POST MORTEM ON LESSONS LEARNED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003100170027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 30, 1962
• Content Type: MF

DD/S 62-5646
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
SUBJECT
: Post Mortem on Lessons Learned
REFERENCE : ED Memo to all Members of the Senior Staff,
dtd 5 Nov 62, same subject
1. Attached are comments prepared by the Offices of Communications,
Security, Logistics and Personnel. The Office of Training, Medical Staff and
Automatic Data Processing Staff had nothing to report.
2. The problem areas identified are under continuing study and, as
you will note, we have taken or are undertaking such actions as we practi-
cably can to effect improvements in the DD/S area. We will be glad to
comment as may be necessary on problems of Agency-wide importance.
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L. K. White
Deputy Director
(Support)
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4 Atts :
Att 1: Memo to ED fm D/CO, dtd 23 Nov 62,
subj: Post Mortem on Lessons Learned
Att 2: Memo to ED fm D/Sec,dtd 21 Nov 62, subj:
as above
Att 3: Memo to DD/S fm D/Lo, dtd 23 Nov 62,
subj: as above
Att 4: Memo to Mr. II fm 0 dtd
20 Nov 6
subj: as above
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 L'~S (c , - s fy
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)
SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on Lessons Learned
REFERENCE : Your Memo dtd 5 Nov 1962 same subject.
1. The Office of Communications has been greatly affected by the
events of the past few weeks. Many of the requirements levied on this
office were taken in stride, but others- -particularly those that came from
outside CIA- -were entirely unexpected and hence we were not fully pre-
pared to meet all of them with available assets. Those assets we had have
been largely expended against crisis requirements with the result that
vital portions of our pre-crisis program may suffer. The basic "lessons
learned" are that a reserve of trained personnel-should be av le at all
time and that large Agency stocks of modern cryptographic, agent and
;
staff communications equipmentsholc, bc,axa h nd on hand against
contingencies. Further, modernization plans should be speeded up and not
phased over a three or four year period as previously conceived. In
order to reap the benefit of these lessons however, it will be necessary to
increase personnel ceilings and expenditures for equipment substantially
above those currently programmed.
2. As you know, during this period we were directed to absorb a major
communications workload in Latin America and elsewhere in the world by
the Communications Sub-committee of the National Security Council. These
re uire.ments stemmed primarily from the lack of ra :id and secure
The majority of rel CIA requirements could have been met durin this
-
erio without anV particular difficult'. Inter- relations of State Militar,
communications ho t can no longe -think:z- planes or act on a whol
unila eral basis.
3. The following discussion points out the major areas where deficiencies
have been discovered. Further details and specific recommendations on each
subject will be prepared if you desire.
a. Personnel. Two main categories of personnel were required
beyond our on-board strength, namely rac1,Q nDPr Oda ansithn,?_,~,~a,,
Attempts were made during this period to obtain military personnel as
operators and commercial Tech Rep personnel as technicians. In both
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Subject: Post-Mortem on Lessons Learned
instances we were only partially successful in that personnel thus
obtained were not fully qualified and when obtained could not be put
to immediate employment as they were not cleared for CIA use. It
is recommended that personnel ceilings be adjusted so that we can
oop to normally on a non-overtime basis and that a reserve of
qualified personnel that can ie cawed on short notice be developed.
b. Equipment. Several categories of equipment were found to
be in short supply during this period:
(1) Voice Secrecy Equipment. A more extensive and flexible
secure voice communications system is r e uire i e W to
area.
requirement peculiar to the Agency, but
one at is common to all of official Washington.
(2) Cryptographic Equipment. Although we had anticipated
the need for a very fast, efficient, and modern cryptographic system
in support of staff communications, we found ourselves only part way
through our cryptographic modernization pro rarrl when the crisis began.
At the pr esent rate our programming for this equipment will take us at
least three or four years to complete. The basic problem is that this
equipment is expensive and difficult to finance out of our limited year
to year operating budget. We are now preparing a thorough study to
determine where we stand over-all on this problem. As soon as this
study is completed, we will prepare a paper on the subject for presenta-
tion to determine the appropriate course of action.
(3) Radio and Teletype terminal Equipment. In this aratalso
we were caught part way through our modernization program when the
crisis began. As a result, we have expended a majority of our ware-
house stocks to meet the crisis requirements levied on us by the NSC.
It will be necessary to re-order such equipment to meet current pre-
crisis requirements. It is recommended that means be found to stock
such equipment beyond such current requirements so that equipment
wiIT_ on hand to meet crises as t ey develop._Had the currenT_cr sis
occurred at the end of the Fiscal Year instead of near the beginning, we
would have found it impossible to meet our commitments.
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Subject: Post-Mortem on Lessons Learned
25X1 (4) Agent E ui ment
By
production of some items at our own small R & D facility and by "flag-
waving" with contractors and payment of overtime we are meeting this
requirement. The lesson learned is that our stock procurement quanti-
ties of modern agent equipment is too low. Experience during this
crisis and during previous years has shown that it is better to over-buy
this category of equipment than to under-buy.
4. In retrospect, the past few weeks illustrated that our basic system
and organization can react to crisis situations if they are not too big and if
they occur only one at a time. We do not have reserve capacity sufficient
for simultaneous large crises or a hot war. The creation of the National
Communications sub-committees absorbed practically the full time of seven
of our senior people in committee meetings for three weeks. During this
time we still had sufficient depth of staff officer personnel to carry on im-
plementation actions on a world-wide basis. Our recommendations stemming
from this period are made in terms of being prepared in the future to meet
rapidly increasing requirements with available assets of equipment and per-
sonnel whether they occur simultaneously in several parts of the world and
whether they occur at the beginning or the end of a given Fiscal Year.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)
SUBJECT . Critique on Week of Crisis
REFERENCES : (a) Executive Director Memo of 5 November 1962,
Subject: Post Mortem on Lessons Learned
(b) Executive Assistant to the DD(S) Memo of
9 November 1962, Subject: :Post Mortem on
Lessons Learned
1. This memorandum is for information and also contains recommenda-
tions for consideration in Section I, paragraphs D, E, and F.
2. This memorandum is divided into two Sections. Section I sets forth
comments deemed to be of overall Agency importance, and Section II com-
ments referring to Office of Security problems.
SECTION I: Agency Problems
A. During the week of crisis, substantial effort was exerted
in planning against requirements and needs of the Agency. Diffi-
culty was encountered in this important area by the lack of
sufficient available information concerns the purpose, nature,
and ext of the ac ivi ies p aeri--f"or-the
25X1 The same type of problem was encountered in plan-
-J
for the protection and support of Agency domestic operations
25X1 to be conducted away from and general Headquarters area.
It has always been assumed that substantial requirements for
security protection and support would be levied. by overseas
stations and bases. Efforts to plan in this area were also ren-
dered difficult by the lack of precise information. We are
vitally concerned with Agency plans for regrouping of personnel
and, at this time, we are not aware of where or how this will be
accomplished.
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C. Recent experience has demonstrated the need for fur-
ther orientation and training regarding emergency robems.
Requirements for adder equipment also became evident. Accord-
ingly, a program has been instituted to hold periodic meetings
of Office Relocation Forces, the Security Patrol, and the Emer-
gency Stand-by Team. Plans are being formulated to provide
for instruction in the use of the gas mask, complete familiarity
with the physical features of Headquarters Building and reloca-
tion sites, fire fighting, radiation detection, and first aid.
Surveys are current to determine the types and quantities of
equipment necessary for training and for emergency operations.
D. Analysis of the Office of Security staff in terms of
emergency requirements leads clearly to the conclusion that we
are not staffed to meet all responsibilities. Accordingly, plans
have been undertaken to assess our requirements and to request,
through appropriate Agency channels, military assistance, par-
ticularly in the area of guarding and general protection responsi-
bilities.
E. The lack of ade uate communications facilities for the
Securi.t Patrol and the over ll.cmgxgency.,o='di+s the
Office appeared critical. Accordingly, a study has been under-
taken to analyze our requirements to determine the necessary
equipment and systems and to implement the study to the point
of solution.
F. We have become aware of the need for mobility and trans-
port which might arise during a catastr he of serious proportions.
This problem is being pursued with consideerati. n-being given to
obtaining a better potential for the emergency use of various types
of transport equipment and obtaining necessary passes and cre-
dentials from the Office of Civil Defense.
G. Further Security planning is necessary for each A enc
relocation site and for all areas housing Agency personnel during
aR emergency. resent plans have been reviewed, and action
has been taken to conduct real surveys designed to bring up to
date the plans for these areas.
H. The adequacy of our vital storage materials program
has been reviewed, and it has been concluded that this program
must be intensified. This will be done.
e
Direr or of Security
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