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December 20, 2016
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October 23, 2007
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May 1, 1959
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 May 1, 1959 MEMORANDUM TOR DR. J. R. ILLL.&N, JR. FROM: W. 0. Baker NSA review completed -J -tlF SUBJECT: Coordination of Military Communications Development with Particular Reference to the CRITICOMM System A letter from Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr. to the Honorable Neil H. McElroy. September 19, 1958, pointed out the opportunity for coordination of communi- cation systems, in the forthcoming extension and improvement of national military and intelligence networks. As noted therein, certain studies in the President's Science Advisory Committee have been concerned with this subject. In the ensuing months the studies have been continued and intensified. (However, there is not yet a completed review of all the relevant scientific and technological factors which enter into the exceedingly complex problem of providing adequate comm'Lanications for national security.) Since the letter of September 19, 1958, the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering has been activated. It has certain responsibilities concerning the acquisition of new communications systems. Likkewise, in this period the organization of the Directorate for Communications-Electronics 0:6) in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has resulted from the reorganiza- tion plan for the Department of Defense and a Director and a Deputy Director have been appointed. The chief communicators of the three services are represented in the 36 activity by a Military Communications Electronics Board, of which the Director of 36 is chairman. Also in this riod, various large, military programs have been started. the 480 Global Air ores Communication System, the UNICOM Global Army Communication System (sponsored by the Signal Corps), and particularly the CRITICOMM system for timely transmission of critical intelligence. The CRITICOMli system 25X3 is the implementation of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7 and for this the Department of Defense Directive S-5100.19 was approved on March 19, 1959. The Secretary of Defense, in accord with the NSCID No. 7, has acted as executive officer and has designated the Signal Corps to carry out this project. All this organizational and project activity is superficially impressive. However, on examination it does not seem to be leading very fast to the desired objective of a single, integrated system adequate to the country's needs. On 25X1 T73; I7:~.36 1 NSC review(s) Oj y completed. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 the contrary, it appears that the effectiveness of some of the new projects may be limited by some essentially arbitrary consequences of the present fragmentation. Moreover, the proposed project plans, in their efforts to provide advanced physical h.axdware, do not always seem to take adequate account of the possibilities of making better use of what we already have. (Indeed, the picture conjured up seems close to that of some day turning off all our working communications and switching to an untried system.) The following comments are directed primarily at the CRITICOMM project, but somewhat more general remarks along the same lines are given at the end of this report. (I) There is already a serious limitation on the physical facilities available for the CR TICOMM system because of the wording 11A ? f the DOE) Directive S-5100.19. Here it is stated that the CRITICOMM system will consist essentially of existing COMINT facilities plus whatever modification of those facilities were proposed in a JCS CRITICOMM plan dated kulust 22, 1958. Critical intelligence, as n should have accessible for its of military convrrsunications . tenet of overriding priority, andling all of the capabilities (2) The limitation of CRITICO M facilities mentioned in (1) may, of course, be attributed to the special encryption and consequent switching center requirements of intelligence messages, but this" just emphasizes another difficulty of the present approach. That is, that the CRITICOMM system as presently interpreted is completely separated from transmission requirements and facilitiee s . A communication system of highest importance is being discussed while ignoring the central position of trans- mission. Vague assumptions of the separability of elaborate switching centers such as are proposed, and will be mentioned , from the qualities of transmission systems of the several services are made. ion should. be reorganised in a way that provides stic engineering relation of switching caters to optimum utilization of available and planned transmission links . This is particularly import ant because most transmission for some time to come must be by the notoriously erratic. B. r. links, and we need fle.dbility of signaling rate to cope with adverse conditions of propagation and maximum flexibility of routing to provide as much reliability as possible in the complete system. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 (3) These preceding basic difficulties only highlight a a' more pressing problem. This is that ,axis fn facilities should be first and fully exploited for CRITICONM purposes. (If this is properly done, the proposed new system will probably not appear as the drastic Improvement that it purports to be.) For example, if the present switching centers were modified and reorganised so that urgent messages could be retrieved from reels when there is an over-s.11 transmission delay, immediate improvements would result. This can be done, for instance, through "stunt-boxes" which teletype circuits can signify the presence of certain message types. By suitable combination of such alarms which would reveal the receipt of critical messages in existing centers, and a reasonable modification of circuits and procedures, there could be acquired within six months a valuable Improvement in present intelligence handling. We would also obtain some very constructive experience on the real requirements of an ultimate system. and would develop a basis for deciding when we could make use of existing s..cilities in such a system, and when we should ask for new. (4) The preceding proposal is also appropriate for the testing of the critical urgent-intelligence processing system being planned in General Goodpaster' a office at the direction of the President. For instance, this testing as presently proposed could yield significant Information on the reflex time for a suitable C TICOMM systeern. This reflex time, which is a pre-ernineent quality of the system, is not controlled by switch- ing center behavior alone, to that present CRITICOl4 plans cannot tell us all we would like to know about the basic needs of the system. (5) There are many specific deficiencies in the projected systems development which it is believed would be corrected by a firm coordination of the development engineering and operations through 36 and the Director of Defense Research and Zngineering. For instance, the alternate routing implied in the characteristics of the proposed system is largely illusory. Most of the messages will go out on a -very few radio links, even though it may look, in the switching center, as though a selection from a large number of choices is being made. Actually, as remarked earlier, many important transmission links are denied to the system through formal restrictions, such as that they are not Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 This marked improvement over the 5-unit stop-start tele- re of the present teletype network was deesigneed to take advantage of existing systems. It is reliable and fast, and without the need for start and stop pulses, it can send at the maximum rate allowed by the transmission medium being employed. As a flexible digital system, it is convenient for the Cyrillic alphabet. In contrast to some much more elaborate proposals, this scheme might even work into present switching centeris by using a torn tape prosedure. In any case the opportunity for prompt improvement of present facilities should be exploited. (10) As implied above, major technical problems of the CkITICOMM system and related communications planning seem to be con- nected to at least six parallel authorities partaking in manage- rnMnt. A system whose (1) development and engineering were managed by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (who might desilpiate a service as Development Agent), and whose (2) operation was assured by 36-JCS, in accord with (3) the requirements of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) and DIR.NSA, might yield more effective progress. Such needed progress is not assured by the present arrangements for military communications planning. In summary, the present plans for communications development appear still to exhibit the fragmentation, duplication, and overlapping of authority among the various agencies which have been noted and deplored by many observers earlier. While it may be possible to achieve a gradual integration of the now projects with each other and with existing systems, the road to this result is by no means plain. should be emphasized that this scattered and fragmented attack on our global communications problem is not only uneconomic, it is also dangerous. Nothing is more likely to fail in a crisis than a collection of individually minimal non-reenforcing, non-exchangeable global communications works. Moreover, the grandiose planning to which competition amon the g interested agencies naturally leads tends to diminish interest in what may be done in improved global communications in the next few years, which may be among our most critical times. "PROVED BY THE PANEL, PRE DEIMe$ 5C VISORY CE317'TEE: H. W. Bode D. Huffman I. R. Pierce W W. 0 . Baker Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Noted by 0,100 mar Mr. Quarle s s May 2, 1959 . 'Baker, Dr. McMillan and I discus sod with you and Dr. York some of the technological aspects of our future communications development In the Gover sad in particular in the Department of Defense, a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee which concerns itself with communlcations has given to me they attached memorandum. The panel was originally formed by me to uad*rtakee studios requested by the Pre tdent's Board of Consultants on Foreign intelligence Activities and at my re- quest, has more recently broadened its studies in the field of communications. Mace the teechniques of communications concern many diverse areas of Government, the advantages of co- operation across departmental lines are especially strong in communications research and development. Particularly in the critical matters of military and intelligence communi- ca-thons, combinations of systems objectives, technologies, and operations can yield facilities both better and lees costly than separate systems provide. Hence, the importance has been noted of unWed nt in largo new communications projects id. Attached herewith is a preliminary report by part of a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee which discusses The integration of existing and ming programs. It also suggests some measures which wed help in advancing especially the most urgent communi- ca e capabilities of the Government. Your comments on the issues raised in the memo- my other reflections you may have will be welcome. Yours s> ?i ere y 2a t J. R. itiliian, Jr. The Honorable -:)onsld A. Quarles Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington 25, L. C. G o p y t o Mr. Allen Dull a rs ?7. th cffc I rrnt^ C -; 1 1 7J~3.. 25X1] Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R004300120008-6