CCPC STUDY ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AGAINST ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000700110059-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: January 24, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Memorandum for
Holders-2
NFIB-D-64.7/4
24 January 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF NFIB-D-64.7/1
FROM Walter Elder
Executive Secretary, NFIB
SUBJECT : CCPC Study on Intelligence Activities
Against Illicit Narcotics Trafficking
REFERENCES : a. NFIB-D-64.7/4, 29 October 1976
and Memorandum for Holders-1,
dated 10 December 1976
b. NFIB-M-11, 16 December 1976,
Item 1.
Pursuant to Board discussion at the 16 .,ecember 1976
NFIB meeting, the attached revised pages are circulated
for substitution in all copies of the subject document.
Copies of the study have been forwarded to the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs; the
Attorney General; Mr. Bensinger, the Drug Enforcement
Administrator; and Ambassador Vance, Chairman of the Cabinet
Committee on International Narcotics Control.
Attachment:
Revised Pages 6 through 17
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A. The Role of the Intelligence Community in the
Narcotics Control Effort
Conclusion #1: The Intelligence Community's participa-
tion in, and assistance to, the narcotics control
effort are limited and are not likely to change without
revisions in current policy and regulations.
Recommendation:
That the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
seek National Security Council (NSC) consideration
of the problem and generation of guidance for the
Intelligence Community.
Conclusion #2: The relationship of both DEA and Customs
to the Intelligence Community as defined in Executive
Order 11905 is not clear. Although both are fully com-
mitted to the narcotics problem, the Intelligence Com-
munity has not always given sufficient attention to
their needs and capabilities in planning, targeting and
resource allocation, and in establishing national intel-
ligence priorities. As the lead narcotics agency with
attendant intelligence responsibilities, it is particu-
larly important that DEA be represented in the Intelli-
gence Community to the extent necessary to permit the
exchange of information on narcotics matters. It is
recognized, however, that as a practical matter, it is
difficult to achieve separation of DEA's foreign intel-
ligence and its domestic responsibilities. Thus, the
integration of DEA's foreign intelligence elements into
the Intelligence Community will involve legal and policy
problems.
Recommendation:
Assuming favorable resolution of the legal and
policy problems mentioned above, that the
Intelligence Community Staff, in consultation
with the Department of Justice and DEA, consider
revision of Executive Order 11905 to include the
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foreign intelligence elements of DEA in the
membership of the foreign intelligence community
for narcotics intelligence matters to facilitate
the coordination of foreign narcotics intelligence
programs. An advantage of such a revision would
be its enabling the DCI to effect overall coordi-
nation of the foreign narcotics intelligence effort
and give him authority to provide guidance and
direction to DEA's foreign intelligence collection,
processing, analytical and production efforts.
A disadvantage to DEA would be the fact that its
inclusion as a foreign intelligence agency would
at the same time subject it to the restrictions
of Section 5 of Executive Order 11905, unless
DEA could get an exclusion from these restrictions.
Conclusion #3: The collection, analysis and dissem-
ination of narcotics intelligence is inadequate,
primarily because of current legal and policy
restrictions imposed on foreign intelligence agencies
and the subsequent inability of all U.S. Federal
agencies to work together in a cohesive, coordinated
manner. There is a need for a mechanism which will
bring representatives of all U.S. Government narcotics
information collection agencies' activities together at
the working level on a continual basis to share all
available information and to address the substantive
requirements of the concerned agencies. The establish-
ment of the IDIG should be regarded as a positive step
toward achieving this end.
Recommendations:
1. That foreign intelligence agencies support
the IDIG concept and activities to the extent pos-
sible, given the current legal and policy restric-
tions that are imposed on their support to law
enforcement services.
2. If an evaluation of the IDIG approach to the
Mexican heroin problem indicates that it is an
effective means of providing better support to
U.S. policy makers, that IDIG use a similar
approach to narcotics problems in other Latin
American, Southeast Asian or Near East countries.
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B. Adequacy and Allocation of Resources
Conclusion #1: Past recommendations of the CCPC and
other U.S. Government committees for improvements in
intelligence collection and analysis in support of
narcotics control have not been fully implemented.
If more effective narcotics information programs are
to be stimulated, a greater degree of support is needed
from the executive level including support from the
White House and from the Cabinet Committee on Inter-
national Narcotics Control (CCINC).
Recommendation:
That the CCINC consider and take appropriate
action to ensure that CCPC narcotics recommen-
dations concerning the overseas missions'
reporting and coordination functions are
implemented.
Conclusion #2: To ensure better coordination of the
overall foreign narcotics intelligence effort, a
permanent narcotics intelligence committee or sub-
committee be established under the DCI to conduct
periodic reviews of the narcotics information col-
lection effort and to recommend measures which should
be taken to improve the U.S. Government's overall
foreign narcotics intelligence programs.
Recommendation:
That a permanent CCPC subcommittee be established
to review and coordinate the overall foreign
narcotics intelligence effort and report on its
findings and recommendations periodically to the
CCPC. Additionally, that the CCPC report to the
NFIB by 1 April 1977 on those actions taken to
implement the Study recommendations and results
obtained.
Conclusion #3: A multidisciplinary team of experts
could make a significant contribution to an estimate
of the worldwide opium poppy crop. To accomplish this
task would require analysis of information on illicit
and licit opium poppy cultivation and opiate produc-
tion by a team of experts that would include photo-
interpreters, agronomists, and specialists in other
disciplines.
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Recommendation:
That the Conunittee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI)
consider the proposal to establish a multidisci-
plinary team of experts, under CIA's leadership,
to analyze the worldwide opium poppy crop. The
security classification of the product would be
a governing factor in its final utilization.
Conclusion #4: Insufficient resources are committed
to the analysis of raw data. The emphasis on law
enforcement operations is often detrimental to
developing effective intelligence capabilities. DEA
and Customs managers should increase resources assigned
to narcotics intelligence programs to correct this
imbalance.
Recommendations:
1. That enforcement agencies, the DEA in
particular, consider assigning additional per-
sonnel, trained in the specialized skills of
collecting and analyzing information, to increase
the efficiency of their overseas intelligence and
enforcement operations.
2. That Customs undertake a program to improve
the analytical training of its headquarters staff
and the information collection techniques of
officers assigned overseas.
C. Intelligence Collection Effort
Conclusion #1: Narcotics reporting from many missions
in response to CCINC information collection require-
ments has been inadequate.
Recommendations:
1. That the Foreign Intelligence Subcommittee
(FISC) of the CCINC be charged with formulating
coordinated information collection requirements
which are more nearly precise and specifically
tailored to each country's or each region's
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particular problem; and, further, that Federal
agencies be tasked to monitor the response of
their reporting elements to these requirements
to ensure that information is reported on a
timely basis.
2. That Chiefs of Mission exploit the expertise
of all mission personnel to ensure that narcotics
information requirements are answered as rapidly
and as thoroughly as possible.
3. That the Department of Defense (DoD) provide
specific guidance to military commands with
intelligence/counterintelligence resources to
ensure that DoD cooperation is given to satisfying
valid information collection requirements through
by-product reporting.
Conclusion #2: Although Mexico is currently the primary
source of illicit drugs entering this country, reporting
on other potential sources of illicit narcotics is needed
to identify promptly those areas which might become
alternate or supplementary sources to Mexico. Special
emphasis should be placed on Burma, Thailand, Pakistan
and Afghanistan.
Recommendation:
That CCINC-approved periodic alert reporting
requirements be sent to Chiefs of Mission in
countries where opium poppies are or can be cul-
tivated. In countries where opium is a legal
crop, that Chiefs of Mission be instructed to
report on crop control measures and the possible
diversion of opium into illicit markets.
Conclusion #3: The cooperation of foreign governments,
particularly their law enforcement and intelligence
services, is vital to U.S. narcotics control programs.
Continued diplomatic persuasion is required to encourage
foreign governments to participate actively in joint
anti-narcotics efforts.
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Recommendation:
Conclusion #4: Interpol's contribution to the world-
wide narcotics control effort is not substantial, but
it has the potential of becoming a valuable facility
in some countries where the police are willing and
able to cooperate.
Recommendation:
That the Department of the Treasury request the
U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol in
Washington to encourage member nations to expand
the use of the total Interpol communications net-
work to facilitate the investigation of narcotics
trafficking.
D. Information Management and Report Evaluation
Conclusion #1: A considerable amount of narcotics infor-
mation is not reaching all of the Federal agencies which
have a need for it. In some cases, information exchange
and dissemination procedures, both in Washington and
overseas, are inadequate. Some collectors of narcotics
information do not appreciate the value of their product
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to other agencies. For example, DEA enforcement officers
frequently collect information of general interest to
Washington analysts and program managers, but make only
a partial record and dissemination of it.
Recommendation:
That DEA, in particular, increase the emphasis
given to narcotics information collection overseas,
devote more resources to analytical responsibili-
ties and improve dissemination procedures to ensure
that valuable information does not remain restricted
to operational files.
Conclusion #2: Current computer systems devoted to
the narcotics problem are constantly being adapted
and improved to meet Federal agency needs. There
have been insufficient improvements, however, in both
data input and interagency access to narcotics data
banks. Restrictive caveats on much of the information
contained in CIA's Target Analysis System (TAS), an
ancillary system designed to support the Major
International Narcotics Trafficker (MINT) Register,
severely limits the enforcement agencies' ability to
use the CIA data.
Recommendations:
1. That DEA, Customs and CIA take immediate
steps to improve the data base input and facil-
itate interagency access to information already
in existing automatic data processing (ADP)
systems.
2. That CIA remove as many of the restrictive
caveats as possible consistent with protection
of sources on information contained in its TAS
system and provide this information for the use
of DEA and Customs in their ADP systems.
Conclusion #3: CIA's non-SIGINT intelligence information
reports tend to be too highly classified and restricted
to be of operational use to law enforcement agencies.
CIA intelligence which can be acted upon by law enforce-
ment agencies in the field is needed. However, if CIA
information is passed to them, measures should be taken
to protect sensitive sources and methods.
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Recommendation:
That CIA make every effort to lower the classifi-
cation and restrictions on its non-SIGINT narcotics
intelligence information without compromising
sources or methods so that this information can be
passed to U.S. and foreign enforcement agencies and
be made available for inclusion in DEA and Customs
computer data banks.
Conclusion #4: The lack of a systematic customer
evaluation procedure for narcotics information limits
the ability of Federal agencies to improve the quality
of their reports, especially overseas, where good
feedback would permit retargeting of ongoing operations
to make them more responsive to customer needs. Such
a customer evaluation system is needed by CIA to
assist in determining if a particular operation is
providing useful information as well as in refining
collection requirements.
Recommendation:
That DEA, Customs and CIA develop a systematic
procedure for DEA and Customs to provide substan-
tive, evaluative comments on CIA raw intelligence
and information passed in the field.
E. Operational Coordination
Conclusion #1: Coordination of U.S. clandestine nar-
cotics intelligence collection operations has improved
since 1972, especially with regard to DEA's foreign
information gathering operations. There is, however,
a continuing need for more extensive operational
coordination in order to prevent duplication of effort
and possible damage to the U.S. Government's foreign
relations caused by the exposure of sensitive clandes-
tine operations. The Interagency Source Registry (ISR)
plays an important part in the operational coordination
process, but DEA and CIA should periodically review
the ISR procedures to ensure complete compliance and
a better interagency understanding of the value of the
source registry. DEA's use of domestically-based
sources to collect narcotics information overseas can
cause problems abroad unless the operational collection
plans are coordinated well in advance of the operation.
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Recommendation:
That DEA instruct its Domestic Regional Offices
to inform the appropriate DEA Regional and District
Offices overseas concerning the travel abroad of
domestically-based DEA sources; and that DEA overseas
offices, in turn, inform the appropriate CIA
Station Chief of the planned travel, identifying
the source and the general nature of his mission.
Conclusion #2: The Memorandum of Understanding between
DEA and Customs (see Appendix I) clarified many points
of contention resulting from the Reorganization Plan
and has led to improvements in the exchange and use of
information collected by both agencies. DEA has made
significant strides in developing its foreign and domes-
tic intelligence collection programs, but its current
commitment of resources is still inadequate to meet all
of the constantly changing narcotics intelligence
requirements.
Recommendations:
1. That Customs and DEA continue to strengthen
and adhere to the agreements set forth in the
Memorandum of Understanding.
2. That DEA management be urged to increase its
commitment of resources devoted to collecting,
analyzing and disseminating narcotics information.
F. Legal Problems and Restrictions
Conclusion #1: U.S. foreign intelligence agencies are
limited in their collection role and in the information
they can disseminate to U.S. enforcement agencies
because of legal restrictions. Nevertheless, the use
of sensitive clandestine sources and methods has proven
to be an effective means of collecting narcotics infor-
mation, often providing the only means of access to vital
data. Efforts should be made to exploit these sensitive
collection techniques, but it is equally essential that
the sensitive sources and methods be protected, without
prejudicing a U.S. court prosecution or an ongoing
enforcement case. A number of urgently needed decisions
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affecting the operational guidelines of Federal agencies
engaged in the narcotics control effort are currently
under examination by the Department of Justice.
Recommendations:
1. That the DCI and the Administrator for DEA
request the Department of Justice to act expedi-
tiously on DEA's request for clear guidelines as
to its relationship with U.S. foreign intelli-
gence agencies in general and with NSA and CIA
in particular.
2. That NSA provide strategic narcotics-
related information (as opposed to operational
enforcement information) to the DEA and
Treasury/Customs.*
3. That DOD formally authorize and encourage
DOD collection elements of foreign intelligence
to report narcotics information as by-product
reports.
Conclusion #2: One of the quickest, cleanest and most
effective techniques to immobilize foreign traffickers
is through prosecution in foreign countries. Informa-
tion from sensitive sources and methods poses far less
of a legal problem to enforcement operations when
prosecution takes place in a foreign court.
Recommendation:
That Federal agencies make greater efforts to
furnish narcotics information, other than SIGINT
and overhead photography, to foreign governments
to aid in the prosecution of narcotics traffickers
in foreign courts.
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interdiction operations. When Customs
o ows its
standard search and seizure
practices,
identification
of source is not necessary.
Customs,
however, must
advise DEA in advance when
information
derived from
sensitive sources is involved in the interdiction opera-
tions so that DEA can discuss with appropriate Depart-
ment of Justice officials the advisability of initiating
a prosecution.
Recommendation:
That CIA, DEA and non-NSA Department of
Defense (DoD) sensitive source information
be made available to Customs to support
those Customs interdiction operations which
are likely to succeed in removing illicit
narcotics from the U.S. market without
revealing how and where the sensitive infor-
mation was obtained.
Conclusion #4: DEA and Customs need to improve the
training of their officers stationed overseas in
foreign information collection techniques. Their
officers are not adequately alert to the value
of good narcotics information. Consequently, they
tend to concentrate on short-range enforcement
actions rather than on the development of longer range
narcotics collection programs. CIA has the expertise
to assist DEA and Customs with their training courses,
but has not done so because of legal restrictions.
Recommendation:
That the CIA Office of General Counsel, in
coordination with the Department of Justice,
as appropriate, be asked to review the legality
and propriety of CIA's assisting DEA and Customs
in developing improved training programs.
Conclusion #5: Defense attorneys often call for
discovery motions during the trial of narcotics
traffickers in U.S. courts, especially with regard
to possible electronic surveillance of the defendant.
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The Attorney General's procedures for NSA and his
proposed procedures for CIA, however, restrict the
information which these agencies are permitted to
have and thus inhibit the passage of such information
to DEA. It is important that accurate and detailed
records of information collection efforts be main-
tained to help the Department of Justice respond to
discovery motions.
Recommendation:
That Federal agencies make any needed changes
in their file-keeping procedures to permit the
maintenance of complete and accurate records
concerning information disseminated or surrendered
to law enforcement agencies. This will enable
the Department of Justice to document the case
for source sensitivity in order to preclude
disclosure of sensitive source information
pursuant to defense discovery motions.
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