STATE-DEFENSE MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL COMMITTEE (S-DMICC)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003100200011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 27, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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y viu ~ C ~-+
SUBJECT: State-Defense Military Information Control
Committee (S-DMICC)
1. Several weeks ago I informed you that on the basis of preliminary
research the Director of Central Intelligence has authority to disseminate
national and interdepartmental intelligence to a foreign government in
accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 1. Having completed this study, I submit the following report,
which supports that conclusion. Included is information on the authority
and formation of S-DMICC.
2. By memorandum of 27 February 1946 to the Secretary of State,
President Truman approved a statement of "Basic Policy Governing the
Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments, "
which had been submitted to the President on that day by the Secretary of
State and which had been approved previously by the Secretaries of State,
War, and Navy. The President by his memorandum also directed the
three Secretaries "to exercise control of the disclosure of classified military
information as contemplated in the statement of policy. "
3. The policy was originally recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to "serve as a guide, from the viewpoint of military security, in determining
what military information . . . which bears a military security classification
may be disclosed to foreign governments. " The type of information contem-
plated under the policy was set out in paragraph 2. "Military Information"
was defined as "all information primarily under the control and jurisdiction
of the United States armed forces, or of primary interest to them. " Two
principal categories of military information were described: (1) "Intelligence
as a category of military information refers to the rra tters alien to the United
States. It comprises all military information about possible or actual enemies
and possible or actual theaters of operation;" and (2) "Information Pertaining-
to the United States which excludes intelligence is military information whi
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pertains to the United States and to U. S. activities. " "Intelligence" is
mentioned again in paragraph 4 of the policy paper, wherein it states:
"Neither the source of intelligence nor its method of acquisition will be
disclosed to a foreign government without specific authorization from the
department or agency by which the intelligence was obtained. "
4. In his memorandum to the President accompanying the policy statement,
Secretary of State Byrnes described it as "necessary as a guide to the three
Departments in the control of the disclosure of such classified military infor-
mation. " He pointed out that "disclosure must be consistent with governmental
policy, with regard to atomic energy and similar or related information for
which special machinery for release has been or may hereafter be established. "
5. The responsibility for developing, formulating and promulgating policies
and procedures governing the disclosure of classified United States military
information to foreign governments consistent with the approved policy now
rests with the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee (S-DMICC).
Membership of the Committee consists of representatives of the Secretaries
of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force with the State member serving
as chairman. A representative of CIA serves as an observer to the Committee.
6. In implementation of its responsibility, S-DMICC has established, with
the approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense, a "policy governing the
disclosure to foreign governments of CLASSIFIED military information. " The
document containing this policy is labeled MIC 206/29 (Revised) dated
15 November 1955, to which amendments have been added. In this document
"Military Information" is defined as "information under the control or
jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, its departments and agencies, or
of primary interest to them. " Intelligence is defined as "evaluated information
concerning actual and potential situations and conditions relating to activities
of other nations or to foreign or enemy-held areas. "
7. Paragraph II of MIC 206/29 (Revised) sets down the principle that
"Classified military information shall not be disclosed to foreign governments
unless F certain conditions/ are met. " Paragraph V (Releasable Information)
A (Procedure and Authority) states that subject to certain limitations and
conditions certain classified military information "may be considered for
release to foreign governments by the Department of Defense in accordance with
/ certain standards/ PROVIDED: Prior to release by the Department of Defense,
concurrence in the release is obtained from such other Government departments
or agencies as have an interest in the information. " There follows a functional
listing of information which delineates "the areas of classified military informa-
tion which may be released. to foreign governments" subject again to those
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certain limitations. One of these areas is entitled "Intelligence, " and
following it this language appears:
x'(20) Intelligence* which is essential to the furtherance of the
common military objectives of the U. S. and the recipient government,
or to enable that government to assess the capabilities, intentions,
and probable courses of action of a potential aggressor. (The disclosure
of intelligence estimates, studies or conclusions of joint interest must be
jointly approved, such joint approval to include concurrence in the
_~
substance).
*EXCLUDING the following:
(a) Evaluated intelligence on the recipient country or its possessions,
dependencies or dominions, except that based upon information obtained
from or with the consent of the recipient country. For the purposes of
this subparagraph, the British Commonwealth nations are considered
as a single nation; or
(b) Intelligence which reveals:
i. A source or method of acquisition that would jeopardize the
operation or existence of a covert intelligence activity;
ii. A source or method of acquisition that would identify and thereby
jeopardize the safety, welfare or reputation of any individual connected
therewith, or preclude the future use of such source or individual in the
collection of intelligence or other activities;
iii. A source or method of acquisition which the recipient nation
would be likely to use for propaganda purposes against the United States,
or to impede a United States intdligence collection effort; or
iv. Significant information on results of major intelligence collection
efforts, which the recipient nation would be likely to use against U. S.
interests. "
8. The above wording must be read in conjunction with the fact that what
is of concern here is military information as set forth early in the policy
paper and as defined in the memorandum to the President from the Secretary
of State, dated Z7 February 1946. Unfortunately, the definition of "intelligence"
appearing in the policy paper MIC 206/29 (Revised) and the language describing
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intelligence in paragraph V B is broad language and, if read without the connec-
tion with military information, could be misconstrued to mean all intelligence,
thereby making it appear as if S-DMICC and the State and Defense Departments
have exclusive jurisdiction over the release to foreign governments of all
intelligence. Based upon the 27 February 1946 memorandum with the attached
policy statement to the President, it is obvious that what was contemplated
under the original policy was military information and that the intelligence
which was included was, narrowly, military information about possible or
actual enemies.
9. S-DMICC policy on. the disclosure of intelligence was clarified and
the limits defined as to military intelligence in terms of the jurisdiction of
S-DMICC as a result of an. exchange of memoranda between the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Secretaries of State and Defense. On 2 May 1958
the Director of Central Intelligence wrote to the Secretaries of State and
Defense recommending that the Secretaries' "authority to exercise control of
the release to foreign governments of classified military information . . . will
not be applied to national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence which
may contain military intelligence. " The Secretaries of State and Defense, by
memorandum dated 11 June 1958 and 27 May 1958, respectively, accepted the
recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence, thus reiterating
that policy of nondisclosure applied to classified military information.
10. Under NSCID 1, the Director of Central Intelligence has authority to
disseminate national and interdepartmental intelligence to foreign governments
upon his determination and the concurrence of the IAC that such action would
substantially promote the security of the United States, provided that such
dissemination is consistent with existing statutes and Presidential policy.
NSCID 1, Revised 18 January 1961, reads in part as follows:
"d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate national
intelligence to the President, members of the National Security Council,
as appropriate, members of the U. S. Intelligence Board and, subject
to existing statutes, to such other components of the Government as
the National Security Council may from time to time designate or the U. S.
Intelligence Board may recommend. He is further authorized to disseminate
national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence produced within
the U. S. Intelligence Board structure on a strictly controlled basis
to foreign governments and international bodies upon his determination with
the concurrence of the U. S. Intelligence Board, that such action would
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substantially promote the security of the United States: Provided, That
such dissemination is consistent with existing statutes and Presidential
policy including that reflected in international agreements; and provided
further that any disclosure of FBI intelligence information shall be cleared
with that agency prior to dissemination. Departmental intelligence and
interdepartmental intelligence produced outside the U. S. Intelligence
Board subcommittee structure may be disseminated in accordance with
existing statutes and Presidential policy including that reflected in inter-
national agreements. "
1. The State-Defense Military Information Control Committee owes its
existence to a Presidential Memorandum approving a statement of "Basic
Policy Governing the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign
Governments" submitted to the President by the Secretary of State. With this
as authority a joint committee was set up for the purpose of, and responsible
for:
"A. Developing, formulating and promulgating policies and pro-
cedures governing the disclosure of classified military information and
for considering proposals for exceptions to those policies.
"B. Submitting to the Secretaries of State and Defense recom-
mendations for establishment of, or changes in, basic disclosure
policies.
"C. Exercising, through a permanent Secretariat, general
supervision of the implementation of U. S. policies governing
release of all classified military information, other than strategic
guidance and planning, to NATO nations and other nations receiving
U. S. military aid.
"D. Making determinations as to the ability of foreign governments
to afford security protection to classified military information (including
classified atomic military information, when such determinations are
requested 1y the Secretary of State) to be released to them by the United
States."-1/
2. S-DMICC operates without statutory authority but carries out executive
functions in support of the duties of the Secretary of State and Defense.
I/ Memorandum for the National Security Council, Subject: Disclosure of
Classified Military Intelligence Information, at 5-6 (23 July 1959)
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3. The jurisdiction of the Committee is limited to the subject matter
of the basic policy statement, namely, classified military information.
4. While this includes military intelligence, it does not include national
intelligence, and where classified military intelligence is included in national
intelligence the Secretaries of State and Defense have explicitly agreed that
their control over the release of military intelligence will not be applied.
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Remarks: Walt: Some time back the Director asked
that we review legalities of the establishment
and functions of S-DMICC. The attached
paper rehearses the history of S-DMICC and
how we finally made arrangements so that it
did not exercise control over the release of
intelligence estimates to foreign countries.
This is contrary to the information Bob
Amory had given the Director. Consequently,
the Director's further question as to whether
S-DMICC has outlived its usefulness may now
be moot. I have been intending to take this
up at an Executive Committee meeting, but
this has been difficult as either there over
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
FORM 10. 237 Use previous editions (40)
II`, GOYI RNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-581282
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ha+ven'fbeen any or other items have occupied
the full schedule. Let me know if anything
more is wanted from this office.
25X1
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