RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OVERFLIGHT OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000600040029-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: January 27, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/11/08: CIA-RDPP8'0M00165A000600040029-4
The Director o` Central Intclligcncc. fit
27 JAN ;977
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable ZE igniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
SUBJECT . Reconnaissance Aircraft Overflight of
Cuba
1. This memorandum responds to some of the questions raised
during the discussion of reconnaissance overflight of Cuba during
yesterday's NSC meeting.
2. Subsequent to the Cuban missile crisis, the Intelligence
Community was highly dependent. on manned overflight of Cuba by
U-2 aircraft to monitor the status of Cuban military forces, the
supply of Soviet military equipment to Cuba and the periodic de-
ployment of Soviet air and naval units to that island. As the
capability and capacity of our film-return photo-satellite recon-
naissance systems improved, the frequency of aircraft overflight
was incrementally reduced. By 1970, the satellites were providing
the bulk of the photographic coverage of Cuban targets and aircraft
were used primarily to respond to time-sensitive intelligence
requirements which could not be met by the film-return satellite
systems. By mid-1974, when the SR-71 replaced the U-2 for over-
flight of Cuba, it was recognized that the justification for
continued overflight was based primarily on the political require-
ment to maintain a continuing US reconnaissance presence over the
island. A continuing standby overflight capability was also
provided for to handle time-sensitive national intelligence problems.
his schedule, which was
established by Secretary Kissinger, has generally been adhered to
unless accelerated or delayed by the Operations Advisory Group or
adversely affected by weather.
Copy No.
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4. From the national intelligence point of view, there are
no longer any requirements justifying continuinn ove
manned aircraft
5. From the political point of view, the continuation of SR-71
flights was intended to serve as a constant reminder to Havana of US
interest and concern about Cuba. Operationally, the flights were
intended to maintain enough presence to preserve the option of using
SR-71's in a period of tension without the flights themselves repre-
senting a major new ingredient. To the Cubans, the flights have been
viewed with considerable irritation as violations of Cuban sovereignty.
Termination of the SR-71 reconnaissance program would likely be read by
Havana as a signal of possible interest by Washington in exploring
avenues for improved relations.
41 JE, 1: E. H. Knoche
Acting Director
Associate Deputy Director tor Intelligence
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Addressee
2 - Acting Director
3 - ER
4 - D/DCI/IC
5 - 0/Comptroller
6 - DDT File
7 - DDI Chrono
8 - ADDI Chrono
I`~77
ly - -L; TA I r r iT_iCF`dI
IOLF-
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/11/08: CIA-RDP8OMOO165AO00600040029-4
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