MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTION OF OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R002900090004-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 6, 2005
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 21, 1962
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R002900090004-0.pdf473.13 KB
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Approved For Releas FICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 1676R002900090004-0 21 May 1.962 RADIX FOR: Director, National Security Agency Management and Direction of Overhead Reconnaissance Activities The Director of Central Intelligence recently asked this staff to examine the arrangements between the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the National Reconnaissance Office. In connection with this examination, selected members of the Coordination Staff have received a helpful briefing by members of your agency. We have now arrived at certain tentative conclusions and recommendations which are contained in the attached paper. 2. Nefore forwarding these conclusions and recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence, we would appreciate any comments or suggestions that you may have concerning them. 25X1 3 I am asking of my staff personally to convey this 0 you, in view of its sensitivity. lie familiar with a on this problem, and is available for consultation with you your staff. At.tqchment NSA, DIA and NRO review(s) completed. NGA Review Completed. Assistant f Approved For Release 2005/ 2 Zliad downgrading and declassification B0167 ordination T.S. Copy 171208/2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 This document may be R002900090004-0 aowngraded to when enclosure ctached. Approved For Release 2005/ A-RDP80B0 A76RD02900090011 -d 12:1 ATTfiCIMT 25X1 MANAGEMENTAt DIRECTION OF OVERR CAI8SC itITIg8 1. The memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from the Secretary of Defense dated 6 September 1961 formalized a working arrangement between Defenae and CIA which came into being in the early stages of developing a satellite intelligence collection capability. It is clear that this arrangement eh/eh placed authority for the conduct of research, development and operations at a high level in each agency, and which recognized the need for coordination of effort and full use of each agency's capabilities, was essential to the success of the initial program. If erraagemeets of this nature are to be continued, they Should be modified in the light Of the intelligence experience which has been gained to date with the, program. 2. In retrospect, it can be seen that the progran has not yet produced the fullest intelligence benefits of which it in capable in the fields of CONINT and RUNT. I The National Security Agency is specifi- cally charged with responsibility for providing at the national level unified organisation and control of COMMIT and BUNT resources and activities of the U. S. Government. Thus, because guidance and assistance were not Obtained from NSA, the COMINT/BUNT satellite reconnaissance efforts to date have not been as productive as might herwise have been the case. 3. Although the memorandum of the Secretary of Defense formalizing NRC) states that it will be responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities as established by the Malted States Intelligence Board (MIR), it Is clear that this responsiveness has been effective only with respect to certain photographic requirements for which the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COM)R) supports U8IB. 4. In the COMINT/ELINT field, the existence of many other collection capabilities under the control or subject to the technical direction of the Director, NSA, necessitates careful consideration of the precise contribution which satellite collection can make in 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 GROUP 1 Exeutled from agtoma,'.! dovrograein3. decfu.7!:i; 1 T.S. # 173208 CoPY # Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP801301676R002900090004-0 Approved For Release 2Q 80601676R002900090004-0 relation to these other capabilities. For other typee of COM/NT/ ELM collection, NSA is responsible for determining the most effective use which can be made of each collection capability to meet total requirements, and for tasking the resources involved. Aparticularly Pertinent and important example of NSA 's function in *gar is This activity if and when completed voula possess a unique collection capability under NSA technical direction Which, if employed to complement satellite collection under unified coherent guidance: would ensure maxim= benefit from both collection means. In order to Obtain maximum advantage and economical use of satellite commiran collection, NSA must exercise its normal responsibilities with respect to this means as it does for all other means of COMM ELINT collection. These normal responsibilities include determination of which COMINT/ELINT requirements can best be met by satellite collection and their priority; determining technical feasibility of satellite collection to meet such requirements; planning end prOgramming the research, development and fabrication of the neceasary collection packages in conformance with the character- istics of the vehicle; and developing the necessary processing and analysis program. With respect to mapping and geodesy, there are apparently ng view among the interested elements of the Department involving queatione as to the most effective techniques to be employed in overhead reconnaissance for these purposes. The memorandum of the Secretary of Defenee dated 17 Mareh 1962 placing responsibility in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for developing a plan for management of Department of Defense mapping end geodetic activities should result in a resolution of this conflict and place DTA in a position to provide guidance as to the needs and optimum techniques for satellite mapping and geodesy. 6. Means therefore exist for determining requirements and priorities within each of the principal collection functions of satellites. For photograTble collection, COMM is an increasingly effective instrument. In the coo* of mapping and geodesy, DIA should in the near future be capable of making these determinations. In the COM/NT/XL/MT field, NSA, with the support of that SIGINT Committee, can accomplish theme determinations with respect to satellite collection as it is now accomplishing for all other types of CON1NT/EL/NT collection. Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA7RDP801301676R002900090004-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release-10 DP80601676R0029000900044) 7. A major remaining Problem is that of furnishing final USD guidance as to priorities among the various collection functions of a satellite. It weld ar that, under Director of Central Intelligence Directive CDCID 2/70 responsibility for developing and reeommending such gultlence is assigned to camp. It aught be argued, hovever, that COMM ought net coordinate photographic reqairements as sueh, and additionelle. be responsible for developing and recommending priorities among its own photograPhic requirements, and other requirements (MINT, mapping and wifely) for satellite collection. However, in light of COMOR's demonstrate& capability in the photographic requirement field, and in view of the functions assigned to the Committee in MID 2/7, it is eensiderea that for the present this would be the best arrangement. Some alterations in CONON membership maybe required to enable the Committee to discharge this additional responsibility. 8. Considerable difficulty has also been experienced in the poet mad can be anticipatea in the future in the photographic field with respect to the lack of an analytical capability commensurate with the volume of material obtained from overhead reconnaissance. It is therefore essential that organisations responsible for processing the material obtained from overhead reconnaissance be kept apprised of planned and programmed collection activities, in order to make the necessary preparations. =mum ? 9. It is essential that arrangements betveen Defense and CIA for the overhead reconnaissance progrmn continue for the present to provide for opecific authority at a high level in each agency for the operational and policy aspects of the program. Additionally procedures should be established to furnish these authorities on a regular and continuing basis with guidance and advice from the intelligence tonnunity as a whole as to intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities) specifically in the field of CWT/ ELINT provision should be made for NSA to furnish guidance and advice consonant with its responsibilities end eapabilities. This guidance end advice should encompass both the direction end emphasis to be taken in research and development of overhead reconnaissance techniques and pay load capabilities for intelligence purposes, and the employment of existing capabilities for intelligence collection., It is imperative that this intelligence guidance and advice be adhered to in the conduct of the program, unless there are overriding policy and operational considerations. - 3 . Approved For Release 2005/02/1A 01676R002900090004-0 Approved For Release ZO P80601 67,6R002900090004-0 10. edures to develop and fUrnish this guidance and advice should. make fullest possible use of arrangements and capabilities now existing within the community for providing overall intelligence guidance to collectors and to research and development activities. 11. The seneitivity of satellite reconnaissance operations justifies some degree of apecial security comartmentation. However, the ecurity ccmpartmentation factor should be exercised on a realistic need-to.knov basis Which would ensure that times elements of the intelligence community which can contribute productively to research and development, collection or analysis phsaes of the Program, are brought fully into the overall progrem. Speelal security compartmentation should not operate to the detriment of the basic purpose for Which these operations are conducted, namely, to improve the intelligence product. 12. Arrangements for Defense/CIA management of the overhead reconnaissance program should be expanded to include provision for the following: a. Guidance end advice free NSA with respect to research and development mad employment of existing capabilities for CONINT/BLINT collection. b. Guidance and advice from DIA with respect to require- ments for research and development and with respect to employ- ment of capabilities for mapping and geodetic collection. e. Advice and assistance from the National Photographic Interpretation Center (WIC) with respect to requirements for research and development to increase photographic collection capability. d. Guidance from camoR with respect to the employment of photegraptic eollection e. Guidance and advice from USIB (taking late consideration COMOR recommendations) as to overall intelligence priorities for research and development and utilization of overhead recoil. naleaance capabilities for collection purposes. Approved For ForRelease 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP80601676R002900090004-0 - -1 Approved For Release 200 g4 rh B01 676R002900090004-0 f. En uring that organizations responsible for processing analysis of the products of overhead reconnaissance programa are adequately advised in advance to permit timely preparation for their respective task'''. 13. Adstailed proposal for implementation of the above recom- mendations Should be developed in consultation vith appropriate representatives of theDeputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Director, NSA, the Director, mu, and the Undersecretary of the Air ?ore*, for gOroval by the Director of Contrail Intelligence and the Secretary Of Defense. Approved For Release 2 002900090004-0