ADDITIONAL FACTORS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN OPINION RELEVANT TO FAR EASTERN ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110032-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: October 15, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

t~ 7-539)
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ADDITIONAL FACTORS
IN WESTERN EUROPEAN OPINION
RELEVANT TO
FAR EASTERN ISSUES
October 15, 1955
State Dept. review completed
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CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
WESTERN EUROPEAN OPINION
RELEVANT TO
FAR EASTERN ISSUES
Page
Foreword
1
Highlights
2
Communist China and U. S. Policy
4
What About Formosa
9
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FOREWORD
This report provides a supplement to "Opinion
Trends in the Afternath of Geneva," September 23. It
presents an interpretation of Western European opinion
since Geneva on a number of Far Eastern issues and
problems.
The data in this report are taken primarily from
poll data drawn from USIA's Barometer Surveys --
particularly from the comprehensive August survey.
The cooperation of the USIA is gratefully
acknowledged.
Nelson A. Rockefeller
October 15, 1955
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`3 ESTERN EUi1.OPE AN OPINION ON
FAIR 01'.~ ST,Z RN 'ISSUE'S
1. #Iighlights
1 number of questions in the .l lwgust survey were directed at
Way Eastern problems - Formosa, general views toward Nationalist
and Communist Chinese, and most importantly - U. ". policies.
The U. S. -Chinese Communist ':.mbas:.adorial talks in
Geneva had already started when these questions were asked.
Judging from the over-all response to Far Eastern problems,
as well as from responses to specific ? issue questions, it appears
that:
',:.f estern Europeans, as a whole, are interested in
Formosa and the ? problems associated with Nationalist
China and Communist China only to the extent that they
feel an actual eruption of these problems - meaning
involvement in war - is imminent
tVith fear of war in the Far East at a low point, most
Europeans have little real interest in the problems.
Perhaps the most significant feature of this over-all
disinclination to feel really concerned about the Far
'East is that tr e: tern European opinion seems more
willing to, accept U. S. actions without undue criticism.
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.`ithin this context, %J estern .uropean opinion
-- favors Communist China's admission to the UN.
-- is about divided on whether the U. S. should oppose
by force of arms a Communist attack on F ormosa.
-- overwhelmingly prefers. "not to take sides" in a
war between "Communist and anti-Communist powers"
or, more specifically between the U. S. and Communist
China.
-- would rather see Formosa put under UN control
than remain under Nationalist China or go to
Communist China.
-- holds a very unfavorable opinion of both Nationalist
China and Communist China.
In contrast to the widespread sense of alarm that spread
through \ estern urope last February over the flare-up in the Formosa
,.traits, most people now feel that the chances of war breaking out in
the Far East are iairly remote.
In three major countries -- Great Britain, France, and est
Germany (the question was not asked in Italy) -- an average of only
6 %%% of the general public -- 5/,, of the upper level - opinion leader ship
group -- thought the danger of a Y ar Eastern war has become greater
in the last few months.
32%6 (general sample) - 42 e(u per level) -- thought the
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2. Communist China and U. S. Policy
In the net, responses to a question dealing with whether the U, S.
is being ',too tough, " "too conciliatory, " or "about right'' in its rela-
tions with Communist China -- indicate somewhat greater favorable
than unfavorable reaction to U.S. policies at the present time.
Britain
Vest Germany
France
All
er
Up
p
All
Upper
All Upper
%p
p
~
/p
%o
To
py0
Too Tough
32
36
16
24
20
17
Too Conciliatory
7
7
8
10
7
9
About Right
30
35
27
32
15
22
No Opinion
31
22
49
34
58
52
100
100
100
100
100
100
Apart from the large percentages in Germany and France who
have No Opinion on this question - a possibly significant feature of these
responses is the virtual split in opinion in Britain and France between
those who think U. S. policies are "Too Tough" and those who think they
are "About Right. " jx=hile these responses certainly do not underrate
the underlying ' touchiness" of opinion toward U. S. Far Eastern actions,
they probably reflect - in the net - a better balance of support for U.S.
actions toward Communist China than has seemed to prevail for some
time -- certainly better than last February.
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CONFI : :NTIAL
- 5 -
On whether or not Communist China should be admitted into
the United Nations at this time -- pluralities in all four of the major
countries 'feel that it should be.
Composite Results
ALL
Should be Should not
admitted be admitted No Opinion
/ ! / / / / / / / / / / / / ! / / 1171 #####################
##################### f
38% 20% 42%
l! l! l l l l f l 7/ f f f l l 1 1; ~'~~'~'~'~'~'~'~~~'~'~ ################ ]
fll!lll!llllllllllllll! '~~'~'~'~'~~''~'~'~'~'~ ################~
43% 26 0 31 %
However, note the large percentage in both groups --
particularly among the general public -- who hold no opinion at all
on this important question. Whether this is a symptom of basic
disinterest in the Far eastern problems or a carry-over of the kind
of lack of interest in non-crisis "issues" that seems to characterize
over-all 'Western . uropean opinion at this time* is difficult to say.
That it may be in part the latter is indicated by responses to
a series of questions of an ascending order of "crisis. "
See Additional Factors in Western European Opinion, October
*see-
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To the question: If Communist China should attack Formosa,
do you think America should oppose the attack by force of arms, or
don't you think so?
Composite - Four Countries
Should
not Qualified
Should oppose oppose answer No Opinion
lllllll 11 l ******~'~'~' ~' ## %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
I l i l I l I l l I l II '**************** ## %%%010%%%%%%%%%%%%s
26% 30% 4% 40%
l l l / l J l / / / / l / l ***~'************+ ##
I3PPEk I/ 1 1 11 I /./ l l l l l l l l I l l l I ##1 %%%%a%%%%%%
37010 31% 4% 28%
To the question: In the conflict between the Communist and anti-
Communist powers in Asia, do you think (survey country) should take
a side or not take a side? Which side?
(Britain, West Germany, Italy - not asked in France)
Com- Anti-
1%
P//
*********:##### # #######################
*********I#################################
17%
63%
/ ***********~'* #######################~########## %%T
UP P .R [i,i*************I ################################# %%
1% 25% 63% 11%
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To the question: If it should come to a war between China
(Communist) and the U.S., do you think this country should take a
side or not take a side? Which side?
Composite - Four Countries
C
H
I
N No
A U. S. Not take side Opinion
######## r; rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrirrrrrrrirrirr %
########, rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr%%%%%%%%
ALL
2% 18010 62%0 ...~ 18%
######### 111 1 1111 r r r~ 1 11 1 1 r r r %%%T?
UPPER ######### rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrirrrrrrrrrrr%%%%%
1?f0 22% 6670 11%
-- As can be seen from the responses to this series of questions
-Western European opinion, as a whole, responds relatively
favorably to a situation calling for somewhat abstract support
of "rights" over "wrong" as reflected in the question as to
whether or not the U. S. should oppose a Communist attack.
But these scruples are apparently abandoned in situations
calling for "personal involvement." As indicated, a lar e
majority prefers Not to Take Sides.
-- Note also that the "softness" of opinion - as indicated by
the extent of No opinion response - decreases as the degree
of personal involvement called for by the situation increases.
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On the ultimate "crisis" question -- "If it should come to a
war between China and the U.S. do you think this country should take
a side or not take a side? Which side? -- there is a relatively
encouraging degree of support for "siding with the U. S. " among better
informed British groups as compared with other sectors of European
opinion.
Britain
Other Countries
All
Upper
All
UT 1p r
%o
-
oho
0/0
0/0
Side with China
2
3
1
-
Side with U.S.
35
44
12
15
Not take side
so
47
67
72
No opinion
13
6
20
13
Surprisingly enough - considering the high propensity among
Western Europeans generally for not taking sides - British opinion
leaders almost split between "siding with the U.S." and "not taking
sides." This may of course be a reflection of far greater interest
in Far Eastern problems in Britain than elsewhere but it would also
?eem to indicate that in spite of criticism of U. S. Far Eastern
actions - occasionally (last February!) reaching a crescendo - better
informed Britains show a relatively high degree of support for the
U.S. in a "crisis."
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French opinion on the "crisis" question confirms other
indicators of rather massive popular "disinvolvement" from the
Far East and its problems:
France
All
Upper
%
O
Side with China
2
-
Side with U. S.
5
8
Not take side
71
76
No opinion
ZZ
16
It seems perfectly clear from their response that Frenchmen
are fairly unanimously agreed not to get re-involved in Far Eastern
3. d hat about Formosa?
Western European opinion as a whole plays "safe" in the
disposition of Formosa -- fairly sizeable pluralities would rather
see Formosa put under: UN control than go to either Nationalist China
or Peiping.
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Composite- Britain, West Germany, France
(Not asked in Italy)
Should
Remain Should
With' go to Be put
Chiang Communist under UN
Kai-shek China control No Opinion
117111 1 ***** ###################1%%%%%%?lo%%%a%%%%%'10
11111 #################### %%%%%%%%%%%?1?%%%%
12% 9%o 36% 43%
But the exten t of No Opinion - 43% - indicates the basic lack
of interest in the problem.
On a follow-up question, a majority of those who thought
Formosa should be. put under UN control felt that if the island could not
be put under the UN it should remain with Chiang Kai-shek.
But this represents a heavily diluted token of positive support
for continued Nationalist control of Formosa.
Perhaps a clearer indicator of the underlying lack of interest
of the Western Europeans in the Formosa problem appeared in
responses. to " Who do you like ? " questions.
Only a minuscule percentage registered "Good Opinion"
toward either Nationalist China or Communist China.
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