FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITY IN REGARD TO A PROGRAM TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEVELOPING SITUATION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R003100100009-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 11, 2003
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 16, 1963
Content Type:
MF
File:
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Body:
Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : Cl D 1k 'B01 676R003100100009-0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/ Intelligence
.eputy Director/Plans
SUBJECT : Follow-up Activity in Regard to a Program
to Consider the lxxzplications and Possible
Courses of Action in Connection with the
Leveloping Situation 13etween Moscow and
r- eking
REFERENCE a. ExDir memo dated 22 July 1963, same
ubject (frK 43- S$ol)
b. DD/ P memo dated 30 Jul y 1963, same
subject tE't- G3 .s%o9 r
c. Eli/ I memo dated g August 1963, same
subject ~3 -,S S[09 ~.~~
25X1
e. CIA memo dated 13 July 1963, subj: Impli-
cations of the Sino-:soviet Rupture for the
11 i t.o (-T n/ e, i g $ S/ 3)
1. The responses of the DD/:P and the D D/I to my memoran-
dum of 22 July are encouraging in noting progress toward developing a
long-range coordinated approach. to the Sine- Soviet schism. From a
review of these responses it seems to me that we are in good shape in
two regards: (a) our present action response to the split within present
policy guidelines and (b) our long- range analysis of the lino- Soviet
situation. The former activity appears to be moderately short-range
and specific while the latter is long-range and somewhat speculative.
`Nhat's needed now. I believe, is a study to determine how we can best
fill in the gaps between short-range action and long-range analysis.
In addition, the DD/ P has stated in Reference B that better research
and analysis is needed to support covert operations; this point is well
taken and should be carefully considered. ,- __
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2. As our next step, I would like to convene a small group
(as indicated in subparagraph 3c of my 22 July niexno) to discuss the
problems mentioned above. In order to move quickly, I suggest that
Cord Meyer and Chester Cooper select individuals acceptable to the
I31)/P and the 1?1/I and arrange for the group to meet at an early date.
I would like to have the recommendations of this group by 6 September
and be kept informed of its progress.
.vrian B. Kirkpatrick
. nan r3. K- irkpatrick
i,xecuLive Director
O/ExecDir
Distribution:
Copy - Addressees
1 - ExecDir
1 - OAD Chrono
V ER
1u 71! ,P3
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WIG 1963
SUBJECT DD/I Inventory of Work Bearing on
Implications of Sino-Soviet Rift
REFERENCE : Your Memorandum dated 22 July 1963,
Subject: Group to Consider the
Implications and Possible Courses
of Action in Connection with the
Developing Situation Between
Moscow and Peking
1. As you know, for the last five years the Agency
has subjected Sino-Soviet relations and their deterioration
to intense and special study. The current reporting and
analytical functions, the estimating functions, and the
research program of the DD/I offices have long since
adjusted to the problem in varying degrees as required.
It is not necessary to repeat here the established program
of research and the schedule of estimates dealing with
basic factors, conditions and capabilities which bear on
the problem, e.g., Chinese capability for the independent
development of nuclear weapons and the implications of
Chinese possession of such weapons. What follows is,
for the most part, a notation of emphases and undertakings
which are in addition to or redirection of the continuing
work in the economies, military capabilities, and policies
of Russia and China.
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