LETTER TO ZBIG FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000400010012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 25, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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central Intelligence Agency F1eC"~PQ ' ~`
Dear Zbig:
25 October 1977
Attached is a copy of our National Intelligence
Estimate on Southern Africa which I think the President
might find interesting. The Estimate, which was actually
published in August, takes a look at South Africa and
some of the surrounding states, and addresses the pros-
pects for change in the region during the next three to
five years. Several of the more significant key judg-
ments and illustrations have been highlighted and tabbed
for your information.
Yours,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Attachment
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-2 - 77
DCI/NIO/AF
MEMO FOR: DCI
VIA D/DCI/NI
FROM NIO/AF
SUBJECT : Transmission of National Intelligence Estimate on
Southern Africa to Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Two attachments:
1) Memo from DCI to Dr. Brzezinski
.2) NIE 70-1-77
Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/both atts)
1 - SA/DCI (w/att land copies of tabbed portions of att 2)
D/DCI/NI (w/att 1 and copies of tabbed portions of att 2)
1 - ER (w/att 1)
1 - NIO/AF (w/both atts)
1 - NIO/RI (w/att 1)
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
EacerT o Regi~u rl
VIA : Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence
FROM National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT Transmission of National Intelligence Estimate on
Southern Africa to Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
1. Action Requested: That you sign and forward the attached
National Intelligence Estimate to Dr. Brzezinski.
2. Background: Per your note of 9 October, we have prepared trans-
mittal documents to forward to Dr. Brzezinski the National Intelligence
Estimate on Southern Africa. Selected key judgments and illustrations
have been tabbed and highlighted as requested.
Director of Central Intelligence
DISAPPROVED:
Director of Central Intelligence
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Potential changes in the hitherto dominant positions of the white
racial communities in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia are once
again subjects for intense debate and arduous international negotiation.
The debate is, not new; the negotiations and the pressures that these
negotiations reflect and that accompany them are, if not entirely
unprecedented, at least new in the far-ranging character of their
objectives: majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and some form of
power-sharing with the black majority in South Africa.
This paper focuses on South Africa. It attempts to locate the sources
of potential change among the major elements of South African society,
to gauge both their strength and the malleability of the existing political
and economic structure under internal stresses and external pressures,__
and to make a current estimate of what kinds of change might occur
during the next three to five years. The paper also discusses the impact
of developments in Rhodesia and Namibia on those in South Africa, and
in the course of this discussion offers an assessment of how the
Rhodesian and Namibian situations appear to be moving.
Against this background, our principal judgments are as follows:
- The white community, despite its internal divisions, will not be
prepared within the period of this Estimate to make significant
concessions in the direction of power-sharing with the black
majority.
- Even movement in the direction of reducing the more petty
manifestations of racial discrimination will come slowly, because
no white South African government can afford to move very far
ahead of the dominant prejudices of the white community. as a
whole, although domestic and international pressures may speed
the process to some degree.
- In the economic arena, while absolute improvements in the
material well-being of those blacks who are employed will occur
gradually during the period of this Estimate, as they have at
periods in the past, there will be a serious and growing problem
of black unemployment due to a combination of demographic
developments and the inherited body of white-imposed custom
and legislation which denies economic opportunity to blacks and
keeps the purchasing power of the black community low.
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- The protest efforts of the black communities will not produce
significant changes in the South African political and economic
system within the period of this Estimate. But they have already
begun to produce a change in the political climate which may
have considerable long-range significance. These protests, which
almost certainly will take the form o sporadic outbreaks of
widespread disorder and urban terrorism as well as strikes and
other nonviolent demonstrations, will create an atmosphere of
heightened racial tension. Thus the next three to five years,
unlike the 1965-75 decade of quiescence, is likely to be a period
of increasing pressures for change, marke by intensified e ate
within South Africa over the government's racial policy.
- The resources available to the South African government for
resisting change will remain formidable during the period of this
_ Estimate, and we believe white South Africans will be able to
cope with any physical challenge they are likely to face. The
armed forces are well trained, well equipped, and because they
are overwhelmingly white, share the outlook of the white
community as a whole. The police, although they are nearly half
nonwhite, do not yet show significant cracl:s in morale or
effectiveness. While we expect that black policemen in some
areas will come under stress, the government has foreseen this
and is preparing for it.
- The South African armed forces also remain by far the most
effective military establishment in black Africa, and will have
noting to fear from the regular military esta is ment o of er
African countries, either singly or in combination. They will also
contain any likely guerrilla effort from outside the country.
- The South African economy is relatively resistant to international
economic sanctions, and will remain so for the period of this
Estimate even in the unlikely event that such sanctions received
widespread international support. The government has prepared
for the possibility of sanctions by stockpiling, and the impact of
sanctions would be to slow growth, and thus to deny what white
South Africans have come to regard as normal expectation,
rather than to bring the whites to their knees. Blacks would feel
the material impact of sanctions far more than whites, and this
might further fuel protest movements. Sanctions thus will be
more effective in their political and psychological aspects than as
economic warfare measures during the next three to five years.
- The one area in which South Africans appear to be especially
'sensitive to pressures for change is in their strong desire to be
accepted as members of the Western community. Yet, their
relative isolation and identification as the pariah of the Western
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world have discomfited, but not induced significant change
amongst the South African whites. In the short run at least, we
believe that the chances are that the South Africans will dig in
their heels in resisting pressures for significant internal change.
We cannot judge at this time what the impact of persistent
Western pressure would be over the long term in building u or
Breaking down South African resistance to change.
Rhodesia
Rhodesia will achieve majority rule during the period of this
Estimate, but the effects of this on developments within South
Africa during this period will be marginal. The longer term
effects of how majority rule is introduced to Rhodesia will be
substantial on South Africa's regional relationships, however. A
relatively moderate, cooperative government in Zimbabwe
would likely offer South Africa a fresh opportunity to attempt,
especially in economic relationships, a policy of "opening to the
north" from which both Zimbabwe and South Africa would
derive substantial material benefits. If, on the other hand, an
independent Zimbabwe becomes an arena for the rivalries that
now plague the nationalist movement, it is likely to emerge
eventually aE. a militant confrontation state. The importance of
economic ties with South Africa, however, would probably act as
a restraint on Zimbabwe's aggressiveness.
Namibia
There are signs, developed by the efforts of the UN Contact
Group, that South Africa is making a major reassessment of its
strategy toward and its future relationship with Namibia. We
think that the South Africans believe that arrangements can be
made that protect their essential interests. They hope to retain
both profitable economic and useful defense ties with an
independent Namibia. If their hopes turn out to be illusory, we
think that the South Africans would still find it difficult to
disengage from the negotiation process, given the presumable
consequences for their relations with the West. We are unable to
agree, however, on the strength of South Africa's determination
to preserve a military position in Namibia and full sovereignty
over Walvis Bay. Certainly, during the course of the negotiations
and transition period, the South Africans will continue to reassess
their options.
Communist Factors in Southern Africa
- We doubt that the Soviets will engage in any radically new types
of activity during the next three to five years. The central
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features of the Soviet presence in southern Africa will continue
to be the provision of military hardware and training to black
liberation movements and to new black governments, together
with vigorous diplomatic support in international forums. The
Soviets will avoid being placed in situations where they might be
called upon to furnish troops-other than advisers-of their own,
although they are likely to continue to make use of gunboat
diplomacy when the risks are low.
- Cuba will continue to collaborate with the USSR in policy
toward southern Africa. Castro regards this arena as one in
which his broader international interests find room to play, but
financial and logistical constraints, as well as ideological affinity,
will keep him close to the USSR here. Castro is not likely to send
Cuban troops into action directly against South Africans in
Namibia nor in offensive operation into Rhodesia, although they
may come to operate defensively in the latter situation.
- China will remain active in this region; some Chinese effort will
go toward supporting the liberation movements and the front-
line states, primarily to compete with the Soviets. The Chinese
are at a disadvantage, however, in competing with the Soviets
because of their inability to meet the military needs of the front-
line states.
Western Europe, Japan, and Israel as Factors
- The major West European countries will be very reluctant to
engage in serious pressures against South Africa during the
period of this Estimate. The UK cannot afford to do so; France
and West Germany wi not wish to forgo the economic benefits.
All will be swayed to some degree, however, by appeals on
human rights grounds, which in Europe come from Scandinavia
and the Dutch as well as from elements within the other West
European countries. Japan's situation will be similar.
- The Israelis will be doing a running assessment of the risks
involved in their ties with South Africa-mainly the dangers that
might be posed for their relations with the US and their
prospects for resuming contacts with black African governments.
But, on balance, we think that Israel will continue to develop
relationships with South Africa.
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are divergent in background, experience, and outlook
(see Figure 1). There are more than 10 major tribes
with numerous subgroupings within each. Two of
these tribes, the Xhosa and the Zulu, individually
outnumber all white South Africans. Moreover, over
half of the Africans now reside in urban areas, and a
large number of these blacks are detribalized to
various degrees. There are thus few unifying cultural
or social forces and the government, through its policy
of separate development, encourages maintaining
tribal identification and perpetuates intertribal rival-
ries and rural-urban splits.
29. South African population statistics, particularly
those in respect to blacks, point to changes in the
demographic patterns by the end of this century. By
the year 2000 the black population is expected to have
doubled and will then outnumber the white popula-
tion by 73.4 to 14 percent instead of 71.2 to 16.7
percent as now. How this population is distributed
between rural and urban areas will depend on how. the
government implements its policies, but it is virtually
certain that there will be some increase in the black
urban townships, which are already overcrowded and
volatile.
SOUTH AFRICA Population Estimates by Percent, 1 July 1977'-::
.,Blacks-Tribal Designation
Total:: 19,102,000
Swazis
Others 4
Shangaans
Zulu 5.1 3.5
;Xhosas.?
19.0 4,1 (Ciskei}:, -
1. The figure.for the- total population-isaprojectionby the. US Department of Commerce Foreign ' Demographic-Analysis Division. It
is based. bn an official mid-1976-South African estimate Figures for the individual ethnic groups were calculated from , official
South .' African:percentages..for?_ each;group.,~ The figures::for the Afrikaans-speaking-^and English-speaking communities were.,1
immigration-,patterns,. will producea change in, racial compositionof- the country's population in the decades ahead:fA recent
report, by, the South. African Department of Statistics projects an overall population- of about 47,000,000 by the year 2000, of
which .14 percent would: be-whites, 73.4. percent- blacks,- 9.9 percent coloreds,.and 2.7 percent Asians. (The- many variables that
The South IAfrican, blacks are currently-about evenly' divided betwedn.those'living in the homelands and those in the-white-areas
(not counting about: 1,500,000 migrant '. workers who take temporary employment in the white areas). of those living in the white
sector;, 55 percent are, in the towns and cities,-45. percent in? rural areas. As long as- the black labor force-remains an essential
element- in- the South African economy and.as long as the homelands-fail to attain economic self-sufficiency (both of which appear
sure bets. for. the-foreseeablefuture),an.increase,inithe number of blacks in the increasingly volatile townships.surrounding the
9
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SOUTH AFRICA: Homelands
BOT'SWANA
Middelburga
SOUTHERN
*Bulawayo
Fort Victoria
RHODESIA
Suid-
Ndehele
Basotho
Qwa Qwa
ZAMBIQUE
Richard's
Bay
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-IE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy for National Intelligence
NOTE FOR: The Director
1. In response to your request,
asked at Commerce whether they would be willing to
distribute OER's steel report to selected industrial
people. Commerce agreed in principle that they
would help in distributing papers of this sort.
However, they are reluctant to push this report,
dated May 1977; they believe it should be updated
first.
2. Maurice Ernst has indicated that OER could
do the update, but he believes that the paper should
not be pushed given the highly political nature of
the steel question. The paper, though a good one,
emphasizes trade factors rather than the domestic
structural aspects, the latter being the really
important concern in the U.S. OER is also concerned
that it might be distorted and exploited by special.
interest groups.
Robert R. Bowie
Distribution
Orig - DCI
I - Acting DDCI
1-ER
1 - D/NFAC Chrono
1 - NFAC file
I - D/OER
1 - NIO/pE
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Potential changes in the hitherto dominant positions of the white
racial communities in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia are once
again subjects for intense debate and arduous international negotiation.
The debate is not new; the negotiations and the pressures that these
negotiations reflect and that accompany them are, if not entirely
unprecedented, at least new in the far-ranging character of their
objectives: majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and some form of
power-sharing with the black majority in South Africa.
This paper focuses on South Africa. It attempts to locate the sources
of potential change among the major elements of South African society,
to gauge both their strength and the malleability of the existing political
and economic structure under internal stresses and external pressures,
and to make a current estimate of what kinds of change might occur
during the next three to five years. The paper also discusses the impact
of developments in Rhodesia an amibia on those in South Africa, and
in the course of this discussion offers an assessment of how the
Rhodesian and Namibian situations appear to be moving.
Against this background, our principal judgments are as follows:
South Africa
- The white community, despite its internal divisions, will not be
prepared within the period of this Estimate to make significant
concessions in the direction of power-sharing with the black
majority.
- Even movement in the direction of reducing the more petty
manifestations of racial discrimination will come slowly, because
no white South African government can afford to move very far
ahead of the dominant prejudices of the white community as a
whole, although domestic and international pressures may speed
the process to some degree.
- In the economic arena, while absolute improvements in the
material well-being of those blacks who are employed will occur
gradually during the period of this Estimate, as they have at
periods in the past, there will be a serious and growing problem
of black unemployment due to a combination of demographic
developments and the inherited body of white-imposed custom
and legislation which denies economic opportunity to blacks and
keeps the purchasing power of the black community low.
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- The protest efforts of the black communities will not produce
significant changes in the South African political and economic
system within the period of this Estimate. But they have already
? 111 x.11 l11 Q
have considerable long-ran signi icance. These protests, which
almost certainly will take the form of sporadic outbreaks of
widespread disorder and urban terrorism as well as strikes and
other nonviolent demonstrations, will create an atmosphere of
heightened racial tension. Thus the next three to five years,
unlike the 1965-75 decade of quiescence, is likely to be a period
of increasing pressures for change marked by intensified debate
within South Africa over the government's racial policy.
- The resources available to the South African government for
resisting change will remain formidable during the period of this
Estimate, and we believe white South Africans will be able to
cope with any physical challenge they are likely to face. The
armed forces are well trained, well equipped, and because they
are overwhelmingly white, share the outlook of the white
community as a whole. The police, although they are nearly half
nonwhite, do not yet show significant cracks in morale or
effectiveness. While we expect that black policemen in some
areas will come under stress, the government has foreseen this
and is preparing for it.
- The South African armed forces also remain by far the most
effective military establishment in black Africa, and will have
nothing to fear from the regular military establishments of other
African countries, either singly or in combination. They will also
contain any likely guerrilla effort from outside the country.
- The South African economy is relatively resistant to international
economic sanctions, and will remain so for the period of this
Estimate even in the unlikely event that such sanctions received
widespread international support. The government has prepared
for the possibility of sanctions by stockpiling, and the impact of
sanctions would be to slow growth, and thus to deny what white
South Africans have come to regard as normal expectation,
rather than to bring the whites to their knees. Blacks would feel
the material impact of sanctions far more than whites, and this
might further fuel protest movements. Sanctions thus will be
more effective in their political-and psychological aspects than as
economic warfare measures during the next three to five years.
- The one area in which South Africans appear to be especially
sensitive to pressures for "dhange is in 'their strong desire to be
accepted as members of the Western community. Yet, their
relative isolation and identification as the pariah of the Western
2
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C -
The Director of Cent ntelligence - 9 1
STAT
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