MEMORANDUM TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FROM BROMLEY SMITH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002900100012-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 12, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 12, 1966
U111 ~IJ~~i~~ ~~~~~
AS~~LL
The attached paper entitled "North Atlantic Treaty
Organization" is forwarded for consideration at the National
Security Council meeting to be held in the Cabinet Room at
noon, Tuesday, December 13, 1966.
Additional information on the problems which the
NATO Ministers will consider this week in Paris is summarized
in CIA. Special Report SC No. 00799/ 66B dated December 9, 1966 -
"NATO Foreign Ministers to Consider Future of the Alliance. "
Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary
SECRET
_ ~ _~. _..
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The Foreign, Defense and Finance Ministers of .the
NATO nations will meet in Paris December 14-16. Nine
months have passed since President de Gaulle announced
the withdrawal of France from the military organization
of the Alliance, six months since the Foreign Ministers
met to take the basic decisions toward relocating and re-
organizing the institutions of the Alliance in response
to the French action. This December's meeting will con-
solidate those decisions and will provide the forum for
considering measures for moving a modernized NATO into
the future--both in the defense and non-defense fields.
Background to the Meeting
As announced by President de Gaulle in March, all
French personnel assigned to NATO conunands and French
forces assigned to Nr'1T0 were withdracan on July 1. NATO
and US military installations in France will be required
to relocate by April l,- 1967.-
The action of the Government of France proceeds ,from
its pasition that while the Alliance continues to be
necessary, the organization of the t311iance is rto longer
suitable. However, the other NATO allies recognize clearly
the benefits provided by NATO for whic'n President de
Gaulle has offered no substitute: 1) security - the
Soviet military machine is still_in place in Eastern
Europe and NATO's joint defense effor-t is the only ef-
fee:tive protection; 2) ~destern European paliticr.l stu-
bility, which looks ever~irnore precious in light of recent
German political shifts.; and 3) political influence - the
NATO consultation ~tocess is seen as the best hope of secur-
ing US attention to European interests a.nd objections.
Conse.:~uently, the Fourfeen have been able unitedly to tu:cn
their efforts~to relocating anc~eshuping the Alliance.
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Relocation of NP.TO and US Organizations Now in France.
SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe)-will
be relocated to Casteau, Belgium. AFCENT (Allied Forces,
Central Europe) headquarters gill go to the Brunssum-
riaastricht area in the Netherlands. The ivATO Defense
College has begin moved to Rome. The North Atlantic Council,
the NATO International Staff, the Military Conunittee (now
in ~~Tashington), and national delegations will move to
Brussels. The US European Command (EUCOM) will be moved
to Stuttgart.. -The US Sixth Fleet horne port is being moved
to Italy. Other US headquarters and units will go to the
UK and Germany.
Negotiations r,~ith France. The Government of France has
put aside unilaterally its agreements with the United
States covering air fields, depots and military headquar-
ters, and has forced the rewriting of the terms governing
the presence of French forces in Germany. Consequently,
there are in progress a series of negotiations concerning
continued US use of petroleum and telecommunications fa-
cilities in France and the relationship between French
forces in Germany and NATO forces.
US-French Bilateral Ne og tiations. Discussions have been
.held on th.e use of military facilities in France ih the
event of war or of N~'~TO alert, or in circumstances such
as anot'r~er Berlin crisis. France has no~:r made c]_ear that
no re-entry by the US into airfields or depots in France
would be possible except after a declaration of war by
France. No French cornmitraent can-be given regarding such
re-entry ir_ time of NATO alert or crisis. They are, however,
willing to permit ccntinued US use of_the Domes-Metz
petroleum pips:line and certain telecornl-~unications facili-
ties in peacetime, Qrovided these-are under French manage-
ment. They give no assurance regarding the availability
of such facilities in wartime.
Additional discussions have concerned the April 1
deadline for the removal of US forces and equipment. "vTe
d.o not accept. the deadline but plan to s,rithdraw as rapidly
as feasible. However, a pferiod beyond next April 1 will
be required to complete the removal of logistics facili-
ties.
S RET
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France-NATO Relationships
The "Constitutional Question". The process of developing
a new role for France in the Alliance has caused less pain
and .disruption than might have been expected. The changes
have-been pragmatic and evolutionary.. The North Atlantic
Council agreed that the fourteen nations in the Defense
? Planning Committee (DPC) should be authorized to deal
with all defense subjects where France no longer contri-
butes. France will not sit in the Com.*nittee. The Fifteen
will continue to be responsible for non-military Alliance
concerns.
French F_arces__in Germany. At the time the French withdrew
from the organizational aspects of the Alliance, they in-
dicated that they were willing to keep their troops in
Germany. The Germans in turn indicated that fihey ~?~ished
these troops to stay. However, because all other forces
(US, UI~, FRG, Canada and Belgium) in Germany nave a DIATO
role, the NATO countries thought that the French troops
there should similarly have a defined NFTO r~].e. At Brussels,
the Ministers, inclucling the French Minister, agreed that
NAC would establish a political framework far the mission
of the French forces in Germany. The French subsequently
backed aff of the agreement. The Germans with the support
of the rest of the Fourteen then agreed to overloo]: tn.e
absence of a political agreement and authorized talY.s be-
tween Lemnitzer and the French Chief of Staff in order tc
determine the extent to which the French, without ccnunitment,
Wright be prepared to cooperate wa.th I~7AT0. Meanwhile the
French. have also been discussing iailaterally with the
Germans a legal basis to govern the status of French forces
on German territory, - _
Here, as in US-French tal'~s, the French i-kave unde-c-
scored. their insistence cn maintaining total freedar~ oL
action.
Air Defense. France is interested in continued parti-
cipaticn in the early warning and cor~:meznications asp ects
of the N~?TO. Air Defense Syster,2, on whicYi the Farce de
I'rap~e derends far credibility. The Fourteen have agreed..
to Frenci: partici,~ation -under pent c~.Ycumstances.
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Overflicxhts. President de Gaulle has put authorizations
far overflights by foreign military aircraft on a month-
by-month basis. There has been no reduction in the number
of flights, nor have the monthly authorizations been de-
layed in any case. But de Gaulle has made clear that these
overflights continue .at his sufferance and could be ter-
minated on short native. The Fourteen have a large re-
quirement for overflights of France. The only real pres-
sure an d~ Gaulle is that if he were to terminate or dras-
tically reduce his cooperation on overflights he would
effectively read himself completely out of the Alliance,
with major political effects.
The 1~Iinisterial Meeting
Organization of the rieeting. The Fourteen, sitting as
the Defense Planning Committee, will conduct the Alliance's
military business on December 14 and the Fifteen, as the
North Atlantic Council, ~+rill conduct its non-military busi-
ness on December 15 and 16.
1:15 Objectives. Our general objectives at the meeting will
be: I) to present the picture of an organization and of
an Alliance which has surmounted its crisis with France
but which will continue to accept French cooperation to
the extent this does not damage essential NF,TO interests;
2) to demonstrate that the Fourteen are going ahead in
a business-like manner; 3) to demonstrate that the nature
of the Soviet threat still calls for an effective NATO;
4) to evidence that a strong Alliance is essential to-
the attainment of a genuine detente and an equitable set-
tlement in Europe; S) to support European efforts to
study the future organization arzd activities of NATO.
Principal P~Iinisteri al bieetinc~ Topics.
East-,?Test Relations. Consistent with last June's Ministerial
mandate and t~Ze President' s October 7 speech, ou:~ erenerai
aims ix7 NATO and at this meeting are to keep the organiza-
tion very much in the East-j?Test picture a.s a major instru-
ment for coordiri~ting i'Testerri policies and, where appro~
priate, specific action.. Aside.~am-the fundamental r'ench
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reservation about coord~_nated positions, several countries
-lean toward the view that too prominent a NATO label on
anything gives the East an impression of Western rigidity.
Nevertheless, we expect that the NATO Ministers will en-
dorse a report which examines possible initiatives looking
toward improved East-West relations. (The wench are
:expected to abstain.)
Technalogical Gap. European concern about the "technological
gap" has led to various statements and suggestions for
corrective action. Among these is the "Italian" proposal,
on which the President conu-nented favorably in the Erhard
communique and in his New York speech. Italy has proposed
that the Ministerial Council either instruct the Permanen-~
Council and the Secretary General to consider the estab-
lishment of a committee to study the technological gap
anal recommend possible solutions to a future meeting of
the Ministers, ar directly establish a corrunittee of all
NATC> countries for this purpose.
The Future of NATO. Foreign t~iinister ~3arrael of Belgium
is expected to propose that the Ministerial Council, includ-
ing France, give a mandate for a high-level, comprehensive
study on the future of the Alliance. The Belgians have
diseussecl their ideas with trs at some length and we have
encouraged them to go ahead with their proposal.
I~TATO Fo.r_oe planninq,iTrilateral Talks. The Trilateral
talks are now in recess, in view of the NATO Ministe~iaJ_
Meeting and until the ne~v German government gets its feet
an the ground. It seems unlikely that the three govern -
ments will be able to narrow much lurther the remaining
differences in their views on military matters untiJ_ they
have rnadc: substantial progress on the financial problems
which triggered the talks. 6~Thile t'ne other NF~TO members
remain sensitive to this trilateral activity they appear
to accept the tr-ree powers' assurances that the talks are a
oiie-time approach to urgent and special problems.
The S?~ecial Cammitteeo One of the major advances we expect
is the esta'r~lishment -of nuclear plane; ncJ rzachinery within
the 111iance,~ which wil.1 ir_clude a Nuclear Defense Affairs
Car