U-2 INCIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004100180003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 17, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR
SUBJECT:
U -2 Incident
, Asst. to DCI 25X1
I. A.ttached :at the statement which Mr. Luiles said would
be distributed for guidance to the mem'oers of the Sol ;dor Stall for sail,-
segment briefing th.eir subordinates as apprcpriate,
Z. Also zo;tached for convenient reference, are the unclassified
statements of the President, the Secretary of staLe, benator Johnson, and
Representative Cannon.,
25X1
MESQ. RE
Disc tribution:
DCI it copy of each)
SlAsst, tor`C.X, Col, Star ev Grogan
SiAsst. to Do?
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25X1 EOIDCI,
At. to DC1, Mr,
25X1 A.ast. to DCL,
At. to DCI.
DOC'
25X1 ?.7; (Acting},
DDS
A/ DDS
SSA/DDS
25X1 DDS (Actin
Walter Elder
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25X1
414,46-2
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D/Commo
D/ Personnel
D/ Security
D / Training
Comptroller
D/Logistics
Gen. Counsel
Med . Officer
DDII
A/Dra
D/PIC
C/00
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ORR
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OBI
C/OPS/DDP
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C /C1 Staff (Acting.
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SECRET
Background on the OZ Incident
1. All of you are well informed on the reports in the press of
the last two weeks involving this Government and in particular CIA in high
altitude reconnaissance of the USSR. The extent of such reconnaissance
and the amount of information has not been revealed and will not be revealed.
The quality of the material is high.
Z. Arrangements have existed for technical exploitation of the
inaterials procured by these means, as well as for the use of the information
nerived, in furtherance of the responsibility of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence to the President and the NSC and the responsibility of other intel-
ligence chiefs to their superiors.
3. Because of what has happened, some may feel that the
materials -we have acquired and the information derived therefrom should now
be made widely available in the Intelligence Community, This is not yet
possible. However, a study is under way to devise, if possible? the practical
means of making the maximum possible amount of information available on a
need-to-know basis as in the case of other highly sensitive materials.. In
this study we are faced not only with the problem of maintaining essential
control of the products of reconnaissance but also of not jeopardizing future
efforts.
4. You are requested not to discuss this information with
persons outside of the Intelligence Community,
You are further rectiested to use caution in. diacussion of this
information within the circle of Intelligence and with others officially concerned.
S E, C ILET
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President Statement on U2 Incident at News Conference. 11 May 1960
I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this
u-2 incident.,
A full statement about this matter has been made by the State
Department and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of
both parties.
For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to
say, with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further
to say---for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful
at this time.
The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activi-
ties. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have know
ledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those
capable of massive surprise attack.
Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential.. In most of the
world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet
Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of
international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be
placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.
As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever
since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in
every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and tie
free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective prepara
tions for defense.
My second point: The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.
Below the Surface'
These have a special and secret character. They are, so to
speak, "below the surface" activities. They are secret because they must cir-
cumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military
preparations.
They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of governmer
which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.
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President Statement Contd
These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather
intelligence short of the use of force---with operations supervised by responsible
officials within this area of secret activities.
? We do not use our Army. Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first
to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities,
and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given
latitude under bread directives, but must be kept under strict control in every
detail.
These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment
which seek to mislead and obscure---just as in the Soviet allegations there
are many discrepancies. For example there is some reason to believe that
the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies
of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special
efforts to conceal them.
Third point: How should we view all of this activity?
Distasteful but Vital
It is a distasteful but vital necessity.
We prefer and work for a different kind of world---and a different
way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents.
Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.
This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955. which
I was ready instantly to put into effect---to permit aerial observation over the
United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack
was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal
again at Paris---since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.
My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues
of the day by what is an incident or a symptom of the world situation today.
This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The
emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed non-military plane can only reflect a
fetish of secrecy.
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President Statement Contgd
The real issues are the ones we will be working on at the summit--
disarmament, search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin and the whole
range of East-West relations, including the reduction of secrecy and suspicion.
Frankly. I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great
issues. This is what we mean when we speak of "working for peace."
mater.
And as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this
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The New York Times
Washington, May 9, 1960
HERTER STATEMENT ON U-2 FLIGHT
On May 7 the Department a State spokesman made a statement
with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American
civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following
supplements and clailies this star.ement as respects the position of the
United States Government
Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union
from wartime cooperation to plat-war conflict in 1946, and particularly
since the Berlin blockade, the forceful take-over of Czechoslovakia and
the Communist aggressions it Korea and Vietnam, the world has lived
in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions.
The Soviet leaders haye almost complete access to the open
societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage
networks. However they kfep their own society tightly closed and
rigorously controlled. Witi the development of modern weapons carry-
ing tremondously destruct:ve nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise
attack and aggression pre;ents a constant danger. This menace is en-
hanced by the threats of lases destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet
leadership.
Western Proposals Rataled
For many yea' the United States in company with its allies has
sought to lessen or e4en to eliminate this threat from the life of man so
that he can go about his peaceful tusiness without fear. Many proposals
to this end have bees put up to the Soviet Union.
The Presieent's "Open Skita" proposal of 1955 was followed in
1957 by the offer (I an exchange of 1:round observers between agreed
military installat.ons in the United ;hates, the U.S.S.R. and other
nations that miel wish to participate. For several years we have
been seeking t1t2 mutual abolition cs:* the restrictions on travel imposed
by the Soviet tnion and those which the United States felt obliged to
institute on. reciprocal basis. Ivinre recently, at the Geneva disarma-
ment conferrIce the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures
of cont rollei disarmament.
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NYTimes, Washington, 9 May 1960, Herter Statement on U-2 Flight
(continued)
It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version
and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West,
but this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our
repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack
and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.
I will say franldy that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political
system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to
face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear
destruction.
U.S. ReponsibilityNoted
The Government of the United States would be derelict to it
responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples
everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take
such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome
this danger of surprise attack. .In fact. the United States has not and
does not shirk this responsibility.
In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the
President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration
directives to gather by every possible means the information required
to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack
and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense.
Under these directives programs have been developed and put
into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by
unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but
on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed
civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization.
Soviet Motives Questioned
The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently
not been a secret to the Soviet leadership, and the question indeed
arises as to why at this particular juncture they shdild seek to exploit
the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.
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NYTimes, Washington, 9 May 60, Herter Statement on U-2 Flight (continued)
This Government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that
in the coming meeting of the heads of government in Paris, Chairman
Khrushchev would be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective
measures which would remove this fear of sudden Masi destruction
from the minds of people everywhere.
Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris,
this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world
of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards
against surprise attack and aggression.
At my request and with the authority of the President, the
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W.
Dulles, is today briefing members of the Congress fully along the
foregoing lines.
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Congressional Record, Vol. /06, No. 35, May 10 1960
Senator Johnsons Staternerxt on the 112 Incident
4.1101?11????
Mr. Johnson of Texas. Mr President, this is certainly a time in
which Americana?and people everywhere?must keep their heads. We can-
not afford hysteria, panic, or hasty and ill-advised action.
There are many unanswered queetions about the incident of the
American plane that was shot down over the Soviet Union. These are serious
questions which will have to be considered very carefully by Congress and by
the American people.
But it le doubtful whether the answers will be forthcoming immediate
ly. There are too many facts which are not available and which will be avail-
able only when the Soviets permit a cool and realistic appraisal of what happened
in their airspace.
Furthermore, it is always difficult to come to objective conclusions
in an atmosphere of sanctimonious statements and threats against other nations.
It is ridiculous for Nikita Khrushchey to profess such shocked surprise over
efforts to gather information.
When Mr. Khrushchav visited this country last year, I do not think
he impressed any of us as being a man who is naive. By that, I mean naive about
what his own country has been doing for many, many years.
The incident, of course, will be assessed with great care and all
of its implications will be explored carefully. But meanwhile, we cannot lose
sight of the overriding reality which confronts us immediately.
It is whether this incident will become an excuse and an alibi for
sabotaging the summit conference.
Within a very few days, our country is going to enter negotiations
with the Soviet Union in an effort to relax the very tensions that have brought
about this kind of an incident. It is difficult to imagine those negotiations as
having much success if they are to be conducted in this kind of an atmosphere,
If Nikita Ithrushchey is going to spend his time taunting the United
States over what he considers the blenders it has made and threatening other
countries on the basis of facts which ha.ve not been clearly established, there
will be little time to talk about the real problems which divide the world,.
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Senator Johnsons Statement on the 1.32 ;:ncident (Cont'cl)
Those problems cannot be traced back to the fact that nations
seek to extract information from each other. Espionage and intelligence
gathering are not something that cause the cold war. They are merely by-
products of the cold war---something that follows logically when nations can-
not trust each other,
Whatever may be his motivations, it is obvious that Nikita
Khrushchev has handled this incident in such a way as to draw attention
away from the real problems. We must get back to those problems?of
people, of armaments, of respect for the integrity of smaller nations---if
the summit conference has any meaning.
If blunders have been made, the American people can be certain
that Congress will go into them thoroughly? But this is something that should
be done objectively and not merely as a panicky reaction to Soviet charges.
And I think that. one point should be crystal clear. Nikita
"rehrushchey cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American
people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united
in a determination to preserve our freedoms and we are not going to be
shaken from that course, or we are not going to be divided in this critical
hour.
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Congressional Record
Vol.106, No 85, 10 May 60
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE CANNON
ON U-2 INCIDENT
Mr. Chairman, on May 1 the Soviet Government captured,
1, 300 miles inside the boundaries of the Russian Empire, an American
plane, operated by an American pilot, under the direction and control
of the Central Intelligence Agency, and is now holding both the plane
and the pilot.
The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported
by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House
Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.
Although the Members of the House have not generally been
informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of
an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the
appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised
during this and previous sessions.
The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recom-
mended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and
operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee
have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the
utmost confidence.
The question immediately arises as to the authority of the sub-
committee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and
especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and
the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details
connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the
floor.
The answer of the subcommittee is--absolute and unavoidable
military necessity, fundamental national defense.
During the Second World War the United States succeeded in
breaking the Japanese naval code. Through this incredible good fortune
the U.S. commanders were able to read every order transmitted from
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Statement by Representative Carmen continued
Tokyo and all interfleet communications. This advance and intimate
information had much to do in preparing the way and increasing the
effectiveness of our great victory in the battle of Midway which broke
the power of Japan in the Pacific. But some incautious member of a
congressional committee or its staff leaked the information to a reporter,
and 30 minutes after the next edition of his newspaper hit the street Japan
changed her naval code and all further advantage was lost.
This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and
established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel
with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same
committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appro-
priation bills a sum which finally totaled more than $z billion for the
original atomic bomb_ Session after session the money was provided,
and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress
without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the
House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the
money. According to the testimony of all military authorities that bomb
ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who
would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever
said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that
eventually aggregated more than the assessed valeation of some of the
States of the Union for that purpose.
Espionage has been throughout recorded history an integral part
of warfare. Before occupying the Promised Land Moses "by the command-
ment of the Lord" sent out from the wilderness of Pa.ran 10 men under the
direction of Joshua to spy out the land.
Ano nation in the history of the world has practiced espionage
more assiduously than Russia. The United States and every other allied
nation today literally swarms with them. Within the last few weeks we
sent to the Federal penitentiary at Atlanta a Russian spy convicted in
Federal court who was regularly transmitting information directly to
Moscow every night. Their spies stole from us the secret of the atomic
bomb. Every Russian embassy and consulate has today time and again
the number required for routine diplomatic and consular service. When
we were at Oak Ridge we were told there were so many Russian spies
there that only by a policy of strictest compartmentaiisrn were they able
to maintain the integrity of their work.
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Statement by Representative Cannon continued
The need for espionage in this instance was exceptional and
compelling. At the close of the world war in which we had saved
Russia from complete subjugation we were surprised to learn that while
all other nations were disarming and returning to a peacetime status as
rapidly as possible, Russia was feverishly driving her factories and
continuing to increase her armament at top speed. Simultaneously they
announced that communism and free enterprise could not live in the
same world.
Every effort has been made by American administrations to
reestablish conditions under which we could discontinue excessive ex-
penditures for armament and divest these vast SUMAI to business and
humanitarian purposes. But each year Russia has become more arro-
gant and threatening and more demanding.
Under our American ideals and system of government, a declara-
tion of war against any nation, however provocative, is unthinkable. Our
military authorities have no choice but to give any enemy the advantage of
first attack an.d then depend on massive retaliation for defense. The
Communists have taken every advantage of this situation.
In modern warfare surprise is a tremendous advantage. Less
than a week before the Communist attack on Korea a congressional
committee from this House returning from Seoul reported that perma-
nent peace had been established and the Land was returning to prosperity.
There was no shadow of war; not the slightest cloud appeared on the
horizon. The sudden rush of a vast army of well armed, reel trained,
and well munitioned Communists across the border made it necessary
for us to throw precipitately into battle raw and untrained troops who
were wholly unable to protect themselves or hold their positions. And
there followed one of the most disastrous period in the history of American
arms.
During the hearings on this appropriation for the last 2 or 3 years,
have each year asked the CIA representative before the committee,
"How could the enemy ;mobilize an army of such size and accumulate
hundreds of tone of supplies and munitions and the transportation facilities
necessary for its movement without our learning that such an attack was
in prospect?"
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Statement. by Representative Cannon continued
And each year we have admonished the Authority, the CIA., that
it must meet future situations of this character with effective measures.
Vr:3 told them, "This must not happen ageing, and it is up to you to ace
that it does not happen again- "; that the American forces must be a.opriseci
f arty future preparation for attack in time to meet it. And the plan they
were following when this plane was taken, is their answer to that demand,:
And I want to take advantage of the opportunity to compliment and -
thank Director Allen W. Dulles and his remarkable corps for the admirable
way in which they have met. the situation through these later years.
They are entitled to the highest commendation by the Department,
the Congress, anti the American people,
We cannot 'permit anoeher Kerea. We cannot take the risk of
carnage and national devastation which might involve every American eity,
We cannot take the risk of the consequences which would follow a similar
lack from across the Russian borders. And settee the Russians refuse
to cooperate in our efforts to establish perrnaneut peace?refuse even to
agree to ethical standards of vraefaree-we have no choice but to protect
our Nation and our people through the age-old methods of defense so long
ose by the Cemmunista themselves, lest tee veske tomorrow, or do not
waite tomorrow, as a result of our failure to knew ;el time what they are
plaereing against us..
The world ha e been appalled by the vicious vindictiveness of
Kslene.iltchey's denunciation. He yesterday characterized the policy of
the United. States as stupid and blundering. His fury is incited by the
tact that it is neither stupid no' blundering., On the contrary it has been
infinitely succesplui and effective.
When we he answered his threats?ale hati very free
-with them on all occasions. even when 'Lie wit s here as our Ruest in our
o-wri (:ountry. , Wheil we have answered his threats by basing our Strategi
Air Command in a 'position to defend ourselves and our allies, he has
ba:?Avite41 that he could stoo them at the border. That is why Ave are now
t-arnestly developing our submarines so that if be ever is able to
:?Ae.itratix4e our Strategic Air Command then we iiJ kw.ve to take its place
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Statement by Representative Cannon continued
a fleet of nuclear-driven missile-firing submarines that will be just
.
as effective a halter upon him as SAC is today.
His discovery that since 1954 for 4 years, CIA has been sending
planes across his border?ands far as 1, 300 miles into the interior
wihout his knowing it--is the occasion of this outburst.
It completely disproves his vaunted ability to stop SAC at the
border.
The only reason he was able to apprehend even this plane or its
pilot was that it developed some unforeseen and unavoidable mechanical
or physiological defect, the first in 4 years. He was unable to hit it or
to overtake it at its cruising height of 70, 000 feet. So in order to leave
the impression that he captured this plane he distributed a picture of a
pile of rubbish which those who know the plane recognised as absolutely
spurious. The plane and the pilot were evidently taken comparatively
uninjured. That completely destroys his claims of invulnerability against
American attack. So he as usual resorts to subterfuge.
And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.
The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our
form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind..
But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an
authoritarian dictatorship.
We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted
by the most ruthlese and criminal despotism can under the Constitution
of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civiliaation.
END
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