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FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITY IN REGARD TO A PROGRAM TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEVELOPING SITUATION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R003100100009-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 11, 2003
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 16, 1963
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R003100100009-0.pdf129.96 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : Cl D 1k 'B01 676R003100100009-0 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/ Intelligence .eputy Director/Plans SUBJECT : Follow-up Activity in Regard to a Program to Consider the lxxzplications and Possible Courses of Action in Connection with the Leveloping Situation 13etween Moscow and r- eking REFERENCE a. ExDir memo dated 22 July 1963, same ubject (frK 43- S$ol) b. DD/ P memo dated 30 Jul y 1963, same subject tE't- G3 .s%o9 r c. Eli/ I memo dated g August 1963, same subject ~3 -,S S[09 ~.~~ 25X1 e. CIA memo dated 13 July 1963, subj: Impli- cations of the Sino-:soviet Rupture for the 11 i t.o (-T n/ e, i g $ S/ 3) 1. The responses of the DD/:P and the D D/I to my memoran- dum of 22 July are encouraging in noting progress toward developing a long-range coordinated approach. to the Sine- Soviet schism. From a review of these responses it seems to me that we are in good shape in two regards: (a) our present action response to the split within present policy guidelines and (b) our long- range analysis of the lino- Soviet situation. The former activity appears to be moderately short-range and specific while the latter is long-range and somewhat speculative. `Nhat's needed now. I believe, is a study to determine how we can best fill in the gaps between short-range action and long-range analysis. In addition, the DD/ P has stated in Reference B that better research and analysis is needed to support covert operations; this point is well taken and should be carefully considered. ,- __ Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003100100009-0 Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIi b B01676R003100100009-0 2. As our next step, I would like to convene a small group (as indicated in subparagraph 3c of my 22 July niexno) to discuss the problems mentioned above. In order to move quickly, I suggest that Cord Meyer and Chester Cooper select individuals acceptable to the I31)/P and the 1?1/I and arrange for the group to meet at an early date. I would like to have the recommendations of this group by 6 September and be kept informed of its progress. .vrian B. Kirkpatrick . nan r3. K- irkpatrick i,xecuLive Director O/ExecDir Distribution: Copy - Addressees 1 - ExecDir 1 - OAD Chrono V ER 1u 71! ,P3 Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003100100009-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003100100009-0 Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003100100009-0 Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : f ~VL1B01676R0031QP100009-0 WIG 1963 SUBJECT DD/I Inventory of Work Bearing on Implications of Sino-Soviet Rift REFERENCE : Your Memorandum dated 22 July 1963, Subject: Group to Consider the Implications and Possible Courses of Action in Connection with the Developing Situation Between Moscow and Peking 1. As you know, for the last five years the Agency has subjected Sino-Soviet relations and their deterioration to intense and special study. The current reporting and analytical functions, the estimating functions, and the research program of the DD/I offices have long since adjusted to the problem in varying degrees as required. It is not necessary to repeat here the established program of research and the schedule of estimates dealing with basic factors, conditions and capabilities which bear on the problem, e.g., Chinese capability for the independent development of nuclear weapons and the implications of Chinese possession of such weapons. What follows is, for the most part, a notation of emphases and undertakings which are in addition to or redirection of the continuing work in the economies, military capabilities, and policies of Russia and China. Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003100100009-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003100100009-0 Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003100100009-0