LETTER TO THE HONORABLE HERBERT HOOVER, JR. FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004200020084-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 84
• Publication Date: July 1, 1955
• Content Type: LETTER

"Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R004200020084-4
iaul,
The Honorable Herbert How
Under S cretary of State
Department of State
Washington Z5. D. C.
Dar Mr. Hoover:
ability to absorb and effectively utilize large quart ties of aid is still
W e recognize that the aid isnne is a complicated one.
y early date. Nevertheless, the Shah is & sensitive
iSTAT
of Iran's stability. It is not within my competence to pats judgments
on the diplomatic and military considerations involved in the aid lean
and mercurial Individual who occupies a critical role in maintenance
However, it is cart intelligence appraisal. bas
and it may be impossible to firm up a realistic long-rang
analysis of the ov*r-all eititioa- in Iran, that failure
to provida the Shah with a reasonably precise statement of the rate we
hope Iran. will play in regional defame preparations and of our own
intentions. may have the following adverse conseiquoaces:
a) The Shit: may conclude that the U. S. has no
serious
intention of developing Iran's capabilities for defense against
possible oviat attack. This would be a serious blow to the
Shah's morale, adversely affecting not only his interest in
participation i* regional defense activities but also his
determination to strengthen his country internally.
STAT
STAT
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 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA2DP80B01676R004200020084-4
(b Iranian political and popular opinion would tend to
interpret the Shah's. failure to obtain satisfaction from
the U. S. on the military aid issue as an indication that
U. S. interest in the future of Iran and V. S. support for
the Shah himself were diminishing. This would encouragil
the revival of anti-regime extremist elements and might
facilitate the eventual reemergence of another Mossaceeq-
type government backed by fanatical nationalist elements
and the Comsreunists.
This matter was discussed briefly in the OCB meeting some'
along the above lines and as Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson
was not present at that meeting, I am sending him a copy of this
letter.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulls
Director
NE/e/ m (Z5 June 1955)
Rewritten: ONE/SK:AWD:hea
1-DCI
1 - Reading
1 - C/NEA
1-NE/4
1-ER
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