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[SUMMARY OF THE REPORT ON THE CONGO AND WEST AFRICA]

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070054-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 14, 2002
Sequence Number: 
54
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 23, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070054-9.pdf395.95 KB
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? c` Approved For Release 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP80BO1676R 83 7OO54-9 =p ~f'~Y4 iv ~ i1 SEP Averell Harriman Summary of the Report on the Congo and '.Jest Africa to Senator John F. Kennedy by '1'. ~,Ivere During the past month I visited eight of the African states - Republic of Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Congo Republic (the former French Congo) and the Republic of the Congo (former Belgian Congo). In each country I talked at length with the principle political leaders and other government officials, as well as the representatives of France, Britain, and other countries. I was accompanied by Ernest Dunbar, John ""A rcum, and Ulric Haynes. Each of them is experienced in African affairs. i-iy companions and I had the opportunity to meet a number of individuals of various backgrounds, educators, business men, representatives of philanthropic and other activities, local and foreign. On my return I stopped at London and Paris at the request of the British and French governments. I called on Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary, and kr. Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal. In Paris I called on President De Gualle, E. Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I 'vi. Foyer, iiinister of the French Community. I wish to express my appreciation for the assistance and courtesy shown me by our missions in each of the countries I visited. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070054-9 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070054-9 Harriman - 2 THE CONGO In spite of the kaleidoscopic changes on the Congo scene, certain factors can be clearly defined: 1. The Soviet Union has been shrewdly at work undercutting the United Nations with the objective of attaining domination of the Congo. To achieve this Lumumba has been used as its tool and given direct aid outside United Nations channels. He har been surrounded by left-wing Belgian and French advisors on his personal staff, with the Soviet and Czech Ambassadors constantly at his side. 2. Lumumba is emotionally convinced that it is his mi3sinn to unify the Congo through a strong centralized government. He believes he is the only man who speaks for the Congolese people. He is a powerful demagogic speaker and a shrewd manoeuverer. If the United Nations dies not do his bidding, he denounces it as a new form of colonialism. His Congolese opponents, he charges, are agents of the Belgians. To achieve his ambition for the establishment of a centralized government, he is prepared to plunge the country into civil war which he believes he can win, providing the United Nations disarms the forces of his apponents and he has the aid and logistic support of the Soviets. 3. President Kasavubu is convinced that a federal system of government is the only practical and feasible form of government for attaining stability in the country at this time. He believes, and there is evidence to confirm this, that he has the support of the regional leaders for such a program. Although he has not the wiliness of Lumumba for manoeuver, he has confidence that his policies are sound, and are the only solution to the problems which face his country. He has the sup, ort of the Abako Party which includes the majcrity of the population in the Leopoldville area. 4,, The economy ?f the Congo is rapidly deteriorating. Its exports, on which its prosperity is based., are declining. Government employees, teachers, etc, are not being paid. The payment of the Force Publique by the United Nations forestalled difficulties from that source. The $100 million Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070054-9 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070054-9 Harriman - 3 asked for by Secretary General Hammarskjold is undoubtedly needed promptly to turn again the wheels of commerce. Little or nothing can be achieved, however, without a stable government. Full support must be given to the United Nations to fulfill its mission, and unilateral action by individual nations must be ended. In this we should concert our policies with the new West African states. At best the Congo will need help from the United Nations for technical and financial assistance for some time, and we should be prepared to see the situation through with patience, understanding and generosity. The United Nations mission in the Congo must succede at all costs Failure cannot be contemplated. WEST AFRICA In the West African countries that I visited, with the exception of Guinea the transition from colonial status to independence has been achieved with a minimum of difficulty and with a maximum of cooperation between the firmer colonial governments and the duly elected leaders of the new states. There is a high degree of good will between the officials and the people of the new states and their former British and French rulers. Even though there is a respect for European traditions, the African leaders are determined that Africa should be developed by Africans, for the benefit of Africans, and in an African manner* The European example will not be followed in some xspects in the development of their social and economic life. In our dealings with them this must be understood and accepted. Although there are strong family, communal, tribal, and national loyalties, there is a pride in Africa as a whole and a desire to develop Pan-Africanism. The difference of conditicns in each county, and the personal rivalries between leaders, will postpone any political confederation for a long time to come, but the countries of Africa can be expected to support comL,cn African objectives. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070054-9 ? Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070054-9 Harriman - 4+. It is significant to note that most of the countries of Jest Africa have one dominant political party - and that the effective opposition to government policies comes from the left, whether within the dominant party or outside it. I found that President Tubman of Liberia is highly regarded by the new leaders as a wise elder statesman. Without exception the African leaders expressed to me their desire to keep the cold war out of Africa. All of them are concerned lest Russia obtain a dominant influence in the Congo. Because we have never been a colonial power in Africa they look to us as a friend and are counting on our understanding and support. However, reports of racial discrimination in the United States act as a barrier to full confidence. For example, on my arrival in Accra, Ghana, a local newspaper had a front page headline "Negro Children Starving In America'' followed by an account of 20,000 illegitimate children who had been taken off the relief rolls in Louisiana. I cannot under- line too strongly the need for progress in the elimination of discrimination in our country as an essential to the development of full friendship and confidence between our country and the new African states. Both Britain and France intend to continue to assist their former colonies in their social and economic development. However, their needs are beyond the resources available. When I asked the leaders of each country what their most pressing requirements were, in every case their request was for aid in education. They ask for aid for the training of teachers, and then for secondary and technical schools and universities. also for scholarships for some students to study in the United States. They recognize that their first require- ment is to develop their human resources. In addition they want technical aid in improving their agriculture, especially food production. Considerable quantities of food are imported at the present time. Since the Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070054-9 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070054-9 Harriman - 5 rural population is now 80 per cent of the total population, it is recognized that as their agricultural production imprcves, people will migrate to the cities. This migration must be planned far, not only in providing housing but particularly in jobs. I found a universal desire to attract private foreign capital for the development of industry and a recognition that to achieve this a climate favorable for private investment must be provided. Each country also has at least one large project for the development of power, irrigation, navigation and mineral resources. A number of these are probably economically sound and we should encourage their development by a combination of public and private f inancing g as is the case with the Volta River project. In this conneccion, the development of mining industries such as iron ore and aluminium will be of future importance both to our own and European industry. The recent dramatic events in the Congo should not permit us tc over3ock the needs of these countries. Concern is felt that we will not be interested in a country unless a communist threat exists. In fact, in two of the countries -- Senegal and Nigeria - - I was asked the direct question "We have no communis.ts and intend to prevent their infiltration. Does this exclude us from American aid?" This unfortunate impression should be eradicated by policy statements and by definite action by our government. I found a difference of opinion between countries as to whether they would prefer to have our aid channelled as much as possible through the United Nations or directly on a bi-lateral basis. For example, in Nigeria, which is by far the largest of the Wesc African scates, they are anxious to have direct contact with us and would prefer aid from us on a bi-lateral basis. They respect America and believe they can learn much from us. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070054-9 ? = Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070054-9 Harriman - 6 I talked wi l-h several of the represen ca Gives of the Israeli government in Africa. They-are giving technical assistance in several countries. Students are being taken to Israel for technical training. In addition, cooperative farming as it is being worked out in Israel, has an appeal to the West Africans where land ownership has been traditionally on a communal basis In a number of the countries I visited the leaders indicated they did no c wish to obtain aid from the East. They trust the motives of the West, whereas they are fearful of the imperialist motives of the Soviet Union and particularly China. They know of the population pressure in China, and some expressed fear that the Chinese might be attracted to Africa because it is an under- populated area. On the other hand, both Guinea and Ghana have accepted aid from the East. President Nkrumah believes that he can take aid from the East wi thrut any political danger. Guinea of course was forced to turn to the East as France abandoned her . and the Eri ti sh and the United States failed to offer aid in the early months of their independence. President Sekou Toure assured me that he was not a Communist and chat he hoped to develop relations with the West in order that he might maintain what he calls 'positive neutrality.' Other leaders in the French Gor.;r,_uni ty with whom I talked believe that Sekou Toure is sincere in this desire. In offering aid the Soviet Union gives almost a blank check, and is not concerned whether the aid is useful or damaging; - whereas we must of course have a sense of responsi- bility and be satisfied that our aid is used for constructive purposes. It is important however that our programs of assistance provide for greater flexibili':y, lar`er suers, and are for a longer period than at present, in order to deal with the problems of these new nations promptly as they become evident. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070054-9 = Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070054-9 Harridan - 7. I strongly urge that the State Department speed up the establishment of adequate missions in each of the new countries. In Abijan, Ivory Coast, we have a former counsel with two assistants and a female clerk. He is accredited as Charge to four of the new countries, and we have no officer in the other three republics, the Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey. In Brazzazille the same situation prevails except that the Charge has even less staff - only one assistant - and there is no officer in Gabon, Central Africa, or Chad. These men are competent and are doing good work under difficult conditions - but we should arrange promptly for representation in each of these countries and authority to begin to discuss what assistance we might be able to offer them at the critical period of achieving independence. The -,est .~Srican countries are taking great pride in being admitted to the United Nations and have a keen sense of world responsibility. I believe that if we have adequate representa- tion in each country and attempt to understand their problems we can establish sound, permanent, friendly relations with these new nations. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070054-9