REVIEW OF THE KEMP/ULLMAN PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000800090014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 19, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
?r 0,101 In? I3ger.c~ Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
N10 2.103-77
19 August 1977
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligen
Review of the Kemp/Ullman Papers
1. On 6 July Professor Kemp sent you two papers he co-authored
with LCDR Ullman. One paper--" Towards a New Order of U.S. Maritime
Policy"--was published in the Naval War College Review; the other--
"U.S. Global Strategy; The Future of the Hale-War P inning Contingency"--
does not appear to have been published yet. You asked that they be
reviewed and briefed to you.
2.. Attached are very brief summaries of each paper with my
comments on each and a draft reply for your consideration.
Attachment:
"Half-War Planning Contingency"--
Suninary and Comments
"U.S. Maritime Policy"--Summary
and Corrments
Draft Reply
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HALF-WAR PLANNING CONTINGENCY
SUMMARY
1. The US is over-concentrating on the strategic nuclear and
central front balances--the one-war portion of the 1 1/2 war planning
assumption--to the detriment of the requirements of the half-war
contingency.
2. The importance of areas covered by the half-war contingency
forces--the Middle East-Persian Gulf; Northern European theater,
Western Pacific, etc.--has increased over the last few years because
of the growing dependence upon foreign sources of natural resources--
particularly oil--and associated sea lines of communications while at
the same time US access to these areas is faced by new constraints
imposed by increased Soviet military power, growing military capabilities
of littoral states and the new ocean regime, including: 200-mile
exclusive economic zones, off-shore drilling and pollution control
zones.
3. To counter this problem the authors suggest the following:
a. To fight tendency to over-concentrate on the strategic
nuclear and central front balances, add a member to the NFIB to
develop "unconventional" approaches to US strategic policy and
testing current and future options.
b. A combination of US and allied actions should be made
to limit western vulnerabilities in the Northern Flanks, Persian
Gulf and Pacific.
c. Express future policy actions in terms of preferred
outcomes--not in vague terms of national interest.
COMMENTS
1. The paper makes the point on page 2 that it is important to
adequate planning that we create policy based on a set of "preferred
outcomes" instead of a more rigid set of "national interests." The
examples of these preferred outcomes are--"prevention of war with
the Soviet Union" and "limitation of any conflict should it occur" and
"maintenance of access to overseas areas." The concept of "preferred
outcomies" does not seem to offer any advantage and is not even
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distinguishable from the current--and supposedly more rigid and narrow--
concept of strategic objectives. A convincing case is not made for the
concept which is the final recommendation of the paper. In any case
the phrase "preferred outcome" creates a problem. For example, it
implies that there are other acceptable outcomes. I suspect we as a
nation would not want to articulate the idea that strategic deterrence--
our most preferred outcome--has an acceptable alternative. The concept
of goals and objectives seems to offer the greatest flexibility.
2. The paper, throughout, repeats the theme that there is too
much emphasis on Strategic Warfare and the, balance on the Central Front
without adequate consideration of other areas. The authors should be
aware that the current administration is in the process of identifying
alternative military strategies in a manner which attempts to integrate
all areas of critical US interest to produce a properly balanced
military strategy. I believe the authors are right about the focus,
however. The:extremely light treatment given in PRIM-10 of the Persian
Gulf vulnerabilities and importance are examples.
3. The authors hypothesize that because of the careful attention
to Strategic Warfare and the balance in the Central Front stability will
be maintained there and in a crisis the Soviets will capitalize on
surprise and take action elsewhere but so as to control the conflict
and influence a post-war settlement. They suggest'that Soviet occupation
of the North Cape of'Norway or some action to remove Western access to
Persian Gulf oil.
a. With respect to the Northern flank, I can't imagine a situation
which is stable or low level on the Central Front where immediately
proximate conflict would not destroy that stability. Additionally,
however, the uncertainty of success and the lack of any clear benefit
probably make that operation unattractive.
b. The Persian Gulf presents a much more interesting. set of options,
costs and benefits (page 14-16). Of these, the one selected--occupy a
portion of the upper Persian Gulf littoral--assumes this is feasible while
maintaining all of the other balances intact and ignores the fact that it
may not produce a significant impact soon enough.
4. With respect to the Pacific the authors properly focus on the
need for a -total force view of force balances. They argue that "Trident"
deployments to the Pacific will cause Soviet counter SLBM deployments to
the Pacific. These forces will be flexible in their capability. If US
actions like a carrier task force transfer from PAC to LANT take place,
a large imbalance may be created. It should be noted that Trident will
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replace existing missiles in SSBNs--and as such does not represent a new
threat but a more capable system, and as such would not necessarily
create Soviet reaction in terms of force levels. For example when the
US went to POSEIDON there is no evidence of Soviet counter-SSBN develop-
ments that were keyed to that specific event.
5. Page 20, first line, uses the term National Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board which is probably intended to be the NFIB.
The function of developing threats to US interests rests with the
Intelligence Community. The development of "unconventional approaches
toward US strategic policy" would more appropriately be a function for
the NSC Staff.
6. The third recommendation focuses on the importance of the
Persian Gulf to the West and urges an increase' in our base support
structure. It is not clear that Soviet interest in this area will not
increase to approach that of the West in the 1980s and beyond. Further,
it is not clear that the Soviets will possess any inherent operational
advantage in the area under a properly negotiated "demilitarization" in
the area. This is particularly true in view of the points made in the
article about trends in Soviet influence in the area and the growing
strength of littoral states--particularly Iran and India.
7. The fourth recommendation includes splitting the Trident
force to both oceans to reduce the impact of likely Soviet counter-
deployments. First, there is no high probability that Trident--as a
replacement--would elicit significantly different force deployments
by the Soviets than did its predecessor. Secondly, the costs of splitting
the force-is enormous in the early stages. Additionally, if the Soviets
reacted by building more ASW-oriented but flexible resources for the
Atlantic, our motivation to swing more to the Atlantic from the Pacific
would weaken the balance in the Pacific. Finally, Trident will ultimately
replace the present SSBN force completely with the same result as placing
all Trident -forces in the Pacific except that the later phasing of Trident
into the Pacific would be done in a period of less certainty about relative
capability and with potentially greater risk involved.
3
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TOWARDS A NEW ORDER OF US MILITARY POLICY
SUMMARY
1. Proposition
The US does riot have a coordinated or articulated maritime policy
sufficient to cope with the fundamental changes taking place in the
strategic environment. Unless we make certain critical decisions
concerning the nature and direction of this policy for the next decade,
we may find our international position severely eroded.
II.
Argument
A.
Importance of maritime environment has grown considerably.
1.
Sea resources
2.
Sea transportation
B.
Western access to this environment -is facing new constraints.
1. Growth of Soviet naval power
2. Law of the Sea
3. Growth in military strength of littoral states
4. Western naval powers are losing access to overseas
military facilities
C. US maritime pclicy debate now almost exclusively concerned with
US-Soviet naval balance.
The other factors are also of great importance and must be
considered in US maritime policy.
D. US maritime policymaking community cuts across many organizations,
bureaucratic politics hinders formulation of a coordinated maritime policy.
There is no clear understanding of maritime issues and no effective
balanced coordination of the various interests in government.
III. Conclusions
In the emerging maritime environment the US has the opportunity to
reap major benefits. To capitalize, US must make tough decisions with
regard to priorities in view of escalating financial and political costs
of maintaining the necessary worldwide maritime presence.
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A. politically the US should take steps to better coordinate
the bureaucratic machinery which establishes and executes an overall
maritime strategy.
B. Commercially, the US should:
1. Increase commercial shipbuilding to exploit fish and
mineral resources.
2. Articulate strong support for commercial exploitation
of the 200 NM economic zone.
3. Exploit advantage in maritime technology in resource
location, ocean drilling and mining, fish breeding, and large
superstable floating concrete platforms.
C. Military, the US should counter Soviet naval power by:
1. Exploiting Soviet geographic weaknesses by expanding
mine warfare and mine delivery systems capabilities.
2. Signal US resolve in critical areas such as the Indian
Ocean by subtle and low-key diplomatic and naval initiatives.
3. Making it increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to
consider seriously conventional naval missions such as inter-
diction of SLOCs. Development of SES, VSTOL, improved Harpoon
with independent OTH capability are suggested along with greater use
of
COMMENTS
air force systems in sea control/sea denial.
4. Increase defense coordination with allies.
1.
At the bottom of page 103 and-top of page 104 the authors imply
that US planning ignores the likelihood of occurrence of contingencies
and focuses almost exclusively on the consequence of the contingency.
I don't think this is a valid criticism. I think that we use both in
national security planning. Limited resources are applied to contingencies
first that threaten national survival until their likelihood of occurrence
is reduced to an acceptable level, e.g., strategic forces and deterrence.
2. On page 105 the authors list five vital signs that analysts
should focus on. The signs listed are in fact routinely used. For
example, it is the interpretation of Soviet writings in fact which
create community differences in opinion about the importance Soviet
2
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planners place in the interdiction of sea lines of communication. It
is probably not a faulty model used in analysis which is likely to
cause us trouble, it is more likely to be a faulty interpretation and
derived "intent."
3. On pages 108 and 109 the point is made that we do not have
existent an integrated maritime strategy for the future and we don't
have the bureaucratic organization that is likely to develop one. With
both of these points I agree. As resources become scarce relative to
requirements the function of government to plan and program expands.
Energy is a good example; planning our proper use and access to the ocean
for communications, resources, and security is probably another.
4. Pages 111 and 112 discuss some developments that are considered
desirable like VSTOL, SES, 0TH Harpoon, and the like. It is easy to
write a list of programs which offer new advantages. As with many wish
lists these are developed without fiscal constraint and in the case of
overseas bases without adequate consideration of political restraint.
What will be given up to get these systems?
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TO:
ACTION
INFO.
ACTION
INFO.
T
DG
11
LC
2
DDCI
12
IG --
3
S/MC
13
Compt
4
DDS&T
14
Asst/DCI
5
DDI
15
AO/DCI
6
DDM&S
16
Ex/Sec
7
DDO
17
8
D/DCI/IC
18
9
D/DCI/NICX
19
i0
GC
20
18 JUL 1977
Aiz-a1 ~
?( "Is
A Mi
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TUFTS UNIVERSITY
THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University
July 6, 1977
ADM Stansfield Turner USN
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Enclosed are two papers written by
myself and Harlan Ullman which you might
find of interest.
With best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosures (2)
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U.S. Global Strategy: The Future of the
Half-War Planning Contingency
Geoffrey Kemp Harlan Ullman
June 1977
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