LETTER TO(Sanitized) FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003500150027-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: September 26, 1961
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80B01676R00350 "159927-1
September 26, 1961
I have just returned from-a brief trip toIiurepe, and found
your kind letter of September 18, with its enclosure, which I have
read with interest and app reciatiail.
It was good to have seen, you during your last trip here,
and t deeply regret that I confused you as to the time for our 7:00
o'clock meeting. I am, however, flattered at the thought took without question that I would be at the d fire at this early hour.
When I have had;r&, chance to study your me randum in
more detail. I shall send you a further letter. At first glance,
however. I find myself in basic accord with what yon have to say,
omitting of course certain over-flattering remarks with regard to
the Director himself.
Sincerely yours,
AWD:at
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1. - DCI File
Allen W. Dunne-s
Director'
k-.,.
"cc - ER hen Mr. Dulles signed this, he said
'&;, .~'ec - JSE Suspense File w/basic.- he was holding the incoming letter as he
wi
h
d
s
e
to read it again. mfb 9/28
Approved For Release 2002/08/23: CIA-RDP80B01676R003500150027=1
 STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003500150027-1
Mr. Allen Dulles
Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency
24th and E Streets
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
PERSONAL
I am enclosing copy of a memorandum which I have prepared
since I last saw you. I have sent one personally to Bob
Kennedy and one to my very secure Senator friend, Scoop
Jackson, who is not only most interested in the cause of
secret intelligence but also, may I add, is a sincerely
devoted friend of yours. He personally asked me for any
ideas that I had.
I have made only four copies of this memorandum and have
made no other distribution.
I do hope it will be of some help. I feel so strongly
about the matter, as I indicated to you, that I want to
do whatever I can as a private citizen to prevent the
boat from being rocked.
I want to tell you again how pleased I was to have the
pleasure and honor of talking with you at length at your
home that sultry evening in Washington.
I do hope that you had some rest on your "vacation" trip
to Europe.
Please let me know at any time if I can be of any help in
any way.
Devotedly yours-
STA
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23' 1pP80B01676RO03500'150027-1
MEMORAND TING
To THg
CT ITRAL IN TT.yIq -A{ ENCY
PWAORs This memorandum has bet r prepay in the
earnest"opmt no precipitate decisions wi-e made
which would or uiak~t impair seriously t iveness
or our intelligence system.
SUMMARY OP MEMORANDUM
1. The highest degree of professional competence
must be maintained. Uf this is not dwrlrswr,r a may lose ton
or more years in valuable time, trying to recreate a pro-
fessionally comps
See Annex A.
2. There is a real danger in interposing a super
intelligence analyst as the President's immediate adviser
in lieu of the Director of the C.I.A. on paper, to a lay-
man., it might appear logical. In fact, it would be highly
impractical.
See Annex B.
3. Despite problems in covert intelligence and
covert operations ** revealed publicly in the U-2 and Cuban
* See brief biographical statement attached hereto.
The latter is not discussed in this memorandum because
of the priority which, at this moment, should be given
to the preservation and continuing improvement of our
Ap V*XltoAMO /M 14 RDP80B01676R003500150027-1
STAT
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
incidents, we should not undermine the basic structure of
the C.I.A. or downgrade it. It is believed that adequate
means of more effective coordination with State and De-
fense Departments and other agencies can be otherwise
achieved.
See Annex C.
4. The criteria for the selection of the director
of any intelligence system such as C.I.A. are so difficult
to combine in any one person that there are few, it any,
men in the United States today who are sufficiently quali-
fied to assume the responsibilities of Mr. Allen Dulles,
the present Director.
See Annex D.
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
w 2 -
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
A A
The highest de ree of professional competence must
be maintained. s s not one we ma lose ten or
more years a iu a me e a pro es-
A ono y comps sys t em.
Secret intelligence involving foreign relations prior
to World War Il was conducted on an unorganized and primarily
individual basis.
Unlike certain European countries, we, as a nation,
were not alerted to its real importance.
As early as 1798, when President Adams revealed the
XYZ negotiations with France, American public opinion be-
came aroused, but virtually nothing was done about setting
up a real secret intelligence system for over a century and
a half.
We have had many devoted intelligence and counter-
intelligence officers in the Army and Navy before, during
and after World War I and in the interregnum between the
two World Wars.
It was not, however, until World War II that the
first really covert integrated system of intelligence was
developed under Oeneral William Donovan, Director of the
office of Strategic Services.
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
bile the Bri tish and some of our European allies
and enemies had developed the techniques involved, we were
almost entirely lacking in training and experience.
We learned the herd, way and made many mistakes, but
it was an essential beginning.
The foregoing conclusions are supported by the report
of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the
Senate, entitled "Intelligence and National Security".
Report No. 1750 of the Second Session of the 86th. Congress,
which sets forth, anion; others, the following "tested prin-
ciples"
1. The collection and evaluation of in-
ligence is a job for professionals. In-
telligence organization should be tight,
centralized, responsive, and to the greatest
possible extent anonymous.
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
2. Officials who depend upon intelli-
gence must be professional in handling
problems which it raises.
3. The conduct of diplomacy must be
insulated from sensitive intelligence opera-
tions. Intelligence is a source of informa-
tion for diplomacy - not a part of it.
Annex A
Approved For Release 2002708123: CIA-R 801301676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
There is a real da er in interposing a super in-
tells g ence analyst as ea President's immediate adviser
appear logieai. in xae
ghUy impractx.caJ..
The theoretical reason is that a staff adviser to
the President could present to the President a more ob-
jective summary and analysis of intelligence, since he
would not be beholden to any one source, i.e., C.T.A.,
State, Defense, A 2, ?. N. I. , etc.
This is logical, but it is not practical, and might
be dangerous. These are some of the reasons:
1. As pointed out later in this memorandum,
there are very few men professionally adequate to assume
such a responsibility. A semi-pro would be worse than an
amateur,, just as a little knowledge may be wore* than none.
2. Even if such a qualified man were available,
he would be living in an "ivory tower", unless he were to
build up a new empire which would duplicates in substantial
part? the intelligence gathering and research and analysis
functions and operations of C.I.A. A failure to fully
comprehend and evaluate intelligence operations from all
original sources to final estimates could be fatal in times
of emergency.
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
3. Even though there may continue to be Jealousies
between various collecting sources of intelligence, wbiah,
after all, is human, it is believed that there has been ac-
hieved, in recen years, a greater coordination in effort
even than that which existed during the critical years of
World War II in one or more important theatres.
4. The C.I.A., one has ample reason to believe,
has developed an important rapport with secret intelligence
agencies of other friendly countries. This is of great
value, and the avenues of communication are, naturally,
secret. To downgrade C.I.A. to the eyes of its friendly
equivalents might dry up, in whole or in part, useful
areas of cooperation, as well as other very important
sources of information.
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
. n x B - 2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
ANNEX C
Despite problems in covert intell 8 ence and covert
operations revealed publicly 15 - an Cuban In5dnto*
Mistakes have been made by C.I.A., by State Depart-
ment and by other departments and agencies of the govern-
Mont. Both inside self criticism and public criticism are
constructive to the extent that they do not impair security.
Certainly every effort should be made to repair and
prevent human and organizational mistakes.
If, when we make our mistakes, we make
them falling forward, we have little to fear.
It is when we make our mistakes falling back..
wards that it hurts."
Let us not fall backwards.
The problem does arise, particularly in view of the
Cuban affair (which, in historical perspective, may tend
to disprove certain assumptions not germane to this memo-
randum), as to the methods to prevent the apparent lack of
the fullest possible degree of coordination.
Coordination is necessary.
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
on the State Department,, Army, Navy, G.S.S. and
C.W.Z. levels in the fields of political and psycho-
10310al warfare, and on the Army, Tavy and C.3.5. 1evei_
of secret, deceptive via.-fare, both psycholo ical and
World War II this
o 'rwiae, during the latter stages of
pa
Was achieved to a so7 ,-Le 1i t r ar.37~arkab e W6 yee in
ton, D. C., and also very effectively in certain theaters.
meet-
Toward the end of World War II, we had weekly
D. C.,, on propaganda and secret, psycho-
loical warfare polioiez and practices. Sometimes? these
meetings were held even more often. It may be that such
reSular coordination meetins are now being held, but, in
any event, f t would appear that there is room for improve-
ent in the techniques of cooperation without indulain in
any major structural reorganization, which not only takes
time but undoubtedly would impair morale. This., no doubt,
has already been adversely affected by newspaper releases
relating to C.I.A.
Annex C - 2
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
NNEX D
would appear that the following are virtually in-
dispensable criteria to be applied in the selection of any
director of a secret Intelligence systems z
1. Superior intelligence.
creative imagination.
Extensive and Intensive knowledge of all tech-
niques relating to covert intelligence activities. In-
cluded among these are such related and partially unrelated
functions and activities as the following:
a. Completely covert agents;
tiof with
in full coopera
elligence units;
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
k, An effective system, which normally
takes years to develop, of assessing and
estimating the value of original sources of
information and intelligence. Unassessed
information may be partly pure gossip or
false information which has been planted
and is therefore dangerous.
4. outstanding devotion and inspired interest. This
qualification must not be underestimated, for covert in-
telligence is dangerous business. The real pros, both here
America and overseas, realize it. Those who are carry-
ing out dangerous intelligence operations overseas are en-
titled to have as the head of the aency for whom they work
a man of devotion and inspired interest.
Approved For Release 2002/Q8/23O: CLA-RDN80B01676R003500150027-1
 4pibved For Release 2002/08 A-RDP80B01676R003500150027-1
Even the best infars N n in the intelligentse
field mould have great di 'f i a y in recoimnendl to the
Pres .c ant any man to succeed Mr. Dulles who would .ifY
under all of the above sriteria. Mr. Dulles do". lie has
had over twenty years of continuous service in the field.
It would probably take at least ten yo&rs for anyone who
has not had adequate secret intelligence experience to
become suffieiel - to ash the responsibility.
For all of these reasons, it is carne tl1 recom-
mended that . Dulles be strongly enocu Bed o remain as
Director ?' C.I.A. until he and thosl responsible for the
selection of a successor are satisfied that whoever is
eventually chosen is thorouShly qualified.
Annex D .. 3
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003500150027-1
 STAT
Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP80B016761R003500150027-1
I have just grad iwa. a k.fs..f ._s..._ ..~ _ .
_ ... ..,:ui..._r__ .: t er go, With its e*tlo ial., which
grad .t
With ftYt~~w 2~a
! r over-llsttwes3 re a with r Bard to
the Director hismuesl#
ted
more detait, 141"1 00" Yom' 7a u in.
YOU a further letter. At t rst g e,
never, I find
' yleif 1w basic accord with wbatKyou bard to ,
I "T
omitting of con
When I have bits
ehtace to a
o'clock 7- wr -V t 1e "me Swear ?f e
stion - 4, 1 04 at the that
tbst I
took withopt a *NW4,be at the , : :.....,...:._
and and I d 'g yotr 4 trip ht*,
rot that 1Ased
AWD:at
Distribution:
good tv" Y. sa
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - DCI File
,i cc - ER
1 cc - JSE Suspense File w/basic
When Mr. Dulles signed this
he 'said
,
he was holding the incoming letter as he
wished to read it again. rnfb 9/28