TESTIMONY FOR THE SENATE AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003400120001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MFR

25X1
;
1/)_vey
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RD 0B01676R00340
EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Testimony for the Senate Aeronautioal sad Space Sciences
Committee
1. On 20 January 1959 the Director with
ONE. and Mr. Houston discussed with
Edwin Wide'. Sr. and Cyrus R. Vance, Special
Consultants to the Senate Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee. Armed Services Committee
Kenneth E. BeLieu, Staff Director, and Max
Lehrer, Assistant Staff Director, Senate
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee
the testimony which the Director would sive before the Senate
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee on 39 January. It
was confirmed that the meeting would be at 10 a.m.. ?ridgy.
29 January (Mr. Belaien will let us know if it goes back to 10:30)
and that they will recess at 1203 p.m. to let Mr. Dulles attend
a luncheon of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities and resume at 2:30 p.m.
2. Discussion started with Mr. Vance's comments about
%ecretary Gates' testimony which is stated to have been drawn
from the CIA estimate on the Russian ICBM prosram. They
cited Mr. Gates as saying that Soviet accuracy was inferior to
ours and that for the first time intelligence has mere accurate
information on the Soviet stockpile. Mr. Dull.. poiated out
OGC Has Reviewed
TS 174804
Copy 2 of 7 copies
Approved For Release/2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
-
p.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
that this was in the epee record and that in his classified testimony
Mr. Gates would be more speeifi? and consistent with intelligence
estimates. Mr. Dulles commented on the variemos amerces of our
information at the present time and meatiated the remark Khrushchev
made to Vice President Nixon about one of the ICBM firing belies a?
runaway shot and that they had feared it would land in some area
that would be troublesome. He asked the group to keep this story
in confidence.
? 3. Mr. Dulles commented generally that the Russia* CEP
may not be quite as good as the Atlas, gave same
details stating that we presently thought that with a radio inertial
guidance system the Russia* CEP was about three nautical moth*,
and with the all inertial system about five nautical miles. By
1963 we felt the all inertial system might be two, aautical miles
and the radio inertial.' somewhat blotter. Mr. Lehrer asked if we
felt any of the 15 firings of the last year were operational in the
sense that they were fired with trained troops as firing site..
Mr. Dulles said he felt that they, were still test firing from
Tyura Tam aad probably not with troops although they could be
training troops itthat site. Mr. Waist said there moss ? contention
that we have more successful tests of ICBM's than the Russians,
and the Director said that such comparative figures were not our
job, that we Past estimated the Russian firings.
4. gays a description of some of the factors
that go into the formula for estimating the CEP. and Mr. Lehrer
asked some questions about the factor of the accuracy of target
locations. pointed out that this was a relatively
minor factor and that both the Russians and ourselves would have
error in interpolating each others geographic systems.
in answer to a question said that our estimate of the Soviet 25X1
reliability factor was that in-flight reliability was now from SS to
75 per cent and within three years we would expect it to be 70 to
115 per cent, He pointed out that some do not get off but that we
felt the on-launcher reliability was $O per cent at the initial opera-
tional capability on 1 January 1960 and might be 90 per cent in
three years.
25X1
5. Mr. Weial said that there seemed to be some divergence
77' between what Mr. Gates was saying and our estimates and what
access did he hays to our information. Mr. Dulles pointed oat that
2
TS 174804
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
Approved For Release 2002110/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
Mr. Gates would have all our isgermatioa and that the estimates
are agreed oh with srame specified disesteem's% in certaia areas.
6. Mr. Weld l comm.z*tsdI possibly the Cgr west act
so important for us as we b ern of retaliates spinet
large cities opposed to 00 oblem of aiming far ear
launching site, and SAC installations. Mr. Dulles commented that
Mr. Khruslichev says he has enough missiles for both purposes.
Mr. Weill asked U the Russians knew our capability, end Mr. Dulles
said if they do they de not tell their people or publicist*
7. Mr. Lehrer asked if they might have a copy of the
National Intelligence Estimate, not to take with titans but to study
here. Mr. Dulles pointed out that he really could sot do this as a
matter of principle and because of the 'recalled it might set in
other cases and that in any as. he would &sod the permisstios of
the National Security Council. He said they would try to have a
prepared statement ready for his *penis* as Z9 January La time
to discuss it with them in advance so that all the points they wan ed
would be made in it.
8. Mr. Vance asked if we had gone into the warhead estimate.
and Ur. Dulles said yes, we put it at 6,000 pounds. Mr. Vance
asked about yield, and Mr. Dulles said while this information was
restricted he would tell this group that the yield was in the multi-
megaton range although he would not necessarily so testily.before
the Committee.
9. Mr. Lehrer quoted ,cr etary Gates as saying that
Russia's missiles were inferior to ours and asked if so how much.
Mr. Dulles said he would testify on this point but advised that it
would be unwise to get into a comparison of missile strength alone
as he felt that the U. S. was superior in over-lal strength and
this is what really counted.
10. The question was asked how we assess Khrushchev's
statements. Mr. Dulles said that as a rule of thumb where he is
talking about existing factual situations widely know* in his own
country lie is pretty accurate, but when he speaks of the future his
fancy roams particularly in connection with agriculture, somewhat
less so in the field of weapons. He made available to the group
copies of the full text of Khrushchey's speech.
TS 174804
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
Be
es asked about our estimate of rocket thrust,
and stated that we estimated the weight of the Soviet
25X1 ICBM to be 50,000 pounds at takeoff with a 6,000 pound warhead.
Mr. BeLieu speculated that tallyho we didn't have to worry about
differences in CEP whoa we were talking about warheads of this
also. Mr. Vance said that if we estimated that the Russian initial
opsretlenel capability for ICBM's was 10 en 1 January me what
were the numbers for 1961. 1962. and 1963. Mr. Dulles sad
25X1 said we estimated that by mi4.196Z Mere would he
140 to ZOO on-laaneher missiles with trained crews *ad that by
mid-1962 there would be ZSO to 350. I Ipoiated mid
that there would be more in reserve and for test purposes*.sente-
what over 100. Ur. Be Lion asked if we had any information.**
lauaching sites, sad the Director Odd we did not. Mr. Vance
asked about mobility, and Ur. Dulles stated that since we believed
they were using a Liquid Seel we did not think they could be fully
mobile. Eve* if they were movable there would be some sites
with some apparatus for fueling and other needs He said we
had no evidence they were using solid fuels.
25X1
25X1
It. Mr. Lehrer asked if we felt that our Current estimates
were of better tuallty than previous cites. and Mr. Dulles stated
that he felt they were because of the IS taste we had observed and
we had MOTO information from various sources including laartishchev's
speeches. said we had considerably more information
on the firing process. Mr. Lehrer asked whether we could state a
margin of error in oar estimates, and Ur. Dello' said net much
on ,error on the actual tests but that the estimates on CEP and
projection of *embers were less firm. said that 25X1
on the CEP we could be reasonably sure of the theoretical conclusions
but that the op. rational degradation was a matter of judgment and we
could not put a piraentage on it. Some et our manufacturers is this
field world claim that there was no desradatios but we feel that there
would be in actual operations. Mr. Vance asked how much we knew
about the actual missiles themselves and said we
know they have one of three types of geidance systems--the pure
radie in which all corrections are computed on the ground sad feed
In direction by radio directly to the control meabsaism of the
missile (this is the most asaurate guidance eyeteeth the radio
Inertial, in which part of the computer fanatical is in the missile;
sad the pure inertial in which all guidance components including
Computer are in the missile. lie was asked if our conclusions
4
TS 174804
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
25X
Approved For Release
CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
were based on our own *ape Mash guidance system* or the
Soviet's I Vilna on what we believe they
. and'
25X1 are using.
13. Mr. Dulles excused him sell and the conversation turned
to OVX concludes* as to the accuracy of ear estimate. Mr. Lehrer
asked if a percentage of error figure on our estiMS*** could be
25X1 stated. said that sine* there wag &large element
of judgment involved it would be extremely diffienk to put any
numerical fivers on the question?a accuracy of so estimates.
Mr. Lehrer persisted as to how we Geoid estinmint their reduction
rate or know their requirements. I laid we are
going on the assumption that there is bat one plant manufacturing
ICBM's now and that there may be two plants by ItfoS. He stated
that we take all the information we know of their entreat situation
and forecast with the most expert advice we can the probable rote
of expansion of production. Mr. Lehrer continued to ask how we
reached this or that conclusion, and Mr. Horst*, Informed the
group that to go into the question of the accuracy of our estimates
would require a review and understanding of the entire evaluation
and estimative process; that it was a complicated process with
many facets, some based on firm informatics, *ease en expert
analysis, and others on assumptions er interpretations by trained
personnel all culminating in the application of the judgment of the
entire intelligence complex; and that U the estimative system and
the people employed therein were good the estimate would have a
reasonable degree of accuracy,
14. The Director rejoined the group few minutes
say goodby.
LAWRENCER. HOUSTON
General Coon el
N. B. Mr. BeLieu has since stated that the Coen nee does not
want a prepared statement.
Copy l.DCI
Copy 2-DDC
Copy 3-IG
Copy 4-DD/I
Copy 5-ONE
Copy 6 -
Copy 7-Legislative Counsel 5
- Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R0 -3
25X1
??
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R003400120001-3
SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
*SOURCE
Geral Comasei
CIA CONTROL NO.
11111104
DOC. NO.
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE ,
COPY NO. 2 imit ir
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES 5
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
Mai
25X1
ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or
classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded,
destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel
and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or
release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand col-
umns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
?MEE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SI GNATURE AND OFFICE
1
DATE
ER
71-0D
2 5X1
DDCI
,
V//,..#d
e
Z
v
..2
_
lit--0--7----.
Auait.,.//
-1-o--:.a....."rz ,