ORGANIZATION OF DD/R

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003200190012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 30, 1963
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Relse 2007/01/16: CIA-RDP80B01676R~3200190012-6
30 July 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Organization of DD/R
REFERENCE : DCI's Memorandum of 24 July 1963
1. I have studied and thought about the Director's memorandum
of 24 July on the organization of DD/R and I can readily understand his
misgivings, particularly based upon the comments which he has been
receiving from various parts of the Agency opposing any changes. I too
would strenuously oppose change for changers sake, or even solely for
accommodation of an individual, but I believe that the changes currently
proposed are valid, objective and should be made for the good of the
Agency. In this I wo-ald admit that I have changed my views in the last
year and a half, but I am not apologizing for a change in views because
I think that certain developments warrant these changes.
2. As the Director points.out, his original concept, which he
discussed at length with the Kirkpatrick-Coyne-Schuyler Board and
myself, the President's Board and Congressional Committees, was to
pull together all scientific and technical talents. It is true that the
study group opposed taking OSI out of the DD/I because it felt that there
was a greater identity of interest for the type of personnel concerned in
the DD/I area than there would be in the DD/R. As far as TSD was
concerned, General Schuyler and myself did not feel that all of TSD
should go to DD/R; Coyne felt that it should. On the other hand, neither
General Schuyler nor myself were as convinced that the R&D part of TSD
shouldn't go to DD/R
rv1(F.I/ DF Pages
 Approved For Re.e 2007/01/16: CIA-RDP80B01676R 200190012-6
3. The changes proposed today will not in my opinion lessen in
any manner the effectiveness of the Agency, and may indeed greatly
increase it. I am convinced that the DD/R will insure that the DD/I gets
as good or even better cooperation and service from OSI in estimates and
current intelligence and other aspects of intelligence production requiring
the integration of various intelligence disciplines. As a balance sheet on
the transfer I would list the following factors.
a. OSI is composed largely of intelligence analysts who should
remain in an area where the bulk of the personnel are analysts.
b. There is greater identity of interest between the background
f the OSI analysts - heavily PHDs - to the DD/I than there would be
o the DD/R - heavily operators (at the moment).
c. Keeping OSI in DD/I enables a greater integration of
Intelligence production.
d. Cline makes the argument that he needs OSI to "keep DIA
Lone st".
e. Cline makes the argument that the system can work effectively
my if he has everything under his command in the intelligence research
nd analytical field.
a. The argument that the analysts should be in DD/I because
that is where all of the other analysts are falls apart if we look at a
broader picture than just the Agency alone. There are and always
will be analysts .n both State and DIA, and it is part of the DCI's
responsibility to produce coordinated and integrated intelligence
which transcends CIA alone. The DD/I must therefore, and very
importantly should, depend heavily on State and DLA for contributions
in their specialties. The fact that he will have to depend upon another
component of CIA doesn't in any way lessen his capability for doing
his job.
b. The argument that there is a greater affinity between the
PHDs in OSI and those in DD/I is completely negated by the fa~at
vvP hnnP to attract to DD/R, R & D, some of the finest scientific
brains in the country - hopefully as many PHDs as possible. Further,
I am now much more persuaded by the "Lodestone Theory" or, as the
scientists would put it, "having a hard nucleus to attract others".
- 2 - ..
nr I?ala~en ~nn7irt~t~F ('IA-RfPR(1RCl'1A7ARnfi7001 001 -6
 Approved For Re e 2007/01/16: CIA-RDP80B01676R200190012-6
c. As far as integration of intelligence, I find little argument
to persuade me of the fact that it can be better integrated if everybody
is in DD/I. Despite difficulties, we seem to have been able to
integrate intelligence with DIA, and with good will on both sides I
see no real problem in this regard.
d. The argument about "keeping DIA honest" appalls me
somewhat because my immediate reaction is "who keeps CIA honest?"
While I do agree that we should have sufficient expertise to insure the
DCI that his other constituents, e. g. DIA, NSA and State, are
producing competent intelligence, I think the mere attitude expressed
in this comment is unfortunate. Further, if it is valid I see no reason
why it can't be done just as well in DD/R. as in DD/I.
e. Concerning the argument that the system can work effectively
only if he has everything under his command, the DD/I does not have
everything under his command today. He doesn't have the DIA or
State contributions under his command. He indeed doesn't have all
CIA intelligence production and analysis under his command. There
is considerable work in this field in the DD/P, such as that of the
International Communism Division in CI Staff and that of some of
the area divisions.
4. Thus in answer to the Director's question, I do believe that he can
be absolutely sure that the support of the DD/I will be continuous, timely
a.nd u~n nterr under all circumstances and that there will be proper
integration of technical intelligence with economic and political opinions.
I would add to this further that the arguments against any change in DD/I
are just as invalid to me as would be arguments to the effect that we ought
to have all of the lawyers in the Agency in one area because they all
have LLBs. I would doubt very much if the Harvard faculty would enter-
tain for one moment combining the Department of History with that of
Physics because they all have Doctorates. They are separate disciplines
with separate philosophies and yet they work together as separate depart-
ments. Further, the present DD/I plans to breakI would further
frag ent unscientific and to hni al of o t rather th
ivin it greater
an g-
emphasis, and I am sure would result _in_a_r u- ct on in th qua of our
scientific effort inasmuch as they would inevitably be submerged to the
'rg'eneralists" in D/I rather than being kept under scientific specialists.
Another compe'lTiii argument is the much greater input we are getting
from the scientific and technical side of the house now that Wheelon has
been attending the morning meetings, and I am impressed by the fact that
his presence not only adds to the breadth of analysis that we receive, but
I am sure also tends to keep this particular "game honest". I am impressed
by the fact that we did not have that type of input before his attendance.
Two other brief comments. I would point out that in the 40's CIA had an
Office of Research and Estimates which included all of the functions now
Arxnrrv, r1 Pnr Palancc')flfl7/fit/1F; C1Li_-IoTPqfRn1F;7rPI1(14'in(1Qnni )_J
 Approved For Rele 2007/01/16: C-IA-RDP80B01676R 200190012-6
existing in five different offices, namely OSI, ONE, OCI, OBI and ORR.
When General Smith reorganized ORE, I heard identical comments to
those being advanced by the DD/I today as to why ORE should not be
broken up. Finally, 18 months ago when we made the decision to create
the Office of Elint, similar arguments were advanced as to why we
would not get good results by taking these Elint fragments and putting
them together. Today I am sure that everybody would agree that we
are getting much greater impact in our electronic intelligence effort.
5. As far as the R & D element of TSD is concerned, I do not feel
there will be any great loss to the Clandestine Services, and indeed they
may get a much greater effort on their behalf by merging this with the
Agency R & D effort? As the DCI has pointed out on many occasions,
TSD is basically a stepchild in the Clandestine Services. Few of the
station chiefs are scientifically oriented, and the mere fact that I have
never yet been able to obtain any DD/P support in my efforts to move
TSD into the new building is indicative of the general attitude. As long
as we are careful to insure that once the item developedfor agent use
is turned over in full. to the operations and support sections of TSD,
which will remain with the DD/P, I envisage no problems here.
6. You have already talked to Col. White about the Automatic
Data Processing Staff and there seems to be no problem in this transfer.
I would only add to this that during my work with ADPS everybody agreed
that it could be located almost anywhere in the Agency, and the most
compelling argument for putting it in DD/R is that this is indeed a field
that is moving extremely fast in the R & D area where not only must our
research for new methods ofinformation storage and retrieval be of The
most advanced and sophisticated nature, but also where the DCI and the
Agency must take the lead to insure the proper and compatible automation
of the intelligence community.
7. ,Finally, the most compelling of all arguments to me for establish-
ing DD/R along the above lines is the fact that you have selected for the
new DD/R one of the truly outstanding young men whom I have seen enter
the Government in many years. Wheelon impresses me as not only a
scientist of great ability, but also as an executive with considerable talent,
and perhaps most im?aortant of all as an objective and rational statesman
who is trying to achieve for the United States and whom I have not seen
swayed by parochial or personal considerations. I would note that Wheelon
devoted considerable time to analyzing the whole DD/R concept and I do
not feel that he recommends moving OSI to DD/R simply for the sake of
taking it with him. I am sure that he has studied the problem in sufficient
Annrnvarl Fnr RAIAacP 7flfl7/fll/1ri C;IA-RflP&)PO10i70iR00:32001 9001 -6
 Approved For Rel,e 2007/01/16: CIA-RDP80BO1676R 200190012-6
depth to feel that what he proposes is the best way to do the job, and
I am confident that it will succeed. I naturally assume that our senior
officers are all of sufficient breadth and quality so that we can assume
there will be the necessary good will and cooperation to insure the
success in any decision made.
t~ 1
Annrn var1 Fnr Ralaaca 9(1r171r1~'tl'1~ ''` 4A.-RflPR(1RnlR7RRnn-A9( l1 Q( ll9-R
 Approved For Release 2007/01/16: CIA-RDP80BO1676R003200190012-6
Q
Approved For Release 2007/01/16: CIA-RDP80BO1676R003200190012-6