SOME THOUGHTS RELATIVE TO DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ON CIA FUNCTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003200200027-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: April 10, 1958
• Content Type: MF

27. Ci7lVI
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L
SUBJECT : SomeeChoughts Relative to Defense Reorganization
on CIA Functions
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seem to consider legislation necessary. These eight actions, some of "
which have bearing upon intelligence relationships, are:
1. All combat operational forces to be "truly unified"
under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the _ b
1. A study of the President's message on uez-ense reorganizatii.on
ae reported in the -.Dress indicates that he has directed the Secretary ,_/A -t 6,t
1'
of Defense to initiate eight spec Lfic actions for which he does not '~T
Secretary of Defense, and not under direction of any branch
of the armed services.
2. To remove control over combat and operational units
from the Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, leaving their
departments as administrative and housekeeping agencies.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff to act only at the direction
of the Defense Secretary and not in their own right.
4. To end the joint committee system under the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and to establish an operations division of the joint
Chiefs of Staff under the Secretary of Defense.
5. To order budgeting officers to prepare figures for the
1960 Fiscal Year on the basis of which funds will be appropriated
by Congress to be expended by the Secretary of Defense.
6. To review the publicity and legislative activities of
the three services and centralize control of them in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
7. To appoint a civilian Assistant Secretary of Defense to
head all armed services liaison with Congress.
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8. To promote Admirals and Generals above 2-star rank, to
assign, reassign and remove them, only upon the advice of the
Secretary of Defense who, in turn, will be guided by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the suggestions of the Secretaries of the
military departments.
II. Of these eight actions, only four appear to have possibilities
of impact on intelligence relationships -- 1, 2, 4 and 5-
1. The "truly unified" operational commands will require
intelligence support heretofore provided by the intelligence organizations
of the "Executive Agency" as well as the Joint Intelligence Committees.
This change may lead to greatly increased integration and centralization
of, intelligence matters at the JCS level within the new operations
division, or at the Department of Defense level, possibly under an
Assistant Secretary.
2. Leaving the Army, Navy and Air Force Departments as
administrative and housekeeping agencies without responsibility for
or control over combat or operational units or commands will reduce the
scope of "departmental intelligence" required for accomplishing the
military departmental missions. If this is actually carried out, many
of the functions heretofore performed by intelligence representatives
of the military departments may devolve upon the intelligence department
or section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This could have some impact on
the intelligence production process, and would be the one of possibly
greatest concern to you.
3. Creation of an operations division will necessitate
comparable centralization of the intelligence function for adequate
support. This may be within, or parallel to, the operations division,
or at an Assistant Secretary of Defense level. The indication would
seem to be more and more CIA contact and relationships at the Department
of Defense and JCS Level., with less at the departmental level, in the
long run. I believe that this impairing of the departmental missions
ig likely to encounter as much difficulty in the Congress as any other
with the exception of the budget problem.
4. Centralized budgeting will be of interest to the Agency
from the administrative point of view but should present no particular
problems so far as -. can see. It might even simplify some of our
present problems.
III. The rema:'ning Presidential instructions to the Secretary of
Defense are not likely to affect ups. We should not be especially
concerned because the JCS acts at the direction of the Secretary of
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Defense and not in their own right; nor at the review of publicity
and legislative activities of the services; nor at the appointment
of a civilian Assistant Secretary of Defense for liaison with Congress;
nor with the promotion of 3 and I.-star Generals and Admirals.
IV. In summary., I should think the Agency position should be
that these actions are all the business of the Department of Defense.
Your concern as Director of Central Intelligence is one of deep
interest that nothing should be done to impair the already difficult
intelligence function, and that you would hope that fact would receive
due consideration. You would of course stand ready at all times to
afford any possible assistance.
1. K. C0I2, JR.
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Director (Coordination)
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