COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ACTIVITIES OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002900100005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 11, 1968
• Content Type: MF

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
06/26/2003
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 11, 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC 5711
SUBJECT: Communications Security Activities of the U. S. Government
The Special Committee of the National Security Council for Communications
Security, consisting of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, has approved and circulated an up-dated directive governing
the organization, management and coordination of U. S, Government
activities concerned with the security of federal telecommunications
and the control of compromising emanations. This action was taken in
response to a unanimous recommendation of the United States
Communications Security Board. '
The new directive, dated August 26, 1968, supersedes NSC 5711, issued
April 25, 1957, entitled, "Communications Security (COMSEC). "
NSC 5711 is now rescinded. Holders of this document should dispose
of it in accordance with procedures prescribed for the destruction of
classified material.
Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 3, 19b8
_~xecutive Registry
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The attached paper prepared by the State Department will serve as
the basis of a discussion of issues arising out of the Czechoslovak
crisis which affect Europe and the United States. The National Security
Council meeting is now scheduled for 5:00 P. M. , September 4. .
Bromley Smith
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The United States, Europe and the Czechoslovakia
Crisis
I. Introduction
The Czechoslovak crisis has raised grave issues
for the United States and its Western European allies.
It has cast into question such matters as the future
of detente, the defensive capability of Western Europe,
and the future of Communism and the independent states
of Eastern Europe.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues
and the current and prospective means for meeting these
problems by the United States and its allies.
II. Detente
The August 20-21 occupation of Czechoslovakia by
the Warsaw Pact provided a cold douche for the future
of detente, or the progressive rapprochement of East
and West. In the late Sixties, the achievement of
detente had become an important objective in the pol-
icies of most Western European nations as well as the
United States. It had become a key element in the work
program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
But its assumed basis was seriously undermined by the
Czechoslovak crisis.
Most Western nations have reacted with strong
expressions of disgust at, and disapproval of, the
Warsaw Pact occupation of independent Czechoslovakia.
There was almost universal support for the United
Nations consideration of this problem and approbation
for the resolution supported by the majority in the
Security Council.
S RET
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To give further meaning to their disapproval,
most Western nations undertook to limit contacts with
the Soviets and the occupying powers of the Warsaw
Pact, and cancelled plans or proposed visits in the
political and cultural fields. As the rep?'ession of
Czechoslovakia continues, with the possibility of the
installation of a de facto occupation regime, the dete-
rioration of East-West contacts may well continue.
These relatively limited actions do not necessar-
ily preclude the possibility of return in due course
to the pursuit of detente. The present disposition
of many European nations is to avoid actions which
might impair the eventual resumption of closer relations
with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern
Europe. The positions of the United Kingdom and the
Government of France on this score are particularly
apparent.
US actions have so far generally paralleled those
of its Western European allies. For the time being we
are seeking a balanced approach that will satisfy the
immediate objective of expressing censure of Soviet
action without destroying overnight our longer-range
goals.
In the cultural field we propose the following
criteria:
a. Cancel or postpone highly visible exchanges
susceptible to being interpreted as evidence of good-
will or friendship toward the invading powers. (For
example, the trip of the rlinnssota Band to Russia.)
b. We do not propose disrupting low-visibility
exchanges already in progress. (For example, graduate
students, individual scientists and researchers already
on study tours.) But we should discourage new initia-
tives.
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c. We should avoid across-the-board restric-
tive measures, such as indiscriminate restrictions on
travel that could be construed as a return to the cold
war.
d. We should maintain exchange activities with
Czechoslovakia to the extent possible, and with the
still-independent state of Romania. In Czechoslovakia,
for instance, we should participate in the Trade Fair
at Brno if the Czechoslovak Government decides to
hold it.
In the political and economic fields similar
criteria should prevail. We are considering cancelling
or discouraging activities such as the second inaugural
flight of AEP.OFLOT.
We might continue certain scientific and technical
activities which are of special interest to us, such
as oceanographic research and the renegotiation of
the US-USSR Atlantic Fisheries Agreement.
In the area of peace and security, important
decisions will need to be taken. For example, should
we agree to open missile talks at any definite early
date. Similar decisions involve US participation in
the solar eclipse experimentation in the USSR, US-USSR
discussions on peaceful nuclear devices, etc.
In the economic area we should discourage the
development of new commercial activities with the
aggressor states, and we are considering a curtailment
of export licenses .
III. The Defense of Western Europe
The movement of In?arsaw Pact forces into Czecho-
slovakia and the continuing occupation of that country
has obviously affected the military situation in Europe.
The status quo has been changed. There are larger
military forces present in Central Europe than at any
time since the post-war period. The military occupation
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of Czechoslovakia puts Soviet forces in a country
where they have not been since World War II. There
is no assurance as yet that the Warsaw Pact forces
will soon return to their deployment where they
existed six weeks ago.
The changed East-West military situation in
Europe is of significance to the security of the
United States and its allies. In the light of these
developments we are reviewing with our allies what
the implications may be for existing arrangements to
provide for our common security.
The principal forum for this review will be NATO.
Since the onset of the Czech crisis, the NATO posture
has combined three essential elements: (a) vigilance
by the NATO political and military authorities; (b) a
low public profile while the spotlight was on the
United Nations; and (c) intensified consultations
among the Allies regarding implications of the situa-
tion for Western security interests.
As a result of NATO consultations a number of
issues require consideration. These are outlined
below.
A. Proposals for high-level NATO meetings
Following a period of speculation and trial
balloons--including Kiesinger's public mention of a
Heads of Government meeting--the British on August 30
took the initiative. They have sought our views on
two alternative proposals. Both take account of the
fact that Defense rlinisters of seven NATO countries
are already scheduled to meet in Bonn, October 10-11,
as the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).
The first alternative envisages postponing the
NPG until the end of October or early November, ad-
vancing the date of the usual year-end NATO meeting
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to the end of October or early November, and holding
both sessions in Brussels. The result would be a
stock-taking meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers
to consider defense and political matters arising from
the crisis. Like the normal December meeting, fourteen
countries would meet to examine defense issues while
the French would join them later to examine political
problems. In the course of the three (or four) day
session, the seven-nation NPG would meet for a day.
The second alternative involves simply broadening
the presently scheduled (October) NPG meeting to
include all defense ministers (except presumably the
French). The British favor the first alternative on
political, psychological and practical grounds. It
would permit a maximum amount of business to be trans-
acted and avoid a "nucl_ear affairs" meeting as NATO's
first major response to the Czech crisis.
A key question, in either case, is whether the
necessary groundwork can be laid in time to permit
ministers to tape substantive decisions. A meeting
without concrete results could be disappointing for
NATO as an organization and for public opinion.
Another possible course would be to hold a
special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers
towards the end of September to issue a new program of
w ork for NATO. The usual year-end meeting would be
h41d in December. A September meeting would have the
advantage of an early public response by NATO to the
crisis.
B. General Alliance policy on East-West Relations
In connection with any special meeting, Ministers
would have to decide whether the Czech crisis--and
Soviet and Warsaw Pact policies demonstrated by recent
events--call for any changes in Alliance policy objec-
tives as stated in the Harmel Report (on future tasks
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of the Alliance), the Reykjavik declaration on mutual
force reductions, or other public pronouncements
(such as on strategic concept) issued by NATO over
the past two years.
Our aim, and presumably that of all Member Govern-
ments (with France a possible exception) would be to
seek a strong public reaffirmation of the Alliance--
its defense and deterrent role--while maintaining the
long-range commitment to improved East-West relations.
C. Strengthening N:'1'1'O by extending the North
Atlantic Treaty
Ita"ly has suggested--although not yet by formal
proposal--that Member Governments consider strength-
ening the Treaty by formal action to ascertain extended
life for NATO. Such action would make clear the Allies
intent to refrain from exercising the right of with-
drawal for an additional period of years (say, ten)
beyond 1969. (Article 13 provides that, after the
Treaty has been in force for twenty years, a signatory
state can withdraw on one year's notice.)
The Allied Governments could act on this problem
either by amending the Treaty or issuing individual
declarations of intent to refrain from exercising the
withdrawal right for, say, ten more years.
Greater assurance about the Alliance's future
would have favorable impact on (a) overall US-European
relations and (b) specific issues, including the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
This subject may arise in preliminary fashion,
at least in the corridors, at any special NATO meeting
held in the near future. Our current position is
that. the Alliance will continue and need not be sub-
ject to formal action. The Czechoslovak crisis raises
issue of need for a more formal commitment.
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D. NATO force levels and planning
NATO is presently considering an urgent Military
Committee proposal that member governments defer any
further force reductions or redeployments pending NATO
review of the overall situation. This proposal gives
the United States difficulty because of the current
examination of further economies in our defense estab-
lishment in Europe.
Beyond this immediate question, 1~?ATO must now
reexamine its entire force posture and dispositions
in Europe in light of such factors as what the invasion
of Czechoslovakia showed about Soviet and Warsaw Pact
operations and capabilities, and the fact that Soviet
forces will probably be stationed on Czechoslovakia's
western frontier for an indefinite period.
Apart from other US objectives that may emerge
as a result of study, we will want to seek increased
European contributions to their own defense. This
could include improvement of reserves, equipment, and
mobilization capabilities as well as any changes in
standing forces.
E. NATO strategy, crisis and alert procedures
NATO's present strategic concept based on "flexible
response" and "forward defense" is unlikely to be
altered fundamentally as a result of the Czech crisis.
But certain aspects, notably the doctrine of political
warning time, will have to be reexamined. The doctrine
envisages that, prior to any overt Warsaw Pact action
against I~'~TO, there would be a period of heightened
tension and warning permitting the Allies to take
necessary reinforcement measures.
Closely related to the foregoing, some at least of
the Allies will want reexamination of the reinforce-
ment times, strategic mobility for redeploying US forces
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SECRET
to Europe, NATO alert and crisis procedures, and the
efficiency of the early warning radar system covering
the Central Front.
F. The Mediterranean
While the Czech crisis has focussed attention on
the NATO Central Front, concern about Soviet pressures
against Romania and Yugoslavia raises anew the
problem of Mediterranean security. At the June meeting
in Reykjavik NATO ministers gave various directives
aimed at improving command arrangements, stand-by
naval force dispositions, and surveillance activities.
These were directed primarily at the increased Soviet
naval presence in the Mediterranean. Recent events
may require review and/or speeding up of NATO work
on security in the Mediterranean and on NATO's south-
eastern flank.
G. The French attitude
On all of_ the foregoing subjects, the French are
in a special position f.or two reasons. First, they
do not participate in most aspects of the integrated
military system. Second, since the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia, de Gaulle has reaffirmed his policy of
opposition to "blocs". As a corollary, the French
have been negative on the idea of special high-level
western meetings--NATO, WEU, or European Community.
In all probability, the French would, however,
be represented at any Ministerial session of the North
Atlantic Council, They would expect the Fourteen to
meet without them for part of the session to deal with
NATO military questions. The best hope for improving
French cooperation in Eastern defense would probably
be through practical steps--improved liaison with the
NATO military or improvement of French forces in
Germany, The Germans are probably in the best position
to sound out the French on these questions.
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H. The key role of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany--on the Central
Front with the largest land army of the continental
allies--has been particularly hard hit by the Czecho-
slovak crisis. The actions of the Warsaw Pact
aggressor states have thrown into question the German
policy of seeking better relations with the countries
of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the rapidity with which
the Soviet Union, with little apparent warning, under-
took this action, has shaken German confidence in
the warning time principle of the NATO strategic
concept .
The Soviet actions have also caused a reexamina-
tion of the Gern~an attitude towards signature of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While no public
decision has been made on this subject the issue is
obviously one now being subjected to re-appraisal.
The Germans feel that to sign the NPT--with its
duration--might well jeopardize their future security.
The German press is heavy with charges of "super
power complicity" in the Czechoslovak crisis and
expressions of uneasy doubts of the ability of the US
and other of Germany's allies to stand up to the
Warsaw Pact. In addition, there is the problem of
Berlin. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor
states, following upon the June actions of East
Germany against Berlin, raise doubts in German minds
about the future of that city which they regard as an
important part of Free Germany.
The result is a general malaise through Germany.
Kiesinger reacted to this feeling in his recent inter-
view when he urged a NATO summit meeting as a means
of putting new life in NATO.
Germany is key to the security of Europe and to
the effective functioning of the NATO alliance. While
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the current malaise may be founded on emotionalism
rather than fact, it remains true that Germany is
uneasy and disturbed, Such an attitude can have a
multiplier effect throughout Europe unless steps are
taken now to reaffirm the solidity and efficacy of
Western defense within NATO.
In short, high-level review and reappraisal by
NATO nations could well be an important ingredient in
calming the German attitude. It could a]_so be an
important factor in the continuance of constructive
US/German relations.
IV. Communism and the Future of Independent States
of Eastern Europe
A, The Communist 4~~orld The USSR has become
increasingly isolated within the international Commu-
nist movement and has undercut its position of leader-
ship because of its rigidity and inability to adjust
to changing times, As things stand, the "Communist
family" has now been reduced to "The Five": The USSR,
Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Clearly
this is too thin a margin of support even for Soviet
foreign policy purposes. Moreover, the loyalty and
stability of some of even these regimes is not beyond
question. We may find that the domestic positions of
Gomulka, and perhaps also of Kadar, have been weakened
much more than now appears by their willingness to
serve as the tools of Soviet intervention.
B. Czechoslovakia The Soviet leaders may hope
that a kind of balance can still somehow be struck in
Czechoslovakia (as it has in different ways in Hungary
and Poland, for example), This is far from certain.
If the Czech leaders prove unable to keep order or if,
keeping order, they end up with a sullen, despondent
population that would leave the country as stagnant
as it was before, Czechoslovakia may end up as little
more than a Soviet military protectorate.
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Over the short-term at least, this would retard
the whole process of normalization in Eastern Europe
and perhaps even lead to more Soviet strong-arm actions
against others caho have not played the game by the
Soviet script, e.g., Romania and, less likely, Yugo-
slavia. Any such eruption of Soviet imperial fury
could have the most profound effect in the USSR itself,
leading to greater domestic repression but possibly
also an upheaval shaking the regime to its foundations.
It could also engage Western interests directly.
One possibility of a calmer evolution lies in
the eventual ernergence of a new type of Soviet leader
who recognizes that Soviet interests are best served
by having neighboring countries pursue their own
aspirations acid interests, including a healthy friend-
ship with the USSR.
C, Romania We are carefully follow ing all reports
bearing upon a possible military action against Romania
by the Soviet Union. Contingency papers have been
prepared in the eventuality of an attack.
The Presi.dent's strong statement on August 30
against further aggression and Secretary Rusk's warning
to Dobrynin that night place the United States clearly
on record and should leave no doubt in the Soviet mind
as to our position. The response by Dobrynin on
August 31 may indicate that the Soviets have taken full
account of the U.S, position.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
06/26/2003
STAT25X1
NSC
June 19, 1968
I want to put on the record our appreciation of the support
services the National Security Council staff receives from
your personnel office.
Recently I learned that had been shifted to
another office. Even thoug a e, want you to know that
we are indebted to him for his cooperation and understanding
of our exacting personnel requirements.
I am also appreciative of the superior service given us by
the Personnel Director's staff assistants --
STAT 25X1 They un erstand 25X1
NSC t oroug your specia requirements an cooperate to the NSC
fullest with the NSC administrative office in selecting and
assigning Agency personnel of the highest caliber to work
in the NSC area.
Would you be good enough to convey my personal thanks to
each for a consistently high standard of performance in
support of the National Security Council.
Sincerely,
Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
i
a
Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 17, 1968
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING NO. 587
June 19, 1968 -- 12;00 noon
AGENDA
Current NATO Issues
Discussion of State Department paper circulated to Council
members on June 17, 1968.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 17, 1968
The attached paper prepared by the State Department will serve
as the basis of a discussion of current NATO issues at the National
Security Council meeting scheduled for noon, June 19.
Bromley Smith
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The Reykjavik T~1i_nisterial Meeting of NATO
A. Background
The North Atlantic Council, in Ministerial session of
Forein I~~inisters ~,~ill meet in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24-25.
This ~~ill be the first time that Iceland, a small but
strategically located country of 200,000 people, has been
the host for a iJATO meeting.
This session takes plac less than one year before
the 20th anniversary of the creation of NATO as a defense
Alliance to c:eter aggression against t~7estern Europe.
As the Soviet Union emerged from Stalinist influence,
the nature of the threat changed. Today, the polycentric
tendencies ~aithin the Communist world, the evolution of
Soviet society, plus affluence in the West, obscure the
fact that mounting Soviet capabilities still pose a danger
to ~?;estern European security.
Europe, long ago recovered from the effects of World
War II, noti~.~ faces problems common to affluent societies.
Stable, prosperous and slightly smug, Western Europe has
suddenly broken out in a rash of political and social crises.
Among NATO members, France and Canada will have elections
at the time of the NATO meeting. Italy and Belgium are
trying to form governments. The US is in the process of
preparing for Presidential elections. Greece is confronted
with a junta looking for a nationally approved constitution.
The faltering British pound has created heavy pressure on
the international monetary system. Despite all this, most
of Europe has ample foreign exchange reserves and remains
confident and firm. The economic structure is essentially
sound.
In this atmosphere, NATO's continued functioning on a
broad front - military and political - constitutes a welcome
element of stability, despite some strains within the Alliance.
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B. Principal Issues at Reykjavik
The P~iinisters will discuss the general question of
East-Y~1est relations. Vie~?as will be exchanged on recent
developments in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Berlin.
It is expected that the German Foreign 1~linist.er ~~~ill report
on the Federal Republic's relations ~,~ith Eastern European
countries in furtherance of its Ost-Politik. The improve-
ment of relations bet~?,een East and ti~Iest, and such matters
as European security, ~ai11 also be discussed.
2. Ni~;DIT ~RRANEA:y SECURITY
Security developments in the Mediterranean ~?~ill be
an im~,ortant issue in the meeting. The Ministers will address
particularly the impact on NATO, and the NATO area, of
increasing Soviet penetration into the Mediterranean. Ways
and means of countering this growing military power in the
Mediterranean will also be examined and recommendations
considered on increased surveillance by NATO countries of
USSR fleet moveme~:ts, and the adoption of a watching brief
for Brosio.
3. h~IUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS
The Foreign Ministers will also take up mutual force
reductions. In February President Johnson indicated to
NATO Secretary Brosio that "maintenance of NATO's strength,
including the US commitment, is necessary to continuing
stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This
stability and security provides the basis for exploring
with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions."
This question is under intensive study within NATO.
The US has proposed for consideration at Reykjavik a resolution
(declaration) on this issue which indicates NATO is studying
the problem, expresses the hope that the USSR and other
countries of Eastern Europe will also study it and be
prepared at the proper time to explore such reductions
together. The overall military capability of the Alliance
should not be reduced except as a part of a pattern of
mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing.
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4. NPT
The negotiations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty have been the subject of intensive consultations in
NATO. The Germans and others wish to discuss some of the
implications of this Treaty at Reykjavik. The non-nuclear
NA`hO po~:~ers have been concerned that their signing the
Treaty ~~;ould impair their security, especially in the
nuclear_ field, p~~.rticularly should the NPT duration outlast
NATO. t~~e have tried to meet their legitimate concerns and
persuc?d` them to support the NPT, and are prepared to make
a supy~orting statement at Reykjavik on our continued
con.-~itment to NATO as an instrument for peace and stability
in Europe.
General tour d'horizon - the meeting will permit each
Foreign Minister to give his views of the overall inter-
national situation. Secretary P.usk plans to meet in
restricted session to discuss Vietnam and the European
vie~.as on what they ~~rould like to see develop in Southeast
Asia after peace is achieved.
C. Long Range Problems and Outlook for the Future
Above and beyond the issues on the official agenda at
Reykjavik, certain general problems confront NATO:
1. FUTURE VIABILITY OF NATO
Fore~r~ost among these is the question of the future
of the Alliance. French ~?~ithdrawal from the integrated
military aspects of NATO i.n 1966 caused many skeptics to
doubt at that time whether the Alliance would have continued
viability. The work of the organization since then has
demonstrated that it can adjust to new conditions and
continue as the keystone of Sr'estern collective security,
even without French participation in its military aspects.
We anticipate that there will be continued support
for NATO by the member governments. The governments parti-
cipating in its military structure continue to recognize
that collective security is the most effective way to ensure
national security. The French attitude notwithstanding,
we do not anticipate any members will take advantage of
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GE ~ Y
I. Germany in Perspective
The advent of the present Bonn Government in December 1966
marks a turning point in German-American relations. The
Aclenauer-Lrhard years ~?~ere years of German dependence upon
the United. States, with the FRG accepting U.S. tutelage in
return for our security guarantees and our support for German
efforts to rebuild a prosperous and respected nation. .The
fall of Erhard. late in 1966, and the creation of the Kiesinger-
Brandt government, signalled the evolution of German policy
toward greater emphasis on the pursuit of reunification of
their divided nation. The relative absence of crisis in
Europe and the public belief that Soviet aggression had.
become somewhat less likely; the growth of a detente
psychology; the passage of years since 1945 and the erosion
of the post-war fears and sense of guilt; de Gaulle's
rekindling of nationalism first in France and then elsewhere
in Europe; all contributed to a greater German sense of
independence from tutelage, and. more active efforts to lay
the groundwork for eventual reunification. In Germany, how-
ever, this has taken place caithout serious strain on FRG
ties with NATO, and without rupturing cooperation and partner-
ship with the U.S. NATO and. the U.S. are still regarded in
Germany as the basis of security on which German efforts to
pursue reunification rest.
The Kissinger-Brandt government's main single policy
innovation has been the pursuit of a more flexible Eastern
policy aimed. at opening a dialogue with the Soviet Union,
improving relations with the Eastern European states, and
seeking to extend the FRG's ties with East Germany (short
of recognition). The FRG regards improved relations with
the East as a contribution to European peace and stability,;
but, at least equally important, it is a necessary prelude
to progress toward. reunification. The results of this policy
up to now have been modest. This is not surprising. The
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Article XIII of the North Atlantic Treaty and give notice
of t~ithdra~oal after its anniversary date (20 years) in
1969 .
2. GREECE
Developments in Greece with the take-over of the
government by a military junta have strained the bonds of
the Alliance. tlany NATO governments, notably in Scandinavia,
the Low Countries and the UF: have been sharply critical
of the Gree': regime. Pressures have been exerted in these
couiit:ries to isolate Greece within the Alliance, if not
to expel it, pending a return to constitutionality. While
Greece remains a full, interested and essential participant
in the Alliance, the Greek problem remains as a divisive
factor.
BURDE\' SHARIi~1G
We ~.eep trying to persuade the Europeans to i~_crease
their o~~:n defe~~se efforts in various ways, but this effort
has met with little positive response to date. Nevertheless,
we have negotiated successfully with some of our Allies on
a bilateral basis in order to neutralize the balance of
payments impact of our military expenditures. Arrangements
for substantial neutralization have been concluded with the
Germans and the Belgians. Similar arrangements are well on
the way to completion with the Danes, the Dutch and the
Italians.
D. R~kjavik and the Continued Importance of tiTATO to US
NATO remains esselitl_al to US security:
1. In view of the current pattern of Soviet activity
and current developments affecting ~~Testern and Eastern
political stability, it is even more essential that the US
maintain a consistent policy of support for a strong NATO.
2. While maintaining this support, we must also be
flexible enough to ensure that the Alliance is responsive
to opportunities for easing tensions in Europe. NATO can
become an increasingly effective instrument of detente.
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3. We shall continue to study within NATO the possi-
bilities for exploring, with the Soviet Union and other
countries of Eastern Europe, mutual force reductions.
Concentration will be primarily on the Central Region of
NATO in light of the heavy confrontation there of forces
of NATO and the I^larsa;a Pact. P~eanwhile, consistent with
the Pres_ident's discussion with Brosio last February, we
should strive to maintain overall NATO military strength.
Unilateral troop reductions could undermine current efforts
to,ard a balanced mutual reduction of forces.
4. In the P~tediterranean area, ~,~e see the Soviet threat
as being primarily political, and tae are recomrlending a set
of modest, non-provocative political-military responses
by NATO to this threat.
5. Through the mechanism of the Nuclear Planning
Group, sae are studying ways for increased national parti-
cipation -- and thereby understanding -- in military nuclear
planning and for developing a sounder basis for NATO mili-
tary planning with respect to the use of tactical nuclear
~,~eapons .
6. We shal_1 continue to try to work out arrangements
to neutralize the effects of our military presence in Europe
upon our balance of payments.
7. We are committed through CY 1968 on US force levels
in NATO. These US forces in Europe contribute to both the
nuclear and conventional defense of the North Atlantic area.
The US forces in Europe are a part of NATO's conventional
defenses as u,~=11 as acting as custodians for the tactical
nuclear ~.aeapons that we maintain there. They also provide
an essential institutional link between NATO's conventional
forces, largely supplied by the Europeans, and the strategic
nuclear weapons which are almost wholly American. In addi-
tion, these units are an earnest of American leadership in
the Alliance.
8. For the future we must examine means for getting
greater European participation in the defense of Europe,
such as a European Defense Organization, or capitalizing
on the U.K. interest in the Continent as the result of its
withdra~?~als East of Suez.
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 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 :CIA-RDP80B01676R002
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
June 3, 1968
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING NO. 586
June 5, 1968 -- 12;00 noon
AGENDA
Current Issues Affecting US-UK Relations
Discussion of State Department paper circulated to Council
members on June 3, 1968 including the effect on the UK of the current
situation in France.
CON~`IDENTIAL
/f
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 3, 1968
MEMORAti'DUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The attached paper prepared by the State Department will serve as
a basis of a duscussion of current issues affecting our relations with
Great Brita~n at the National Security Council meeting scheduled for
noon, June 5.
The effect of developments in France on the issues included in the
paper will be discussed by the Secretary of State at the meeting.
4
Bromley Smith
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