FIRST MEETING OF TEAM B ON SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES - 18 AUGUST 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001100030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 19, 1976
• Content Type: MFR

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19 August 1976
SUBJECT: First Meeting of Team B on Soviet Strategic
Policies and Objectives - 18 August 1976
1. Attendees included:
Richard E. Pipes, team-leader
NIO/Coord/CA
William Van Cleave
General John Vogt
Seymour Weiss
Paul Wolfowitz
General Daniel 0. Graham
2. General Ja er Welch arrived after the meeting
and was briefed by
3. Dr. Pipes hopes to recruit Paul Nitze to work
with Team B.
4. Dr-. Pipes opened the meeting with a brief descrip-
tion of the. background of the competitive analysis project
and distributed copies of Robert Galvin's (PFIAB) letter
to Director Bush which set forth the purpose of the exper-
iment and the procedures to be followed. Dr. Pipes also
V noted that there is. no fixed. definition of this Team's
mandate from PFIAB, and perhaps that's just as well. Pipes
expressed the hope that as a result of this project either
the method of drafting the NIE will change or that Team B
will become a permanent part of the NIE process. The
participants agreed that:
(1) The product of the Team B effort will be
a "lawyer's brief".
(2) The Team will work as "subpanels", membership
of each subpanel to be decided at the 25 August
meeting.
(3) The NIE deals with the strategic threat in
isolation from political and other considerations.
(Pipes)
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(4) The NIE doesn't really address itself to
the question of general (global) Soviet strategic
objectives.
(5) The NIE -is based on unwarranted assumptions,
for example, that the USSR regards strategic
nuclear power as the central factor in its great
power aspirations and that the Soviet military
effort is fundamentally defensive.
During the discussion. of point (3) above, Weiss stressed
the political utility of the Soviet military forces in
exerting pressure on the U.S. and Vogt observed that
Soviet forces in Europe are aggressive in character. In
an aside Graham noted that he is studying the question of
whether the Soviet attitude is still C.lauswitzian; his
opinion is that it is.
5. Wolfowitz suggested that the Team should give
some consideration to the transfer of technology from
the West to the USSR.
6. The Team members decided to bring in experts in
various fields at a later date to brief the members on
controversial or technically complex issues. Possible
briefers included:
General Keegan - lasers
Gus Weiss
Jim Wade - NSC - 68 (through Wolfowitz)
T.K. Jones - civil defense
Joe Braddock
Fred Wickner
Andrew Marshal economics
Gordon Negus
Al Flax
Doak Barnett - China
Fritz Ermarth
Colin Gray
7. suggested that Marshal and Ermarth be'invited
to discuss existing ll/3--3. Pipes repeatedly stressed that
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Team B has a short time to complete its draft. The members
agreed to the following schedule:"
25 August meeting, 2 -- 4 P.M. Members to present
their criticisms of NIE. 11/3-8 and
suggest issues to be considered by
Team B; decide on briefings;
8 September 2 - 5 P.M. meeting to review memos
produced by individual members and/or
subpanels and prepare outline of report;
15/16/17 briefing by outside experts; individuals
September and topics to be decided at 25 August
meeting;
17-24 Sept. drafting of the Team 'B report; length to
be 20-25 pages by R. Pipes; -
27-28 Sept. dissemination of the draft to team members
and possibly to Wohlstetter, Ed Teller,
and John Foster for critique;
October draft revision, conferences with Team A,
criticism of Team A product.
Paisley noted that if the team felt it critical to have more
time available it would be necessary to get PFIAB agreement
to extend Team B's time limit.
8. Members offered to devote.the following time to
the project.
Pipes
Van Cleave
Wolf e
WWdolfowitz
Graham
Amb. Weiss
Welch
Vogt
Others
-- Tuesday - Thursday through late
September
- Tuesday - Thursday until 20. September;
thereafter Mondays and Tuesdays
- 2 1/2 weeks in first half of September
- 2 days a week
- 1 day a week.
- several days. in September
couple days a week
one or two days a week
indefinite
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9. Pipes agreed to establish a "basic library" of
documents for team members to be available daily in the
Ames building offices. (These documents were ordered.
from OPR, OSR, and NIO after the meeting adjourned; the
complete "library" will be available Monday, 23 Auguste)
Members should also feel free to request any. additional
materials through They also might arrange
appointments with qua i ie government personnel through
him.
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 SEGREI
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Office of Legislative Counsel
Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
OLC 77-3366
f . AUG 1377
By letter of 1 August 1977, the Director notified Chairman Inouye
that General Daniel Graham and Paul Nitze held appropriate clearances
to review the Select Committee's full A Team-B Team report, and that
the clearances for Richard Pipes had been reinstituted for this purpose.
The Director's letter emphasized the need for strict security measures.
It is my understanding that Mr. Pipes and General Graham have
read the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report, and subsequently
asked for access to certain materials relevant to the preparation of their
B Team report. The only materials thus far specifically identified,
minutes of B Team meetings and B Team recommendations, are enclosed.
Please afford these the same security protection given the other material
being reviewed, and return them to the Agency when they are no longer
needed.
As other documents directly related to the B Team study are
specifically requested by General Graham, Mr. Pipes, or Mr. Nitze,
we will endeavor to make them available, under the same security
procedures.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
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Acting Legislative Counsel
Declassified When Separatelm-
From Enclosures
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
THROUGH : Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Recommendations of Team "B" - Soviet
Strategic Objectives
In our critique of current and previous National Intelligence
Estimates, we made a concerted effort to identify those aspects of
methodology, procedure and institutional structure which we believe
have contributed to unsound estimative judgments. In the attached
paper we proffer our recommendations to PFIAB concerning improve-
ments in methodology, procedure and structure aimed at correcting
the perceived deficiencies. Evidence for our conclusion that the
cited shortcomings do, in fact, exist in the NIEs is to be found
in the main body of our report.
Professor Richard Pipes, Team Leader
Professor William R. Van Cleave, Team Member
General Daniel 0. Graham, Team Member
The Honorable Paul Nitze, Advisor
Ambassador Seymour Weiss, Advisor
Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Advisor
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Team "B" Recommendations
1. Concerning methodology
A. Mirror Imaging. To overcome the bias toward viewing.Soviet
motives and intentions in U.S. terms, it is urged that:
1) In dealing with Soviet intentions, the NIEs should
integrate observed and projected Soviet weapons' programs
and force deployments derived from the "hard" physical data
with more thorough analysis of historical, political,
institutional, and other "soft" factors shaping Soviet
motives and intentions. The search should be for a consistent
elucidation of both sets of factors and their interaction.
In this connection considerably more attention should be. paid
to relevant open and clandestinely acquired Soviet pronounce-
ments and writings (especially those directed to internal
audiences) than has been the case in the past. In this regard
it should be understood that expert analysis of the open
material can reveal a great deal, insofar as the Soviet
political system often compels the Party to issue to its cadres
authoritative guidance on policy matters 'through unclassified
sources;
. 2) Soviet objectives should be perceived in terms of
Soviet concepts: this rule applies especially to the treat-
ment of concepts like "strategy", "strategic threat" and
"strategic objectives", all of which should be understood
in the Soviet context of "grand strategy." When, for reasons
of convenience to U.S. consumers, the NIEs address Soviet
military programs in the U.S. rather than the Soviet strategic
context, this fact should be made clearly evident to the reader.
B. Net assessing.* Whatever their intentions, the drafters of
the NIEs do engage in implicit net assessments of sorts, particularly
when advancing major judgments in the executive summaries. These
* What we mean by net assessment in this context is a judgment on
the balance between U.S. and Soviet military capabilities based
on the relevant static indicators extant or projected, or based
on a dynamic analysis of the balance assuming that those
capabilities actually are to be called into use. The latter type
of net assessment assumes a scenario, but may or may not assume
actual-warfare.
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assessments are usually so rough, so poorly documented, and essentially
so speculative that they invite -- indeed, cannot be'immune from -- the
injection of the authors' general biases. Where NIE judgments demand
net assessment, the netting should be done explicitly, analytically,
and thoroughly, not implicitly or perfunctorily. The interface between
NIE judgment and net assessment should be identifiable.
C. An integrated view of Soviet weapons and force developments.
The NIEs tend to an excessive extent to analyze each Soviet weapon system
in isolation from the totality of the Soviet military effort (and indeed
from other relevant non-military factors as well), with the result that
the overall Soviet military effort appears as less significant than it
actually is. Team "B" urges that in the future weapons systems
and force developments be examined in a more integrated manner to yield
"combined evaluations" more indicative of Soviet total military
capabilities and overall intentions.
D. Policy pressures and considerations. In the opinion of Team "B",
total avoidance of policy pressure on the intelligence estimating process
is an impossible goal. The normal and proper function of policy makers
in raising questions which are to be addressed by the intelligence
estimators in and of itself influences the answers the latter provide.
Some awareness on the part of the estimator of the impact of intelligence
judgments in support of or in opposition to policy is unavoidable.
Nonetheless, improved methods and procedures adopted for the preparation
of the NIEs should be able to minimize the policy pressure on judgments
and prevent the abdication by the intelligence apparatus of its responsi-
bility to-provide objective answers.
E. Disciplined presentation of conclusions. Key judgments of NI Es
are presented in various styles and formats. This on the one hand
permits statements to be made with a certainty that is not warranted by
the available evidence, and on the other hand permits statements, better
supported by the evidence, to be degraded in the reader's mind through -
the insertion of a clause or sentence that have the effect of dismissing
their impact. A more disciplined (though not necessarily rigid) format
for NIE key judgments, summaries, and conclusions should be constructed.
The format and style should ensure that the various reasonable interpre-
tations of the available evidence are laid out without semantic embellish-
ment; that the pros and cons of evidence supporting each are discussed
briefly; that the likelihood of occurrence of each is assessed; and that
the requirements for additional data to resolve remaining uncertainties
are identified. Further, each major intelligence estimate should contain
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as an annex a review of the past 2 to 10 years' "track record" of
U.S. estimates on the major aspects of the relevant subject matter.
Such an annex would be best prepared by a body of analysts not
responsible for the estimates critiqued. The purpose of such an
annex would not be to criticize or chastise but rather to throw light
on possible trends of misanalysis or mistaken judgments so that a
compounding of error by continuation into future intelligence estimates
can be avoided.
2. Concerning procedures.
A. Some, though undoubtedly not all of the methodological
shortcomings which Team "B" found in the National Intelligence Estimates
can be overcome by improving the process of their preparation and review.
The authors of the NIEs will always remain in some measure prone to
perceive the USSR in U.S. terms and to allow political considerations
to affect their judgments. Nevertheless by minimizing inherent
institutional biases and broadening the range of judgments brought to
.bear on the NIEs it should be possible to weaken considerably the impact
of factors which have accounted in the past for NIE misperceptions.
B. Team "B" considers the organizational position of the NIE
function within the national defense - security - foreign policy complex
less than optimal for guarding against both policy and institutional
biases. Current and previous organizational entities charged with
preparation and processing of NIEs have been subordinate to the Director,
CIA, and staffed almost exclusively with CIA officials. This arrangement
was intended to compensate for the real or alleged biases of the
Departments of Defense and State, but it can over-compensate by encouraging
the institutional biases of the Central Intelligence Agency itself.
C. Team "B" recommends that some combination of the following three
steps be considered:'
1) The first involves building as much immunity to
institutional pressures as possible into that entity which
is charged with preparing NIEs on Soviet strategic objectives.
There are various ways to accomplish this end. One attractive
possibility is to identify an official in the Executive Office
of the President who would be charged with assuring such immunity and
who would report directly to the President. His staff would be small
and guarded against acquiring an institutional life of its own.
Members of the staff would be drawn from the various intelligence
organizations and serve relatively short tenures (3-4 years). The
official charged with this function would be genuinely removed
from and independent of the operating membership of the NFIB by
the devices of a separate budget, a separate staff, and a separate
physical location. He should have the authority to subpoena
substantive intelligence officers from any agency and to require
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of pertinent departments and agencies such net assessments
as may be necessary to the NIE process;
2) The second step involves the marshalling of
expertise in and out of government to offset the temptation
to mirror-image. The official charged with assuring the
objectivity of the NIEs (as specified above) should enlist
the part-time services of a panel of prominent outside
specialists for the purpose of reviewing estimates so as to
identify judgments that are based on questionable assumptions
concerning Soviet strategic doctrine and behavior. Such
reviews should be carried out immediately post facto, but
they should not form a part of the NIE preparation process
itself.
3) The third step involves periodic independent checks
on both the process and the substance of the NIEs by employing
procedures similar to the PFIAB-conceived Team "B" approach.
Intermittently, perhaps initially every second year, a team
of outside experts who owe no formal responsibility to the
existing governmental intelligence agencies would be assembled
to play the adversary role. The composition of the Team would
vary every time. Team members would have available all the
pertinent information from all the sources. The effort would
be reasonably time constrained. The report of the Team would
be subject neither to review nor to revision but would be
made available directly to the President, Secretary of State,
and Secretary of Defense. (After the Team had made its report,
it would become available to other governmental agencies for
criticism but not for revision). While this step would not
eliminate the particular views and biases which the non-
governmental experts would bring to their study, it would be
free of the bureaucratic pressures or biases of the existing
governmental intelligence -- or indeed policy -- agencies.
D. Team "B" has not addressed itself to substantive national
intelligence issues other than Soviet strategic objectives. Should
similarly critical issues arise -- e.g., with regard to China or the
Middle East -- the above recommended processes could help to ensure.
objective intelligence support to top policy makers. .
4
S E C R E T
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7 December 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of Team B, Soviet Strategic Polici.es
and Objectives, 2 December 1976
1. Attendees:
Richard Pipes
Daniel.Graham
Paul Nitze
Thomas Wolfe
Paul V olfowitz
2. Pipes opened the meeting with some brief remarks
on the possibility of declassifying the 'T'eam B report
and then read a memorandum from Richard Lehman which re-
jected the declassification option. Pipes said that he
would urge PFIAB to make the Team B report available to
as large an audience as possible. If his appeal to PFIAB
were rejected, he suggested that the team members could
meet to discuss other alternatives. He mentioned as one
possibility the publication of articles on the general
subject of the Team B report without reference to classi-
fied information. He said that large parts-of the-Team B
report contain no classified information and therefore
publication is a valid option. Pipes also raised the
possibility of using the Freedom of Information Act to get
the report into the public domain. Graham said he thought
that this was an unrealistic approach.
To prevent unauthorized declassification. of sensitive
sections of the report, Graham said that he felt it would
be advisable to declassify the report as far as possible.
Wolfowitz said that he feared that selective leaks,
which distort-the true character of the report, would be
used to discredit the Team B effort. He suggested classi-
fying the report by paragraph to allow publication of unclassi-
fied sections. Graham noted that DIA followed this procedure
and Pipes expressed interest in this approach. 0 commented
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that CIA does not normally follow this procedure and
discussion of this option was dropped. Sqolfowitz then
suggested that Part III of the report, which he said
contains no classified information, should be declassified
and published as a separate document.
Nitze suggested that the Tears write separate papers
on the topics covered in the report but at a lower classi-
fication (Confidential to Secret) to ensure a wider
audience.
Pipes suggested that further discussion of this subject
be postponed until the Team had an opportunity to discuss
its concern with PFIAB.
3. The members discussed some minor changes in the
Team report and reviewed Graham's draft of the recommenda-
tions.
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13 September 1976
!!OR ~NDU i FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Joint Meeting of "B" Teams - 9 September 1976
1. Attendees:
Richard Pipes
General Graham
General Vogt
Paul Wolfowitz
Jim. Drake
Roland Herbst
Charles Lerch
2. The meeting Was called-to exchange information
on the full scope of the Team B effort.
3. Richard Pipes spoke briefly about the .-rork of
the Strategic Policies and Objectives Team. (See Memo'
randu: for the Record, 26 August 1976 and 8 September' 1.976)
4. Roland Herbst spoke on ICBM accuracy. He said
that the panel is'concernedprimarily with the accuracy
of new Soviet systems, specifically the SS 16, 17, 18,
and 19. His group believes that these systems were de--
signed to be highly accurate. The level of. accuracy can
not be determined from design; accuracy depends on the
quality of the guidance systen. His group believes the
Soviet instruments are better than the NIE estimates.
No data is available on the quality of the guidance sys-
tems used in the SS 18 and SS 19. But Herbst and members
ofl~ his group believe the Soviets are working hard to
improve the accuracy of these systems.
Herbst noted that the Soviets test their missiles
from operational silos. The US does not and this gives
the Soviets-an advantage. Graham agreed with this point
a-.1;1 added that the theoretical accuracy of system does
not interest a soldier; he is interested in the wartime
effectiveness of a system.
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Herbst. commented on-the US experience with the
iinuteman guidance system to make the point that a guid-
ance system can get, better or worse than expected. Ex-
perience with a system and the ability to calibrate make
a big difference.
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5. Charles Lerch spoke on the subject of Soviet
low altitude air defense. The basic question for his
group is what is the strategic defense capability of the
Soviet Union.
Lerch criticized the NTE for making a'net assessment
of the Soviet low altitude defense capability. He said
that both the B-52 and B-1 would have great difficulty
penetrating Soviet air defenses and added that he would
not want to attempt to penetrate Soviet air defenses.
Drake said that the Soviets have a large number of
air defense .qaapo-0s and could greatly reduce the' number
of penetrators probably to about 10 - 15% of the original
force.. Lerch noted that each air defense installation
would have to handle one or at the most two penetrators
at one time. Drake and Lerch agreed that the cruise
missile is an effective means of counteracting Soviet air
defenses but noted that development of the system by the
US is in doubt.
Drake said that Soviet exercises do not emphasize
low 'altitude air defense as much as we think they should.
However, Lerch countered that the number of such exercises
is increasing.
Lerch and Drake agreed that a small number of defense
posts have been identified but more could exist.
On the air defense problem both said there is too
much data to evaluate in the time available. Even in the
intelligence communilty, more data exists than have been
thoroughly analyzed.
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6. During general discussion of the Strategic
Policies and Objectives report, 0 repeated his be-
lief that the ANIE tendency to underestimate Soviet capa-
bilities is a cyclical - periods of underestimation
follow period of overestimation. Political pressure is
another-factor in the cycle. He also said that the
Soviets have a belief in the inevitable victory of communism
and believe that the mind is the ultimate target.
I land Graham agreed that the Soviet view of the
strategic balance considers more than military hardware.
The Soviet view includes the "correlation of forces'.'. As
another example of the difference between US and Soviet
thinking, Wolfe said the 'Sovi ets are concerned with how
to win a war while the US is concerned with how to prevent
-a war.
Graham said that he believes the US has three impor-
tant advantages over the Soviet Union: a superior economy,
superior technology and better morale. Vogt generally
agreed but noted that in the-strategic area some believe
the Soviets have achieved pari t;- with the US and in some
fields may be ahead. In any case, the Soviets are making
a concerted effort to achieve a technological breakthrough.
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9 September 1976
AtE~?O.i'`;DU`I FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Third Meeting of Team B on Soviet Strategic
Policies and Objectives - 8 September 1976
1. Attendees included:
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Richard Pipes, team leader
General Daniel Graham
William Van Cleave
General John Vogt
General Jasper Welch
Paul Wolfo.Vitz
2. Dr. Pipes reported on his meeting with Robert Galvin,
uho chairs the PFIAB subcommittee that is in charge of the
Competitive Analysis experiment. Pipes gave Galvin a copy
of his memo, "Purpose, Scope, and Plan of Team. "B'".Report"
and told him that he believed sections IV and VI "The Soviet
Strategic Threat, 1976-85", will be the heart of.the Team
report.
3. Galvin told Pipes that the length of the Team B
report presents no problem to the members of PFIAB. It was
Galvin's opinion that. the report would be discussed at
PFIAB's meeting in December. He also agreed with the two
basic purposes of the Team B report and said that in its
report the Team could matte recommendations for improving the
J NIE. Galvin also indicated that the Team can consider the
question of domestic political pressure on the NIE process.
The- Team :embers agreed that this was a factor worth considering
but agreed with Pipes' comment that it would 'have to be handled
with caution.
25X1 4. distributed a draft on ASW and noted that
25X1 it had been reviewed by Commenting on the report,
Welch said that the.Team must be aware of the tendency to
mirror-image or_ capabilities, intentions and scenarios. He
also noted that the possibility of short term deployment of
systems. might be considered. Welch said.that short tern
.deployment can be effective and can usually be done quickly
and at far less cost than long-term deployment.
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may provide a 1
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S. Graham distributed a draft on Civil Defense and
suggested that other drafts might follow his format:
Discussion of NIB position, Presentation of the evidence,
Analysis/Estimate, Forecast. Pipes and Vogt liked the format
and suggested that it be tried in other drafts. Vogt felt
that one of his reports on C E C and hardening might be
added to Graham's CD draft. Pipes agreed that some elements
of Vogt's report might be incorporated into Graham's but
felt that it should remain a separate report.
Pipes and Vogt also noted that US observers
frequently refuse to take the Soviets at their word even
when they repeatedly and publicly take-the same position.
6. Vogt read his draft on C ? C.and hardening. (Copies
will be available to team members on 9 September.) Pipes
repeated his-belief that Vogt's C ; C report should. not be
fused with Graham's CD report. In response to a question
from 0 Vogt said. that. there is no disagreement over
hardening figures in the intelligence community. There
seemed to be general agreement that the Soviet C E; C and
hardening effort indicate that the Soviets are going beyond
mutual deference and are determined to survive and win in the
event of war. Pipes said that Soviet publications frequently
speak of World War III in terms of when, rather than if.
7. Vogt read his draft on the Backfire. (Copies will
be available to team members on 9 Sept.) Vogt said the
Backfire is clearly a strategic weapon and noted that many
of those who reject this position cl.ssify the US F-lll as'
strategic even though its unrefueled radius is lower than the
lowest estimated radius for the Backfire.
Vogt noted that the Soviets are determined to get a.
high assurance factor and. are willing to increase the number
of strategic. weapons. They believe the number of weapons
available is very important. He added that while the. US tends
to consolidate and thus reduce the number of targets the
Soviets tend to disperse thus increasing the number of targets.
He. said that the US use of nuclear weapons is limited by a
number of factors including the number of targets to, be hit
and the amount of radiation fallout we are willing to expose
our allies to.- .
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Commenting on the current controversy over the
Backfire range, Graham noted that it was similar to an
earlier conflict over the Badger. Vogt noted that-Brezhnev
and the Chief Soviet military advisor. at SALT haire used
different figures on the Backfire range.
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Pipes commented that the NIB tends to hedge on the
Backfire in rejective a strategic role for the Backfire
but noting that it could be strategic if certain tkhings
were done.
8. Welch indicated that his draft on anti-satellite
testing was incomplete. He said the Soviets have a semi-
operational anti-satellite system capable' of hitting targets
in low orbit but nothing to take care of future satellite.
systems (ten year time frame).
11Wolfowitz noted that the Soviets have not taken a clear
position on what constitutes "national means of verification".
Pipes felt that this subject could be dropped if no
threat is apparent to the team members. Graham disagreed.
Wolfowitz and Graham agreed that the Soviets tend to take
a more skeptical view of US-Soviet relations than the US
does.
Graham said the Soviets do not rule out war as an
extension of politics. They are building forces to fight a
war and get detterence as a fringe benefit. Vogt disagreed:
He said that the Soviets would rather avoid war and have
built forces so strong that the US will be reluctant to use
strategic nuclear ;weapons to defend. territory. Vogt said
the size of the strategic forces on both sides reduces the
credibility of the US deterrence. He added that the Soviets
are ready to use superior conventional. forces to take Europe
because the US nuclear deterrence will not readily be used.
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Pipes said if the soviets achieve nuclear superiority
they can then make use of their superiority in conventional
forces.
9.. Vogt read a report on Mobile ICBMs (SS 16 Fj SS 20).
(Copies will be available to Team members on 9 September.)
Vogt noted that the NIE does not cover the question of
convertibility of -these systems. 0 asked why the Soviets 25X1
.are making the systems convertible. Is it to ensure sur-
vivability o~r to multiply the number of weapons they can put
on target? u said that he believed it is difficult to
determine Soviet motives.
Graham responded that survivability of multiple systems
depends on the intelligence ability of the other side. He
said that the evidence suggests it is a matter of numbers,
now or in the future, rather than survivability.
11. Van Cleave distributed a report on Depressed
Trajectory.
Graham commented that it is important not to drive
intelligence to prove the negative. He said the community
could reasonably expect to detect evidence of Soviet testing
of depressed trajectory systems.
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Pipes* said that the 'CIE tends to draw firm conclusions
from inadequate data and this may be an example.
Welch said that this capability can be developed
.quickly so the' point is how the 'N'IE handles the question.
Vogt asked why the Soviets would not opt for this
capability. Welch said this is mysterious. 114'olfowitz.said.
that part of the Soviet philosophy is to conceal important
capabili-ities. Welcii countered that in this case the Soviets
have little-to gain by concealment. Graham said that analysts
still tend to work on. the basis of clear US superiority which
no longer exists.'.
12. Graham distributed a report on Soviet defense
spending. Graham said he intends to add new evidence on
total Soviet expenditures for defense. Pipes questioned the
value and purpose of computing the cost of Soviet defense
expenditures. Others agreed with Pipes' statement but noted
that it had originated under McNamara and had to be done to
meet his demands. This was the period of the whiz-kids and
great concern over cost-effectiveness, according to Graham.
It was noted that while there is competition for defense
rubles within the military there is no effective competition
from the civilian sector for resources. Pipes said the dis-
tinction between civilian and war expenditures does not
exist in Soviet society. Even Soviet culture is USO, i.e.,
morale boosting. The Soviets do not consider the military
a social overhead but rather a social benefit.
13. Pipes closed the meeting at 1645 and said -the
reports not discussed 'at this meeting would be considered at
the meeting on 15 September. He also reminded the members
that an informal conference with some members of the other
two "B" teams was scheduled for 9 September at 1 P.M.
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26 August 1976
NEMORANDUMI FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Second Meeting of Team B. on Soviet Strategic
Policies and Objectives -- 2S August 1976
1. Attendees included.:
.Richard Pipes, team leader
General John Vogt
General Daniel Graham
William Van Cleave
Paul Wolfowitz
2. Dr. Pipes made.a brief opening statement. He
said that he wanted.to prepare an agenda for the subteams
and establish a definite list of briezers for the 15-17
September briefing sessions. He advised the members to
read The Track Record in Strategic Estimating.
3. -Pipes stated the Team has two tasks: (1) to
reinterpret the data made available on strategic weapons
and the threat they pose to, see if a different estimate
of threat is possible.- If Team B does come up with a
different interpretation, it should make as strong a case
as possible for its position. Task (2) is to criticize
j the methodology underlying the NIE process. Pipes
distributed a list of suggested topics for the Team to
investigate.
4.- The Team members agreed that a two part report
would be produced.
1) evidence and conclusions: all contributing
with Pipes drafting final text;
2) criticism of methodology: Pipes drafting
with contributions from other members.
5. The meeting was opened to more general discussion.
Graham said that he had read several of the NIB 11/3
reports. He said that he noted a change in tone and
nomenclature over the years as well as a general tendency
to put U.S..perceptions and terms into the Soviet vocabulary.
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Van Cleave believed that the topics suggested by
Pipes were too technical. Pipes, with Vogt concurring,
explained that he did'not envision a technical paler but
felt that the Team had to address and indicate areas of
uncertainty. Vogt added that the incomplete evidence
used in the NIE process often does not support the con-
clusions reached by the drafters. As an example, Graham
cited the Soviet civil defense effort and agreed with
Vogt's comment that the Soviet CD effort is aimed at a re-
con,stitution capability. Graham said.he believed the
Soviets want to assure a sustaining force and a second
.strike capability.
There was general agreement that the NIE underesti-
mates the seriousness of the Soviet CD effort and assumes
that the U.S. could make an immediate response. Vogt
said an immediate response is unlikely.
Vogt also noted that the U.S. has no real air defense
capability. Van Cleave added that as the SALT negotiations
are proceeding it appears that the Soviets could develop
a bomber force outside the SALT agreements-
Wolfowitz suggested that the Team check out any
new evidence on dismantling of the SS-7. Vogt and
.Van Cleave. commented that Soviet concealment and deception
efforts make verification of the SALT agreements difficult.
Both agreed that the Soviets appear to have rejected the
thesis that numbers do not count. As the number of
targets increases,-the number of deliverable warheads
must increase to ensure destruction of important targets.
Pipes and Graham, with agreement of the members
present, commented that the NIE assumes, without evidence,
that the Soviets want to spend as little as possible on
defense.
6. The Team agreed on a list of topics and volunteered
to direct their efforts as indicated below:
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topics in which they have particular expertise.
Team B Strategic Policies and Objectives will check
with the other sections of Team B to see how broadly they
have interpreted their charters.
In response to a question from Van Cleave, Pipes
said that he felt there would be 'no problem with funds for
moderate travel by Team members as this could be handled
through SRI.
7. Graham opened the discussion on methodology with
the comment that the NIB, from the time of the NcNaraara
era, has made net assessments which are not supported by
the evidence. He also said there is .a tendency to mirror-
image when writing about the Soviet military effort. As
a final point he noted that every estimate since 1962 has
used the impact of economic pressures in the Soviet system
as the fundamental reason for a judgment of the Soviet
military effort.
Pipes said there should be two aspects to the critique
of the NIE process:
1) noting that the estimate is based on assumptions
which are not spelled out, for example, that the
Soviet military effort is basically defensive and
that the. Soviets want to spend as little as possible
on weapons, etc.;-
2) technical flaws in the process of preparing
the NIB.
Van Cleave commented that the NIE seems to reject the
idea of unanimity in the Soviet decision making process
and suggested that some attention be given to party-military
relations. ?
Graham noted that the NIE process forces compromises
on controversial issues.
offered secretarial support for the Team.
and Welch will be asked to worn on
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S. The Team agreed to invite the following individuals
to brief:
Sherman Kent -
James Schlesinger
NIE process
- Soviet strategic weapons and
their role in Soviet strategic
thin king
economic aspects of the Soviet
strategic effort
lasers & other directed
.energy weapons
Soviet colmnand and control, -
hardening as well as the thrust
of the Soviet strategic effort
NIE process
NIE process
JCS problems with the NIE
process
Possible additional briefers:
Paul Nitze
James Angleton
I I agreed to contact the briefers and
schedule them tor the 15-17 September briefing period. Ten-
tatively it was agreed to schedule one briefing in the
morning and two in the afternoon. Briefing sessions are
to be limited to one and one-half hours.
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