozen LASL fission Although a practical power reactor prob- ton accelerator and various betatrons. A enerator will be lsed neutron g u kil lt p ovo 350 - ' have been tested In 8 and fusion devices series of tests in the Pacific and in 8 comprising 100 shots, conducted at series , the Nevada test site. Today, more than 90 y . e or ex space ships The weap- the first 20 ears . y l y i g ur n id e d l w percent of all fission and fusion warheads in will put ion propulsion within practicathe U.S. stockpile are Los Alamos products. reach. ons program depended heavily on theoretical During the first decade, as it is today, the work-and still does. In addition, Lasl Laboratory's primary responsibility was de- The harnessing of thermonuclear energy theoreticians have been active in many peace- velopment and - improvement of nuclear as a cheap, almost inexhaustible source of ful areas of research, from :nuclear structure weapons. However, in view of Bradbury's power was discussed at Los Alamos long be- to astrophysics. Much of the complex work, emphasis on programs of fundamental re- fore the hydrogen bomb became a reality. both theoretical and experimental, is made search and development related to the prob- Just before the Mike shot in 1952, the first possible by the Laboratory's unique array of lems of nuclear energy, it is not surprising experiments in what is now called Project fast computers. In fact, the Laboratory that peaceful and fundamental fields of re- Sherwood were conducted with a device boasts the world's largest computer center. search have received increasing emphasis called perhapsitron-perhaps it would work. Maniac I, first of the stored program paral- until today approximately half of the Labo- perhaps it wouldn't. lel electronic computers, was designed and ratory's effort is devoted to this type of re- It didn't. But the experiments offered built at Los Alamos and went to work in search, enough encouragement to keep the search 1952. Seven years later, it was replaced by One nonmilitary project, now the Labora- going and opened up an entirely new field of - Maniac II. In addition, the Laboratory' has tory's second largest program, is Project Ro- investigation; plasma physics. an IBM 704, two 7090's and the supercom- ver, the Nation's effort to develop nuclear Since no material exists that is capable of puter, "Stretch," developed) for the Labors rocket propulsion. Since 1955, the Labora- withstanding the incredibly high tempera- tory by IBM. tory has concentrated on design, develop- tures required to produce a sustained ther- In the last 20 years, while the Laboratory ment, and eventually testing of the Kiwi monuclear reaction in ionized deuterium gas, was making notable scientific advances, the series of reactors. These are named for the the plasma must be confined in the nonma- community of Los Alamos itself was coming flightless Australian bird, because they are terial walls of a magnetic field, or "bottle." of age. .not Intended to fly, Successful tests of three Trying a variety of approaches to this prob- The AEC brought to Los Alamos-in the Kiwi-A and one Kiwi-B reactors, using gas- lem, Los Alamos scientists eventually late 1940's-an ambitious, $121 million plan eous hydrogen as a propellant-coolant, began achieved, with a machine called Scylla, a for community expansion and laboratory re- in 1959 and removed doubts about the feast- burst of neutrons showing an energy tem- location which put new, modern technical bility of developing nuclear propulsion at all. perature of 15 million degrees-and fusion. facilities on neighboring mesas, removing the This year tests of Kiwi-B reactors using Though recognized around the world as the unsightly old wooden structures-and their liquid hydrogen as propellant-coolant, will first manmade controlled thermonuclear high fences-from the town's main street. be conducted with the purpose of evaluating reaction, the achievement also showed that A spacious, attractively landscaped shopping and modifying the reactor for use in a rocket there was still a very long way to go. Some and community center was added. Schools engine. During the year, phasing from re- 10 years of work with a variety of devices and housing were built in the frantic effort actor to engine development is expected in have resulted in some disappointing fail- to keep up with the need. A post office, li- a cooperative effort with contractors in the urea, some promising successes, and always, brary and medical center were added. No. 73-2 In ably will not be a reality until sometime the 1970's, such a device could power the in operation soon, and a tandem Van de life-supporting facilities man needs in his Graff generator is being purchased. It also Theoretical studies at Los Alamos ranged nded journe s t f Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 1$63 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Mr. STRATTON. I have a rather long speech and it might, perhaps, be better for us to get in the discussion after I have had a chance to get it in the RECORD. Let me say that the reference to the. photography gap was a statement di- rectly from the committee report that they looked into the charge of a photog- raphy gap, and I am sure the gentle- man recalls when this was made, and it made big headlines, they looked into it and found that the charges were un- founded. Mr. MORSE. Between what dates? Mr. STRATTON. Between September 5 and October 14. Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will yield further, is it not a fact that there was no aerial reconnaissance surveil- lance of Cuba, during. that period of time? Mr. STRATTON. No, that is not a fact. The report-and I invite the gen- tleman's attention to it-lists the extent of the coverage and backs up the state- ment which it made and which I am quoting, that there was no gap between September 5 and October 14. Mr. MORSE. I thank the gentleman. Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, here are some other points the report makes, in its own wording: . The intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America. Offensive weapons systems- were identified before becoming operational and their loca- tions and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite ad- verse weather and an almost - completely closed society. Photographic reconnaissance ultimately produced incontrovertible proof. of the pres- ence of strategic missiles and offensive weap- ons in Cuba. Credit is due to those In- volved in this mission. It has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of un- confirmed reports and rumors from human sources' about strategic missile-related ac- tivity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. And again, on this same subject, which incidentally lies at. the very heart of the attacks which have been mounted against our intelligence performance. During the July-August period refugee re- ports of alleged missile activity in Cuba in- creased significantly. These reports Were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even- though many of them included con- sistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity there was no con- firmation of them. We have been reading a lot, Mr. Speak- er, about those who had information-be- fore the President of the United States went on television on the 22d of Octo- ber and how those who had this infor- mation were right and how the Govern- ment was wrong. Here a direct reading of the Senate document, which has not received the attention it deserves in the press, completely and totally refutes that kind of a charge. The MRBM's were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they were still in their crates. The Mig 21's were discovered when only one had been removed from the ship- ping container. CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photographic capa- bility, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, ? his advisers and U.S. diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet Government assur- ances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the OAS and world acceptance of the cor- rectness of our position. The Intelligence -community does not believe that in fact Cuba is now or has been a base for Soviet submarines. Now, Mr. Speaker, I have here listed 11 specific points, in the language of the report itself, which I think are respon- sive to Some of the charges we have all been reading in the press. These are the hard, demonstrated facts about our Cuban intelligence found by the subcom- mittee. They add up, in my judgment, to a simply overwhelming confirmation of an outstanding job done by our in- telligence agencies in the Cuban crisis. And they conclusively refute and, indeed, demolish, Mr. Speaker, all the myriad charges we have heard raised on this floor and in another body about what was really going on in Cuba, or what was really known to someone with some specialized brand of "inside intelligence dope." I think this is a tremendous verdict to be handed down by any jury, Mr. Speaker, and surely it. should have de- molished once and for all the nit-picking attacks that have been made variously on the competency and integrity of our Nation's intelligence services. Not only should these facts wipe out completely all of these efforts to cast doubt and suspicion on the performance of our in- telligence agencies, surely they should give us a great sense of pride, both in the performance of our intelligence people and in the conduct of our Government leaders acting on the basis of that in- telligence information. Yet, Mr. Speaker, and this is the thing that disturbs me, and it is the reason why I have taken this time today, having clearly acquitted the defendant on the basis of the factual evidence, the sub- committee jury, by some strange legis- lative alchemy, then proceeds to find him guilty not on the basis of the facts but on guesswork. Let us take a closer look at this strange turn of events in the sub- committee report. First. Having discarded the charge about missiles being hidden in caves, by saying that the intelligence chiefs "to a man" did not believe it, the subcom- mittee goes on to add: However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise * * * based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about this matter. What a strange statement, Mr. Speak- er, that is. Anything, of course, Is al- ways possible. But are we living in a real world or are we living in a dream world? Do we act on the basis of facts .8287 and evidence, or on the basis ? only of philosophical skepticism? Do we make our decisions on reality, or in terms of absolutes which can have no application to our real world? Are we now suddenly to discard the reasoned, rational, realistic beliefs of every single one of our intelligence chiefs and to fall back instead on some appeal to absolutes and "nothing more" than philosophical skepticism as the touch- stone of truth and falsity when it comes to Cuba? We certainly do not operate this way in any other agency of govern- ment; we do not operate this way in the business world; we most certainly do not operate on that basis in our everyday lives. Then why should we now sudden- ly be told that such an approach is a meaningful factor in assessing our Gov- ernment's conduct in the Cuban crisis? Or consider this statement in the re- port: The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assesment of the accumulated data. Moreover there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the infor- mation which had been gatherer:. And again: It was not until the photographic evid- ence was obtained on October 14 that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. Mr. MACGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gen- tleman from Minnesota. Mr. MACGREGOR. In connection with the point the gentleman made as to the verification of ballistics missiles in Cuba on October 14 for the first time, I would like to inquire whether the gen- tleman was in the House of Representa- tives on September 26, 1962-and I am quoting the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 19719-when the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] advised the House as follows: We have arrived, Mr. Chairman, at the point where we had better .march together while time remains. I got a lot of information over the 22 years I have been on the military committee, and I have other assignments from which I get information. They are loaded for bear in Cuba. Russia has missiles, and they are portable ones that can permeate the United States-and they are portable-from Havana, Cuba, to Norfolk, Va. And this is not idle talk. Was the gentleman in the Chamber on September 26, 1962, some 3 weeks in ad- vance of October 14, 1962, when the dis- tinguished gentleman from South Caro- lina [Mr. RIVERS] made that statement without, I may add, any refutation what- soever? Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman knows I cannot recall specifically whether I was in the Chamber on a par- ticular day. Mr. MACGREGOR. This was during the debate on the Cuba resolution, and I assume the gentleman was here. Mr. STRATTON. I know I was there that day, and was proud to vote for the Approved For. Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002800280006-8 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 8288 resolution. I do not recall the gentle- man's statement being made. I have no doubt it was made. Mr.:YIACGREGOR. I assure the gen- tleman that I have correctly quoted Mr. RIVERS statement. Mr. STRATTON. I would not take issue at all with what the distinguished ranking member of our committee said. I simply point out to the gentleman that what applies to the gentleman from South Carolina applies to the distin- guished Member of the other, body, with whom :C have upon occasion taken excep- tion with regard to this same point; namely, that there were a lot of rumors and reports of strategic missiles and of short-Lange missiles in Cuba prior to October 14. The point I am making is the point made by me in this body before, and now has been demonstrated and proven by the report of a subcommittee of the other body; namely, that until October 14 there was no proof, no con- firmation of this charge. It is one thing to talk about rumors, and it is another thing to talk about proven fact. When you are going to take this country to the brink of nuclear war, as the President did' on October 22, you had better be very sure that what you are talking about is a fact and not a rumor. Mr. MACGREGOR. I have served, like the gentleman, in the intelligence branch of our military services. Would the gentleman not agree with the dis- tinguished subcommittee of the other body that intelligence coming from a closed society covers a certain range of factual information, and the principal problem is proper evaluation and analysis. Mr. STRATTON. I certainly would agree with the gentleman on that point. If the gentleman will bear with me a moment, he will see I am now moving into a discusion of this specific point. I am sure that after the gentleman has heard what I have to say, because of his background in the intelligence field and his own native sound intelligence, he will agree wholeheartedly with the state- ment I am about, to make. Mr. MACGREGOR. I await the gen- tleman's further remarks with bated breath. Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentle- man. Resuming the direct quotation from the subcommittee report on this second major critique which they make of our intelligence performance in the Cuban crisis: It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14 that the intel- ligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14 negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy, and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence com- munity. Now, Mr. Speaker, I regret to say that this statement simply makes no sense to me. The report itself has already stated, as I mentioned just a moment ago, that until the U-2 flight of October 14 there was not a single bit of confirmation of the human reports that strategic mis- siles had been placed in Cuba, even though they were most scrupulously checked out by our intelligence person- nel. Are we now being asked to criticize our intelligence people because they did .not conclude that strategic missiles were in Cuba before they had any confirma- tion of these rumors in their hands? What does the subcommittee think our intelligence chiefs should base their judgments on-confirmed fact, or fic- tion? Before October 14 the record it- self says there was absolutely no con- firmed proof of Soviet strategic missiles at hand. Our intelligence agencies would have been derelict indeed had toey made any such conclusion then before the Oc- tober 14 date. But we also know that as soon as the October 14 evidence was in, they immediately made the correct con- clusion, and they passed it on swiftly to the President, and he in tufn acted swiftly, courageously, and effectively. Does the subcommittee really think our intelligence agencies are open to repri- mand because they failed to manifest psychic powers prior to October 14? Again, the report says this: Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not in- troduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as In- terpreted by them. . Well, this may well have applied to some or even many in the intelligence community, but it emphatically does not apply to the chief of that intelligence community, Mr. John McCone, as the distinguished Senator from Washington, Mr. JACKSON, makes clear on page 7733 9f the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for May 9, the day the text of the report was made available to the other body. The subcommittee report goes on: The danger that such pereonceptions will control the weighting of the facts as events unfold is evident. And again: It appears that on this point [about stra- tegic missiles] the analysts were strongly in- fluenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Now, Mr. Speaker, this statement too makes no sense to me. I am sorry to say, the subcommittee's own report has made it crystal clear that whatever may have been the erroneous preconceptions and philosophical judgments of certain ana- lysts within the intelligence community, they had not the slightest control or in- fluence over the weighting of the facts, because from the very moment the re- ports of strategic missiles in Cuba came in, the Government did everything with- in its power to determine the truth of these reports. Checked them out, as the subcommittee itself commented, "scru- pulously." That is a pretty strong word, Mr. Speaker. What more could it have possibly done? Whatever erroneous philosophical judgments there may have been, they had absolutely no impact on our actions. We were not lulled asleep, as at Pearl Harbor. We did not refuse to May 16 check out all' the evidence as at Pearl Harbor. Instead we did a fantastically thorough intelligence job that got results as quickly as humanly possible, even though those results proved to be con- trary to the philosophical preconceptions of some people; and then finally we ac- cepted that confirmed proof and we acted. on it the moment it was received- as the subcommittee's factual findings also indicate. What a vast-and most fortunate difference-from what hap- pened in the days before Pearl Harbor. Finally, Mr. Speaker, we are told that the intelligence community erred by substantially underestimating Soviet troop strength in Cuba. Now let me make just two comments on this par- ticular alleged error. In the first place, there can be no other basis for determining Soviet manpower in Cuba except our own intelligence esti- mates. If our intelligence agencies can be said to have underestimated Soviet manpower this can only be so because they have now, on the basis of further information, come up with a new esti- mate. There is no other benchmark short perhaps of direct Soviet and Cuban announcements, Mr. Speaker, by which to measure real Soviet strength in Cuba, or an on-the-spot head count on'Cuban soil. So to criticize the performance of our intelligence reports on the basis of other updated intelligence reports made by the same agency strikes me as an exercise in futility. Secondly, the subcommittee appears. to be laboring here, as before, under a- misapprehension that intelligence can- not be good unless :[t is absolutely certain and 100 percent correct. Now nothing could possibly be further from the truth than that. Intelligence of the enemy must by its very nature be inexact, an attempt at approximating a truth that is deliberately and ingenously being con- cealed from us. To criticize intelligence, even softly, simply because it is not accu- rate is to retreat once more into an un- realistic dream world of absolutes that bears no relation to reality itself. To in- sist that our intelligence services must have nothing but perfect scores would be like insisting on an airplane flying with- ogt the wing drag-without which sus- tained flight itself, of course, would be impossible-it just cannot in the nature 'of the case be done,. Now, Mr. Speaker, on the basis of this analysis, I think it should now be clear that as far as the facts developed by the distinguished subcommittee of the other body are concerned, the record of our intelligence services during the Cuban crisis, far from being open to doubt, suspicion or attack, is nothing short of phenomenal. The discovery of the stra- tegic missile sites in Cuba was a major intelligence victory-and one which has been almost as much overlooked and de- preciated in recent days as the military and diplomatic victory which was won by President Kennedy between October 22 and October 28. Only when we leave the realm of facts behind, Mr. Speaker, and retreat into another wQrld of absolutes and unat- tainable perfection can there be any basis for criticizing the performance of Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 1963 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002800280006-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE our intelligence agencies in Cuba or for suggesting that the attacks which have been made against them have any real merit whatsoever. I deeply regret, Mr. Speaker, that there has been this strange blend of fact and fancy. On the facts the committee de- veloped there certainly could have been and I believe there should have been, a clear, forthright, unmistakable, and con- clusive rejection of all these unwarranted and irresponsible attacks that have been made against our intelligence agencies. The facts were there. The call could and should have been given, loud and clear. Instead, Mr. Speaker, the trumpet has given forth an uncertain sound. Those who in months past have gained fame and notoriety by the supsicions they have tried to create about the performance of our intelligence agencies have unfortu- nately been given aid and comfort by the inconclusive nature of this report. Indeed, already they are citing the sub- committee document as proof of all their earlier- charges. . But there remains one ray of hope, Mr. Speaker. This report is after all an in- terim report. Others, we are told, will be issued later on. I am indeed hopeful that when the final report is in, these curious contradictions will have been eliminated. Unanimity is a great thing, Mr. Speak- er. But let me say that I am hopeful that if the final report on this vital issue cannot come down unanimously solidly behind the ability and integrity of our intelligence services in the Cuban crisis, at least we will have a minority report to read which will state the record with- out hesitation or apology, as one chapter in American military history of which we can all be proud. FOREIGN, TRAVEL EXPENSES f'JF 1b1BERS OF CONGRESS SHOULD BE LIMITED The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House. the gentle- man from New York [Mr. HAI,PERN] is recognized for 15 minutes. Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate the Members of this House for approving legislation that, upon enactment, would restrict foreign travel expenses of Members of Congress. The legislation is, of course, House Joint Resolution 245. 1 feel strongly about this legislation and I trust it will win overwhelming sup- port in the other body. My only regret is that the measure did not come before the House in the original, stronger and broader version as introduced by the distinguished chairman of the Commit- tee on House Administration, the gentle- man from Texas [Mr. ? BuRLESON]. However, the legislation as passed by the House is a long step forward and I hope the first of many steps to follow. It is true that the House Rules Com- mittee during this Congress has tight- ened authorizations for matters pertain- ing to congressional travel. It is also true trough that the Rules Committee actipfis do not have the permanence of law, and therefore, can be relaxed at will. It is important therefore that travel reform legislation is enacted. Other- wise, Congress will once again be open to charges of practicing temporary and ineffectual cures, and of neglecting permanent and effective ones, in spite of the Rules Committee's notable efforts. Commendable as this legislation is, it should be considered as only a first step by Congress in putting its Houses in order. The reform of travel expendi- tures, after all, is only one of many necessary reforms, few of which have been seriously considered lately by Congress. The next reform measure that Con- gress should consider would provide for the examination of all congressional re- form proposals. My bill, H.R. 1952, and several similar bills would establish a Commission on the Organization of Con- gress. I trust that the Rules Committee will give priority to this legislation and afford an early opportunity for hearings on it. This Commission would r'ecommerid legislation that would take up where the Reorganization Act of 1946 and relevant legislation left off. Generally speaking, the Commission would study Federal leg- islative conditions, and then recommend improvements in the organization and operation of Congress. The study would be undertaken with a view to altering Congress in the follow- ing ways: strengthen it, simplify its op- erations and make them more efficient, improve its relations with the other branches, and enable Congress better to meet its constitutional responsibilities. Tile Commission's studies would in- cl e, but not be limited to, the organza- " "and operation of the House and Senate, and the relations between gress, including the structure and work- ings of all congressional committees and the relations among them, and the em- ployment and pay of congressional em- ployees. Furthermore, the Commission would study the relations between Con- gress, the executive,-and the judiciary. The Commission would be composed of at least seven Members from each House, with an initial party ratio of 4 to 3, in favor of the majority. These 14 Mem- bers would be supplemented by 2 more, with distinguished records of interest in public affairs, and appointed by the President of the' United States, regard- less of political affiliation. A majority vote of the Members repre- senting each House, taken separately, would be necessary for approval of Com- mission recommendations. The Commission would make avail- able to Congress not only stiffer organi- zational standards, but also standards of behavior. Standards in the latter re- gard have been, and continue to be, poorly defined, and as a result have con- tributed to unfortunate and misleading publicity. The rules of Congress have been taken for granted at a time when nothing should be taken for granted. If Con- gress continues to neglect revision of its rules, the work upon public business will become only more haphazard. We 8289 shall be charged with relying on rules that appear to be sound chiefly because Congress has endured, and not because such rules have aided in the dispatch of business. It would indeed be tragic if Congress would change only when an aroused Na- tion forced it to change. Force breeds haste, violence, and unsound reform. Therefore let this Congress act not from forced impulse, but rather from sea- soned deliberation, in order to provide for the inevitable. NEW TEST-BAN PROPOSAL (Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 10 minutes.) Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, on September 26, 1961, President Kennedy affixed his signature to a document. It was not an ordinary document, for it proclaimed to the whole world the desire of the American people to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race but to a peace race. The document which the President signed on that day was the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. This legislation, of which I was a spon- sor, received extensive consideration in the Congress and in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which it is my privilege to be' a member. It passed by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 73 to 14 in the Senate and 290 to 54 in the House. The purpose of the act was to create the Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency. By congressional man- date, it was to explore, recommend, and if approved by the President, negotiate possible alternatives to the arms race in order to enhance our national security. Ever since its establishment, I have closely followed and strongly supported the activities of this Agency for peace. This year I introduced the first of many bills in the House to remove the $10 mil- lion legislative ceiling on appropriations which was contained in the original act. Out of this $10 million, $8.33 million has been appropriated to the Agency during the year and a half it has been in ex- istence. By comparison, almost $50 bil- lion was appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1963 alone. If the work of the Agency is to continue, and if we are to continue to pursue safeguarded and informed negotiations in the field of arms control and disarm- ament, the legislative ceiling on appro- priations obviously must be lifted. I admit that I may not be as knowl- edgeable as some of the experts and technicians who are concerned with working out the details of arms control and disarmament agreements. Perhaps, though, this permits me, as it permits other Americans, to be more objective in my judgments. You have all read and heard about the controversy over wheth- er or not our test-ban proposals are ade- quately safeguarded. Arguments have raged over whether or not our proposed verification system is adequate to detect Soviet cheating under a test ban. For the most part, this concern has been directed at possible secret Soviet tests with a magnitude less than one- quarter the size of our first nuclear ex- Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 8290 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD - HOUSE plosion in New Mexico almost 20 years ago .and less than one ten-thousandths the sine of the largest recorded Soviet ex- plosion It is the view of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Con- trol ani Disarmament Agency that sig- nifican, Soviet advances would require a series of tests; that the probability is high that any meaningful series would be discovered by seismic or other means; and that such occasional small tests as might evade detection, if the Soviets were prepared to risk getting caught, would not have a damaging impact on the military balance. Weighing the risks of continued unlimited testing against the risks involved in a test-ban treaty, both this administration and the Ei- senhower administration concluded that such a treaty would be in our national interest. Now let me mention just briefly a few of the advantages of a test-ban agree- ment. It would: First, be a first step toward slowing down the nuclear arms race; second, be a first step toward in- hibiting the further development of nu- clear capabilities by other countries-a development which would increase the chances of nuclear devastation; third, eliminate the expense of conducting nu- clear tests, an expense which is in the hundreds of millions of dollars for each series; fourth preserve for a longer time our present advantages in nuclear weap- onry; and fifth, eliminate radioactive fallout. Despite these overwhelming advan- tages, tide issue has been beclouded and misundersjood. In addition to the dis- proportionate and sometimes manufac- tured fears of Soviet cheating, arguments have also raged over the so-called con- cessions we have made in the number of annual onsite inspections. These critics ignore the fact that, when the United States was proposing a greater number of annual inspections, we be- lieved there were almost four times more earthquakes annually in the Soviet Un- ion than has proved to be the case. This greatly diminishes the number of nat- ural earthquakes which would be likely to be confused with the tremors caused by nuclear explosions. These opponents of a test ban also ignore the fact that research has given us improved ability through seismic and other means to dis- criminate at a distance and without in- spections, between earthquakes and ex- plosions. If these are "concessions," they are concessions to peace, to the greater security of America and all na- tions, and to scientific progress. The President, the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have all stated that a test ban agreement would be in treaty form, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate before it could be put in effect. Some Senators in Con- gress have recently speculated that if the present proposal were submitted to them, the required two-thirds majority would be lacking. One Senator recently suggested, on the basis of a study his staff had made, that the proponents of a test ban treaty would be lucky to get 57 out of 100 votes. I speak to inquire if the country feels the same way-if American mothers and fathers want to continue to face the prospect of nuclear annihilation for themselves and their children-if they want to face the con- tinuing and ever-increasing threat of radioactive fallout as more and more countries start testing and building up nuclear arsenals of destruction. In an address before the United Na- tions on September 25, 1961, the day be- fore the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was signed into law, President Kennedy said: Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when it may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident, miscalculation or madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us. I do not believe that the estimates for U.S. Senate support of a test ban treaty, if correct reflect the sentiment of the vast majority of Americans. I say that it is imperative that we make some effort, in however small a measure, to strength- en the slender thread by which the nu- clear sword of Damocles hangs. I say we must break the stalemate which again exists at Geneva. Although I am not a military technologist or an expert on seismology, I am an American and a human being. I personally do not be- lieve it is either realistic or in the interest of our national security to let technicalities of comparatively minor import blind and distort a goal which two administrations have concluded to be in our national interest. Over the years the distance between the Soviet and U.S. positions has been narrowed by changes on both sides. Who knows if time and the possibility of a new regime in the Soviet Union will render impos- sible the goal we so earnestly seek and obliterate forever the frail opportunity that we now have? I say let us make clear evidence of our overwhelming de- sire to go forward in the cause of peace and security. I say, let us split our di- vergence down the middle. I say, let us propose an agreement for 1 year with the option of renewing that agreement for longer periods. I say further, let us propose an agreement calling for five effective, meaningful onsite inspections. The Soviets are satisfied to permit two or three inspections only. We have been asking for six or seven inspections. I suggest here a compromise of five mean- ingful, onsite inspections under a 1-year treaty, with the option of renewal. In this way we could promote the cause of peace, security, and trust, and test the validity of our proposals. Thus we may accomplish the results sought through- out the world by the man in the street- a test ban treaty. Certainly, this may involve taking some chance, but is it comparable with our continuing gamble on international nuclear annihilation? If it is determined that the proposed agreement is found unworkable, we could always return to the uneasy peace pres- ently existing. s.~. May 16 As Senator CHURCH of the Senate For- eign Relations Committee said at a re- cent hearing on test ban negotiations: Practically no attention is given at all- which would permit the people of the United States to put this question in perspective- to the risks that we are taking and continue to take if, somehow, we do not begin to turn this nuclear arms race down. We are like passengers on a train that is headed toward a terrible precipice, and we know the bridge is out, and yet, we are arguing with one another as to what the dan- gers are in jumping off the train without taking into, account what the inevitable end result will be if we continue on the tracks. What do I seek? An avenue, an ap- proach to attain a goal which the world seems to be crying out for-a goal that may be just beyond the touch of our fingertips. I am not unmindful of cer- tain disadvantages that may be inherent in my proposal and. I would not want it to be put into effect unless our security experts agreed that, on balance, it was in our national interest. However, un- less some means is found to break the stalemate, this illusive thing called peace may not be attained in our lifetime-and who knows-how long this lifetime might be under present world conditions? RUSSIAN TRAWLERS IN THE CARIBBEAN The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentle- man from Florida [Mr. ROGERS] is recog- nized for 60 minutes. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL]. (Mr. FASCELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks and to include extraneous mat- ter.) Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, last March 4 there appeared in the southern- most newspaper of the United States The Key West Citizen of Key West, Fla., a news story by Jim Cobb, supported by photographic evidence of a Russian- made fishing boat, the omicron 50, which was reportedly hijacked by its two Cuban crewmen. At this time, as a prelude to the discussion which is about to take place I would like again, Mr. Speaker, to draw my colleagues' attention to this incident and to refresh their memories on the subject. The headline was: "Russian-Made Fishing Boat Is Brought Here; Hijacked by Cuban Crewmen." The story follows: A new 50-foot fishing vessel, identified as Russian-made and reportedly hijacked, dock- ed here yesterday and its two Cuban crew- man were taken into custody by immigra- tion officials. The vessel-the Omicron 50-is believed to be a part of the huge Soviet-backed develop- ment program of the Cuban fishing indus- try announced last October by Premier Fidel Castro. It arrived under its own power about 8:30 a. in. The two Cubans were immediately whisked off to Miami by immigration au- thorities. Their identities were not released. Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002800280006-8 Congress of the 1niteb'tatO 3bouze of 3atpreoeutatfbeo Honorable John A. McCone Director Central Intelligence Agency l; 2+30 E Street, N W. Washington, D. C.