TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003200080010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 28, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
28 July 1960
SUBJECT: Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy
Changes in Sov-1-e-lu Conde;^t Sine the Sturm .t Collapse
1. In the two-month period since the breakdown of the Summit
a significant change has developed in Soviet conduct toward the
Nest, and especially toward the US* Although there has been no
acknowledged change in policy, the tone of Soviet statements and
propaganda has hardened considerably in recent weeks. This memorandum
discusses the motivations which may currently be operating in Soviet
policy and considers some of the factors which may bear on Soviet
behavior in coming months.
2. In one sense, of. course, Soviet policy and conduct had
to be different after the Summit breakdown. The 18-month period
prior to Paris was dominated by a trend toward active negotiation
of the major East-:Jest issues. The nuclear test talks entered a
serious phase with concessions and movement toward agreement being
made on both sides. In the fall of 1959 a formula was found for
resumption of the long-interrupted disarmament negotiations.
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Although there was an intermittent drumbeat of threats on the
Berlin question, from the time of the MacMillan visit to Moscow
early in 1959 these seemed intended to influence the terms of
negotiation rather than to make negotiation impossible. Khrushchev
had, especially after his visit to the US, given increasing credit
to the Western leaders for their good intentions. He based his
position as leader of the Bloc, even against a vigorous Chinese
challeige, on the proposition that negotiations to deal with major
causes of tension could succeed.
3e The one result of the U-2 affair and Khrushchev's handling
of it at saris which was clear immediately was that this proposition
was invalid, for some time at least.* Initially Khrushchav adjus-
ted to this by adopting a pose of patience: if the West was not
yet ready to negotiate, the USSR had no pressing need to do so, it
could wait. He said on 23 May: "Our policy is correct and just.
Why should it be changed?" But this could have been no more than
an interim phase in the interest of maintaining the fiction that
In memoranda written for USIB du?img the Summit week the Board
said that it was likely Khrushchev had decided even before the
Summit that it was not going to produce progress on the central
issues of Berlin and Germany, and that this was one of the
reasons he used the U-2 incident as he did in order to insure
the breakdown*
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Soviet policy is always consistent, never veering from its
purposeful devotion to the "right" courseo
1. In fact,, there was no doubt that the dramatic breakdown
of the Summit was the end of a phase. The real question was how
the Soviet leadership would set its course thereafter. Would it
concentrate its efforts on rebuilding the shattered bridge of
contact and work its way back to a new basis for negotiation?
Or would it allow the new gulf to widen, perhaps even adopt a
line of conduct which actively encouraged a new increase of
tensions?
5. In recent weeks,, and especially since the Bucharest
meeting of Communist parties in late June, the choice the Soviets
have made has become more clear. They have given up the pretense
that they looked forward to a resumption of negotiations and have
launched into a phase of aggressive agitation and propaganda with the
US as the principal target. They have used the events in Japan.,
in Cuba, the Congo and the case of the RB-47 to disqualify the US
as a negotiating partner. They attribute to the US all the worst
motives and intentions associated with the classic description of
the imperialist villain in Communist demonology. Khrushchev has
also reverted to the practice of frequently invoking the Soviet
missile threat. The change hab amounted to a deliberate shift
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of activity from negotiating to propaganda forums., illustrated by
the break-up of the Ten-Nation talks on disarmament and the
demand that the UN Assembly take up the subjecto The only
remaining negotiation, that on nuuiear tests., is stagnated, and
could be broken off at arjy time, The conduct of policy has thus
been transferred from the diplomats to the hatchet men in the
agitprop departments*
6e In a way., the abusive language now being employed repre-
sents the norm to which the Communists always revert when negotiations
are not in prospect. The modicum of trust and good will which the
latter require be attributed to the "imperialist enemy" is an
ideological embarrassment in the Communists' white black mental
world, as Khrushchev's defensive speeches in the period prior to the
Summit clearly showed. To smite the enemy hip and thigh is the
easy and natural thing in a political system immersed in demagogy;
to deal in the reasonable terms of adjustment and compromise, as
negotiation requires, always seems to border on betrayalo
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7. That this behavioristic explanation of the recent change
in Soviet couct is part of the story is doubtless true, but
there is surely an element of calculation present also. During
a period when they see no favorable irospect for negotiations, that
is, at least during the life of the present US administration, the
Soviets intend to use every opportunity to discredit US motives
and policies in the eyes of world opinion, to weaken the trust
placed in US leadership by allies, and to create new problems and
distractions for US leaders. They hope that, if and when negotia-
tions are resumed, the moral position of the US world-wide will
be weaker, its allies less firm in their support, and the pressures
for concessions to the USSR greater.
8. This fits the Soviet concept of a negotiation as a single
encounter in a continuous political struggle. The aim is, not to
compromise differences, but to enforce concession and submission
on the "enemy." The ability to do this depends upon mobilizing
political forces prior to negotiation so that irreststible pressure
can be brought to bear on the opponent once he enters the negoti-
ating chamber. The intervals between negotiations are devoted to
what is called "mass struggle," that is, propaganda and agitation
to build up the necessary pressure. That Soviet policy is currently
in one of these phases where the dominant motif is "struggle" was
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made clear by Khrushchev in replying to a question on disarmament
at his Vienna press conference on 8 July, Discounting the prospects
for negotiations on disarmament, even if they were shifted back to
the UN3 he said:
"The Pentagon will never agree on disarmamento.o.A
struggle must be waged,.. The people must be called
upon, the earth must be stirred up against all those
who harper and wreck the solution of the disarmament
problem. Then a solution on disarmament can be found,
then peace will be attained, when the people take their
destiny into their on handsoT'
The shift of emphasis from negotiation to propaganda and the
purpose of this change was made even more clear in a statem-tnt to
the Communist-front World Peace Council by its executive head on
9 July:
"Great advances had been made in bringing them (the great
powers) together at the summit meeting and at the
disarmament comm:itteeo,,. We must realize now that
it is not going to be sufficient to bring some govern-
ments to the negotiating table, Popular pressure must
be made so great that once there, they mast agree to
real disarmament and to the abandonment of the cold
war."
9o It is easier to describe the change in Soviet conduct than
to answer the questions it raiseso The most important of these
are: How long is the new phase likely to last? Is it likely to
includes in addition to the tension-raising language and agitation
which is gU that it has involved thus far, actions which would
carry risk of producing situations of serious crisis?
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10@ References to a new Summit in 6 to 8 months have tended
to drop out of Soviet propaganda. This gambit was probably in
any case only a way of underlining the insult to the Presidents
The Soviets must certainly realize that a new President could not
entertain another Summit until a long chain of preparatory
events, perhaps including the appearance of a personality other
than Khrushchev on the Soviet side of the table, had taken places
However, the Soviets could return to the path of negotiation at
a lower level. If they decided that the time was ripe to make
progress from their point of view through negotiation, the summit
would not be essential. It was a device that fitted the temperament
and the tactics of Khrushchev, suitable as a demonstrative way of
collecting concessions if the West was prepared to make them, but
not suitable for serious negotiations. If they were really ready
for a new rotnd of serious negotiations, the Soviets might well .
prefer more normal methods. And they would be likely to think that
the resumption of contacts at more routine levels would not be
difficult at any time, despite the present deterioration in the
atmosphere. In short, the fact that the Soviets have made a
Summit impossible for a long time does not mean that they have
foreclosed negotiation altogether.
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CONFIDENTIAL
11. On the whole, it seems unlikely that the Soviets have
yet decided upon an-ything more far-reaching than a period of
vigorous abuse of the US until a new administration is installed.
This does not mean that they are certain to alter their tone
after January 1961, but only that they have not now decided to
persist in it indefinitely. They are nothing if not tactically-
minded and, since we believe that they do eventually want to be
able to use channels of negotiation, they are not likely to have
decided already to go on souring the atmosphere without pause
right into the period of a new administration. It would also serve
to underline and Justify their repudiation of the old administra-
tion if they greeted the new one more mildly. The present violence
of their language is not therefore evidence of an intention to
bring about a profound and long-term deterioration of East-West
relations. It should be remembered also that the Soviet polemical
style always employs a large trowel and that what Westerners tend
to regard as irretrievable excesses do not necessarily appear so
to the Soviet mind.
12. The real test of the Soviets' intentions, however, is
whether or not they actually take actions involving risks. So long
as it is only polemics which causes the deterioration, the presump-
tion has to be that we are witnessing a limited and probably
short-term variation in Soviet tactics. So far there have been
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no serious indications that the Soviets are planning to unde?take
actions involving a degree of real risk. Rude noises have again
been made about Perlin, but these have so far been, if anything,
even more imprecise than many in the long series of ominous state-
ments made since November, 1958. They can be explained by a desire
to avoid the impression that after so much agitation of this question
the Soviets are in fact retreating from their demands. While we
have always stressed the danger that Khrushchev could underestAm ate
the risk of a unilateral action, the Soviets have certainly shown
that they appreciate that there is some degree of risk. No evidence
has yet appeared requiring us to alter our basic view about the
Soviets' approach to the Berlin problem -- namely, that they do
realize that a change in the status of Berlin can be safely achieved
only through negotiations. Moreover, it seems likely that they would
consider a further round of East-West negotiations as a necessary
prelude to a separate treaty with East Germany. At the very least,
a move on Berlin would probably be preceded by some preparations to
minimize the risk and would not come as a bolt from the blue.
13. Leaving aside targets of opportunity which might attract
an aggressive Soviet response, there are not many other areas where
Soviet-initiated action seems probable. The implied threat to
expel the Western military missions from East Germany is not
implausible. It would be a dramatic way of stating, and enforcing
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in defiance of the West, the basic Soviet position on Germany
that all the Four-Power accords are dead. It is a step that
might well appeal to the Soviets in the current phase. They
might calculate that it would sharply increase Western concern
about Berlin without actually inourring much risk. It is also
possible that if the Soviets wished to heighten tensions further
at this time they would prefer that this be done by a Chinese
initiative. The Chinese hale opportunity and capability for aggres-
sive action, and a Soviet green light for some limited move might
improve the troubled relations of the partners as well as provide a
further testing of US nerve without immediate Soviet involvement.
lip. Taking into account that the change in Soviet conduct is
very recent and probably still in an early phase, a summary
estimate might run about as follows: The element of pressure M d
intransigeance is clearly increasing in Soviet policy. It has
always been our estimate that phases of this kind could be anticipated
when the movement of events made this seem desirable from the
Soviet point of view.' Thus far there are no persuasive indications
TIE 1l-4-59, 9 February 1960: "We expect to see elements of
both pressure and detente combined and varied as tactical
advantage may suggest. For the nearer future the present
emphasis on negotiation and accommodation seems likely to
continue; later the motif of pressure and struggle will prob-
ably reappear."
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that the Soviets intend to pass from aggressive language to
aggressive action of a kind which could involve serious risk.
They probably realize that the aims currently sought by Soviet
policy cannot be won through aggressive pressure or ultimatum
alone, certainly not without excessive risk, and will therefore
keep open the possibility of again resorting to channels of nego-
tiation. It is too early to conclude that the present phase will
be a prolonged one, or even necessarily that it will be marked by
a consistent trend toward further deterioration in relations. Much
is likely to depend on contingencies which may arise unrelated to
any Soviet initiative and on the opportunistic responses the
Soviets would then think appropriate.
Factors of Uncertainty
15. To describe the present phase in East-West relations as
presenting a "fluid situation" is to take resort to a hackneyed
phrase to cover a very confused picture. But the phrase may be
more justified than it usually is -- with the effects of the Summit
breakdown still being worked out, with US elections in prospect,
and with more than the usual quotient of turbulent local situa-
tions spread all the way from Tokyo to Havana. Not all of this
fluidity has an immediate bearing on Soviet policy but there are
some factors which do make a projection of Soviet policy parti-
cularly risky at present.
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16. One of these factors is the evident tension in Sino-
Soviet relations. The Soviets seem to have obtained in the
Bucharest communique of the conference of Bloc parties a formal
acknowledgment of the correctness of their general line and
therewith of their continuing preeminence and authority within
the Bloc. Having obtained this they have made some semantic
concessions to the Chinese. More important, the whole content
of their propaganda against the US comes close to talking
Chinese. This may be a deliberate attempt to bridge the differ-
ences with China or to avoid seeming to lag behind the Chinese
in revolutionary ardor, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. It is unlikely that the Soviets would allow them-
selves to be taken in tow by Chinese belligerence, or would
voluntarily consent to Chinese actions involving undue risk.
Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders are bound to regard the pre-
servation of Bloc unity as a vital interest. We cannot be sure
how far they might go to adjust Soviet policy to Chinese desires
in order to avoid a more serious deterioration in Sino-Soviet
relations. During a phase when they have no desire to con-
ciliate the West, they might be willing to go a considerably
greater distance than they have been until now.
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17. There is also some question of the effect on relations
among the Soviet leaders of foreign policy developments in
recent months. For two years or more Khrushchev has dominated
the conduct of foreign policy, bringing to it his character-
istic agitprop style. On the Berlin question he mounted a cam-
paign of agitation and bluff which has not only failed to achieve
results, but which may still either prove costly in prestige or
bring serious risk of war. His wide-ranging interventions, as
recently on Cuba and the Congo, serve no immediate Soviet in-
terest and are more likely to hamper than to encourage the
spread of Soviet influence. Beyond this, he has managed to
bring relations with China to a critical state. There may well
be men in the Soviet leadership who, although they do not differ
greatly on objectives, would nevertheless prefer a more cautious
and conservative conduct of policy. While we have thought that
Khrushchev enjoyed a very considerable ascendancy over his
colleagues, we have not thought that his authority was absolute.
He appeared to preside over a consensus in which his own voice
was the loudest. But if his colleagues took a sufficiently
serious view of the developments resulting from his policies, it
is not impossible that the consensus could shift. In this case,
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some constraints could be imposed on him, or more lik:-~l.y, he
would himself alter course and head off in the new direction
still baying at the head of the pack. Such a check might not
visibly affect his position in the leadership, but could affect
the future course of Soviet policy.
18. Finally, the US election period introduces some
element of uncertainty into US-Soviet relations. The Soviet
leaders have shown some signs of departing from their old
cliche that since there are only two "bourgeois" parties the
outcome of elections make no difference. They seem to think
now that there are varying attitudes toward the USSR in the US
or at least that personalities make a difference. (This is not
to say that they have a preference or would try to influence
the outcome of the elections; they probably have no very clear
notion of what to expect of Senator Kennedy even if they feel
they know the Vice President.) There is no evidence that the
Soviets believe the common observation that the elections limit
the ability of the US administration to respond to challenge
or to react decisively in a crisis. It seems unlikely that they
would undertake a risky action on this calculation alone.
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However, they may well consider that US behavior is less pre-
dictable during an election period, especially as they show
signs of not finding it very predictable even in normal times.
Altogether, it seems probable that the US elections introduce
some element of uncertainty into the Soviets' estimate of
future TIS behavior, and therefore into their own policy.
19. Given the known or inferred factors of uncertainty
referred to in the three preceding paragraphs, it is entirely
possible that contingencies which might arise over the coming
months would elicit Soviet responses of an unexpected kind.
The summary estimate made in Paragraph 14 should therefore be
read with this caution in mind.
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SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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