COMMENTS ON GILPATRIC PROPOSAL ON ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN CRITICAL OVERSEAS AREAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003000020010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 19, 1961
• Content Type: MF

Approved For R*se 200it 8 n ' IA-RDP80B0167613000020010-8
19 April 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Comments on Gilpatric Proposal on Organization and
Administration of Special Operations in Critical
Overseas Areas
1. I attach a brief comment from Abbot Smith indicating that the
national estimating machinery can and should play a key role in deter-
mining what countries are critical. If the Gilpatric proposal is
adopted, I would consider that a formal NIE is highly desirable before
you ask the President to make a determination of "criticality." This
might well have to be a crash estimate, but there is no reason why we
should not do the work if the very top levels of Government are going
to get involved in the question.
2. Basically, the proposal leaves me quite cold. It seems
premised on an overly formalized view as to the precision with which
situations in countries and areas can be categorized. I am also con-
cerned that every desk officer with reasonably tough problems before
him would conspire and contrive to get his country designated "critical"
in the fear that otherwise his area would be relegated to a low-priority
status.
3. There is also a strange implication that coordination of
operations is only needed in areas of outstanding criticality.
Approved For Release 20 G1' RDP801301676R003000020010-8
 Approved For Fuse 2003/III L UP80B01676103000020010-8
4. If informality is to be the rule, why not let your Thursday
lunch group take the place of the Critical Areas Board? I have no
particular objection to task forces headed by a full-time director pro-
vided it is recognized that the latter must have the seniority of
approximately an assistant secretary or he won't be able to get his
job done.
6. All in all, I do not regard this proposal as in the same
class with the Jackson, Jackson, and Jackson report of eight years ago.
ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Deputy Director (Intell.gence)
Attachment:
Comments by Abbot Smith,
dated 19 April 1961
Approved For Release 2003/08 5. ALA=RDP80B01676R003000020010-8
25X1
25
 'Approved For Rose 2003/0 DP80B01676000020010-8
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DDP for Executive
Branch Matters
SUBJECT: Special Operations in Critical Areas
REFERENCE: Gilpatric Memorandum to the DCI,
dated 17 April 1961, same subject
1. Informal comments of the CA Staff regarding reference
are submitted herewith. Our comments are limited to that
portion of referenced paper which sets forth the general
organizational concept for dealing with "special operations" in
critical areas. We understand Dez FitzGerald is preparing
comments on the particular application of the concept in Vietnam.
2. At the outset, the use of the term "special operations" in
reference is misleading and we would like to see another term
substituted. "Special operations" normally carries a clandestine
connotation. Apparently, this meaning is not intended in the
paper where it is used to apply to all operations conducted by
State, Defense, CIA, USIA and ICA, the proposed members of
the "Critical Areas Board. " As used in the paper, it may be
all-encompassing to include all U. S. Governmental activities
abroad.
3. The proposal for a "Critical Areas Board" is interesting
and the document setting forth the concept contains much with
which one might agree. The proposed solution for deficiencies
in the decision-making machinery, however, may raise more
Approved For 1~G? 08/25: CIA-RDP80B01676R003000020010-8
 Approved For Rise 2003/0` 61 ;BAP80130167610000020010-8
problems than it solves. Basically, the proposal seems to challenge
the President's recent decision, as we understand it, to center in
State responsibilities for over-all planning and coordination of U. S.
foreign policy as well as operations. The proposal itself seems to
advocate a combination of the roles of the NSC and OCB in the new
Critical Areas Board, although a close reading of the document
suggests that the functions of the new Board would be restricted to
giving the President opinions (with dissents) as to whether an area
should be considered one of crisis or opportunity. (Parenthetically
the paper refers, from time to time, to countries of opportunities
but seems really concerned only with current or potential crisis
areas. In our opinion, we might have less of the latter if we paid
more attention to the former.) After the President determines
that a country or area is critical, he appoints a Task Force (T. F. )
which thereafter seems to run the show and the role of the Critical
Areas Board becomes obscure. It is not clear from the proposal
what, if any, role the Board or in fact, the heads of the Depart-
ments or Agencies will have on:
a. The selection of the representatives from their
organizations - (The President . . . " will bstablish a Task
Force . . . One representative from each department and
agency will serve . . . ")
b. The selection of the Director of the T. F. - ("The
President will select . . . a Director, who shall serve full
time . . . and he releived of all other . . . duties. ")
c. The performance or reporting of the T. F. - (". .
the T. F. shall . . . prepare a plan, . . . supervise, .
monitor, etc. . . . and keep the President and his major
advisors informed. ")
4. The proposal also, (in some cases, aptly) raises pointed
questions about the over-all competence of Chiefs of Mission to
discharge responsibilities assigned under Executive Order
10983, since in some cases, they have' not been provided with
needed assistance' Thus, the Country Team concept may be
discarded and a 3-man task force dispatched to the field.
Approved For Release 2003
 Approved For Rose 2003108%
This T. F. would appear to be both over and under the COM or a
chief designated by the President to administer the "plan" if the
COM cannot or should not be responsible . . . "
5. The whole document rather forthrightly challenges past
Executive Branch procedures and indirectly questions the efficacy
of attempts of the present Administration to streamline those
procedures. Whether the proposal transmitted in reference will
resolve or compound past or present difficulties is, in our opinion,
open to question. It tends to institutionalize the task force concept
to which increasing resort has been made in U. S. Government
practice in recent years. It certainly tends to draw things closer
to the White House and, unless carefully refined, the formaj.i-
zation of the Task Force procedure may lead to by-passing the
heads of the departments and agencies it seeks to coordinate.
Basically, however, this controversy seems to be one primarily
between Defense and State and one which we should enjoy watching
from the side-lines but not as active participants.
Chief
Covert Action Staff
25X1
5I -RDP
Approved For Release 2003 80B01 676R003000020010-8
Lilt.
 Approved For Rse 2003/08/25: CIA-RDP80BO16763000020010-8
19 April 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/EBM
SUBJECT: Defense Department Paper on Special
Operations in Critical Areas
1. I agree with the Director that by and large this paper is
not too bad and would not be harmful to us however much it may
precipitate battling between Defense Department and State.
2. The principal lack in the paper seems to me to be lack
of a definition of "special operation, " particularly as that may
apply to ICA and USIA, to say nothing of ourselves.
3. The idea of a "critical areas board" seems to me a pretty
good one and the appointment of task forces for areas to be
determined critical also seems to me sound and in line with
current ad hoc practices. The idea of supplying chiefs of mission
with a special three-man staff is reminiscent with the frequently
suggested concept of supplying chiefs of mission with a chief of
staff who is responsible for coordination. I would think that the
three-man staff concept should be more flexible so that in a
relatively uncomplicated area a single person could be designated
whereas in highly complex areas an even larger group than three
might be required.
4. On top of page 4 the statement is made "Recently, one
person has been designated to monitor all U. S. special operations
in Laos. " There is as you know a Laos task force and a designated
chairman but I was not aware that a particular individual had been
selected to perform the office described.
5. The concept set forth on page 5 of substituting the "best
qualified person" for the Ambassador in certain situations appears
Approved For Release 2003108i" -R P80BO1676R003000020010-8
 Approved For Rose 2003/08/25: CIA-RDP80BO1676W 000020010-8
to me to byholly unsound. A little greater flexibility in the I
movement of Ambassadors should suffice.
6. With regard to the specific paper on Vietnam, I believe
the first and second goals stated on page, two, i. e. pacification
and stabilization, are wholly sound objectives. The third objective,
unification, seems to be infinitely long range and perhaps very
dangerous if taken seriously.
25X1
esmon i era
Chief, Far East Division
Approved For Release 20 RDP80B01676R003000020010-8