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DEFENSE POSTURE HEARINGS BEFORE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE-5 APRIL 1961-AFTERNOON SESSION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R003400130016-6
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 17, 2003
Sequence Number: 
16
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 6, 1961
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R003400130016-6.pdf236.19 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R0034001300167-6__ OGC 61-4563 6 April 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR.: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Defense Poster. Hearings Before Senate Armed i e-rmices Committee 5 April 1961 - Afternoon Session 1. This memoraad is for information only. Z. During the afternean of 5 April, General Lemnitner presented his prepared posture statement a mpting to discuss the Soviet military posture vis-a-vis the U. S. miller posture. General Lsnaitser pointed out that his statement melded both" TOP SECRET material and TOP SECRET RSSTRICTEG DATA and that there would be no unclassified version available. As a pselimiaary to his prepared statement he pointed out that the intelligence, an the Soviet military strength was based on the work of the entire intelligence co ,community but indicated that we never had enough intelligence en all phases of the program. General Lernnitsar Ares a sd three basic slides on the M program. The first dealt with the Soviet program ivin the g g upper and lower limits of the current estimate. tin the second slide the three illustrative programs were marked and Oral Lemaitser carefully explained the position of each of the intelligence comp..eats and their reasoning. The third slide ores basically the sewed slide with the U. S. program superimposed. -Senator $altoastall inquired what was based` on hard evidence and what was based on soft evidence. General Lemnitsor indicated that with respect to the qUestion of production and deployment the evidence is fragmentary and equivocal but as to the testing program, range, and CEP he would consider the evidence as bard. - Approved For Release 2003/04/18: CIA-RDP80BO PIWApproved For Release 2003/04/1.8: CIA-RDP80BO1676R003400130016-6 4. Senator Symington queried the longer reaction On* attributed to the Soviet missiles as compared with U. S. missiles. General Lemnitser went off the record to explain bow we followed their activity with electronic aids. Senator Camnoa asked the question of why the Soviet ICBM was credited with a range of 6500 nautical miles when in fact they have exhibited capability to shoot for longer distances. General Lemnitser gave no answer to this, simply saying that this was what the estimate was. In view of the wide spread in the estimates, Senator Russell asked what was the Joint Chiefs of Staff view and could not they come to any specific conclusion from the varying views. General Lemnitner stated that as planners they had to take into account the entire range as indicated by the estimate without -pting to decide whether one component of the community was sight and another was wrong. Lemnitsor did indicate that this sub jest was under current review with the hope that the range in the views could be narrowed. 5. Discussion thou turned to Cuba. Senator Symington referred to Senator Smothers' statement that there is "irrefutable evidence that missile bases are being built in ?Cuba". General L itser at first stated that the current intelligence estimate is beat there is no positive evidence that there are jet aircraft, nuclear weapons or missile bases in Cuba. In discussing it further, Lsmnitssr stated "there is no positive evidence that missile sites are being constructed according to the intelligence agencies. " General Lemnitser stated that the situation is getting worse in Cuba and that time is not on our side. He mentioned the recent actions whereby the Cuban refugees had selected Verona as a provisional president. General Lemaeit.sr was then asked the legal effect of a U. S. blockade of Cuba. He stated it was Us understanding that this would mesa war. H. was asked his personal view on what should be done with Cuba. General Lem nitser stated that his personal view was that he would like to see Cuba isolated and insulated. Senator Russell then stated that he believed that as soon as it became apparent that Cuba was Communist dominated we should have invoked the Monroe Doctrine. He was very strong in his views on this and was joined by Senators Case, Sygtes, Thurmond and Bush. In fact, Senator Bush requested that there be inserted in the record his resolution introduced in January 1960 calling for a Senate F`oreliga Relations Committee to hold hearings to determine if there had been a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003400130016-6 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 CIA-RDP80B01676R003400130016-6 4. Senator Symington raised specific questions concerning the estimates on Soviet fighter strength for this year as compared with last year asking about the decrease and why these changes were made. He also queried the difference in bomber figures. In the context of the discussion at this point, General Lezunitner did not respond to these specific points. 7. General Lemnitser was asked about Laos and he gave a general background briefing of the situation in Laos going back to the Geneva Convention. Senator Symington inquired whether or not we had the capability of conducting limited war in Laos if the Communist Chinese intervened. General Lemnitser indicated this would create a very serious problem although he did state that under the current situation probably we had the capability of seising the principal communications and control points in Laos but we would be left with a guerrilla warfare problem. 8. General L.emnitser had presented a quantitative-type chart on the forces available to NATO which caused considerable discussion since upon questioning be agreed that the figures did not represent the true strength of the NATO forces. For example, he had included on a quantitative basis the French divisions which are in fact in Algeria. Distribution: Orig - DCI ? 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - IG 1 - ONE/Stoertz 2 - Legislative Counsel OGC/LC:JSW:mks JOHN S. WARNER Legislative Counsel Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003400130016-6 et1'F1Si O N TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP 03400130016-6 CHECK CLASSIFICATI ER - 237 Admire FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. OGC/LC - 221 East UN L SSIFI 1 76 0$8 FORM 11- Opp I A R 55 237 Replaces Form 30-4 (40) which may be used. U U S GOVERNMENT PRIN . . . TING OFFICE : 1955-0-342531