PROPOSED ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF THE FREE WORLD REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003800120023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 22, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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I S
MEMOR+TD1U FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Psychological and Paramilitary Staff
SUBJECT: Proposed Acknowledgment of Receipt of the
Free World Review
1. This memorandum suggests action an the part of the DCI.
Such requested action is contained-71n p ragraph 2 .
2. Attached are two is ttera for the DCI I a signature
acknowledging receipt of a copy of the Free World Review.
International Organizations Division
Attachments:
1 - Letter for DCI signature to Mr. Stephen Sisa
2 - Letter for DCI signature to Dr. Charles Lowry
3 - Letter to DCI from Dr. Charles Lowry - (ER 10-6373)
cc: DDCI
STATINTL
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1 - C/PP
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1 - 10/3
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 ,Approved For Release 2002/0
MATITh E09 liiii'its ACTION
CHARLES WESLEY LOWRY, PH. D.(OXON)
CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
EDWARD L. R. ELSON. D.D.. LITT.D.
CO-CHAIRMAN
To make religious truth an effective force for the
romotion of ordered freedom and the common good
DP80B;r67,rq~OQ'~A,QIOI; 023.7~e family of Nations."
IN THE SCJAI AND Wit ORDER
1112 DUPONT CIRCLE BUILDING
WASHINGTON 6, D. C. DU. 7-4100
August 12, 1958
Executive :Registry
{
Mr. Allen Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
I am sending you herewith the current number of a magazine
in which I am very much interested and which has, I believe, a large
and as yet unrealized potential in the battle of the Free World for free-
dom.
The editor and founder of the Free World Review, Stephen Sisa,
is a naturalized Hungarian with an extraordinarily rich set of contacts
around the world. In fact, I have come to see through his editorial cor-
respondence, which is still far from thoroughly developed, that there is
in existence a worldwide network of talented individuals from "behind
the iron curtain". I believe that with even a limited cultivation and di-
rection we could develop an effective force for the ideals of freedom and
the cause of human dignity, to paraphrase the fine words of President
Eisenhower to the new Envoy of Egypt quoted in today's news.
In this connection, particular attention is called to the article
The Untold Story . . . by Jorge Romano. An editorial presenting a
depth-interpretation of Khrushchev's recent "sharp zag" is believed to
be of more than passing interest.
If you would have an assistant acknowledge receipt of this Summer-
1958 issue of the Free World Review, addressing Mr. Stephen Sisa, Editor,
16 Beaumont Place, Newark, N. J., I would be greatly obliged.
With high personal regard,
CWL:kh
Enclosure
Sincerely,
Cha`rIes Wesley Lowry
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS RT. REV. ATHENAGORAS EDWARD W. BARRETT 'THE HON. WILLIAM R. CASTLE *REV. JOHN F. CRONIN. S.S. GEORGE L. CROSS N. R. DANIELIAN
M THEODORE A. DISTLER WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT REV. DR. LOUIS H. EVANS HENRY FORD, 11 FRANCIS PENDLETON GAINES - *RABBI NORMAN GERSTENFELD KENNETH S.
GINIGER REV. DR. BILLY GRAHAM GORDON GRAY REV. DR. FREDERICK BROWN HARRIS ALBERT J. HAYES REV. THEODORE M. HESBU RGH, C.S.C. BISHOP IVAN LEE HOLT
SHE HON. HERBERT HOOVER *ROBERT L. ~JOHNSON .}, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON No ~JJEROME G. NKwEERWIN FRANK ~ppC. LAUBBAACHFEp~L~'JHENRY RR~./L1J~LUUCE /L *THE MON. GEORGE C. MCGHEE RABBI
jHO.
\''AARD SG NPAUL TH REVS DR. ~I CEATM-PE-ALE~~feTL cABLE-C" POW T ?MSE' J~I OP1105~ER~" FRIG 1(RtDSE2oGE DRT.E
MUSTERW REVD BDRN JOSE PH ER.
SPYROS P. SKOURAS ROBERT E. SMITH GUY E. SNAVELY REV. DR. RALPH W. SOCKMAN ROBERT G. STOREY *THE HON. JOHN L. SULLIVAN D. ELTON TRUEBL0OD
TV. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER JAMES F. TWOHY KENNETH D. WELLS WILLIAM R. WHITE CHARLES EDWARD WILSON MOST REV. JOHN J. WRIGHT RICHARD S. ZEISLER
'~ STANDING POLICY COMMITTEE
 FREE WORLD REVIEW
Aspects of Cambodian Neutrality
PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK
The German Phoenix Rises
from its Ashes
ARTICLES - REPORTS
Book Reviews
CAPTIVE EUROPE Bulletin
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FREE WORLD REVIEW
A QUARTERLY DEVOTED TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING AMONG FREE NATIONS
CHAIRMAN OF THE EDITORIAL HOARD:
Charles W. Lowry, Ph.D. (Oxon,)
Managing Editor:
Stephen Sisa
E ditor s:
James D. Atkinson, Elemer Bako, Anthony T. Bouscaren, Robert F. Delaney, Lev. E. Dobriansky, M. Stanton Evans,
Rev. Frank Fadner, S.J., Ian Karski, Joseph A. Mikus, Edward M. O'Connor, Nicolas de Rochefort, Elie A. Salem,
William Spencer, 0. Carlos Stoetzer, Mrs. Jayne A. Szaz, Francis Wagner. Book Review Editor: Mrs. Yolanda Horan.
F o r e i g n E d i t o r s: London: Eugene Hinterhoff, Munich: Coleman Konkoly, Buenos Aires:
Jorge Romano
KHRUSHCHEV RIDES THE WAVE OF NEO-STALINISM (Editorial)
3
THE UNTOLD STORY BEHIND THE NIXON ORDEAL
Jorge Romano
5
ASPECTS OF CAMBODIAN NEUTRALITY
Prince Norodom Sihanouk
11
THE GERMAN PHOENIX RISES FROM ITS ASHES
Coleman Konkoly
13
THE SOVIET ICBM: A PAPER TIGER?
M. Stanton Evans
16
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENT: A REAPPRAISAL
William Spencer
18
THE 'PEACEFUL' WORLD OF SOVIET MAGAZINES
Gabriel Gersh
20
ISRAEL PREPARES FOR THE THIRD MILLION
Eugene Hinterhoff
22.
PEKING'S DRIVE FOR RECOGNITION
Denys Jackson
24
BOOK REVIEWS
Books on the Hungarian Revolution
Elemer Bako
29
Other book reviews by: George Kirk, Fauzi M. Najjar
The Strange Record of Mr. Hammarskjold
25
The West's Greatest Weapon Against Moscow
26
Call for Danubian Cooperation
27
F.C.I. Ten Years Old
28
NOTES ON NEW CONTRIBUTORS
PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK, former ruler of the Cambodian Kingdom (between 1941-
1955), has been the leader of the Sangkum National Movement since 1955. He also holds
the post of the Premier Minister of Cambodia.
JORGE ROMANO, a journalist-historian of European origin, has been living and traveling
in South America for the last fifteen years. He is a specialist on international problems
in general and on Communism in particular.
COLEMAN KONKOLY, journalist and author who lives in West Germany. Chief-reporter
at Radio Free Europe between 1952-1957. His book, Ungam in Flammen, a first-hand ac-
count of the Hungarian Revolution has become a bestseller in Germany. Mr. Konkoly is
a regular member of the West German Television Panel on international affairs.
M. STANTON EVANS is the Managing Editor of Human Events, a well-known and often
quoted news bulletin in Washington D.C.
GABRIEL GERSH is an American free-lance writer and contributor to The New Leader,
Commonweal, St. Louis Post-Dispatch and numerous other magazines and newspapers.
DENYS JACKSON (Melbourne) is an Australian journalist and commentator on foreign
affairs.
This Review is the official organ of Free World Forum Inc., an educational, non-profit organization established to promote better,
understanding among free nations; to analyze American foreign policy, and to further the cause of freedom for all peoples.
Published by Free World Press, Newark, N.J. - Subscription f 4.- a year, payable to Free World Review, P.O. Box 1254, N e w
Y o r k, 8, N.Y. Editorial correspondence should be sent to the same address or to the Washington, D.C. office: 1112 Dupont Circle-
Building, Washington 6, D.C. (Tel. DU. 7-1377). - The opinions expressed by the contributors do not necessarily reflect the
views of the editors.
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KHRUSHCHEV RIDES THE WAVE OF
NEO - STALINISM
The presupposition of this article, dealing with events that have not only shocked, but surprised and
pained large sectors of the non-Communist world, is that two Ks are interchangeable. Kremlin equals Khrush-
chev, and vice versa.
Party First Secretary and now Premier Khrushchev has been in command decisively since late June, 1957,
- four years, three months, and three weeks from the day Stalin gasped his last. The chronological parallel
with the rise and accession of Stalin is remarkable, and the comparable absence of violence is noteworthy.
With the betrayal and dismissal of Marshal Zhukov nine months ago, there was no effective and concen-
trated power left to threaten the new dictator. He had not only reached the topmost pinnacle of the ancient
towers of Muscovy's citadel. He had succeeded in toppling over and flinging into outer space all rivals.
This was clear from the dictator's bearing and actions last fall and through the winter and early spring.
Reenforced by the sensational success of Soviet science in the launching of huge Sputniks, he exuded con-
fidence and even jubilation. His attitude to the West hardened. Impetuously reaching for a summit meeting - he
nevertheless refused to make the slightest concessions and for a considerable period literally sought to brow-
beat Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower into a speedy and unrehearsed convocation. Here he had
surprising assistance from skeptical but helpless Western governments whose peoples were easily stampeded
by nuclear panic. Some dent was certainly made on the American public. Congress, however, proved staunch
and responsible, on both sides of the aisle in both houses; and Mr. Dulles during this time of ordeal was at
his very best. Whatever may be thought of some of his judgments and actions in the past, no statesman of this
generation has turned in a better performance than our Secretary of State during the past year in out-waiting
and out-maneuvering the diplomatic chess masters of the Kremlin.
Nor should the President be omitted in this recital. By nature a man of good will and pacific, benevolent
instincts, he is constitutionally and temperamentally less well suited to play in a game as tough and as crafty
as the diplomacy of the contemporary colossi, the USA and the USSR, with the future of humanity at stake.
The President has, however, in this difficult period shown notable firmness and intellectual fortitude. He has
not let the cause of freedom down; and at the same time he has shown patience, tact, and prudence in relation
to the world scene.
The Khrushchev who succeeded Stalin as top dog and unchallenged master of the second power in the
world was the First Secretary wl}o at the Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1956 had put on a mantle of
liberality and had denounced the dead tyrant as a sadistic and psychopathic monster. The liberal tide which
he thus unloosed was a roaring flood which very nearly broke up the Communist empire. At the same time the
shrewdness and intuitive capacity which had reckoned, following Stalin's death, that both the USSR and the
world had moved on to a phase which required far more mobile and flexible tactics, were crowned by what al-
most amounted to a halo in the eyes of the uncommitted nations and many elements in the world of the West.
Even the brutality and treachery of the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution did not permanently alter or affect
the hope which he had aroused in the hearts of millions round the world.
Even after Khrushchev became humanly omnipotent, and despite much truculence and proud boasting, he
moved mildly and increased rather than diminished the hope that he would prove the liberalizer of Communism.
Then, suddenly and without warning, Khrushchev moved and moved far toward placing himself in the path and
footsteps of the desanctified highpriest of absolutism who had been his predecessor.
He denounced T it o and the Yugoslavian nationalistic schism, taking up almost the identical position
and attitude of Stalin on the same issue in 1948. The extent and gravity of this zag can be gauged, if we re-
call not only the trek of the barefoot Kremlin pilgrims to the Belgrade Canossa in late May, 1955 but the words
Khrushchev spoke into the loudspeaker on arrival.' He said: "We ascribe the aggravations to the provocative
role played by Laurenti P. B e r i a and other recently exposed enemies of the people. We are ready to eliminate
all obstacles standing in the way of complete normalization of relations between our states."
The reversal on Tito disturbed the uncommitted peoples and the liberal and hopeful elements in the anti-
Communist nations. But the real flinging down of the Red and bloody gauge was still to come.
On Tuesday, June 17 the Free World awoke to learn with shocked surprise that terror walked again openly
and brazenly in Hungary and that Nikita Khrushchev had indeed crossed the Rubicon of re-Stalinization. An
official release from the Hungarian Justice Ministry (the avoidance of irony is not the Communists' long suit)
announced that I m r e Nagy and Pal Male t e r, with two associates, had been executed after a secret
trial and "without confessing their guilt"..(Italics ours.)
The resulting impact on leaders and people in the Free World was predictable and was surely taken into
account in the calculated decision to destroy the Hungarian heroes, not for senseless. vengeance which would
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have been a piece of thoroughly un-Communist sentimentality, but in the implementation of high policy. Krush-
chev must have known also that his already rent and soiled robe of liberality and comparative righteousness
would now be torn to tatters. From motives of both inclination and foreign policy he would have preferred to
hold on to the image of reason and reform. Yet he hesitated no more than he did on November 3, 1956 when or-
ders were given to annihilate without mercy the revolution in Hungary. Only, in 1958 his power was absolute,
whereas earlier the form of authority at least was collective.
Why did Khrushchev elect the liquidation of his liberal image in turning on Tito and in making martyrs of
Nagy and Maleter? Why did he zag so sharply just at this time, with so much to lose on the Free World front?
We shall set down the answer, for purposes of brevity, in a series of numbered theses.
1. From a general and theoretical standpoint, Communism believes in quick crises, sharp turns, abrupt
swings, contradictory developments. This is in accordance with the principle of dialectic which is the key to
history. Communists are less afraid than normal people of inconsistency, and are reassured rather than fright-
ened by a sharp alteration of direction, accompanied by violence.
2. It is a fundamental axiom of Communism,a theory hammered out in revolutionary practice and adversity,
that internal problems must be dealt with realistically irrespective of opinion, pressure, and even threat of
loss in the external sphere. Internal power and prestige considerations have at all times the highest priority.
3. The current sharp zag is a reflex of Khrushchev's failure to gain a quick and easy summit meeting.
Prestige and hurry were his primary motives in reaching so avidly for such a meeting, augmented by extreme
confidence. Had he scored a sufficiently spectacular summit success, the Soviet dictator would have had a
short-cut to the perfection of his absolutism, would have had the heat taken off in relation to criticisms of his
policies in agriculture and industrial decentralization, and could have afforded a longer period of lingering
,toleration for mild dissent and variety.
4. The USSR, save for war on its own people and the will to continue the reality of cold war while urging
in words peaceful coexistence, is at peace and is incomparably stronger and more confident than at any previous
time in her forty-year history. Khrushchev desires to resolidify the domestic and satellite situation after a par-
tial thaw for five years, and has decided after apparent hesitation and weighing of alternatives to reStalinize.
5. Khrushchev, despite Western hopes and Asiatic illusions, is a total Communist. He is a product of the
toughest, most brutal, most grueling, and most sheerly Machiavellian political school known to history - Sta-
lin's own school lasting a quarter of a century. He was a top henchman and came up the hard way -the way
of murder, mass liquidation, obedience and rivalry to the point of swimming in rivers of blood. The drastic de-
Stalinization, of which Khrushchev became the symbol, was partly accidental, partly the result of the basic
political situation and power vacuum left by Stalin's demise. It represented, in other words, a combination of
shrewd calculation and impromptu tactic, not a position based on principle. As such it was bound to be a pass-
ing phase.
6. The logic of Communism, which is absolute totalitarianism, is a Stalin-like dictatorship. Collective
rule is a temporary expedient. Tolerance of dissent is self-defeating. The admission of a little liberty is like
a spike driven through a steam boiler under high pressure. This is the dreadful built-in-terror of Communism-
a system based on naked force, contempt for law, the denial of God, and the artificial organization of inhuman-
ity.
7. There was strong pressure on Khrushchev from Red China- the result primarily of the storm of free
dom created by deStalinization. Hungary had a profound effect on China - on the people, the intellectuals, and
the hierarchy. There is evidence that more than one revolt on the scale of the Hungarian revolution may have
taken place in the vastness, and isolation of the land behind the Bamboo Curtain. In any event Mao Tse-tung
and Liu Shao-chi are at the moment having no picnic and know, with the icy clarity of Marxist, materialist
reasoning, that the only hope of industrializing their immense domain and appropriately imitating and even sur-
passing the Russian ascent to world power is via the Stalinist route. In the face of this decision and its force-
ful if veiled communication to the Communist world, Khrushchev has chosen not to resist publicly but to ride
the wave in his own person and to lead aggressively in the re solidification process. Thereby he may hope to
kill two birds with one stone: eliminate any fishing by Mongolian rivals in troubled satellite waters and avoid
any risk of loss by Moscow in prestige or clear primacy as the center of universal Communism.
s
What conclusion should be drawn from recent developments and their enactment-into hard policy decision
by the successor of Stalin and Lenin? The answer surely is clear. There never was any genuine prospect of
gradual, Communist devolution toward sincere peaceful coexistence based on the renunciation of dogmas and
dreams adding up to the inevitability of a Communist global revolution and a Communist world order directed
and dominated by Moscow. Now, however, this is evident even to the most confirmed illusionists. The strong-
est feature of Communism, next to its sensational power and material success, is its continuity. Its hostility
to the West and its rejection of ideals of reconciliation and genuine peaceful cooperation are revealed as un-
altered and unalterable save by events and counter forces that have not yet come into being.
This is a severe and unpleasant conclusion to reach and to record. Would that it could be otherwise) As it
is, we are somewhat comforted by the stout remark of the Anglican Bishop But 1 e r out of the Age of Reason:
"Things are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be; why then should we wish-to be
deceived?"
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The Untold Story
Behind the Nixon Ordeal
It may be true that the humiliating insults Mr. Nixon
and through him the United States of America suffered
during his South American tour were mainly the work
of unscrupulous Soviet agitators, but the courageous,
young Vice-President of the U.S.A. must also have seen
during his ill-fated "good-will" trip the other side to
the coin: the almost complete failure of Anglo-Ameri-
can propaganda which proves to be appallingly inef-
fective against Moscow's methods, especially on con-
tinents having a colored or mixed population. All over
the world the awakening consciousness of colored-
mestino peoples is producing a kind of nationalistic
fever, which surpasses by far in dynamic and extremism
the behavior of European nationalists a century ago,
when the so called romantic nationalism was born on
the old Continent.
In November, 1956 this writer had inadvertently par-
ticipated in a night-demonstration organized spontane-
ously by the people of Buenos Aires, outraged by Sov-
iet brutality against the revolting Hungarians. The pas-
sionate outbursts of the Argentinos produced almost in-
credible scenes on that night. To prevent the Soviet
Embassy from holding a reception on November 7, the
anniversary of the Bolshevist Revolution, the demon-
strators, representing a cross section of Argentine
society from simple laborers to fashionable ladies of
the upper class, used autos, street cars and even fire
ladders to build road blocks in the streets around the
new Soviet Embassy (the old one was burned down by
other demonstrators earlier). From the upstairs win-
dows refuse paper was thrown into pyres burning in
the middle of the streets. Hundreds of policemen armed
with fire-hoses and gas-bombs were unable to restore
order. Dignified old matrons were threatening the po-
lice from the balconies, hysterically shouting that the
latter should not allow murderous Bolsheviks to dese-
crate the Argentine capital with their presence.
Those living in Buenos Aires in these days could
also witness a touching, non-violent demonstration of
human-emotions: the long queues formed by thousands
of Argentine men and women around governmental build-
ings waiting patiently for hours to donate blood for the
bleeding people of Budapest or to register for adopting
refugee Hungarian children. It looked as though the
soul of this continent had opened its heart as never
before to save the heroic Magyars from the brutal grip
of Soviet Communism.
The Changed Scene
Twenty months after these unforgettable scenes,
just preceding Mr. Nixon's arrival in Buenos Aires, a
different kind of demonstration took place on almost
the same premises. To celebrate the imminent inaugur-
ation of the new Argentine President, a picturesque
and impressive parade was held on the Avenidas at-
tended by the delegations of about fifty nations. The
famous San Martin mounted Guards opened the proces-
sion amid fanfares and martial musique. Behind the
Guards marched the long line of delegations, headed
by a dark-haired, decorative looking, tall man, who as
the virtual center of attention was happily receiving
the cheers of the same Argentinos who less than two
years ago had seemed to want death for every Commu-
nist in the world.
This time, however, the situation was very different,
for the tall man heading the parade was no one else
but the head of a Communist State: Comerade Joan
Gheorge Maurer, the President of the Rumanian Peo-
ples Republic, the highest dignitary.,in the crowd, sur-
rounded by Rumanian, Hungarian and Czechoslovak
Communist ministers, some of whom had been active
in the suppressing of the Hungarian Revolt in 1956.
While a noisy, antagonistic group of students was at
hand when Mr. Nixon visited the local University, Com-
erade Maurer was accorded a dignified reception at the
University of Cordoba where, as elsewhere, he was
treated with all the ceremonies and courtesy reserved
for heads of States. The flock of Communist journalists
always trailing him could not complain either: while
enjoying immensely the sunshine of hospitality and
quasi popularity with their Red boss, they were even
given opportunity to visit the editorial offices of'a re-
spected newspaper in the Argentine capital. They used
their visit to sing high praises of the 'freedom of the
press in the Soviet orbit' while scoring the same time
the American press as the slave of capitalists. The
views of these journalists were given wide publicity
and no effective protest was raised against their pro-
paganda.
The softening attitude toward Communists can be
detected almost all over South America - even in Chile
which was counted as perhaps the number one anti-
Communist stronghold on the Continent, due to its, se-
vere restrictive laws against the Reds. The Chilean
government, reversing its earlier stand, now makes pre-
parations to assure the Communists all the political
rights the other parties enjoy.
On the other hand, anti-Americanism is on the rise;
President Ibanez has become almost a popular hero
5
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since he had refused to pay a visit to Washington. If
one starts conversation with Chilean students, as this
writer did, they are ready to blame "American capital-
ist system" for the present economic troubles which
beset their country, forgetting the fact that the econom-
ic imbalance plaguing many countries is mainly a re-
sult of a world divided by artificial and violent means
into two parts and that Soviet imperialism bears the
direct responsibility for this as well as for the poison-
ed world atmosphere.
Dynamic Anti-Communism Absent
South America has always been the continent of emo-
tional extremism and of quickly changing popular mood.
However, the above described, strange phenomenon
cannot be explained by this circumstance alone. The
comments and reports in the U.S.A. press gave an in-
complete story when they put the blame for Mr. Nixon's
ordeal on Communist machinations and deteriorating
economic conditions in Latin America. Communists
still represent a numerically small fraction of the po-
pulation here. As for economic conditions, they are not
the decisive factor, either, in the growing anti-Ameri-
canism among the Latinos. After all, if allegiance and
faithfulness to Western Christian ideals and social or-
der were to depend on foreign aid or dollar loans alone,
then our Christian civilization based on two thousand
year old ethical values would cease to have its "rai-
son d'etre" and might as well surrender to the other
alternative, Moscovite materialism, right now.. .
It cannot be denied that a very serious, almost fun-
damental breach has been revealed in the Christian
Weltanschauung of South American society, which in
this critical phase of the cold war could do no better
than play the role of an indifferent spectator when
Vice President Nixon, one of the most attractive lead-
ers in the Western World, was attacked and insulted
repeatedly by a mob representing a small minority.
Graver than the incidents in Montevideo, Lima, Bogota
and Caracas themselves, was the sad fact that the bet-
ter elements of Latin American society were not will-
ing or able to suppress a priori the voices of glowing
hatred, fanned by professional agitators, and failed to
counteract them when the disturbances had broken out.
Had the South American public displayed a more digni-
fied, genuinely solemn atmosphere fit for the good will
visit of Mr. Nixon, these agitators would have almost
certainly refrained from trouble-making.
Where, one could ask for example,were those students
whose studies were and are made possible by the nu-
merous scholarships given by U.S. institutions. Due to
U.S. generosity, a great number of exchange students
go every year to North America. Upon their return they
are supposed to be better acquainted with U.S. customs
and the American people and saturated with the politi-
cal ideas and ideals of the Western world. Yet, there
was an astonishing silence and inaction even on the
part of these elements who apparently failed to regard
it as their moral obligation to pour in protests and raise
their voices - and their protective arms - against the
scandalous behavior of their colleagues.
Does that mean, one is compelled to ask, that these
exchange-students have not been educated properly po-
litically in the United States and have not been made
immune to Communist ideas? Or, are the universities
in the U.S.A. themselves unable to imbue their students
even in these critical years of American history with
the proper amount of antidote against poisonous, Red
'Socialistic' ideas? In the wake of Mr. Nixon's ordeal,
it would be an interesting and certainly illuminating
task to prepare a survey of the present political alle-
giance of those South American individuals who have
received their education in American universities. Are
they reliable political allies of the West or not? What-
ever the answer may be, it remains a disturbing fact
that the attitude of the South American public during
Mr. Nixon's tour has revealed a deep ignorance, un-
awareness and indifference of the masses toward the
great struggle of our era between two world-concepts
- a struggle in which they cannot and shouldnotremain
neutral.
During the Hungarian Revolution they had a chance
- for a short period - to look into the infernal depth of
violence and brutality inherent in the Soviet system.
The thunders and lightnings of the Hungarian struggle
for freedom, the vision of human suffering and heroism,
and the barbarity of the Russians in suppressing the
Revolution provoked an immense response and an un-
precedented outburst of emotion in the masses against
the Communists.
Still, in the absence of repeated and continuous anti-
Communist impulses, the whole Hungarian tragedy has
remained but a distant and fading vision in their minds.
Communism continues to remain an unrecognized danger
even after Hungary and part of the blame for that should
be put on the American attitude and propaganda, which
failed to exploit this historic occasion. Had the West
had the courage and foresight to take some demonstra-
tive action - short of war - on behalf of the Hungari-
ans (a massive parachuting of food or medicaments, im-
mediate dispatch of U.N. observers to the battered
Hungarian capital, the recognition of Hungary's neutral-
ity, etc.) they could have turned the table on the Sov-
iets in East Europe by evoking simultaneously inde-
scribable enthusiasm among the peoples of the world,
including Latin America, for the United States.
As matters stand now, many South Americans have
disturbing thoughts when thinking of the Hungarian
Revolution in retrospect. 'If people like the Magyars
were so utterly abandoned during their fight, the fault
must lie either in themselves or in those powers who
have betrayed them.' Thus things have begun to back-
fire from an American point of view: the bloody suppres-
sion of the Hungarian Revolt which could have turned
the whole world against the Soviets permanently, is
being attributed largely to the weakness of Western
democracies, led by the U.S.A., who lack faith, courage
and determination to defend their friends, principles
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and their own ideals.
Facts often act in a subliminal way in the minds of
the masses, and history metes out punishment for blun-
ders committed, sometimes with surprising speed. It is
certainly not a coincidence that since the tragic Fall
of 1956 American prestige and President Eisenhower's
popularity have been declining steadily. Mr. Nixon and
his entourage had ample opportunity to measure the
freightening depth of that decline in Lima and Caracas.
American Propaganda Soft, Uninspiring
The failure of American propaganda in South America
is all the more arresting, because the public here re-
ceives the news and reports on international events al-
most exclusively from Anglo-American sources. The
newspapers are served mainly by U.S.A. news agencies
and Soviet cold war activities are reported through a
filtering Anglo-American news network. American pro-
paganda, paradoxically, is being defeated on a field
where it enjoys an almost absolute monopoly in influ-
encing the masses not only by the news media but by
cultural means also. Russian culture and art are almost
unknown to South Americans who from their childhood
on are exposed to an overwhelming North American im-
pact and influence. The thousands of South American
movie theaters from Panama to the Tierra del Fuego
present mainly American films. The little indigenes in
Caracas, Lima, Bogota or Buenos Aires are better ac-
quainted with the Wild West, with the stars and splendor
of Hollywood and the familiar figures of comic strips
than with the historyand the heroes of their own native
country. Spanish language editions of U.S.A. magazines
are widely read all over the continent.
All in all, Americans here enjoy a unique position to
develop an intimate and friendly relationship to South
Americans and to generate a favorable atmosphere to-
ward the United States, thus creating a common spiri-
tual front against the common enemy: Communist im-
perialism. After Mr. Nixon's ordeal one cannot but ask
the painful question: Why cannot the U.S.A. cultural
export and propaganda cope with Communist penetra-
tion and why has it failed thus far to exploit the tre-
mendous potential it enjoys on this continent ?
One of the main reasons for the failure is that the
material flowing from Anglo-American propaganda
springs have rather a cooling than an inspiring or ex-
citing effect, supplying something undrinkable for such
passionate, ardent people of vivid imagination as the
Latins. A dry, rational, colorless approach, disdain
for using emotional and dramatic effects, lack of proper
psychology, linguistic weakness and lack of intuitive
sensitivity on the part of U.S. officials should be put
high on the list of the causes for American failure. But
there are ocher important causes also rather unnoticed
by the American press.
While the Russians and their accomplices are em-
ploying every means and use every opportunity to hurt
and discredit America, there is a noticeable disinclin-
ation in American propaganda to hit back at the Rus-
sians and Communism with equal vigor, imagination
and determination.
Apart from a few best sellers like Kravchenko's "I
Choose Freedom" or Gheorghiu's "The Twentyfifth
Hour" very little has been done to depict Communism
in its real, horrifying reality to South American intel-
lectuals, not to speak about the masses. Up to the
Hungarian Revolution not a single anti-Communist ex-
hibition worthy of the name was organized in Argentina
or elsewhere on the continent, except by the feeble ef-
forts of Iron Curtain emigre groups, whose voices are
weak and means insufficient to create wide attention.
The notable absence of anti-Communist exhibits and
the lack of hard-hitting publications devoted to the
struggle against Communism is a serious negative fac-
tor helping the advance of the Soviets. The only so-
called anti-Bolshevist League of South America is a
rather passive gathering of conservative intellectuals,
which lacks the characteristics of a forceful popular
movement. It is hardly noticed by the press.
The movie theaters all over the continent still pre-
sent numerous well-made and touching films based on
second World War and illustrating the horrors of Nazi
cruelty. But Hollywood has yet to produce a really mov-
ing, great anti-Communist film written and played with
the same devotion to stir up human sentiments on a
grand scale. (And dozens of such films are needed!)
The same film industry which gladly spent hundreds
of millions - and rightly so - during World War II to
depict the crimes of the enemy and to glorify the he-
roic deeds of the Allies shows a strange reluctance to
turn its powerful psychological weapon against Com-
munism, an enemy niore dangerous than the Nazis were.
The few half-hearted, alibi efforts in making cheap an-
ti-Communist films did more harm than good. In this
respect the sub-standard film made about Cardinal
M i n d s z e n t y is a glaring example. This writer at-
tended the South American premiere of that film made
in Hollywood and it is enough to mention that at the
scene which was supposed to be a tragic climax the
spectators could not but burst into laughter.
The new Katorga, the persecution of the Churches,
the fate of millions of Europeans deported into Siberia,
the uncounted deeds of individual heroism behind the
Iron Curtain, the horrors of Katyn and the GPU prisons,
the great purges within the Soviet Union and the satel-
lites, the mysterious deadly chain of Soviet concentra-
tion camps from the Arctic Circle to the Mongolian de-
serts, the deeds of Soviet espionage in stealing the
atomic secrets, and, last but not least, the unforget-
table events of the Hungarian Revolution could offer
dramatic settings and colors to produce spectacular
and monumental films fit for Cinemascope and Techni-
color. Such films would not only serve the cause of
America and the free world but-would certainly result
in excellent box-office returns. The. failure of Western
studios to exploit these themes, to capture the imagi-
nation of hundreds of millions in and outside America
and creating at the same time permanent revulsion a-
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gainst the only exisintg colonial slave Empire of our
era, has contributed a great deal, in the negative sense,
to the attitude of the South American masses manifest-
ed during Mr. Nixon's visit here. These masses should
and could have been influenced to hate Red colonial-
ism instead of an imagined "Yankee imperialism".
Masses Unaware of Communist Danger
The cool and objective tone of Anglo-American
sources may suit the temperament of Anglo-Saxon peo-
ples but hardly has any propaganda value in South Ame-
rica where people can be impressed only by colorful,
dramatic reportage and interpretation of world events.
South American readers or radio listeners just don't re-
act and don't appreciate the policy of understatements
as practiced in America and Great Britain. On the con-
trary, this is the continent of heated political arguments
where the use of overstatements is an almost imperative
necessity to attract attention. The soft American ap-
proach, appealing to reason rather than to emotion, can-
not match the ruthless and unscrupulous Soviet propa-
ganda which knows that a moderate and sophisticated
approach is easily misinterpreted here as weakness.
This is the world of almost childish credibility, a
fertile breeding ground for wonderdoctors, astrologues,
fortune tellers and spiritists, a world where emotions
prevail over reason, boldness over cautious compro-
mise, forceful, colorful presentation of views over
'prudent', routine approach.
It would be too much, of course, to expect from Ame-
ricans to adopt in their official propaganda an entirely
new tone and style not in harmony with the cool Anglo-
Saxon temperament and objectivity, but which neverthe-
less would suit better the tastes of colored people
lacking political maturity and balanced temperament.
The gap could and should be bridged, however, by en-
couraging independent, private agencies and institu-
tions (including Iron Curtain exile groups) and by or-
ganizing a large scale cultural export toward the coun-
tries to the South. Films, books, exhibits, performers,
writers should emphasize and describe not only the
values of Western civilization but also educate their
readers and audiences about the Communist enemy
menacing the Western way of life. The views of intel-
lectuals and artists are more sympathetic and palatable
to the South American public than those coming from
political sources. Unfortunately, the utterances of Ame-
rican and European intellectuals who are given some
publicity here, seem to be contaminated by leftist views
and by the spirit of coexistence with Communism and
seldom, if ever, condemn Communism. Still these views
are given more credence and circulation than the rou-
tine anti-Communist statements of Western political
leaders.
Thus, the inability or unwillingness of American
propaganda to make the masses aware and afraid of the
destructive character of Communism reduces the pres-
ent life-and-death struggle between freedom and slav-
ery in the eyes of South Americans (and probably of the
Arabs and other Afro-Asian peoples as well) into a
mere rivalry between two giant powers. It will not make
much difference - they think - whether Moscovite im-
perialism or Yankee imperialism triumphs in the cold
or a hot war at the end. This state of mind of South
Americans - though not general yet - is more harmful
to America than to the Soviets. After all 'Yankee im-
perialism' seems a more acute 'danger' to them, be-
cause the Yankees are in their immediate neighborhood
and can inflict by their overwhelming power and influ-
ence more damage to Latin American economies and
are more in the position to exploit South American
workers than the Russians who are far away.
As to the Kremlin, it knows well that South American
workers and employees are not much interested in
Marxist and Leninist theories. To become owner of a
Dome with a little garden around, to acquire a small
workshop or a store, to travel around on a motorcycle
or in a small car - these are the dreams of the average
citizen here and not an unknown new system of govern-
ment or a Socialist state. They sympathize with revo-
lutions but not with the kind that would basically alter
the present private ownership and free enterprise sys-
tem. From a Marxist point of view these represent a
typical small-burgeois and capitalist attitude, the only
socialist element of which is the desire of the common
people to see a curb put on the excessive fortunes of
the very rich, and to have some social security. They
dislike rich men and skilled agitators can generate
this dislike into hatred not only against individuals
but also against the wealthiest nation on earth, the
United States. The omnipotent "Dollar", the so covet-
ed and envied dollar, has become in a strange way the
magic word by which hidden passions of the masses
can easily be stirred up at the time of an economic
crisis.
II
In South America, as in other countries where Com-
munist penetration is in its beginning phase, the Reds
have one basic instruction which might be formulated
as follows: "No nonsense now! Be good boys, go along
well with the others, don't boast of your strength, and
try to capitalize by supporting popular issues." The
Communists, adapting themselves to the prevailing cir-
cumstances and atmosphere, did not speak a word dur-
ing the whole election campaign about collectivism,
kolkhozes, socialization of production, or other Com-
munist objectives. Instead they presented themselves
as defenders of the naturar riches (like oil) of the
country who are guarding jealously the independence
of national industry against the "North American
sharks." The Reds, protagonists of internationalism
elsewl ere, bear here the toga of nationalist champions
struggling against any kind of foreign intervention and
"colonial or semi-colonial dependence."
Their agitation on South American universities re-
flects an alarming picture. The so called "refugee
students" are here the primary tools of penetration, re-
presenting the avant guard of the Kremlin on the Con-
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tinent, though sometimes involuntarily. Exiled or chased
away from. other Latin American republics in the wake
of a revolution or a new dictatorship, these dark-colored,
bushy-haired, glowing-eyed fanatics represent ideal
material in Moscow's hands. They appear as persecut-
ed victims and romantic heroes in the eyes of their fel-
low students. Usually they are not from the immediate
neighbor srates but from farther countries, mainly from
Central America (like Guatemala) where revolutions
and dictatorships are more fashionable than toward the
South. Often wandering from one country to another,
they are soliciting "brotherly refuge", loudly proclaim-
ing themselves persecuted champions for the cause of
world liberty. Wherever they succeed in settling down
for a while, they jump into political activity at once,
snooping for 'reactionary elements' in every corner of
their adopted country. They are divided into numerous
political sects including trotskyists, scalinists, lenin-
ists, national marxists, and heaven knows how many
ocher kinds. The majority are not paid by Moscow but
keen observers can easily detect the trained agitators
among them at political meetings. These have seen
many countries and possess a vast repertoir of anti-re-
actionary, anti-Church, anti-Yankee and anti-capitalist
slogans.
The Communists are playing a very wicked game in
the overthrowing of dictators in Latin America. The
rise of dictators is helped here, as in ocher parts of the
world, by a political atmosphere in which the ideas of
democracy and liberty are misused and the impotence
and corruptness of the prevailing regime cause a drift
toward political chaos. The different parties and poli-
ticians involved in petty politics and personal feuds
are moving around in their own political "microcosmos"
without paying due attention to popular mood, which
fed up with a regime seeks for a "strong hand" able to
clean up the political scene and restore order.
In countries where the state has weak traditions and
the system of government lacks a firmly established
basis and political organism, this process of rotating
regimes is much faster than in countries having a more
stable heritage. In most Latin American states even
originally sound regimes tend to degenerate in a rapid
tempo, thus paving the way for dictatorships, which in
turn, after a "honeymoon period" with the people, fol-
low the same path toward corruption as their prececes-
sors. In other words, political remedies are prone to
become poison with the passing of time. Nowhere in the
world can dictatorships rise and fall so quickly as in
Latin America.
Communists know how to play both ends of the game.
On the one hand, they are active in pushing a demo-
cracy toward anarchy, and on the other, they are mas-
ters in infiltrating the growing opposition against a
dictator, after he has taken over the reins of the coun-
try. The more rapid the rotation of regimes around this
vicious circle the greater are Moscow's chances to get
a controlling hand at the center of "the devil's wheel".
Moscow n e e d s dictatorships in South America be-
cause in the inevitable revolutions which overthrow
them, Communist agitators can have real field days
fishing in troubled waters and inciting mobs, intoxicat-
ed by a sudden overdose of political freedom, to commit
excesses. Venezuela offers a good example in this
respect.
Church and Army Are Main Red Targets
Moscow needs such rapidly rotating political situ-
ations for other reasons also. The subsequent turmoil
produces an ideal atmosphere for undermining - helped
inadvertently by bourgeois elements - the two main in-
stitutional pillars of South American republics which -
in contrast to the unstable political regimes - are not
only well organized but also have firm traditions of
their own. These institutions are the Roman Catholic
Church and the Army.
The opinion' is often expressed that Communist in-
filtration cannot be successful in South America for the
simple reason that the Latin Americans are 'deeply
religious people' while Communism professes atheism.
This is not a new argument. The same could be heard
in Italy after the Second World War. Yet, in Italy the
Reds have succeeded in creating the most powerful
Communist party outside the Iron Curtain.
As to South America, foreign travelers are impressed
here by the romantic colorfulness of Spanish Catholic-
ism which is rich in ancient features, still using in
some primitive regions - especially in Central Ameri-
ca - strange rituals and ceremonies inherited from pa-
gan Indian tribes. Anglo-Saxon novels about South Ame-
rica depict old families with almost fanatical religious
fervor.
But there is another side to the coin. Perhaps no-
where in the Christian world are the anti-Church pas-
sions so deep though hidden, as in the Spanish world,
despite the devotion of the Latinos to mystical-relig-
ious formalism. These anti-Catholic passions flared up
in their shocking reality during the civil war in Spain
and Mexico and in various disturbances in South Ame-
rican republics during which priests and nuns were
killed in large numbers and churches and religious
shrines were destroyed and burned down by raging
mobs. The explanation of these phenomena lies in the
fact that the anti-clericalism of the Jacobins still en-
joys a hidden virulence in Spanish America, perhaps
more so than elsewhere. Jacobinical atheism was a
strong ally of England in its fight against the Spanish
Empire and played an important role in the disintegra-
tion of Spain's overseas possessions into smaller, in-
dependent republics. The Spanish Church of that era
with its rigor and hierarchy formed the cementing force
among the hundre~ gfl Nomadic tribes on Spanish-ruled
territories. In the only 150 year old tradition of Latin
American republics one can easily detect a suppressed
though latent animosity over the obstructive role of the
Church in the creation of these republics. In a subcon-
scious way the mulattos still consider the Church an
obstacle in their drive to achieve unlimited liberty.
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Anticlericalism and anti-Church sentiment are potent
weapons in the Kremlin's hands. "The Church should
keep out of politics, she must not intermingle in state
affairs" - say the Communists. When the Roman Catho-
lic hierarchy withdraws from politics and fails to take
a stand against a dictator, she automatically becomes
the target of another accusation: "Look, the Church is
a servant of the dictatorship!"
An editorial in the New Y'rk 7` s criti`i~d
ident Eisenhower's order ale-^ing same p+-csn, raising the recent events in the Arab world, the
lwasli political and military leaders believe that this
plcKOt process of fermentation could give them a valu-
aAle time to develop and build up their country, and,
abevv all - and this is the most important problem now-
#0 absorb the third million of immigrants into the exist-
#at borders.
C-ooacquently, it goes without saying, that Israel
would never agree to any return to 1947 frontiers, though
a mutual border adjustment is not excluded.
For a British subject it is comforting to see that Is-
raeli attitude toward Britain has been changed consi-
derably and several Israeli politicians or diplomats in
a frank chat-are ready to admit that they won't mind to
see Britain's eventual return to her traditional position
in the Middle East as a stabilizing factor. Such views
of course, do not affect their sentimental ties with
America.
The blueprints of a plan to absorb that third million
of immigrants have been almost completed, and a great
importance has been attached in these plans to the
development of the Negev, which reminds a visitor of
the films of romantic American Wild West. Its vast emp-
ty spaces need water for irrigation, and, at the same
time, it awaits the results of various geological re-
search missions which will attempt to find some untap-
ped natural resources. All these ambitious plans need
for their realization a tremendous amount of creative
energy, practical science, and, above all, foreign in-
vestment.
This brings us to a fundamental problem which pre-
occupies the minds of Israeli leaders today. They re-
alize that in 1964 German reparations will come to an
and it will be also necessary to begin to repay Israeli
Bonds sold in the United States. They also realize
that in order to achieve an economic independence Is -
rael will have to treble its export within the coming
decade. The progress of the first ten years may be a
promising sign. Exports in 1949 amounted to $30 mil-
lion and in 1957 to $140 million; production has been
trebled and so has industry and the merchant marine.
There is still considerable gap to close between ex-
ports and imports and the country is working relentless-
ly and feverishly towards this goal.
The enthusiasm of the people of Israel (Mr. Ben-Gu-
rion is reputed to have said that economic laws do not
apply to Israel) and their devotion and energy may well
shatter the doubts of some economists. Given a few
years of relative peace, Israeli leaders are deeply con-
vinced that Israel can survive as an outpost of Western
civilization and achieve economic stability. Peace
with its Arab neighbors will, no doubt, help Israel and
them alike.
THE 'PEACEFUL' WORLD OF SOVIET MAGAZINES.
(Continued from page 21.)
Their 'God' is constant but the 'Devil' has many
(ottaa- Once it was Churchill, but Dulles now far over-
ebado*s him. Once the Devil has been identified, he
-Ktives the full scorn and abuse of the Soviet maga-
:lae press, so that his grotesque, caricatured figure
bituats the soul of Soviet citizens. The enemy is thus
41vto a concrete shape. The Soviet 'humorous' period-
kal. Crocodile, is a positive nightmare of devils.
The impression, then, that we derive from reading
even the less official press is that in the land of smil-
ing faces and sunlit maternity wards, there is no
thought but of peace. Coupled with this is the impor-
tant corollary that each citizen must be made in Le-
nin's image in order to beat off the Western devils
when they attack. And devils always do attack.
s s s s? a a s ~_*
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PEKING'S DRIVE FOR RECOGNITION
The campaign for expansion of Australian trade with
Communist China is the main current propaganda line
of the Communist Party of Australia and of the Austra-
lian Labor Party, which since 1954 has pursued a pro-
Communist foreign policy.
This campaign has received an impetus on two fronts
in Australia in recent weeks. In the first place, a trade
delegation from Communist China has been touring
Australia. The newspapers have been conspicuously
silent about its whereabouts while the trade delegation
has been pursuing private talks with representatives of
primary producers' organizations in particular. The ob-
vious idea is to build up influential contacts quietly
so that when the next public campaign on the Commu-
nist China trade issue develops a number of influential
persons of impeccable non-Communist antecedents will
have been involved already.
The second instance was the return of the Federal
President of the Australian Labor Party (Mr. J. Cham-
berlain) from a visit to Communist China where he was
a guest at the May Day celebrations. He too repeated
the same line on the necessity for trade relationship
with Communist China and accompanied that line with
the usual inspired reports concerning the "progress"
of China under Communism and of the existence of re-
lative religious freedom under the Communist regime.
Repeated in identical phrases by spokesmen of both
the Australian Labor Party and the Communist Party,
the line is by now familiar enough to Australians. It is.
(1) Recognize Communist China.
(2) Increase trade with Communist China.
(3) Give Communist China a seat in the United Na-
tions.
Currently a Red Chinese trade delegation is in Aus-
tralia, beating up business.
Trap for the Unwary
The plea is, on the surface, a reasonable one, de-
signed to appeal to the uninformed and the unthinking.
Refusal to give diplomatic recognition to the Peking
regime is, we are told, a needless insult. By recogniz-
ing the Communist government, we lay the foundations
for friendship instead of enmity; these foundations will
be strengthened by increasing trade with mainland
China.
By giving Red China a seat in the United Nations,
we would be enabling her to put her case before the
councils of the world, without recourse to methods
which could possibly involve a threat to peace.
But it is no mere coincidence that finds the Commu-
nist Party putting forward such "reasonable" propo-
sals, just as it is no mere coincidence that finds the
Australian Labor Party and the Communist Party speak-
ing with a single voice. The " sash ,**
designs of Red China in Asia. They
~,
cated, not to strengthen world peace, bOt r
Peking regime along its road to
tOOgfeef.:
The Overseas Chinese
Recognition of Red China is lmportaw y
plans for Asia - and South East Asia Ir
for with it is tied up the whole questies'
giance of the overseas Chinese. Tbeo W#
11 million Chinese living in SE Asian
Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia?
these countries they are numerically
prising a third of the population or score, h
exercise an immense influence on tbesai.W
In fact, of Malaya and Thailand It can be saM I"
Chinese community virtually controls the
the country.
They are in every way key people.U tbek
goes to the Peking government, it 1s only a
a relatively short time before all Soutb.enat ww
lows suit. The important thing to remimAW Is.
Chinese emigrants in SE Asia seldom, 11.,sy~
their ties with their homeland. They ate Nt
colonists, like the Japanese for instance. Tbekaillis
not so much to find a new life abroad, as tf.e Ms
ney, then return home to spend their old aje,
and their allegiance is generally Riven a
to the leaders of the local Chinese commudW. . ?
are invariably the representatives of the Chislf! rW,
.
ernment. Thus, the Peking regime sees 10 the (*rawi
v However, the best they can _count on Si press *t4
OTIP
exists on Formosa, it stakes a prior elolo. The
seas Chinese are naturally anti-Communist. They r!
business-men; the plight of their friends and t
in mainland China has not endeared the C ffiwww
regime to them. But, where the Peking regiwe if 100816
ly recognized, the natural pressures tend So Pius"
It can be said with reasonable G&
ad
d l
R
h
.
e
e
e
follow t
curacy that, where the Free Chinese GoeernPO W
d
h
local
e
, t
e
- - -
recognize
Where the Peking government is recognized. ire
al
d
l
oc
s
-----e-- -
sentative comman
et for Communist diplomatic o1fe861e'SS
tar
i
i
g
ty
or
A pr
and Communist propaganda is to bring about
"
all recognition of the Peking regime, and the 16
t
MS
discrediting of the Free Chinese governmen
t...
S
h
out
--- v
done, the whole of
fall, like a ripe plum, into the Communist Mt.
24
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U mm
0023- 1958
CAPTIVE EUROPE
Bulletin
SELECTED ARTICLES, VIEWS AND FACTS ON CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN PROBLEMS
Mr. Hammarskjold's Strange Record
The General Secretary of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold gave a press statement in connection
wtth the murder of Imre Nagy. In this, he declared that he will "consider the event and investigate whether
Hungary's membership in the United Nations should not be revised."
I he statement cannot be criticized on formal grounds. According to the rules of diplomacy, the General
Secretary of the United Nations cannot call a murder a murder or make promises in the name of the organization
he is working for, nor is he allowed to use passionate words in a public statement, though he might feel moral
sndignation. Thus, it does not matter that Mr. Hammarskjold said only so little. What hurts us is that even the
tenor of his statement is false. For Mr. Hammarskjold will even now not consider the facts and draw from them
the obvious political and diplomatic or moral consequences. Or, to put it plain: he will continue to do nothing.
This hitter prophecy is based upon the sad record of almost two years. The Soviet leaders and their Hun-
far tan puppets have in the past twenty months exhausted the repertoire of all the crimes, for the prevention of
which the United Nations were organized. They crushed the independence of a nation, and imposed on it by
the power of armor and artillery a form of government against which this nation was struggling and protesting
to the bitter end. Mr. Hammarskjold did not fly with his usual quickness to Budapest, as he does when the fate
of an oilpipe is at stake. First, he promised to make a visit, then he withdrew his promise. After all, only the
the freedom of ten million people was involved. Though his appearance might have decisively influenced the
the attitude of the still vacillating Russians, he did not come. Later, when thousands of Hungarian freedom-
Itghtcrs were being deported, and new hundreds and thousands were brought before the firing-squad, Mr. Ham-
marskjold kept calling thousands of witnesses to inquire whether there was a revolution in Hungary and wheth-
er it was really Russian power which crushed the fight?
The documentary evidence was published in a book, and the United Nations formally condemned Kadar &
o. The Russians abducted the legal Prime Minister of Hungary and held him imprisoned for more than a year
and a half. Despite all the facts and evidence, Mr. Hammarskjold considered no measures to be necessary a-
gainst the violators of the U.N. Charter. Only after Imre Nagy's execution is the General Secretary considering
what to do. It is not impossible that the United Nations will again pass a condemning resolution against Kadar
and Co. Of course, without any sanctions. In order to prove that this murder, like all the other murders in Hun-
gary were committed at the direct instruction of the Soviet Russian government, the United Nations might again
need a thousand witnesses who can only be reached with great difficulty. It might also insist on new obser-
rcr, who then will be barred again from entering Hungary. Therefore, the name of the USSR will not even ap-
pear in this process.
Ten million Hungarians, until the fall of 1956, desperate of other hopes, nurtured exceeding confidence
to the person and the office of Mr. Hammarskjold. Perhaps the unforgettable memory of Gustavus Adolphus,
ltaakon I'll, Folke-Bernadotte and Raoul Wallenberg contributed to his image in the Hungarian mind. This was
the image of a man who already in his life resembles to his later bronze-statue, and who fulfills his respon-
sibilities without sparing energy or his personal security, following the commandments of his humanitarian
and professional conscience.
Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, we are sorry to say, does not belong to this class of courageous, resolute states-
men. He is rather the spiritual successor to the old bureaucracy of the League of Nations at Geneva, who
pushes files, creates committees and sub-committees without realizing that due to his position he had become
a man of destiny on the scale of history. It is a tragedy that Mr. Hammarskjold turned out to be a short-weight
on his place.
(The foregoing article was published originally in the Irodalmi Ujsag (Lite Gazette), the official organ of
tde Hungarian Writers' Federation in exile, in London, on July 1, 1958.- FU
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The West's Greatest Weapon Against Moscow
(The following are excerpts from an interview given recently by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky to A.B.N. Coffoaffifth.
dente, an anti-Communist paper published in Germany. Mr. tiobriansky is professor of Georgetosm lJ
and national Chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. he is also a member of tgtt tlj
board of Free World Review.- ED.)
Q. In what way do you think it would be possible to overthrow the Russian Bolshevist imperiuss, it *e `es
ing statesmen of the free world are not prepared to give active support to the notional liberation revolws{eft
as was the case in Hungary?
A. Rationally, in order to overthrow the Russian Communist Empire there is no other way possible th" &sa
of active Western support of all the national liberation movements in this va
d
st an
unprecedented estpjs,
of the eventual revolutions which they necessarily imply. As entertained by Mr. George F. Keenan, the emew
of transfiguration of this empire through cultural erosion is based on a sophisticated miscomprokom pt Of&
totalitarian enemy and a dangerous misreading of contemporary history. Dir. Kennan has been wrong so g-
times and with such uncanny consistency that truly, for those who have followed his thinking closely, be b la
become notoriously unreliable.
The equally unrealistic notion of evolution toward freedom in this last remaining empire, as advaet_
C.I.A. director Dulles and others, is only a phraseological variant of the preceding one. Those who lm*Ue&
tually cling to either of these notions are obviously most susceptible to the perilous ideas of aeeepci aill,
status quo of the Russian Communist Empire and permanently (if it were at all possible) dividing the waW I&
to two broad spheres of influence. With some calm reflection given to this ideational generation one tM
but conclude that the only alternative is a liberationist approach which in essence precludes these wishful I.
tellectual steps that in the end can only spell disaster for the Free World.
Now, the possibility of being forced to adopt this liberationist approach is real and promising.Tbe Ism
of objective circumstance rather than reason may compel our statesmen to support actively the patriotic a0!!?
ments. This could occur in short time. For example, should the patriots of Poland reach a breaking-polOt sari
the entire population revolt, it would be well nigh inevitable that this revolt would spill over not only lass
Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union but also into East Germany and West Germany, whereupon t e
West could not but assume the inevitable stand. Especially in the light of the Hungarian revolt, It would be
foolhardy for our policy-makers to ignore this short-run, real possibility.
Q. Do you not think that the passive attitude of the Western major powers towards the national tev.I.tles"
fight for freedom of the peoples subjugated by Russia is helping to-hasten the outbreak of a nueloor wool
There is no logical doubt in my mind that this passive attitude maximizes the chances of a hot-w" owe
break. By definition this passive attitude toward the liberation movements in the Russian Communist Eatpkf,
which fundamentally embraces Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and even Yugoslavia, means t be abo
sence of any implemented policy of liberation. This lack of implementation guarantees Moscow the freedoa to
consolidate its empire, to resolve almost any tension in the confines of its empire, to continue its loagrra0jje
military planning at tremendous costs to the captive populations, to attain not only to military adequacy hilt
even superiority in relation to the West, to incite at will and with initiative tensions in the Free World, sad to
strike first against the United States when the risks become well-calculated.
Taken in toto, these elements add up to the fact that time is on the side of our enemy, assisted negsilfasy
by us. Sheer containment and an arms race are no solution for the prevention of a third World War. On the cosh
rary, at staggering costs they will build their own psychological momentum "to get the thing over with".
Aimless predictions of a cold war snuggle for the next ten, twenty, and even fifty years are in the aatt0o
of mouthy utterances rather than results of reasoned analysis of the basic institutional factors at work. Agalsr
the climactic paradox of our situation might well be the salvation of the passive West by the bold mass reti'oltl
of the patriotic populations in the Russian Communist Empire, as indicated above. If we are to drift with his.
tory, it might as well be along a right course determined by those who have least to lose materially....
... The captive nations are the West's greatest weapon against Moscow. Unfortunately, up to now oslly
?
Moscow knows this best.
Q Why does the free world not take part in the fight for freedom of the peoples subjugated by Russia, seolaS
that Russian Bolshevist colonialism represents a grave menace to its own existence, too?
A. There are several reasons accounting for the neglect of the Free World to* actively support the national lib.
ration forces in the Russian Communist Empire. One, as concerns the formidable forces within the Saw
Union itself, is plain ingorance. Many in high places are simply uneducated in regard to the primary empirf 0(
g
ar
Moscow. Some have been misinformed and a few even disinformed by anti-Communist but pro-imperialist
sian emigres. In the United States ignorance still is the chief enemy.
The second reason is the understandable fear of precipitating a global hot war. Carried to the Causal, x'
this fear would lead to national self-paralysis and, individually, many are already in their minds at this lair.
ld be done for fear that this wouldllead,
The ,..,....
----_-__
d t,
h
an
ou
seems t
at
to a hot war. Coupled with the first reason, this one largely explains a lack of understanding with regard t0
the aims, objectives, and art of the policy of liberation.
An unphilosophical materialism is the third reason. Assuming the absence of the two preceding reasoosr
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s cc.dent that this third one, a reason of the will rather than intellect, is independently sufficient to ac-
,un: for the Free World's neglect. In brief, this reason holds life is short, let's enjoy what we have, just
r~ c .urd let live, and to do these things, let's be "realistic" and accept the status quo of Moscow's vast em-
rc This form of myopia and spiritual decadence is, of course, not new in history. Sufficiently generalized,
o,ad a ,a in plunge a civilization into oblivion. However, it is a force today which must be kept constantly
t;,,rness.
Is it not true that the only guarantee for a lasting peace... lies in the disintegration of the Russian im-
p.,i?r? into independent nations states for all the subjugated peoples, all the more so since Russia is the
lost and most terrible colonial empire in the world Is
\othin. is more powerfully true in the international realm today than the idea expressed in this question.
i t:cthcr one reasons about this forward or backward, the predominant single guarantee of lasting world peace
and security is the dissolution of the Russian Communist Empire. In point of fact, it is the last and most
tcrrii,le colonial empire in the world". To be sure, there would still be problems in the world - in Africa, the
tli.idle East, in Asia and elsewhere. But with the decisive break-up of this Russian colossus, the environment
and climate would be ideally compatible with the world's interests of lasting peace and security.
Call for a Danubian Cooperation
TF.e following article was published in the February, 1958 issue of the Czech Struggle, an exile paper in Lon-
don. Its author, Mr. Eugene Padanyi Gulyas is a well known personality among Hungarian emigres. Re was
the I ice-President of the Chamber of Hungarian Architects and Engineers, and a Member of the Hungarian par
lramcnt (elected 1939).
Whenever I passed by the Chamber of the Delegations in the Houses of Parliament in Budapest, I sadly
rctlccted how seldom this room was used for the purpose for which it was built. In my time the heavy oak doors
%crc closet permanently. There were no longer any delegations to meet. It seemed to me that the doors had to
he closed because the delegates did not use the room often enough when it was open to them.
This chamber was designed to accommodate the diet of the delegates of the Austrian and of the Hunga-
rian Parliaments to discuss so called common matters: the financial, defense and foreign affairs of both coun-
tries, main components of the ancient Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. After all that happened to the respective
;,coples, I think they still have their common affairs even if they try to manage them separately. To put it more
clearly we have to remember that the common affairs of the Austrian and the Hungarian delegations were
actually common to not only the Austrian and the Hungarian people, but also the Czechs, Slovaks, Croats,
Slovenes, Serbs, Rumanians, Ruthenes, Poles and the different groups of Germans; in short, all the peoples
who composed the Monarchy.
This empire was not only an artificial product of treaties, charters, concordats and constitutions. These
political instruments provided for fairly good management of those really common affairs, which brought the
respective peoples together and kept them together for long centuries.... There were some basic functions
which had to be carried out by these peoples in their God-given lands... The creation, flourishing and downfall
of the Monarchy came about in strict accordance with its ability to carry out the duties originating from'the
Same functions. The Monarchy fell but the historic old job still has to be done. Do the Danubian peoples
realize this ?
There are certain portents showing that they do. The portents may be weak as yet, but the art of states-
rcanship requires sensibility to discover the slightest signs of the changing times, and to foresee their im-
portance. Hungarians, for instance, wish to refer to some events experienced during the October, 1956 revolu-
tion. On October 29, Radio Veszprem requested that the government should pursue the possibility of a Danu-
bian confederation. On October 30, Radio Miskolcz broadcasts: "We noticed that in Slovak and Rumanian cir-
e:cs the idea of a Danubian confederation, as it was suggested by the Miskolcz Student-Parliament, was la-
beled as revisionist, irredentist and legitimist in character. We have to point repeatedly to the fact that our
%ujgcstion was aimed at a broad cooperation of independent countries along the Danube just to enable them to
preserve their own independence. The federation of the countries along the Danube can be made voluntarily
and with all respect for economic, cultural and geographical viewpoints." A representative paper of the active
Participants in the October, 1956 revolution, the Nemzet5r dedicates special columns to investigate the past
efforts and the future possibilities for a federative Mid-Europe.
Another little sign of our times is a workshop of independent Hungarian scientists, experts and writers
recently organized to study, to work out, and to represent a future Hungarian attitude toward national, Euro-
pean and world problems. This group of rather well-known personalities is honestly searching for the ways of
a future understanding in the Danubian region and a number of them are noted protagonists of the federative
idea. This writer also belongs to that group and personally is a strong believer in the prevalence of function
over form. If forms of architecture, or forms of government no longer fit any more, it usually means that they
do not truly express or fulfil any real function. It is not difficult to find proper form for any existing function.
Furthermore, we believe that it will not be too difficult to find, not only in Budapest, but also in other
capitals of Mid-Europe, adequate rooms for rotating meetings of delegates, once there is a will to meet and
there is a desire to discuss common affairs of the respective peoples - after-their liberation from the Commu-
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nist yoke. Sir Winston Churchill's beautiful dream of a common European currency, with coins bearing one
symbol on one side and national symbols on the other side is still attractive to us and thought-provoking to
numismatists. A united time-table for all railways of the Danubian region, with good connections to travel to
any place without restrictions is not a bad idea either.
And how about actions or reactions of 50 million or more Danubian people in cases when strangers to this
region try again to interfere with their lives? Would a common defensive action not be better than to fall into
captivity one by one? Did the Ruhr Coal represent less trouble for those who finally settled this matter? Was
the question of the Saar Region less delicate? If old enemies like the French and the Germans could establish
workable agreements, the peoples of the Danube area should accomplish the same much easier, because they
were more often fighting on the same side and very seldom against each other.
These are just a few of the questions worth discussing and there are many more. The only trouble is, that
for some reason our discussion has come to a stand-still. The parties concerned seem to be too cautious. Some
of them may think they would risk too much by disclosing how they really feel. We are of the opinion that the
risks are made far worse by concealing our desires and plans. To keep the ball rolling, we offer two sugges-
tions:
First, let us start a joint study concerning the function of the Danube region as we see it today. Each
group shall provide an English-language copy of its views to the rest of the groups. Our group is ready.
Second, let us concentrate emphatically on the future.
Problems and their solutions are interesting only if they help to make happier not only political groups
and their leaders, but the peoples themselves. An entirely new world is shaping up around us. We want to grow
and evolve with this new world. We don't want to remain an island of relics or an old slum in a new deve-
lopment.
F.C.I. Ten Years Old
(F.C.L stands for Free Czechoslovak Information. This is the name of the world's smallest news agency,
founded and directed by Mr. Joseph J o s t e n, an excellent Czech journalist and specialist on Iron Curtain
affairs. This spring F.C.I.celebrated its tenth anniversary on which occasion Mr. Josten gave an interesting
account about his agency's work and successes. Joining the numerous well-wishers, we reproduce here a few
excerpts from his report. - ED.).
`Until the fall of Czechoslovakia, much news from Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and from the rest of the
Soviet Orbit used to seep out through Prague, which was 'a sort of a listening post and an enclave of free in-
formation. But after the coup the new overlords were shy of witnesses and one by one, the Western correspon-
dents either lost their credentials or were expelled and even arrested... In a few more weeks I stood on Brit-
ish soil as an exile. Mindful of Jan Masaryk's last words, "Truth shall prevail, if we give it a clear chance",
within 48 hours I began operating a news agency called F.C.I...
In order to fill the vacuum, F.C.I. stepped in and there were periods when only the courage of its corre-
spondents and couriers, besides sporadic travellers or escapees, brought exclusive news on life under Soviet
domination to the West. And News it was! On the first Soviet atomic blast (36 hours in advance of the official
confirmation in Washington and London);... or on the fall from grace of the CSR Foreign Minister Dr. Vlado
Clementis who disregarding FCI reports, returned to Prague from the United States, only to be dismissed, ar-
rested, tried and executed...
Since 1948 F.C.I. has issued in its press releases or through other media some 6550 news items and re-
ports, of which at least half were exclusives. It has circulated over 300 features. With this material it has hit
front pages, leading articles (See Manchester Guardian 16.9.50), and created banners at one time or another in
many of the big journals of the world. About 170 of these F.C.I. reports appeared in the Daily Telegraph alone,
just to mention one of its subscribers...
This was partly made possible, because F.C.I. can draw for its information and reports on a number of in-
ternational experts engaged in permanent research of the Soviet orbit and on contributors of fame. H.E. Cardi-
nal Bernard Griffin, the late Archbishop of Westminster, Viscounts Cecil and Jowitt, Prof. Gilbert Murray, Lord
Vansittart, Wickham Steed, Arthur Deakin, Edouard Herriot as well as Lord Birdwood, Lord St. Oswald, French
Generals L.E. Faucher and Julien Flipo, Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart... Senator Herbert Lehman, Alexander
Bergman, Bjoern Hallstroem, etc... are some of the many who made their valuable contributions available to
the F.C.I. news and feature service.
Already by 1951 the work of F.C.I. got on somebody's nerves and a man was caught who tried to destroy
our Press Releases in the process of postal delivery... He had a definite political allegiance... The work has
since gone on undisturbed. F.C.I., fully recognized as a reliable source of news, has grown in strength year
by year. In 1954 it was formed into a Limited Company and since 1955 has operated from its own house in Ken-
sington. The staff is not big and the technical possibilities are laughable when compared with its gigantic
brothers and disters in the field of news distribution. But the "know how" is here, in the field of both gather-
ing and disseminating news...
When the day comes that information can flow freely between East and West, then F.C.I. will be operating
its news service from the other end too
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F: LEVIER BAKO
Books on the Hungarian Revolution
The Hungarian Revolution, the culmination of a long pe-
riod of hopeless searching for a better future and the natural
accumulation of bitterness and hatred, erupted on October
23, 1956, and shook the world for nineteen days. The number
of eyewitness accounts, battle reports, and documentary
publications as well as fictional works is still increasing
and contributing to an intimate and detailed description of
the incredible uprising of a small nation against the ruling
master of the Communist world.
The Russians lost out in every field of their forcibly im-
posed system in the economically exhausted, socially dis-
turbed, and immeasurably degraded and humiliated Hungarian
society. Marxism as a political doctrine, as well as the mi-
litary capacity of the Russian occupation forces, was deeply
affected. Well-trained party leaders, like Rikosi and Gero
were revealed as political greenhorns, and the great 'impli-
cations' of the Twentieth Party Congress, held in Moscow
in February, 1956, were turned into instruments of self-de-
feat, causing deep splits in most of the Communist parties
all over the world.
Similarly, the existing weaknesses and shortcomings, the
lack of preparedness and the ambiguous policy-planning of
the Free World was demonstrated in the great hour of the un-
expected Hungarian events. The question raised by the Hun-
garian freedom-fighters has remained unanswered.
The uninterrupted flow of research documents proves a
continuing interest in Hungary. Those of all political con-
victions, including the Communists, have tried to evaluate
their beliefs in the light of the revolution. Political scien-
tists, leaders of great nations, and of spiritual and intel-
lectual movements, as well as private individuals, have ex-
amined the moral, political, historical, educational and other
problems reflected in this recent mirror of our age.
Characteristically, the most illuminating description of
Communist party treachery in a subjugated nation was author-
ed by a Communist, Hungary's former "new course" premier,
I m r e Nags. His "dissertation" was intended as a weapon
of self-defense against the repeated attacks of the party's
ruling group. The manuscript, completed during the summer
of 1956, was first published secretly in a state-owned Hun-
garian press. its English edition was published by Praeger
in New York as On Communism, in Defense of the New
Course. In this occasionally incoherent flow of new, crit-
ical ideas and expression of uneasiness about the future of
the Hungarian people, Nagy proves to be an excellent pro-
secutor of his political enemies and of Rikosi's highly am-
bitious plans of industrialization. In another publication,
edited by Gy6rgy Piloczi-Horvath, titled One Sentence on
Tyranny; Hungarian Literary Gazette Anthology (London: Wa-
verly Press, 1957), the foundation laid by the "writers '
revolt" of Hungarian poets and novelists is emphasized in
an appropriate way.
The West could not believe what every reader of the pre-
revolutionary Hungarian press and periodicals foresaw. The
best proof of such a vacillating attitude is the documentary
National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe.
A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary,
February - November, 1956, edited by Paul E. Z i n n e r. This
publication of the Program on East Central Europe at Colum-
bia University (1956) is a careful presentation of material
which, with a few exceptions, was derived from Communist
sources. Although the Communist point of view was the fo-
cus of research, it was not the only matter of interest.
"One will not find here the voice of the Hungarian people
in their anger and defiance, only the voice of the Commu-
nists - Polish, Hungarian, Russian, Yugoslav - in a time
of crisis."
This characteristic sentence might as well be the expres-
sion of the contemporary Western attitude which similarly Vsten-
ed only to Communist cries at a time of crisis.
Some works, giving first-hand accounts of the Hungarian
events, fulfilled the mission of the first eye-witness stories,
so eagerly sought after.
Andor H e11er, an excellent photographer on the staff of
the official Hungarian news agency, was commissioned by
the revolutionary authorities "to use every means possible
to tell the people of the world the truth." His pictorial re-
porting entitled No More Comrades (Chicago: Henry Regnery,
1957), is well-documented, realistic and pertinent.
Laszlo Beke's (pseud.) A Student's Diary; Budapest, Oc-
tober 16 - November 1, 1956 (New York: Viking Press, 1957),
offers a good presentation of revolutionary preparations a-
mong Hungarian students, although the account was inter-
rupted by the sudden departure of the author from Budapest
preceding the second attack of the Russian army on Novem-
ber 4th. An original piece of contemporary literary documen-
tation is the French edition of the November 2nd issue of
the Irodalmi Ujsag (Literary Gazette), the official organ of
the Hungarian Writers' Association. This "traduction com-
plete", published by P. Hatay in Paris, contains the de-
clarations, poems and.prose of seventeen Hungarian writers
who supported the !cause of the revolution. This first and
only issue published in an atmosphere of political freedom,
was presented in a Western language as a supplement to the
January, 1957, issue of Preuves, a progressive French mag-
azine.
To render the historical event memorable, numerous West-
ern press representatives have extensively reported in words
and pictures on the revolution. Among them, the special edi-
tion of Life magazine, Hungary's Fight foe Freedom (New
York, 1956) has been unforgettable.
The U.S. Information Agency prepared two motion pictures
for public education. One, A Nation in Torment, reviews
briefly the history of Hungary, in addition to the original
shots on the Revolution, its repression by Soviet Russian
troops, and the exodus of Hungarian refugees.The other, is
entitled Hungarian Fight for Freedom describes, as an addi-
tional feature, demonstrations of sympathy in various cities
throughout the world. Both strips were prepared by Hearst
Metrotone News in 16 and 35 mm editions and were released
through the United States Office of Education.
James Albert M i c h e n e r, well-known novelist, produced
another bestseller with his book, The Bridge at Andau (New
York: Random House, 1957). By using the method of com-
posite characters, he wrote some interesting chapters on
several types of refugees based upon hundreds of interviews
which he held with them immediately after they had crossed
the Austrian border. Michener's work, with surprisingly
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few errors, offers worthwhile and fascinating reading.
The Revolution and its domestic and global effects are
treated in a number of scholarly and political publications.
The report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hun-
gary of the United Nations General Assembly was published
by Columbia University Press (New York, 1957), and was
followed by a well-prepared condensed edition of Marshall
Andrews (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1957). The Re-
port of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary,
which describes the findings and recommendations of the
five-member Special Committee constituted of representatives
of Denmark, Australia, Uruguay, Tunisia and Ceylon, is the
most important and most authoritative source. It states that
the revolution was (1) a spontaneous national uprising, (2) it
demanded democratic socialism, and (3) could be defeated
only by the military intervention of the Soviet Union, and
(4) that there was really a counter-revolution, prepared, how-
ever, by the Kadar group which established an oppressive
regime to combat a broad revolutionary movement, supported
by the vast majority of the people.
A similar edition, containing additional documentary ma-
terial is The Hungarian Revolution; The Story of the October
Uprising as Recorded in Documents, Dispatches, Eye-wit-
ness Accounts and World-Wide Reactions, edited by Melvin
Las k y, published in England for the Congress of Cultural
Freedom (London; M. Secker and Warburg, 1957) and in Ame-
rica (New York; F.A. Praeger, 1957). This monumental
"White Book" on the Hungarian Revolution presents an ex-
cellent and well-organized documentation.
Other publications, such as the textual compilation of the
Free Europe Committee: The Revolt in Hungary; a Docu-
mentary Chronology of Events Based Exclusively on Internal
Broadcasts by Central and Provincial Radios, October 23,
1956-November 4, 1956 (New York, 1956), or The Nineteen
Days, by George Orban, a broadcaster's account with a fine
foreword by the eminent Spaniard, Salvador de Madariaga
(London, Heinemann, 1957), may support those above-men-
tioned with more on-the-sport recording.
Two analytic essays written by leftist Hungarian emigres
provide delicate insights. Francois F e j to, former Socialist
representative of Hungary, now in Paris, published his
thoughts under the impressive title, Behind the Rape of Hun-
gary (New York, Douglas McKay, 1957), an English trans-
lation of the French original. Although written with a strong
II pre-disposition" in favor of the "national Communists"
whose very existence is doubted by many experts in the
field, the author's informative book constitutes good reading
on the history of the period preceding the revolution. George
Mike s, The Hungarian Revolution (London: Deutsch, 1957),
is another interesting and lively account of the "most glo-
rious revolt of this century". Some hitherto unpublished in-
formation, obtained "from Hungarians in a position to know"
certainly improves the value of the book.
Many highly publicized works have not contributed any-
thing new to the information derived from the above sources.
However, there are special studies, treatises and statements
which deserve attention.
The historical message of the President entitled, Immigra-
tion Matters (Document 85, Washington: G.P.O., 1957)ex-
pressed the concern of the Free World with the situation of
the Hungarian refugees. The U.S. Senate's Committee on the
Judiciary's report, Emigration of Refugees and Escapees
O.S. 85th Congress, First Session, Senate Report 129) pre-
pared legislation "to deal adequately with both the overall
and Hungarian refugee problems." A Report of the Special
Study Mission to Europe on Policy Toward the Satellite No-
tions was published on June 4, 1957, by the Committee of
Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, deal-
ing with the consequences of the Hungarian Revolution on
American foreign policy and with the problems of Hungarian
refugees in Austria and Yugoslavia. Two prominent Hunga-
rian political refugees gave valuable information to the Un-
American Activities Committee of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives which published a study titled International Com-
munism: Revolt in the Satellites (March 20, 1957). Repre-
sentative Alvin M. Bentley and nine other congressmen
reviewed the past and-present struggle of Hungary for free-
dom and independence and paid tribute to the Hungarian na-
tion in the House of Representatives. Their contributions,
One Hundred and Ninth Anniversary of Hungarian Indepen-
dence, were printed in the Congressional Record of March
18, 1957.
Other problems, suchas the role of the Free Etaope Commit-
tee in connection with the revolt, were studied and some
"preliminary result of depth interviews and attitude scales"
were published by the project chief, Edmund O. Stillman et
al. in Inquiry into Political and Social Attitudes In Hungary
by the Free Europe Press (New York: 1957).
Paul-Henri S p a a k, distinguished leader of the Western
European unity movement also wrote an original analysis of
the Western position in connection with the Hungarian prob-
lem. Some of his surprisingly frank statements, published
as "The West in Disarray", in Foreign Affairs (January, 1957)
are herewith reproduced:
"It looks as if the United Nations had been able to pre-
vent the extension of the war in Egypt but were powerless
to block or end the Soviet aggression against Hungary. This-
difference fosters the fear that in an organization where im-
partiality was supposed to be the rule, power of cynicism
actually has carried the day. This is the fundamental fault,
but there is still another worse. The Charter signed at San
Francisco aspired to be all-embracing... The San Francisco
Charter seems to me dangerously incomplete and so inef-
fectual that I do not see how, in its present form, it can long
endure."
Touching on the legal effects of the post-revolutionary
situation, in both the domestic and global meaning of the
word, two inquiries of the International Commission of Jur-
ists, the Hungarian Situation and the Rule of Low, and The,
Continuing Challenge of the Hungarian Situation to the Rule
of Low, representing the findings of this group of observers
on the summary trials instituted by the Kadar regime, are of
enduring value. The reports
"drew attention of lawyers throughout the world to the
illegal character of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, and
to the breaches of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of 1947
and of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which have followed
the institution of the Kadar regime in Hungary."
J anko M u s u l i n's "Austria After the Hungarian Rising",
in the Foreign Affairs (April, 1957) evaluates the "impact
of a revolution on a neighboring country", whereas A. R o s-
s is "Western Communists on the Defensive", in Foreign
Affairs, (January, 1957) describes the catalytic effects of
the Polish and especially of the Hungarian events on the
latent crisis of the Communist parties of the West. The strik-
ing failures of Communist indoctrination and the basic inef-
fectiveness of Soviet Russian political education is briefly
analyzed by Henry Gleitman in his Youth in Revolt, The
Failure of Communist Indoctrination in Hungary (New York:
Free Europe Press, 1957). To quote him:
"The events in October, 1956, bear striking witness to
failure; the new Communist youth has not been materialized,
and the political police remain an indispensable adjunct to
the Communist regime."
Among the reports describing the development of the sev-.
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eral refugee programs following the exodus of 200,000 Hun-
garians after the Revolution, attention should be paid to the
series of interim reports released by the United Nations Of-
fice of the High Commissioner of Refugee Problems, the In-
ternational Rescue Committee, the Coordinated Hungarian
Relief and the several religious agencies, all of which par-
ticipated in these activities. However, two highly interesting
reports published in the National Academy of Sciences News
Report (May-June, 1957 and January-February, 1958) provide
us with a picture of the program resulting in the training and
placement of 1,081 Hungarian refugee scientists in the Unit-
ed States. This "new type of activity" is ample proof of the
practical sense and capabilities of the Academy.
To sum up these highlights of publications on the Hunga-
rian Revolution and its effects, Hugh Seton-Watson' s
valuable studies on the East European situation should not
be forgotten. One of them was "Eruption in East Europe, A
Myth Destroyed and A Revolution Betrayed", in the Com-
mentary (December, 1956). To quote him:
"It might be thought that the Hungarians behaved reckless-
ly, that they were wrong not to follow the example of moder-
ation set by the Poles. But this is a baseless, criticism. The
decisive difference between events in Hungary and in Po-
land lies in the different attitudes of the Communist leader-
ship. Ochab and Cyrankiewicz were wise enough to make
way for Gomulka, and Gomulka was strong and clever enough
to take and hold power. In Hungary the warty was built around
the autocracy of Rakosi. In both countries Communism as
such was detested by the vast majority of the nation. The
Communist parties were small minorities, but while the
Polish party was an intelligent minority, the Hungarian party
was a purely one-man show., Three provocative blunders made
an explosion inevitable: Ger6's Stalinist speech of October
23, the invitation to the Russians to intervene, and the mas-
sacre in front of the Parliament. After this, what could the
Hungarians do but fight or surrender? There was no opening
for moderation or maneuver. That they choose to fight is a
proof not of recklessness, but of courage and national unity."
This analysis "sine ira et studio'-' provides ample evi-
dence of the true nature of the great historical event, and it
should be borne in mind by the researcher looking for new
vistas and explanations for this unique struggle of the Hun-
garian people.
EDITOR's NOTE: The above study has been necessarily
limited to works published in English on the Hungarian
Revolution. At another time, we might publish a second
article on the subject to be devoted to foreign language
publications, the number of which well exceeds those print-
ed in English.
COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
By Walter Z. Laqueur. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956,
Pp. xi, 362. $ 6.50)
No serious reader of this book can escape a feeling of
disappointment. Here is a study which indeed could have
been "the first of its kind", but, alas, the author does not
seem to have put his material to proper use.
His work is uneven both in organization and in quality.
The unevenness is most striking in the number of chapters
(15) the author devotes to Communism, while the parallel
treatment of nationalism fills one small chapter; and even
then the discussion is confined to extremist religious groups.
This might be excused by the fact that several works have
been published on nationalism in the Middle East, whereas
very little has been done on Communism.
The book may be divided into two parts: factual and ana-
lytical. The factual material is contained on pages 31 to
217, which is a straightforward survey of the Communist
movements in Egypt, Sudan, Palestine and Israel, Jordan,
Syria and Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. The pattern of Commu-
nist infiltration has been the same in all these countries:
Communism in the Middle East is not a mass movement, but
a movement led by the intelligentsia.
Laqueur's ability in securing his data (from newspapers,
leaflets, tracts, brochures and underground sources in the
major Middle Eastern as well as European languages) is
astounding. Unfortunately, the author must have assembled
this wealth of material in great haste; without a proper ana-
lysis and systematic organization. The result has been a
detailed description of the several Communist parties and
their activities (training cadres, infiltrating trade unions
and student groups and establishing "front" organizations)
which is more of a chronology than an interpretative presen-
tation. Laqueur's scholarship is further impaired by the num-
ber of mistakes in transliteration and documentation which
make his study appear slovenly. To mention only afew: Jum-
balat's first name is Kamal and not Kamil (p. 163 and passim).
The author of the Muslim Brotherhood is Ishaq Musa, and not
Jamal-al-Huseini (p.342). The date of the Bludan Conference
is given as the Summer of 1937 (p.99), and again as May,
1946 (p.111). The latter is correct.
Undocumented and unwarranted sweeping generalizations
also appear. On page 16, the author states that "in the Ame-
rican University of Beirut the Communists, together with
their sympathizers, would appear to be strongest, and the
extreme nationalists a close second." To the reviewer this
is absolutely erroneous. Nor is the author's'judgement that
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"there was no opposition to communism among the intelli-
gentsia" (p.272) which is based on the mere fact that a num-
ber of lawyers volunteered to defend a Communist before the
courts, more tenable.
The analytical part of this study is rather unclear. La-
queur must be handicapped by a lack of understanding of the
deeper cultural and political forces which underlie Middle
Eastern life and thought, or by a pre-established attitude to-
wards the Arab countries. "The Arab countries are now more
likely than most others in the world to provide a favourable
breeding ground for communism" he states (p.6). The reason,
according to the author, is that Islam has lost its hold on
the minds of the elites in the Arab world, leaving an ideo-
logical vacuum (the implication here is that nationalism is
not an ideology) which Communism is only too happy to fill.
There will be no resistance to Communism simply because
the East (and not only the Arab world) lacks the tradition of
"individual liberty" established in Europe by "the Renais-
sance, Protestantism and the Enlightenment." The "author-
itarian" character of Islam makes it much closer to Commu-
nism than to democracy.
This kind of oversimplification is neither original with
Laqueur nor does it follow from his study. His pessimism
over the prospects of Communism in the Arab world is neither
justified by the figures he quotes (p. 276) nor by his revela-
tion that Communism is a Western doctrine introduced to the
Middle East by non-Muslim minorities, Jews, Greeks and Ar-
menians (chapter 17). "Communist success" in the Arab
world has not been "'easier than it was in Europe where it
had to face political and spiritual competition." There is in
the West's approach to the Middle East problems a recogni-
tion that Communism breeds more on social and economic
discontent than on an ideological or spiritual "vacuum".
Communism is not necessarily the only alternative to demo-
cracy.
The trouble is that Laqueur never makes the distinction
between pro-Russian sentiments and Communism. He men-
tions, but does not adequately interpret the recent shift in
Soviet policy in the Middle East which has 'arranged' a
mariage de convenance between Communism and "bourgeois
nationalism", and for the success of which the West is to
blame. Russia's change of policy from internal subversion
as the method to establish Russian influence, to courting
the favor of the "national bourgeoisie" and promising eco-
nomic and technical aid, is the most important single factor
in the orientation of Arab nationalism towards Russia or to-
wards neutralism.
Laqueur has no sympathy for Arab nationalism which he
often describes as "rabid", "fanatic", "extremist" or "xen-
ophobic". Consequently, he could neither see the possibility
of Arab nationalism becoming the strongest bulwark against
Communism, nor suggest to the West a constructive approach
to the persistent problems of the Middle East.
In spite of a number of shortcomings, Communism and Na-
tionalism in the Middle East is indispensable for any future
study of Communism in that part of the world.
FAUZI M. NAJJAR
FREE WORLD FORUM, INC., is an educational, non-profit organization established to promote
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