LETTER TO RUSSELL ASH(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002900100008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 21, 1968
• Content Type: LETTER

NS REVIEW
CO PLETED,
O6/2 /2003
Sincerely.
STAT
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Mr. A. Russell Ash
National Security Council
Room 386
r, Executive Office building
vFaehington. D. C. 2G!O6
21 February 1968
Dear Russ.
Per our phone conversation today. I am
attacbtng hereto a copy of National Security Council
I (revised 4 March 1964)
Izatellilgence Directive No. r;rnent
for your uee in making it ava able to the Depa
of the Treasury for information.
I understand thats by arrangements with
Mr. Robert .an, this copy will be provided to the office of the Assistant to the secretary (Aiatioral
Security Affairs) to meet the needs of the Secret
Service.
Please let me know if there is anything more
I can do in this regard.
Very best regards.
Attachment,
NSC1D No. l
25X1 U-21 Feb 68 (ext.
1 _ A/DI
i _ OICRS
NSC Di Orig. _ Addressee with att.
stributi?n: ?ri & 1
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25X1 STAT
NSC
25X1 STAT
NSC
1-ER 1 USIB/9
TAT
25X1
C"/ .
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
January 22, 1968
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING No. 579
January 24, 1968 - 12:30 P. M.
AGENDA
1, The Cyprus Situation - CIA Director Helms
2. A strategy for the negotiation of a Cyprus Settlement - Secretary Rusk
f
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
January 22, 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The enclosed paper proposing a strategy for the negotiation
of a Cyprus settlement will be considered at the next National
Security Council Meeting scheduled for Wednesday,
January 24, 1968.
Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary
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STRc I.'LC Y FOR NFG O_`.i ]\T ION
^ O1' A. CYPRUS SET LE~tt:.lT
The Cyprus Study Croup t?Ja S established
on December. 1.1, 1-957, for the purpose of
evolving "a strategy through which tho
.part:ies to the Cyprus problem can be
brought: to accept a solution holding some
promise of stability, durability and insurance
against recurrent threats to Greek-Turkish
amity and peace in the area ," The Group
has studied the problem and the attached
report sets forth the conclusions it, 'has
reached,
Charles 1U70 Yo" ;t:
December 20, 1957
Career Ambassador_, Retired
Chairman, Cyprus
Study Group
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 1.2-year intervals;
not a ~torn~. - c~ 117 , ~~ ~ f~3
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SIG
S_Lratcy for Negoti ation of a Cyp;"us Se.t tlc_1ie?lt
As the Cyprus sit:uati_on now stands, the matters being
considered for negotiation-1 among_ the parties fall i_nt:o two
categories: Those shorter'-term measures coming wi_th:!_n
paragraph 4 of the Greek--Tur.ki_sh accord, and a long rang e
settlement: of basic issues.
The Study Group believes tha t
it would be feasible to conduct: the negot:ice t:iolls on the
two cat:egos:i.es s separately, though it might in the end pro\c
impossible to reach agreeille nt on short ?-terra measures until
a .context: is provided by a long -?term Set t.lcillent,
In consider_ i_ng what role the United States should
play in attempting to promote and assist these negoti_ati.or, s,
the Study Group has assigned gr.eet:est weight: to the danger_
of war in the area. The Group accepts the thesis that
unless and Lentil a long- term settlement i_s reached, a recur-
rence of last month's crisis is very likely, and that if it
recurs, war can probably not be avoided, Under these cir--
culllstancc's, the Group believes that: the United States
Governulent shoulCd, ' iinmediat:cly and in coming months, take
whatever measures lie within its power to bring about a
negotiation and a long-term sett:.lement.
Such ineasures involve, first:, our asstlri.ng that
third party assistance is available. to. hel'p bring about
negotiation (provided by either the UN or ourselves);
and second, our commitment of the, substantial political
and modest economic resources necessary to support t:he
extremely difficult process of bringing the. parties to
agreement..
The Study Group has taken into account the undeniable
ti sadvantages of engaging the Un:i_ted States i_n an attempt,
by no means assured of success, to settle a dispute of
such complexity. It has weighed against this factor its
belief that without direct: United States leadership the
chances for a settlement are materially reduced, and i-t-
ROUP 3
Downgraded at. 1.2-year intervals; 1.7
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has concluded t:hat: the risks are worth tc king. The
United , States could be able to bring grey ter pressure
to bear on the part:i_es than other
peasihJ_e intern d:i_~ r _es,
and w i..t:llo~rt: such pressu-re ac;reclnent: seems unlikely, The
United States l.-has, in part::i.cular, greater. leverage t';:i_tl1
the Tlirks Attempt:ing to wok b-,
- c-hilld a reprosentative
other than an Amer 7_can reduces our control and the chances
of success w.-i_thout r.ecluc 7_n , the corilIlli_i:r11C'nt. to the maim:e?-
r_
nanee of peace in the area which, in the last analysis,
we have recognized Whenever peace has been threatened.
r'lle Study Croup has been impressed, however, With
the degree to which the problem of Cyprus is linked to the
United Nations. Since T,arc'.1 1964, it has been dealt with
primarily Cwt:hi_n 2. UN frame:work0 1'110 Secretary General's
recent: appeals and the Security Council resolution cxt:end-
ing the mandate of UNFICYP further embed it in the United
Nations , The Group has concluded that the United States
must acquiesce in UN leadership where the Secretary General
and the parties consider thhat: this course .should be
followed. It believes it would be preferable, llow:eve;.-,
if the UN good offices were related principally to the
negotiation of the short-term measures, while the United
States took the lead in assisting the negotiations for a
long- term settlement 'J'}:lere is logic to this division,
since the short-term measures concern UNfICYP and are the
principal subject of the Secretary General's appeal. It
considers that an early step should be an effort to work
out an arrangement with the Secretary General along these
lines . There are at-cached two 'scenario which outline the
two alternative courses of action which might develop,
depending on whether such an arrangement can be arrived at :
Scenario I: United States leadership within a
general UN framewo-k, or
Scenario 11: UN leadership C: it:}l strong and
persistent: United St:ates support:.
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The essential difference between the two is that : in
first case a United States representative Would n
promote and assist= the negotiation directly ri.t:h the
parties, while in the second case a UN representative
would do so. Each scenario assumes the UN will take the task of providing ass _sMace to the p s on the
negotiation of the short--t:erm Measures covered by
paragraph 4 of the Greek-Turkish accord
I_]1 we]_gI.I:LI)g t:}le advantages of United States against
UN leadership the Croup noted that the Cyprus Government:
has in the past strongly preferred a UN c rena because it
has felt the Secretariat the Soviet
~ ~.I1Cl I10,11--aligllC:d
presence in th Security Council and the non-aligned majority
in the Assembly, provide it with certain advantages.
This factor seems to he offset:,however, by Turkish d i_st:rust
of the UTNN. Whether Cyprus will accept other t:han UN good
offices can be determined early in the negotiation and the
question should not preclude the United States from
attempting an initiative.
Both attached scenarios make reference to the possi_--
bility Of direct Cypriot-Turkish talks. Embassies Ankara
and Nicosia have emphasized the desirability of negotia-
tions on this basis. The Study Group agrees that they
would be desirable, particularly since the partial dis-
engagement of Greece leaves the issue more directly between
Cyprus and Turkey. The Group is concerned, however, that
negotiations between the two Would not be fruitful unless
third party assistance were ava_labl e and unless careful
preparatory work were done. It therefore .has left-direct:
talks as a phase -to be worked toward as negotiations
proceed.
Previous United States efforts to promote a long--term
seta:l.elnent were based on some form of ends s . Such a
solution no longer seems realistic, and the Study Group
has concluded that a set:tlement will likely have to be
sought on the basis of an independent: Cyprus. A paper
outlining the possible element:s of such a settlement (the
Declaration of Reconciliation) is attached.
S RCN T
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The Study Group not-.cis that the carl_:i.er preference
for enos is was based in part on the thought that,
in
this Way, the heavy indigenous communist: influence on
.the island could be partially neutralized, in the
of absence of enos is this will not be the case o The Group
considers t AML this Problem should be kept in mind
during the coming period and that:, in part:i.cula the.
development of adequate internal security forces on the
island should be encouraged,
The Study Group has considered S1lpporting measures
wh:i_ch might further negotiations toward a settlement,
Some of these in the economic and security fields would
require United States financial assistance to have sig--
ni_ficant effect. They could provide to the Cypriots a
positive stimulus to agreement which would reinforce the
implicit: threat from Turkey and the pressures of other
governments . Some possible measures are described in an
attached paper. They include, for example, police train-
ing, retraining of demobilized fighters, development: of
employment opportunities , et:c. The Group.cons:i_ders that
the value of a settlement, in terms of United States
interest, is such that we must: be prepared to make
expenditures. of this kind.
RECD ii} Ni)XT10'NS
1 That the United States ,strive to bring about: in
conjunction wit--h the UN Secretary General an arrangement:
under which the UN assists the *parties in reaching agree-
ment on the short--term matters covered in paragraph I of
the Greek-Turkish accord, and the United States assists
them in working toward a long-term Settlement (Scenario I)
2. That:, if agreement is reached on such an arrange -
ment:, and if the init:ial soundings by Embassies prove
positive, the United States promptly appoint a respecLed
and experienced diplomat to promote and assist negotia-
tions among the parties looking toward a long-t:erin
settlement; that the United States give active support at.
the same time to the UN activity in connection pith shorL-
term measures";
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3. That the United States effort: ton,?1nrd a long ?-
range settlement t:ahe n s ii:- point: of departure the
at:tachecl Dec larat..i.on of Reconc:i.]_:i_at.:i.o.
4. 't'hat, if t:he Uri Secretary (; neral cons I_ders the
United Nations should take the lead i_n efforts to r_eac1_1
a long --t. C). I set:t1.eIII ent., the United St-at.es acquiesce and
Play a vi_ ;orous supporting i-ole;
5. 'That: the United States tale the lead in
mu i.ti
lateral. (or if ne essary, uni.l~! teral) economic and
political suppo -i designed to i_mp -ove the env:i.ronment
for ne?;ot: _at: i_on and reduce some of the causes of conf 7.:ict
Our economic support is the subject of a short: study
which is attached,
Attachments :
1o Cyprus Scenario I.: United States Leadership
2. Cyprus Scenario 77: United pations Leadership
3. Dec7arati_on of Reconcili.at.:i'on
4o Economic Support: for Negot:i_ations
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 Sl, ' hT
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C,J1_, u s Scc') c? Un1.lt_c c! Stc_t es heacl c r s h
:i_p
1. D t_ cuss t:l1C f o].lowing the Canadian.; and
}3r it; in New York and l?asil.:i_n~;t:on
2. Discuss what he proposes
to CIO about
(a)
pOsSible widened ion of present.
~Ii\I'1.~.Y'}~ I11?i"]C1 1~C 1-I1 fJ.C'.J_CIE; of SC'curlty, disC'_rm
ame11t and pac:i_ar_icatioil;
(b) ne"otiat:ion of e:x})!ldced ma11C, C,;
(C) ne otlot:ion Of Nat]-on ?J_ CLla`.rd d i.S i"lilarient
(d) negotiation o:=' J ont term settl_Cil'ent; ,
1_11x>plore with 11i.rn the rel_at::i_onshi_p between the limited
measures (covered by paragra-!)h 1, of t i-ic Creek--Turki.sh
accord) and a J.on" term settJ-erccnt.
lie may say he does not: intend to play a role in either
aspect in the absence of a positive request by 13. three
parties. If this his posit::i.on, out:]_i-ne for him the effort:
we arc prepared to make to-.?mrcl a lon"- tcrrl settl.er_lent: i Il-
vo1.v%n" the Declaration ol: Reconciliation. (110 wi.l.l. identify
this as Canadian,) Strongly urge hint to take on the at+empt
to negotiate paragrapii 4. (J.f necessary, ur"e the parties
to avail themselves of his good offices.)
If the Secretary-?Ceneral inclicat.es tie intends to make an
active attempt. Co assist the Part-it's to reach agree% nt 011
paragraph 1i (e.g. , if t11e Secllrit:y Coullc7 1 resolution re-
quests him to or if the parties have recluest ed it), out:l.ine
our lon" --t:erm plan, as above. Say we are prepared to go
ahead with this sin_u]_taneously ~';1t11 his effort re paragraph
It i.s pos::i.ble, thou"h unli-l:cl_y, that the Secretary-Genera].
will say he intends to be active both witch respect: to pare
graph 4 and a long-tc^..1"ill sett:Iement. In such a case, Scenario
J a_ appes .
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3Proceed along the J_ines of th undcrst:andi_ng reached
with the Sc c'ret~ ]_y Gc'ner. ] J. , If the tUnited Net ions be
C=UnC}llCt: 1_i'1~, a I1Cigot O?1 p ,1'ag]"c?}~11 ~! , Supl)O]"L i_t and
CUU] d:i_Il