CONVERSATION WITH WILLIAM MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000600150006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 10, 1977
• Content Type: MFR

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OLC 77-2056
10 May 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with William Miller, Staff Director, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
ILL.EG.!B
I s
1. Talked with Bill Miller., Staff Director, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, regarding our concerns with the
Derwinski amendment so that he would be alert to our interest in
this legislation. I told him of our proposal to work with members of
the Senate who would he involved in the debate on similar language in
the Senate version of the bill to clarify any misunderstanding as to
what the implications of the Derwinski amendment were with respect
to the Director's authority regarding national means of verification
and any confusion about reporting of information on the identities of
CIA analysts involved in SALT analyses from a verification standpoint.
2. I also talked with Miller about the open budget issue and
how the Select Committee proposed to handle this matter. It appears
clear that this question will be raised by the Select Committee members
with the President when they meet with him at the White House on Friday,
but it also appears likely at this time that as the Select Committee reports
out an authorization resolution, it will defer any disclosure of the budget
amount until after the appropriation process is completed. I also
expressed concern to Miller about possible line item deletions on
covert action infrastructure programs and told him that we would be
following up with him on this topic.
3. I told Miller that I would be accompanying the Director to
a meeting with Senator Harry Byrd (I., Va.) this morning noting that
Senator Byrd has been named Chairman of a three-man Subcommittee on
Intelligence: of the Senate Armed Services Committee on intelligence
matters. The other members of the Subcommittee are Senator John
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Stennis (D., Miss.) and Senator Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.). Miller
said he had not been aware of the appointment of Senator Byrd to the
Chairmanship of this Subcommittee but informed me as a matter of
information to me that the Senate Armed Services Committee has
decided that it will not take any action of an authorization nature in the
mark-up of the NFIP. It will take action on a number of intelligence
related items which are within the jurisdiction of the Committee. We
discussed the fact that there were four members of the Select Committee
who were also on the Senate Armed Services Committee (Senators
Goldwater, Gary Hart (D., Colo.), Robert Morgan (D., N. Car.),
and Jake Garn (R., Utah)) and this created considerable continuity
between the two Committees.
STAT
X , UAI-tY
Legislative Counsel
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 The Director
Central Intelli ence A enc
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The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am writing to express my personal hope that you will
find it possible to be CIA Guest Speaker on Tuesday, 14 June
1977, at 3:00 p.m. in the CIA Auditorium at Langley. This
will affirm the invitation extended informally through your
staff by our Legislative Counsel.
Our employees and guests from the Intelligence Community
would profit greatly by your discussion of "Congressional Over-
sight of the Intelligence Community." It was disappointing to
them that you were unable to be here in December and I hope
that the date we now propose will prove more convenient.
To repeat some of the information in George Bush's letter
of 4 November 1976, the CIA Guest Speaker Program is designed
to give our employees the stimulus of the thought of leaders
in foreign affairs. Among earlier Guest Speakers are Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Wernher von Braun, John Fairbank, Ellsworth Bunker,
and, most recently, John Kenneth Galbraith. Harlan Cleveland
will speak to us on 10 May on "The Ethics of Public Service in
Foreign Affairs."
The pattern of our Guest Speaker Program is usually a
40 to 45 minute address followed by a question period of about
a half hour. We can promise you an interested and responsive
audience of about 500.
If you find it possible to accept, our Legislative Counsel,
George Cary, will be in touch with you about the details of the
arrangements. I will hope for a favorable reply.
Yours sincere
STANSFIELD TURNER
L.triiil!#+r..+vr-IIr~Y i'r
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 IDD/A Registry
vsuas----- -----
URANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FR?M :
SUBJECT:
REFERENCES:
John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
CIA Guest speaker Program - Senator
Daniel K. Inouye
(a) Letter to Senator Inouye from DCI,
dated 4 November 1976
.(b) Memo to DCI from DDA, dated
29 November 1976
(c) Memo to ADCI from i1DA, dated 4 March, 1977
1. Action RSgaested: It is requested that you sign
the attache er to at.)r Daniel K. Inouye inviting him
to be CIA Guest Speaker on Tiesday, 14 June 1977, on the
subject of "Congressional Ovrsight of the Intelligence
Community." If he accepts, it is requested that you plan to
introduce him.
2. Back round: Senator Inouye accepted an invitation
from Mr. Buu to a CIA Guest Speaker on 14 December 1976.
About 10 days before the event, his staff notified us that
Senator Inouye was in Hawaii and would have to cancel. lie
canceled, at the same time, a number of briefings the
Legislative Counsel had arranged for him. It is possible
that Senator Inouye was waiting for a resolution of the
question of CIA leadership. The Senator's staff left the
way open for us to return with another date.
In March 1977, with Mr. Knoche's approval, the
Legislative Counsel raised the question again with the
staff. The date then proposed was not convenient; and on
the second try, the staff suggested we send another letter.
The advent of a nev Director seems a propitious
time to invite the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee
to meet with us on a question of importance to us both.
3. - St f Position: Te Legislative Counsel concurs
with the recoen a~on
4. Rec
the attache
on: It is recommended that you sign
John P. Blake
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1 - DCI
2 - ER
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The H2>orable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select ommittee on Intelligence
US Senate,
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mr. Chaiman:
I am writin to express my personal hope that you will
find it possible o be CIA Guest Speaker on Tuesday, 14 June
1977, at 3:00 p.m. in the CIA Auditorium at Langley. This
will affirm the inv-tation extended informally through your
staff by our Legisla4ve Counsel.
Our employees and uests from the Intelligence Community
would profit greatly by our discussion of "Congressional
Oversight of the Intellig nce Community." It was disap-
pointing to them that you ere unable to be here in December,
and I hope that the date we'.now propose will prove more
convenient.
To repeat some of the information in George Bush's
letter of 4 November 1976, the CIA Guest Speaker Program is
designed to give our employees t`he stimulus of the thought
of leaders in foreign affairs. Among earlier Guest Speakers
are Zbigniew Brzezinski, Wernher von Braun, John Fairbank,
Ellsworth Bunker, and, most recently, John Kenneth Galbraith.
Harlan Cleveland will speak to us on 10 May on "The Ethic's
of Public Service in Foreign Affairs-."
The pattern of our Guest Speaker Program is usually a
40- to 45-minute address followed by a.question period of
about a half hour. We can promise you an interested and
responsive audience of about 500.
If you find it possible to accept, our Legislative
Counsel, George Cary, will be in touch with you about the
details of the arrangements. I will hope for a favorable
reply.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
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 AD1&f(
t. e NAR 1,77
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
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John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT : CIA Guest Speaker - Senator Daniel K. Inouye
REFERENCE : Letter to Senator Inouye from Director
of Central Intelligence, dated
4 November 1976, Same Subject
(DDA-76-5099, ER-76-8898/4)
1. This memorandum requests your approval for the
Legislative Counsel to renew our earlier invitation to
Senator Daniel K. Inouye to serve as CIA Guest Speaker. The
specific date we now have in mind is Tuesday, 12 April.
2. You will recall that Senator Inouye accepted. our
invitation to speak on 14 December but found it necessary to
cancel after plans for his visit were far advanced. The
request to reissue the invitation is being made on the
assumption that a new Director will be on board in March and,
that 12 April would be a propitious time to hear from the
head of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
3. We would like to suggest that Senator Inouye's
amenability and availability be explored informally by
the Legislative Counsel. If all goes.well-and a specific
time can be agreed upon, you or the new Director might there,
wish to extend a personal invitation.
STAT
disapprove ( ) reissuing the invitation
I approve (6'
to Senator Inouye via the Legislative Counsel.
_er date.
I approve (_) but for a Jat
DDCI
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STAT
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A.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
VIA: The Vice President
~. FFQ R.~I 077
01
1. On Thursday, 5 May, I called on Senator Inouye. He
indicated that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is
nearly evenly divided on the question of whether or not to
release a single figure for the intelligence budget. He
further stated that he had talked with the Senate Leadership
and they, too, were uncertain.
2. The Senate Leadership asked Senator Inouye to write
you a letter and ask what your specific desire is. They
indicated that if you oppose a release, it will not be
released; if you favor a release, it will be released.
3. 1 suggested to Senator Inouye that rather than send
you a letter, since he and his Committee are scheduled to meet
with you on the 13th of May, he might want to raise it at that
time instead. He indicated that he would do so.
~ JExecuu,
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4. My recommendation is that you respond along the
following lines:
?`I have agreed not to object to disclosure of a
single budget figure in a desire to be more forthcoming
and open. I am persuaded that only a single figure can
be released within the bounds of security. It is now
up to the Senate as to what you want to do. I do not
want to attempt to dictate to you because of the
accompanying responsibility also to maintain a strict
adherence to a policy of only one number."
STANSFIELk1URNER
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(Sophie)
-Per our conversation, this version of
ER 77-1266 was shown by ADM Turner to the
Vice President on Friday, 6 May, and returned
w/DCI. We then sent a revised version on
Tuesday, 10 May. DEBBIE
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CONFIDENTIAL
Awl
The Director of Central intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
1. On Thursday, 5 May, Senator Inouye indicated to me that
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is nearly evenly divided
on the question of whether or not to release a single figure for
the intelligence budget. He further stated that he had talked with
the Senate Leadership and they, too, were uncertain.
2. The Senate Leadership asked Senator Inouye to write you
a letter and ask what your specific desire is. They indicated that
if you oppose a release, it will not be released; if you favor a
release, it will be released.
3. I suggested to Senator Inouye that rather than send you a
letter, since he and his Committee are scheduled to meet with you
on the 13th of May, he might want to raise it at that time. He
indicated that he would do so.
4. My recommendation is that you respond along the following
lines:
As stated by Admiral Turner in his testimony
on 27 April, I would not object if the Congress
decided to release to the public a single figure
for the national foreign intelligence program budget.
I do this with the sense of confidence that I would
be able to hold the line within the Executive Depart-
ment to prevent any breakdown of that single figure
into its component parts. It is not within my purview
to make a similar determination of the ability to
prevent an unraveling within the Legislative Branch.
It is the responsibility of Congress itself to come
to their own conclusion on this basic factor in
deciding whether or not to release the figure."
STANSFIELD TURNER
CONFIDENTIAL
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W;nhinglon.D.C20505 / j
OLC 77-1462
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
I am writing in response to your letter (R#6614) concerning
release to Ambassador Korry of his 24 February 1976 testimony before
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities. We do not favor public release of
information on sensitive operations, such as those discussed in
Ambassador Korry's testimony. Such a release would diminish the
confidence of cooperating Americans and foreigners that the Intelligence!
Community can protect the confidentiality of the relationship. This,
of course, would ultimately reduce the Community's ability to serve
policy-makers in the Executive and Legislative branches.
The release to Ambassador Korry of his testimony, however, does
present a unique case, because of the substantial information on CIA
operations in Chile previously made public by the Church Committee. In
light of this, we will not oppose release to Ambassador Korry of his testimony
provided the deletions enumerated below are made. We concur in the deletion
of all portions of the transcript specifically listed in your 25 February 1977
letter. In addition, we request the following deletions be made from the
transcript:
page 6, line 13:
page 6, line 20:
page 135, lines 7 - 12
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We also request that the following deletions be made from Ambassador Korry's
prepared statement:
page 5, lines 3 and 4:
page 7, line 21:
page 19, lines 18 and 19: "35" and "31"
I appreciate your concern that intelligence sources and methods
continue to be protected, and I consider all the deletions listed above to
fall strictly into that category. I note in your 25 February 1977 letter
that release to Ambassador Korry does not constitute Committee endorsement
of his testimony; similarly, my agreement to release of the transcript does
not constitute an Agency endorsement of his testimony nor imply Agency
confirmation or denial of the accuracy of references to Agency activities.
I understand that you have also consulted with the Department of State on
this matter, and we, of course, defer to the Department on the foreign
policy aspects of the proposed release.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Distribution:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
executive Registry
I am writing in response to your letter (R#6614) concerning
release to Ambassador Korry of his 24 February 1976 testimony before
the Senate Select Committee to Study Go 1'ernmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities. I a6 firmly opposed to public
release of information on sensitive operations, such as those discussed
in Ambassador Korry's testimony. ;Such a release can only diminish
the confidence of cooperating Americans and foreigners that the
Intelligence Community can prot?ct the confidentiality of their relationship.
This, of course, will ultimately reduce the Community's ability to serve
policy-makers in the Executive and Legislative branches.
The release to Aml16.ssador Korry of his testimony, however, does
present a unique case, because of the substantial information on CIA
operations in Chile pre f ously made public by the Church Committee. In
light of this, I will not/oppose release to Ambassador Korry of his testimony
provided the deletions enumerated below are made. I concur in the deletion
of all portions of to transcript specifically listed in your 25 February 1977
letter. In addition, I request the following deletions be made from the
transcript: ~.
j page 6, line 13:
page 6, line 20:
page 135, lines 7 - 12
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I also request that the following deletions be made from Ambassador Korry's
prepared statement:
page 5, lines 3 and 4:
page 19, lines 18 and 19: "35" and "31"
page 7, line 21:
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I appreciate your concern that intelligence sources and methods
continue to be protected, and I consider all the deletions listed above to
fall strictly into that category. I note in your 25 February 1977 letter
that release to Ambassador Korry does not constitute Committee endorsement
of his testimony; similarly, my agreement to release of the transcript does
not constitute an Agency endorsement of his testimony nor imply Agency
confirmation or denial of the accuracy of references to Agency activities.
I understand that you. have also consulted with the Department of State on
this matter, and we, of course, defer to the Department on the foreign
policy aspects of the proposed release.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DCI
l - DDCI
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY T v
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
OLC 77-0853
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
j 1 MAR 1977
I have been asked to respond to your letter of 25 February 1977 to
Admiral Turner requesting the views of this Agency with respect to public
release of the February 1976 testimony of Ambassador. Edward M. Korry
before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities.
We will review those portions of the transcript which your staff has
marked for deletion. In addition, we will examine the entire testimony
again to specify those portions which, if released, would jeopardize national
security or intelligence sources and methods. I appreciate your concern.
for the protection of sensitive material in bringing this matter to our
attention.
Sincerely,
t,S1
George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
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OLC /RJK/sf 9 MAR 1977
ovu1'-ow
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OLC 77-1824/a
1 1 MAY 1977
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
I have your letter of May 6 to Admiral Turner regarding the
article "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon" which appeared in the May 2
Aviation Week and Space Technology. I have asked appropriate Agency
officials to evaluate the sensitivity and accuracy of the article and
we will respond as soon as that evaluation has been completed.
Sincerely,
George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
1.J1SLrluui.lUu: ?' rr^T'68'~3
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OLC:DFM:jms (10 May 1977)
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 Concept of a charged-particle beam weapon is based on the design of a negative hydrogen beam that is accelerated and neutralized by
passing the beam through a charge exchange cell. In this ballistic missile defense concept, the collimated charge-particle beam is directed
So vie ts
ffuS,
for Beam
USSR developing charged-particle device aimed at missile
defense, exploring high-energy lasers as satellite killer
by Marshal of the Soviet Army General
P. F. Batitskiy. Since the PVO Strany
would be responsible for deploying a beam
weapon to counter U. S. ICBM warheads,
Washington-Soviet Union is developing a charged-particle beam device designed to Marshal Batitskiy's role indicates a near-
destroy U. S. intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile nuclear term weapons application for these experi-
warheads. Development tests are being conducted at a facility in Soviet Central Asia. ments, U. S. officials believe.
The Soviets also are exploring another ? Point-by-point verification by a team
facet of beam weapons technology and upper atmosphere. The USAF/TRW of U. S. physicists and engineers working
preparing to test a spaceborne hydrogen Block 647 defense support system early under USAF sponsorship that the Soviets
fluoride high-energy laser designed for a warning satellite with scanning radiation had achieved a level of success in each of
satellite killer role. U. S. officials have detectors and infrared sensors has been seven areas of high-energy physics neces-
coined the term directed-energy weapons used to determine that on seven occasions sary to develop a beam weapon.
in referring to both beam weapons and since November, 1975, tests that may be a Shifts in position by a number of
high-energy lasers. related to development of a charged- experienced high-energy physicists, who
A charged-particle beam weapon fo- particle beam device have been carried out earlier discounted the Soviet capability to
cuses and projects atomic particles at the in a facility at Semipalatinsk. develop the technology for a charged-
speed of light which could be directed ^ Ground testing of a small hydrogen particle beam device. There is now
from ground-based sites into space to fluoride high-energy laser and detection of grudging admission that the USSR is
intercept and neutralize reentry vehicles, preparations to launch the device on board involved in a program that could produce
according to U. S. officials. Both the a spacecraft. Some U. S. officials believe such a weapon.
USSR and the U. S. also are investigating the test of the antisatellite laser may be ^ Recent revelations by Soviet physicist
the concept of placing charged-particle related to recent Soviet activities on a Leonid 1. Rudakov during a tour last
beam devices on spacecraft to intercept manned Salyut space station. summer of U. S. 'fusion laboratories that.
missile warheads in space. This method ^ Test of a new, far more powerful the USSR can convert electron bear-
would avoid problems with propagating fusion-pulsed magnetohydrodynamic gen- energy to compress fusionable material to
the beam through the earth's atmosphere. erator to provide power for a charged- release maximum fusion energy. Much of
Because of a controversy within the particle beam system at Azgir in Kazakh the data outlined by Rudakov during his
U. S. intelligence community, the details stan near the Caspian Sea. The experi- visit to the Lawrence Livermore Labora-
of Soviet directed-energy weapons have ancnt took place late last year in an under- tory has since been labeled top secret by
not been made available to the President -ground chamber in an area of natural salt the Defense Dept. and the Energy
or to the National Security Council. dome formations in the desert near Azgir Research and Development Administra-
Recent events have persuaded a number and was monitored by the TRW early tion, but it gave a clue to U. S. scientists
of U. S. analysts that directed-energy warning satellite stationed over the Indian that the USSR is far ahead of the U. S. in
weapons are -car g, r offe ,orr feas2j 4/o?/ 3 ; CI/a4-1 QP89MQ ?SA( inertial confinement
the Soviet l,nio H e. ~ ew c site t r- P1 r~s s ,all pellets of thermal
Detection of large amounts of gas- direct control of the Soviet national air nuclear fuel) and weapons based on that
eons hydrogen with traces of tritium in the defense force (PVO Strany), commanded technology.
 toward a target. Using a space-based design for a charged-particle beam weapon avoids effects of the earth's m f
t
The Semipalatinsk facility where beam said about a.3.000-m1. high-angle rocket. In my opinion, such a thing, is
weapons tests are taking place has been Impossible.... I say technically I don't think anybody In the world knows how to do
such a thin and i feel f? f'd,~
under observatiggn b the~~~~11 f bo g sang period of time to
10 years. ThaAPEAT 9f8i cl g ~pt e ~O"A/23 GIRp MUd1 ~ 6~1; (Q`b~-!
facility is believed by some officials to ? Within eight years, the U. S. would initiate its own massive effort to develop tong-
contain a collective accelerator, electron fangs ballistic missiles, and within 10 years, the Soviet Union would be testing just
agne
rc field on the bean
and the task of propagating the beam through the atmosphere. Both the USSR and U. S. have space-based experimental concepts.
^ Pattern of activity in the USSR,
including deployment of large over-the-
horizon radars in northern Russia to
detect and track U. S. ICBM reentry vehi-
cles, development and deployment of
precision mechanical/phased-array -anti-
ballistic missile radars and massive efforts
aimed at civil defense.
There is little doubt within the U. S.
scientific or intelligence communities that
the Soviets are involved in developing
high-energy technology components that
could be used to produce a charged-
particle beam weapon, but there is a great
difference of opinion among officials over
whether such a device is now being
constructed or tested in the USSR.
In increasing numbers, U. S. officials
are coming to a conclusion that a decisive
turn in the balance of strategic power is in
the making, which could tip that balance
heavily in the Soviets' favor through
charged-particle beam development, and
the development of energetic strategic.
laser weapons.
Most of the controversy centers on what
tests are being conducted in an unusual
research facility about 35 mi. south of the
city of Semipalatinsk.
In the face of mounting evidence of
Soviet efforts aimed at developing a
charged-particle beam weapon for anti-
ballistic missile defense, the Air Force's
Scientific Technical Intelligence Commit-
tee (STIC) has scheduled a fall meeting td
review new data.
long, with walls of reinforced concrete 10-
ft. thick. the entire facility, with its asso-
ciated support equipment, is estimated to
have cost $500 million.
The test site is at the southern edge of
the Semipalatinsk nuclear test area, and it
is separated from other test facilities. It is
surrounded by a series of security fences.
The total amount invested by the USSR
in the test project for the 10 years' work
there is estimated at $3 billion by U. S.
analysts.
The U. S. used high-resolution photo-
graphic reconnaissance satellites to watch
as the Soviet technicians had four holes
dug through solid granite formations riot
far from the main large building at the
facility. Mine heads were constructed over
each opening, and frames were built over
the holes. As tons of rock were removed, a
large underground chamber was-built deep
inside the rock formation,
In a nearby building, huge, extremely
thick steel gores were manufactured. The
building has since been removed. These
steel segments were parts of a large sphere
estimated to be about 18 meters (57.8 ft.)
in diameter. Enough gores for two
complete spheres were constructed- U. S.
officials believe the spheres are needed to
capture and store energy from nuclear-
driven explosives or pulse-power genera-
tors. The steel gores are believed by some
officials to be among the earliest clues as
to what might be taking place at the
facility.
The components were moved to the
nearby mine heads and lowered into the
chamber.
Some other U- S. physicists believe the
steel gores are designed for underground
storage of unused nuclear fuel for a
-Debate Seen on Charged-Particle Work
'Washington- Senior U; S. scientists and engineers believe that this :nation is on the
verge of a heated debate over the strategic implications. of charged-particle beam
~? development in the Soviet Union and the U. S_ .
' That debate is just getting under way and It is likely to rival the `Fortress America
Great Defense Debate' in 1952 Involving Taft [Sen. Robert A. Taft]. the 13-36 bomber
rand strategic defense policies," one U. S. official said.
Some observers see an ominous parallel between the .attitude of some U. S.
scientists toward beam weapons and that of the late Dr. Vannevar Bush toward the
feasibility of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the mid-1940s. The highly respected
scienlist, who had directed the U.S. military research effort during World War 2,
 es to German Base
500t160?0Fr7hc Soviet Union has 'Tr
o paced thq U, S., according to a U. S.
official.
Some scientists and engineers refused to
accept information that the installation at
Semipalatinsk had anything to do with
beam-generation tests or that levels of
energy required for these experiments
could be attained. And even if somehow
the energy could be generated, it could not
be harnessed for beam application, they
said.
First operational squadron of Air Force/McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighter aircraft flew
from Langley AFB, Va., to Bitburg Air Base, West Germany, last week in a single
movement designed to show USAF capability to reinforce NATO forces rapidly. The
flight involved 23 F-15s, including two TF-15 trainers.
The 525th Tactical Fighter Squadron, led by Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Kyler.
commander of the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing, arrived at Bitburg after a 7-hr flight with
four in-flight refuelings. Three of the unit's F-15s already were in place. Two additional
F-15 squadrons are to move to Bitburg by the end of the summer to bring the wing to
full strength.
Gen. Kyler reported on arrival to Gen. Franz-Joseph Schulze, commander-in-chief
of Allied Forces, Central Europe. The 525th squadron was trained in the U. S. and was
operational on arrival. -
The flight was made with the aircraft grouped in three cells of six aircraft and one
cell of five, with about 30 min. separation between cells. Flight routing was along the
U. S. and Canadian east coasts to Newfoundland, then across the Atlantic, Britain and
Belgium to Bitburg.
Maintenance personnel were in place at Bitburg before the squadron arrived, with
some having been trained in the U. S. and some at Bitburg.
from explosive generators to energy to power generation, electron injection, col- regularity from Soviet experiments," a
produce the electron beam. lective acceleration and beam propaga- U.S. official said, "and scientific studies
i?3'b ktif h gaseous hydrogen
particles at high ve Obved For Releagdt2OO47413t{T301 li 0Mb(095A&10 "ru
^ Flux compression to convert energy experimentation, researc a oratories, tsc arges are now being detected with
magnetohydrodynamic or closed cycle gas
core fission process needed to power beam
weapons or for storing waste products
from the fission process.
One of the major problems in gaining
acceptance of the concept within the U. S.
scientific community was to convince
high-energy physics experts that the
Russians might be using nuclear explosive
generators as a power source to drive
accelerators capable of producing high
intensity proton beams of killing poten-
tial.
Initially, some U. S. physicists believed
there was no method the Soviets could use
to weld together the steel gores of the
spheres to provide a vessel strong enough
to withstand pressures likely to occur in
the nuclear explosive fission process,
particularly when the steel to be welded
was extremely thick. U. S. officials later
discovered that the Russians invented a
process called flux welding and had been
using it for years in producing pressure
spheres. The flux welding process, accord-
ing to some U. S. officials, makes the
bonded material weld as strong as, or
stronger than, the steel walls.
U. S. officials, scientists and engineers
queried said that the technologies that can
be applied to produce a beam weapon
include:
e Explosive or pulsed power generation
through either fission or fusion to achieve
peak pulses of power.
^ Giant capacitors capable of storing
extremely high levels of power for frac-
tions of a second.
? Electron injectors capable of gener-
ating high-energy pulse streams of elec-
trons at high velocities. This is critical to
producing some types of beam weapons.
^ Collective accelerator to generate
electron pulse streams or hot gas plasma
necessary to accelerate other subatomic
Energy Levels Required
Typical levels of energy required for use
with a beam weapon are I0 = joules per
pulse, with the energy of a particle of the
beam from, 1 to 100 giga electron volts. It
is theca levels of energy required that still
cause some skepticism among high-energy
physicists.
"Keegan refused to accept CIA's evalu-
ation of the USAF intelligence data," one
U. S. official said. "So, he systematically
set about acquiring talented young physi-
cists to analyze the information and to
probe the basic physics of the problem-
an area in which U. S. scientists were
notably deficient."
One scientist in particular, a USAF
civilian employe at Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio, was influential in providing
Gen. Keegan with an assessment of the
information, which said that it appeared
the facility at Semipalatinsk was being
developed for use for nuclear power gener-
ation related to beam weapon work. His
assessment was made very early in the
observation of the. facility, long before
atmospheric data of possible beam weap-
ons testing was obtained.
"These young physicists gathered to his
cause by George [Gen. Keegan] were a
very sharp group of young turks; and some
have since gone on to gain stature within
the high-energy physics crowd," one offi-
cial said.
It was anticipated by Gen. Keegan and
his advisers that the USSR would be
forced to vent gaseous hydrogen from the
experiments at Semipalatinsk and that
early warning satellites could detect it.
Underground Testing
Liquid hydrogen in large amounts is
believed by some officials to be utilized to
cushion the nuclear explosive generator
sphere and for cryogenic pumping of large
drift tubes nearly a kilometer in length
through which the beams are propagated
for underground testing. In both cases,
large amounts of gaseous hydrogen are
formed and released into the atmosphere,
probably carrying large amounts of
nuclear debris or radioactive tritium that
can be exploded at altitude and dispersed
to avoid harming the people below,
a Switching necessary to store the
energy from the generators in large capac-
itors.
^ Development of pressurized line,
needed to transfer the pulses from the
generators to power stores. The lines must
be cryogenically cooled because of the
extreme power levels involved.
Fof several. years, Air Force Maj. Gen.
George J. Keegan, who until his recent
retirement headed USAF's intelligence
activities, has been trying to convince the
Central Intelligence Agency and a number
of top U. S. high-energy physicists that the
Soviets are developing a charged-particle
beam weapon for use in an antiballistic
missile role.
Evidence was gathered by Air Force
intelligence from a variety of sources,
including early warning and high-resolu-
tion reconnaissance satellites, published
USSR papers on high-energy physics and
visits between Soviet and Free World
physicists. In contacts with scientists
deeply involved in developing components
necessary for beam weapon application in
both the USSR and the U. S., data was
gleaned that clearly showed the Russians
to be years ahead of the U. S. in most
areas of technology, one U. S. physicist
said. He added that it became increasingly
clear that the Soviets were making a
concerted effort to develop the technology
in each area so that, if it was pulled
together, a beam weapon and possibly
related laser weapons could result.
All of the evidence that Gen. Keegan
and his small team gathered about Soviet
designs on charged-particle beams was
presented to the CIA and its Nuclear
Intelligence Board. which has so far
rejected their conclusion that beam weap-
ons development is evident.
over a four-year period and involved the according to some U. S. scientists.
 tory
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~5
Experimental auto-resonant accelerator concept shows the hardware
configuration in diagram. The design is to determine whether the
accelerated plasma wave can be grown in a laboratory and whether
collective acceleration of protons can be achieved. The illustration
shows that the more efficient acceleration of particles may be
of the gas releases and explosions have
confirmed their source as being near the
Semipalatinsk facility."
USAF intelligence developed an acro-
nym-PNUT-to refer to the test area at
Semipalatinsk. The letter P is for possible,
and the other letters stand for nuclear
underground test. The CIA still refers to
the site as URDF-3-unidentified re-
search and development facility three.
In recent public pronouncements, Gen.
Keegan has taken the CIA to task for
having rejected Air Force intelligence
information about Soviet beam weapon
development. He also has spoken bitterly
about a number of top U. S. physicists
who refuse to accept even the possibility
that the Soviets are involved in beam
weapon development. Most of the physi-
cists who would not accept the data were
older members of the scientific community
who had been involved in research and
development from the early days of a
project called Seesaw.
Project Abandoned
The U. S. attempted unsuccessfully to
develop a charged-particle beam device
under the project code named Seesaw. It
was funded by the Defense Dept.'s
Advanced Research Projects Agency but
abandoned after several years.
A number of influential U. S. physicists
sought to discredit Gen. Keegan's evidence
about Soviet beam development.The gen-
eral attitude within the scientific commti-
nity was that, if the U. S. could not
successfully produce the technology to
and collective acceleration," an offici.,
explained. "The bottom line was that tl:
panel said there is no way to control c
stabilize such a beam if a weapon
produced. The net result is that evident
about possible beam weapons developmer
was rejected."
Later, some of the same physicists wh
rejected the charged-particle beam dal
realized the Soviets had made progress i
many separate areas of required tecl
nology for beam weapon applicatioi
Some physicists involved sought fundin
from the National Science Foundatic
and Energy Research and Developmicr
Administratioi, for nuclear power an
beam generation studies, one official saic
In an effort to prove that USAF intell
Bence estimates were correct, Gen. Kee
Ban and his young physicists set abot
trying to prove Soviet technology exists i
areas necessary for beam weapons.
Theoretical Blocks Isolated
After isolating the theoretical roar
blocks identified by the Scientific Adv
sory Board's munitions panel, the phys
cists, along with several new grout
recruited by Gen. Keegan, went to wor
exploring possible USSR technologic..
Within a few months the team, unde
the direction of a young Air Force phys
Gist. found that all the munitions panel
objections could be overcome "and ha
already been solved in the Soviet Unior
Several breakthroughs in high-energ
physics were involved," an official said.
Explosive generation was solved in th
USSR by Soviet academicians . Andre
certainly could not. "It was the original "The and of experts re ected_vitually' Terletsky, uho was once a KGB agent i
not-invented4ppti-QMed,Spr Releass.2004/WIU.~,CI I4dd: R49M 65A0006OQ1 OOO .7Andrei Sakharov, who v.a
physicist said. emotional meeting, they denigrated all instrumental in developing the Sovic
There were about 20 hypotheses ad- suggestions of nuclear explosion genera- hydrogen bomb and is now a dissident.
., -A h.? 16- . .nrt th.. f A'~ e.... ..,,.. ter.,...,,.. -- trnn:miccinn Cnvi~-t nhveiciet Rtiralcnv visited th
have a beam weapon, the Russians
possible using the concept where a traveling wave in an electro
beam traps and accelerates protons. The relativistic beam is mor
than simply a medium for propagation of the wave. It is the activ
medium that serves as the power source for reinforcing the electri
field of the wave and for accelerating the ions.
Nuclear Intelligence Board as to what the
facility at Semipalatinsk was being used
for by the USSR. One theory was that it
was a supersonic ramjet test site and
another was that it was a nuclear reactor
test site for commercial applications. That
was based on the layout, which resembled
some reactors in the USSR.
"There is now no doubt that there is
dumping of energy taking place at the site
with burning of large hydrogen flames,"
one official said. "What bothered the
Nuclear Intelligence Board at first was
that it was hard to imagine that some
seven technologies critical to the weapons
concept could be perfected there within
the time frame presented and not be
detected by us.
"In each case, the Air Force was able to
disprove the theories advanced, at least to
USAF satisfaction," one U. S. official
said. "But along the way Keegan became
an outcast within CIA and the Defense
Intelligence Agency. This was despite the
fact that many times in the past it turned
out that his intelligence information
proved correct when it was not accepted at
first. He [Keegan] made some great intel-
ligence breakthroughs," another official
said.
As evidence of Soviet intent mounted,
the Air Force convened a munitions panel
of its Scientific Advisory Board to
examine the problem. The panel met at
Livermore Laboratory for three days to
study the data of Gen. Keegan and his
technologists. Some members of that
panel also were involved in the Seesaw
project before it was halted.
 U. S. in July, 197Ap" &f:bjp IqG&a
advances in electron ram fusion. ERDA
immediately tried to cover up'the ideas he'
presented at Livermore in response to 'a
taunt by a Western scientist. It was all
considered highly secret in the U. S. and
"those seated there had to sit with their
mouths open and not respond to Ruda-
kov's outline," one U. S. physicist said.
"His idea startled the U.S. physics
community by its magnitude-transform-
ing laser and electron beams to soft X-rays
to compress fusion fuel at low energy
levels. This is a real scientific break-
through," the physicist said, "and could
allow them to produce large amounts of
fusion power to be used in producing
energy for a beam weapon." Rudakov had
such good results in using relativistic elec-
tron beams to achieve fusion that he now
is developing a $55-million machine
funded for this purpose in Russia called
Angara 5, a physicist added.
Gen. Keegan and his physics team
quickly determined that the next problem
to be resolved was flux compression
needed to convert energy from explosive
generation to electrical energy to power an
accelerator.
"Through open sources they learned
that the Soviets had long since solved that
problem," one expert said.
200Jf9C9Ik fflf 0016
Washington-U. S. Air Force and Navy
are expected by Fiscal 1978 to cut in-
house research and exploratory develop-
ment to approximately 35%, with 65%
being contracted out, a Defense Dept.
official told Congress.
This is approximately the goal set a
year ago (AwSST June 7, 1976, p. 47),
John L. Allen said during testimony
before the House Armed Services sub-
committee on research and develop-
ment. Allen is deputy director of Defense
research and engineering for research
and advanced technology.
Earlier, the Navy agreed to a cut of
3,000 persons and the USAF to a reduc-_
Lion of 1,000. These reductions were to
be accomplished within each service's
research and development staff and were
not limited to in-house laboratories.
The goal for the Army was placed at
2,900 employes, a figure to which that
service has not yet agreed, although
discussions are in progress. Allen ac-
knowledged that the Army is "heavily in-
house" oriented and would have to shift
personnel from laboratory work to
achieve the 35% goal.
0"0600l0MOQ6t%ration for commercial
application, but by its very nature, the
development of, energy or offshoots of the
technology has application to the beam
weapons field, the of icial said.
"This is a field where to our knowledge
there are few secrets. We go freely to their
5USSR] laboratories and have few doors
barred to us," a U. S. high-energy physi-
cist said, "and the same thing is true for
them in this country." This does not apply
to laboratories where weapons develop-
ment is being carried out.
Gen. Keegan's scientific 'team set out to
prove the feasibility in another area of
Soviet technology required for beam
weapons use-switching. Switching the
energy from its storage capacitors to the
electron injector is a major element
required for the weapon to function,
according to U. S. experts. .
A small U. S. company has devised a
breakthrough in switching technology, a
U. S. scientist explained, and has patented
it. Theoretical feasibility has now been
fully established, the scientist added.
The electron injector was the next area
of investigation on which the team focused
its attention. For this to be successful,
several engineers have explained, a gener-
ator is needed to provide a steady stream
of rapidly pulsed plasma of 100 million
electron volts per pulse at levels of 107
megajoules/sec.
"This is pure Buck Rogers to the physi-
cists at Livermore Laboratory, who
refused to accept that the Soviets could
accomplish it," one U. S? official said.
U.S. scientists since have been able to
confirm that Soviet high-energy institutes
long ago solved problems of electron injec-
tion that place them years ahead of U. S.
technology. "At the Institute of High-
Energy Physics in Novosibirsk, U. S.
scientists have found generator technology
that, when scaled up, can be used as an
electron injector." Such equipment is now
being exported to the U. S. for commercial
use. The Soviet technology involved is at
least 10 years ahead of anything under
development in the U. S.
CIA Chief Informed
U. S. scientists meeting at Livermore- beam. The beam is bent at an angle by
objected and said that power pulses gener- magnetic mirrors and propelled near the
ated could not be conducted over known speed of light along the drift tubes running
cabling without burning it up until Gen. underground about a kilometer, they
Keegan's researchers discovered that pres- believe, and the drift tubes are evacuated
surized gas lines invented in the U. S. to simulate operating the beam in space
years earlier by ITT and General Electric and are used only for beam propagation
were available and in use by the USSR. testing.
Reconnaissance Data At one time, there were five concentric
rings constructed around the building
Pipes at the Semipalatinsk site. leading about 5 km. (3-1 mi) apart. At each 5 deg.
from the underground chamber were of arc, a vertical sensor was placed. At
spotted by reconnaissance satellite, but first, U. S. analysts believed this arrange-
they were discounted by the CIA and ment was to monitor movement of gaseous
munitions panel as being there for another hydrogen clouds. The geometry was so
application, possibly to exhaust supersonic precise, however, that some believed the
ramjets. Photographs from satellites also sensors were located to measure beam
revealed a number of tank cars near the impact or for beam tracking.
test site loaded with liquid hydrogen. Storing energy to manage its flow was
USAF intelligence officials believed it was the next area of technology that Gen.
being used by the Soviets for cryogenic Keegan and his scientists investigated.
pumping of beam drift tubes. This was They discovered that the Soviets had In 1975, Gen Keegan disclosed his find-
considered impossible by U. S. scientists solved the problem earlier by using large ings on Soviet technology related to beam
because they believe liquid hydrogen is too water capacitors to store energy. Dense weapons development to William Colby,
volatile and dangerous for cryogenic use. fields of energy/electricity can be stored then head of the CIA, and to a number of
Again, however,'papers have been publish- using pressurized vater as a dielectric its.nuclear scientific advisers.
ed in the USSR on the subject, and liquid with pressure to 101) atmospheres. This is "On the strength of Keegan's informa-
hydrogen has been used for years for that considered another breakthrough by U. S. tion that the Soviets were on the verge of
purpose, one official said. physicists, because the USSR can store 40 developing a weapon to neutralize our
Officials believe that cabling leading times the density of energy that can be ICBMs and SLBMs, Colby directed the
from the underground granite chamber at stored in the Free World, one official formal convening of the CIA's Nuclear
Semipalatinsk carries power from a fission explained. "This technology is now being Intelligence Panel to consider the disclo-
explosive generator to nearby transformers developed in the U. S.," he added, after it sures," according to a U. S. official.
where it is stepped up. The power is cabled was completely verified under a contract in a final meeting last year with the
into giant capacitors inside one end of the with the Defense Nuclear Agency. panel, Gen. Keegan and his associates
large thick-walled building, they believe. For the past 15 years there has been an presented evidence over a three-day period
Along the 700-ft. b: 1 cl went into executive
electron injector g '"and ha 'collective aannAt~ic Q/' S7Tiinntl 'it fh ene~ pFiy~siicss5Aseesssiio teo sttudd~y the data and then wrote its
accelerator, according to their theory. The area, one U.S. physicist explained. That report. No copy of the report was ever
power is fed into them to produce a proton exchange is related mostly to projects for presented to USAF intelligence.
 :CIA-RDP80M00165Q04IQ600150006=7
Approved For ReIea a 2004/03/23
INJECTION BUNCH
the intelligence community is whether the
facility at Semipalatinsk is experimental
in nature and whether it will require a
major effort by the USSR over many
years to build more such facilities to use
for weapons purposes.
"One of the problems is that some U. S.
intelligence officials and scientists have
difficulty in understanding the concepts
involved. The technology is simply beyond
their comprehension," an official said. The
facility at Semipalatinsk is an example,
the official continued. It depends on how it
is visualized. "This is a case where the
experimental hardware is identical to the
equipment necessary to destroy an ICBM.
If they can generate the charged-particle
beam to test the device, and large amounts
of hydrogen being burned there indicate
they are, then they can generate for
weapons use."
The giant vacuum drift tube under-
ground at the facility is used only to
simulate upper atomspheric and space
conditions for the tests; in operational use,
the weapon's beam would be fired from
the collective accelerator front end.
"After 10 years of work at the site and
after developmental testing of the beam
for over a year, the only thing required is
to scale the device for weapons applica
tion," he said. That could be accomplished
by as early as 1978 with a prototype bearer
weapon, and it could be in an operational
form by 1980, some officials believe.
MAGNETIC
Collective accelerator principle in a schematic drawing shows that more efficient acceleration of particles may be possible when a trttvelir
wave in an electron beam traps and accelerates the protons.
That is standard, one official said,
because copies of the report are routed
only to those in authority within the
CIA.
"What the report said was that there
were no technological errors in USAF's
analytical work. It was agreed by the
board that there is a massive effort in the
USSR involving hundreds of laboratories
and thousands of top scientists to develop
the technology necessary for production of
a beam or other energy weapon for use
against U. S. ICBMs and SLBMs," an
official said. The report also said the
board was unable to accept USAF's
detailed conclusions regarding the experi-
mental site at Semipalatinsk. It reasoned,
according to several sources, that since
none of the key subtechnologies involved
had been perfected in the U. S., it was
implausible that the Soviets could be so
far ahead. In any event, the U. S. scien-
tific advisers to CIA were unwilling to
concede that the Soviets could harness
such advanced technology into a working
weapon or demonstration system. -
They were willing to accept that the
technology had been developed indepen-
dently, but not that it has been used in
series for weapons work at either Semipal-
atinsk or Azgir, officials said.
Colby wrote a letter to former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger just before he
left on a trip to negotiate with the Soviets
about strategic arms limitations and
mentioned that there "was a facility
related to nuclear functions that were
unknown but that it rpight have high
scientific application," one official said.
With that exception, none of the USAF
ACCELERATION
SECTION
scientists over the feasibility of beat
bending, USAF intelligence established
Soviet solution to the problem for th
Soviet beam concept, an official said.
Precise pointing and tracking may nc
be required. "All that is needed is for th
Soviet long-range precision radars no,
deployed in violation of the ABM agre;
ment to detect avenues or windows tc
reentry vehicle trajectories against targei
in the USSR. By aiming rapidly pulse
proton beams into these windows, ICBM
and SLBMs could be quickly saturate
and destroyed," he explained.
The windows would be located fror
1,000 to 2,000 naut. mi. out in span
"With this method, many acquisition an
tracking problems could be overcome. B
using the window concept to scatter th
beam over a wide area through whic
warheads must transit, it is believed tha
not many beam weapon devices would b
required to protect the USSR from a U.
retaliatory strike," the official said.
Many deployment schemes of grea
simplicity are open to the Russians. On
such scheme would be to place the collet
live accelerators vertically inside silos tha
the USSR now claims are for commanc
control and communication-
There are at least 1.50 of these silos tha
the U. S. is now overlooking by acceptin,
the Soviet definition as command an
control centers for their use. Using nearb
silos linked to those with the accelerato
Another big objection offered by some for containment of the explosive genera
U. S. physicists and other scientists is that tor, the Soviets could deploy such a systen
the beam from such a weapon will have to within a few years, an official said.
be prop gated and bent to intercept "Since the necessary radars are nearin;
incoming warheads in reentry vehicles, an operational readiness, all of the ncedet
intelligence 10MVIMt r g6_2004fO3tt23JiFd IA-RiDP8OMOOi65A000600460 +- Tents could be emplaced,'
able to the President, the secretary of One possible solution is that a "mag- he added.
State or the National Security Council, he netic mirror" can be used for beam "The one thing that George [Gen
added. bending to intercent reentry vehicles. Keeeanl find cn r,.rnirntrc nhnilt IN;
 Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M0016500600150006-7
U. S. officials scoff at the idea that the
backward Russians can develop technolo-
gy that we have been unable to develop in
the U. S. ," one official said. "He [Kee-
gan] admits that he could be wrong, but
he is not wrong about the Soviets' will to
produce such a weapon and about the
national assets they are devoting to it."
"From all of this evidence we have a
good idea of where the Soviets are in
development and where they are headed
with beam weapons and high-energy
lasers. Not much has been done in this
country since Seesaw," a U.S.-physicist
said. "But there is certainly a. lot, of new
interest now within the scientific commu-
There is an effort under way to establish
an agency in the U. S. to coordinate the
development of directed-energy weapons.
Some congessional staff members as well
as officials within the Administration are
pressing for this to be accomplished.
Fragmented Development
"Development is now fragmented with
various factions from a number of agen-
cies and laboratories trying to compete for
funding. What is needed now is for a
control point to be set up with some cohe-
sion and orderly planning to develop the
various components of technology re-
quired for weapons," one House staff
member said.
John L. Allen, deputy director of
Defense research and engineering for
research and advanced technology, said:
"Science fiction writers have been fasci-
nated with the concept of a directed-
energy weapon that beams energy directly
to a target, obviating the need for bombs,
missiles or projectiles. A weapon of this
type now appears not only to be possible,
but we may even have a choice -of the
beams that can be used . . . electrons or
other fundamental particles.
"These beams travel at or near the
speed of light [186,000 mi./sec.] so that
the delivery time is negligible, an attrac-
tive attribute for a weapon. The beams can
also be moved rapidly from one target to
the next. Thus, for defense against nearly
simultaneous multiple attackers, directed-
energy weapons are appealing."
He added that high-energy lasers are
the most advanced of the directed-energy
devices. "About 10 years ?go, it became
apparent that the generation and propaga-
tion of damaging levels of energy might be
feasible," Allen explained. "However, the
technical problems foreseen were formid-
able. High power is needed for useful
lethal ranges. The achievement of such
Allen said the Defense Dept.'s Ad- limited to pulsed operation. That limita-
vanced Research Projects Agency and the tion now is--frorn the design of associated
services are investigating the application electron-beam diodes and power supplies.
of high-energy lasers. "Both the Army and If E-beam diodes and power supplies can
Navy are pursuing terrestrial applications. be developed that can be repetitively
The Air Force is pursuing airborne appli- pulsed at the rate of 100-1,000 pulses/sec.
cations, and the Defense Advance Re- for several seconds, average beam powers
search Projects Agency is looking at the ;in the 1,000-megawatt range are believed
possible application of lasers in space possible.
defense with emphasis on chemical lasers. ."A number of military applications are
It is still too early to determine the poten- possible by changing the total energy
tial cost effectiveness of high-energy lasers requirements and repetition rates. Some of
as weapons, but the next two or three these missions are close at 'hand," a U. S.
years will yield a great deal of insight:'
Problems Cited _
physicist said.
Under current funding, U. S. officials
are convinced that M. L. Sloan and
"Particle beams--beams of electrons, William E. Drummond will complete their
for example-are not directly affected by mathematical model for the auto-resonant
the weather and may provide longer accelerator by July. In a paper on the
ranges than high-energy lasers in adverse accelerator concept, Sloan and Drum-
weather. However, they have other prob- mond explain the principle: a conceptually
lems. Charged-particle beams have a simple and compact method of generating
tendency to be unstable. They also are pulsed ion beams in the multi-ampere
deflected by magnetic fields, so pointing current range. -
and tracking uncertainties exist. If these This accelerator scheme combines the
problems can be solved, a viable weapon basic cdncepts of traveling wave and
could result. We believe that charged- collective acceleration. While the traveling
particle weapons might, in some applica- wave is used for the acceleration process,
tions, present a useful alternative or the wave is a collective eigenmode of the
complement to the high-energy laser for electron beam-magnetic guide field cytin-
giving us 'zero time of flight' weapons. We drical guide system rather than a vacuum
are `pursuing projects at an exploratory wave guide mode as in a conventional
level," Allen told the House Armed traveling wave accelerator.
Services research and development sub-
committee. Economy In Size
The Navy is seeking $6 million in Fiscal
1978 for a program called Chair Heritage
to continue exploratory development of
beam weapons, mostly related to acceler-
ator development. It plans to transition to
advanced development in Fiscal 1979.
Navy is now working on a scaled-down
advanced test accelerator. The design for
the device was selected in July, 1976, and
experiments with the accelerator are
slated for completion in August, 1978.
The auto-resonant accelerator, a nurn??
ber of knowledgeable physicists believe,
offers the potential for generating low-
cost, extremely intense beams of high-
energy heavy particles. The device is
believed capable of generating beams of
ions in the giga electron volt range. Power
levels would be in the range of 10" w. with
pulse lengths on the order of a microsec.,
i.e., single pulses with an energy of 1-10
mesaioules.
From the military application stand-
point, the auto-resonant accelerator has
the potential for being used to deliver the
equivalent of pounds of TNT to blast
targets at long range at the speed of light.
The effects of neutron, hot X-ray and
Because of the collective nature of the
medium of propagation, much higher
effective accelerating fields can be sus-
tained than in a conventional accelerator,
allowing for economy in the size of the
machine. This is extremely important in a
weapons application.
The cyclotron wave used in the auto-
resonant accelerator is a negative energy
wave so that in the acceleration process
where energy is delivered to the ions,
instead of being degraded, the electric
field energy of the wave actually grows.
If the auto-resonant accelerator
achieves only a few percent efficiency in
conversion of electron beam energy to ion
energy, pulsed currents in the tens of
amperes range or larger are anticipated.
The name auto-resonant accelerator is
derived from the process involved-the
novel feature is that as the cyclotron
eittenmodle delivers enerev to the acceler-
ated ions, it automatically extracts energy
from the relativistic electron beam. Power
is thus automatically fed from the relativ-
istic beam to the resonant ions.
To provide the accelerating medium,
the electron beam is propagated in a
high power requires a strong foundation of gamma radiation would have an equally vacuum over a distance of several meters.
basic knowledge of the physics and chem-- 'destructive impact on warheads. Austin The relativistic electron beam is the accel-
istry of highly excited gases, coupled with, Research Associates is doing basic re- erating medium and is used to accelerate
in some svelocirlpprQft*dtAF high- ZlMOb protons cncTgle
volume, high can be allowed into
The flow rates involved in gas dynamic ment, senior experts in physics believe, the front or injector end of the auto-
high-energy lasers are like those from a jet substantially higher energy levels can be resonant accelerator. Whcrr. the electron
 ppr a or ase 7d01CJ`(:.iRDBtfltll)~
protons at a predetermined rate, depend-
ing on the ambient hydrogen pressure and
volume and the electron beam energy,
current and cross-section. Juggling these
quantities can adjust the production rate.
There are other promising concepts for
collective accelerators at U. S. laborato-
ries and research centers, but they are not
all being actively pursued because of a
lack "of funding and coordination within
the high-energy physics field, according to
U. S. officials. These include:
a Traveling potential well accelerator
at Sandia Corp. funded by the Energy
Research and Development Administra-
tion and the USAF Office of Scientific
Research. Craig Olson at Sandia has
developed the concept for controlling the
acceleration of a potential well using an
intense light source or lasers beamed into
a low-pressure gas for a two-step photo
ionization process. Olson uses laser beams
at different wavelengths for ionization and
cesium vapor for the gas.
! Self-synchronized pinch mode! accel-
erator concept by Sidney Putnam at
Physics International in San Leandro,
Calif. This concept was proposed by
Putnam in 1972, but no experimental
work has been accomplished in the U.S.
The Soviets, however, have picked up this
concept and accomplished theoretical
work with it. The concept uses a space
non-charged neutralized electron beam,
which contracts in an envelope around
ions as it moves through the accelerator.
This is based on local magnetic pinch
effects.
O Collective bunching model acceler-
ator being developed under the Naval
Research Laboratory along with a trav-
eling wave accelerator using a slow space
charge wave. Cornell University is doing
the simulation work for the Navv.
? Toroidal storage ring accelerator con-
cept by Norman Rostoker at the Univer-
xity of California at Irvine. This concept.
provides for a small torus about four
meters in diameter. A cloud of electrons is
stably confined in the machine to trap
ions inside a ring to focus them.
^ Electron ring accelerator at the
University of Maryland under National
Science Foundation sponsorship. This is a
variation on the USSR smoke ring accel-
erator theme proposed years ago.
"Many possibilities are open for the
U. S. but remain unexplored," a senior
U. S. official said. "Whether this results
from lack of interest, lack of funds for
research, lack of national focus for efforq
in this field, or a belief that the possibility
that such weapons may adversely effect
detente is unclear. It does seem that the
Soviets have to ?en ve ,~-
v.hick may v1AP~d1Qy rove mo!stRe
planners and analysts to be wrong. If this
proof comes early enough, it may then be
Wash inb on--House of Representatives last week supported President Carter's strate?
nuclear weapons program in passing a $35.7-billion authorization for Fiscal 19
military research and development and procurement to buttress the Administratior
posture on a new strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreement with the USS
(Aw&sT Apr. 18, p. 16). After two days of debate, the measure Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D.-Calit
was approved by a vote of 347 to 43, offered an amendment to eliminate $1:
without any change in the aerospace, million for the USAF MX advance
program recommendations of the House' ballistic missile system and cancel ti
Armed Services Committee (Aw&sT Apr.
11, p. 21). The authorization increases the
Administration's request for procurement
programs by a net $793 million. This is
offset by a net reduction of $777 million in
research and development programs.
B-i Debated
The pros and cons of the controversial
USAF/Rockwell International B-I pro-
gram were argued on the House floor. But
neither the advocates of accelerating the
program, nor the advocates of canceling it,
challenged the President's decision to
procure five of the strategic bombers in
Fiscal 1978. The Ford Administration had
proposed a buy of eight.
Senate Unit Cuts F-14A
Washington-Senate Armed Services
'Committee last week reduced the
Navy/Grumman F-14A procurement pro-
gram from 44 aircraft to 36 during action
on the $35.7-billion Fiscal 1978 authori-
zation for weapons systems.
both the Ford and Carter Administra-
tions recommended $941 million for the
buy of 44. The Senate committee's action
would reduce the Fiscal 1978 funding by
$200 million.
The committee also adopted language
that would:
^ Limit the Fiscal 1979 buy of F-14s to
36, Instead of the 60 aircraft programed
by the Navy. _
^ Direct that the two-year saving, esti-
masted at a total $550 million, be applied
toward any shortfall In the McDonnell
Douglas F-18 program (Awasr Mar. 28. p.
14). -
The Navy solution to funding problems
was to permit a year's slippage In the
F-18 program and cancel the Lockheed
P-3C program in Fiscal 1979.
Congressmen claim the Navy wants to
00410 -1c pp80M00165A
Last week the House approved the
funding proposed by the Carter Adminis-
tration fnr hnih tHn C1A n...4 0 1 o
teic or,
'? Y ' JQff PC
Y 17
program. But only 11 House menibe:
supported the amendment. The other 8
members present voted against it.
The mobile NIX will only decrease U. 5
-security, Rep. Dellurns said. "The greate
accuracy of the missiles will pose
constant threat to the Soviet ICBMs, thu
increasing the chances of a preerriptiv
first strike."
Estimating the total MX program cos
at $40-50 billion, Rep. Dellums saic
That is a lot of money for a weapon tha
has been called `an arms controller'
nightmare.' President Carter has alrcad-
expressed his desire to ban it altogether
But owing to the verification problems i
will cause, it may be too late to ban it afte
we have developed it."'
Challenging Rep. Dellums, Rep. Jack F
Kemp (R.--N. Y.) told the House:
The premise upon which the [Dellurris',
argument is based is that the U. S. ii
provocative and that the Soviets have not
developed mobile land-based missiles,
That is wrong. They do have right. now a
3,000- to 4,000-naut. mi range- mobile
SS-20. If they combined the SS-20 with
the SS-16. it gives them a mobile intercon-
tinental ballistic missile. It would have
hard-target capabilities. It is the SS-20
that is destabilizing, not our MX research
and development program.
SALT Flexibility
"`W; should be giving the President the
flexibility to go into SALT 2 negotiations
with the support of this Congress by not
tying his hands in this important weapons
program, stopping it unilaterally," Itep.
Kemp said.
The Carter Administration reduced the
S294 million proposed by the Ford Admin-
istration by $160 million to the $134
million.
Meanwhile, the Carter Administration
has delayed implementation of its decision
OQ6QG1i5Q006rill-it cancellation of Min-
uteman 3 production, announced by
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown Feb.
 Approved For Re lase 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165 0600150006-7
Editorial
Beam Weapon Threat
The Soviet Union has achieved a technical break-
through in high-energy physics application that. may
soon provide it with a directed-energy beam weapon
capable of neutralizing the entire United States
ballistic missile force and checkmating this country's
strategic doctrine.
These developments are described in detail in this
issue by AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
Military Editor Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., in the
story beginning on page 16. There are those in the
official intelligence bureaucracy who will challenge
our judgment in printing these facts on those
Watergate-worn grounds of "national interest." We
have been following this story for more than a year
and have in fact refrained from printing it earlier
because of what were then legitimate matters of
intelligence security. But those considerations no
longer exist.
The hard proof of eight successful Soviet tests of
directed-energy beam weapon technology gives new
and overriding urgency to bring these developments
into the public domain and rip the veil of intelligence
secrecy so that this whole matter of vital national
urgency and survival will finally be brought to the
attention of the President of these United States, the
Congress and the citizens of this republic whose
future is at risk. In all of the previous four years that
these Soviet developments have been known to the
official intelligence community, they have been stifled
by a conspiracy of skepticism and silence and never
once penetrated to the highest decision-making coun-
cils of this country.
Technology Leap Verified
The incredible story of how the Soviets leap-
frogged a generation of high-energy physics tech-
nology and developed a workable experimental model
of a directed-energy beam weapon now has been
largely verified by the successive Soviet tests at Semi-
palatinsk and Azgir and the brilliant work of a small
group of extremely young physicists in this country.
The fact that this country still has a chance of
avoiding a crippling technological surprise that could
render its entire strategic missile force ineffective is
due to the courageous, dogged and perceptive work of
a handful of U. S. Air Force intelligence specialists
who polarized around the leadership of Maj. Gen.
George Keegan, Jr., recently retired chief of Air
Force intelligence (Aw&sT Mar. 28. p. 38).
We do not suggest any formal conspiracy to.
suppress the mounting evidence of' a massive Soviet.
research, development and industrial push aimed at
the goal of an anti-ICBM directed-energy beam
who through the ages have spent their twilight years
proving that the next generation of breakthroughs is
"impossible."
In modern times, we have the continuing examples
of Dr. Vannevar Bush, who thundered that the ICBM
was a technical impossibility, and the assortment of
scientists in the Eisenhower era who firmly believed
that manned spaceflight should be abandoned
because the human system could not survive its rigors,
It was a similar group of high-energy physicists. some
heavy with Nobel laurels, who encouraged the natural
technical illiteracy of the Central Intelligence Aorency
to discount the steadily growing stream of Soviet
developments and to lead the bitter intramural battles
that suppressed the evidence from higher government
councils for crucial years.
There is still considerable debate over the real
significance of the Soviet tests at Semipalatinsk and
Azgir and-how long it will take the Soviets to trans-
late their experimental developments into a usable
weapon. But there is no longer much doubt among
top-level U. S. high-energy physicists that it is
feasible to develop a directed-energy beam device.
epi;c,tsm Overcome
There also is an element in the Pentagon that can
visualize the eventual Soviet deployment of the
directed-energy beam weapon as the end game of an
intricate chess exercise that began with the 1972
nenotiatien of' the anti-ballistic m' siie treaty. which
effecti?.efv stopped not only L. S. deployment of an
anti-ICBM system but also most of its significant on-
going research and development. The hypothesis, for
this chess gaine, which ends in the early I980s with
the triumphant Soviet shout of ``check and mate,-
involves the U. S. finding its strategic deterrent
ballistic missile force stripped of any defensive
system, with the Soviets using their anti-ICBM
directed-energy beam weapon to negate any U. S.
retaliation and a strong civil defense shield to mini-
mize damage from the few warheads that might
penetrate.
The race to perfect directed-energy weapons is a
reality. Despite initial skepticism, the U. S. scientific
community now is pressuring for accelerated efforts
in this area.
It is absolutely essential that the remaining chap-
tors of this debate be conducted in public where (-very
American citizen, from President Jimmy Carter on
down, is aware of the elements that will determine
this nation's future. It is far too important an i?u~: to
be cloaked in the obscure bureaucratic in-fighting of
weapon. Rather it was a combination of' smug Amer- It could be a fatal error for this country
icon assurance that the Soviets were simply not to put it, aiaior strategic reliance on a
ani.tb ~~, r~iicctuijlf ~l~a'?~~OE3 Ift13 F3`c 191 DP801VI rooi65AhQ~U6~Q4r5QUc,n (-punter
theintelfiLence community.
t+i continue
i, if ...c._.
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 The Director
Approved For#Rele '992O23 : CIA-RDP80M00
Dear Senator Hathaway,
Now that the hearings on the open budget
question are completed, I want to let you know
how much I appreciate your guiding hand in the
way you carried this out. Your advice and your
instant intervention with Senator Inouye certainly
changed my approach to the issue. I am very
pleased with the way it has gone and believe this
was by far the best approach.
Again, thanks and warmest regards.
Yours sincerer
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Honorable William D. Hathaway, Chairman
Subcommittee on Budget Authorization
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
ER Note: Orig to OLC for delivery to addressee
Icy - DCI
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 - : B. DAN
ARY A E ' 1',AOi?EIORiCI A9SVO04/03/23: CIA-RDP80M00165A00060 0006-71 Execativa ra,ist:y
BIRCH BAYH
IND
,
, CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J. {C1 .~.. /-7
ADLAI E. ST'VENSON, I0 JAKE GARN, UTAH t r, ('/'/ r I
WILLIAM D: HATHAWAY, MAINE CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR.. MD.
WALTER D
HUDDLE
TON
KY
.
2
,
. JAMES B. PEARSON. KANS.
JOSEPH R. BIOEN, JR., DEL. JOHN H. CHAFES, R.I.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD G. LUGAR. IND.
GARY HART. COLO. MALCOLM WALLOP, WYO.
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA., EX OFFICIO
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN., EX OFFICIO
WILLIAM G- MILLER. STAFF DIRECTOR
EARL D. EISENHOWER, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
's,ICnifeb , fofes Z- on,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 400, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
May 3, 1977
IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R#7735
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Admiral Turner:
I am writing to reiterate a request. Earlier
this year, the Committee and the Agency engaged in
discussions and correspondence regarding the Commit-
tee's access to CIA reports to the Intelligence
Oversight Board (IOB) and to the Attorney General
on activities that raise questions of legality, pro-
priety or possible violations of law. The Agency's
agreement to provide the substance of these reports
to the Committee was confirmed in a letter addressed
to me from Mr. Knoche and dated January 21, 1977.
During your confirmation hearing, you reaffirmed
the Agency's commitment regarding the provision of
the substance of Agency reports to the IOB. Like-
wise, in response to the Committee's supplementary
question on reports to the Attorney General, you
cited the relevant portion of Mr. Knoche's letter.
In a letter to you, dated March. 3, 1977, I set out
the Committee's additions to Mr. Knoche's initial
statement of terms.
I am concerned that to date the Committee has
not received any information regarding either reports
to the IOB or reports to the Attorney General. As I
have indicated before, the Committee considers the
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Admiral Stansfield Turner
Page 2
May 3, 1977
full and timely provision of this information neces-
sary for effective oversight. The Committee would
appreciate receiving this material promptly.
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 UNCLASSIFIED ~ CONFIDENTIAL. SECRET
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EXECUTIVE' SECRETARIAT
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ACTION
1 FO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
D/DCI/IC
4
DDS&T
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/NI
9
GC
10
LC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/ Pen
14
D/S
15
DTR
16
Asst/ DCI
17
AO/DCI
18
C/IPS
19
DCI/SS
20
D/EEO
21
22
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 Approved For Releee 2004/03/23: CIA-RDP80M00165A009fiO0150006-7= -
t
4 MAY 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Executive Assistant to the DCI
Bill Miller called to say that the DCI agreed to send
the IOB Reports to the SSCI on a regular basis but nothing
has happened yet.
STAT
Commander, U.S. Navy
cc OGC
IG
DDCI (per BCEvans)
OLC (per BCEvans)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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 Approved For Relea2004/03/23 :CIA-RDP80M00165A0000150006-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OLC 77-0858/A
March 10, 1977
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Your letter of March 3, 1977 (R#6693) to Admiral Turner
was received on March 9, and The General Counsel has been
asked to develop an Agency response. Agency representatives
are now looking into this matter and we will respond as soon as
all appropriate Agency offices have been consulted.
Sincerely,
George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - C&R Staff
1 - OLC Subject
1 - O Chrono
STAT OLC:DFM:jms
a----'E R,
10 March 1977)
Q~~WTION
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