CRISIS STAFFING PROCEDURES OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001600150007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 12, 1977
• Content Type: MF

?:, 9 au '' : ? Executive RegL"
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
12 MAY 1977
14EMORANDUM FOR Secretary of State
Director, Federal Preparedness Agency
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Director, White House Military Office
Director of Central Intelligence
Secretary of Transportation
SUBJECT: Crisis Staffing Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Attached is a copy of Crisis Staffing Procedures prepared by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff This document prescribes emergency staffing
procedures to be used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and collaborating
Department of Defense and Federal Agencies in situations ranging
from low level crises to open hostility involving U.S. armed forces.
These procedures are under continuous review and are revised when
significant changes occur. Comments or proposed changes are invited
and should be submitted to the Director, Joint Staff (Attention:
NMCS Support Division, J-3),-'Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (OJCS).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that all agencies referred to in
these Crisis Staffing Procedures, in writing internal crisis management
plans, consider the guidance contained in this document. They further
request that copies of those plans be forwarded, along with rosters
of designated personnel, to the Director, Joint Staff (Attention:
NMCS Support Division, J-3), OJCS.
DJSM-75-73, 11 January 1973, "Emergency Opdr'ating Procedures of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Implementing Inst'ructions(EOP-II)," and JCS
Memorandum of Policy (1st Revision) on Emergency Operating Procedures
(Attachment to JCS14-349-71, 27 July 1971) are hereby superseled.
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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-1390
-T I
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1 Nl it' 10177
DCI-D/DCI/IC Brief on Warning and Crisis Management
OVERVIEW
-- Community W/CM operations are complex and decentralized; all
agencies have a piece of the action.
-- Each agency conducts W/CM operations and reports findings inde-
pendently Interagency efforts are consensus-formation exercises.
-- CM efforts are largely ad hoc.
o Expertise required is scenario dependent.
o Insufficient analytical resources available to maintain
standing organization.
-- In W/CM operations the DCI has operated essentially as an inde-
pendent entity, supported by the NIOs and the CIA Opscen.
o There is no central marhagjsm~#o-cgodpati.pn-ar~~-fgGsing
of collection yrbda .i?es .
o There is no systematic provision of feedback and guidance
from decisionmaking to analytical levels.
o Restrictive documentation of sensitive intelligence, diplomatic
information and military ops data severely hampers analysis/production
and creates psychological inhibitants to timely warning.
BACKGROUND
Post mortem review of Community performance in W/CM
reveal following major problem areas:
o Hard intelligence available was ambiguous, particularly
concerning intentions of actions involved;
o Community was swamped by information resulting-from increased
collection/reporting and shortage of analytical resources in relevant
substantive areas;
o Community was unable to control effects of uncertainty
created internally by factors discussed in overview, preconceptions
as to what would or would not happen, and psychological deterrents
to crying wolf.
rr..,
MIX
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-- Community performances during crisis management periods has been
significantly better than during pre-crisis warning periods.
o The major cause of uncertainty inhibiting Community operations,
i.e., whether a crisis was going to occur, was dissipated;
o Common recognition of the parameters of the crisis provided
a natural focusing and coordinating mechanism for Community operations;
o Consequently, the Community was better able to marshal and
direct its resources and effort to optimum effect.
DISCUSSION
-- Ambiguity of available intelligence relating to a developing
situation will likely always exist and must be,assumed as a given.
Thus, the Community will always be potentially vulnerable to the effects
of uncertainty.
-- The potential for missing the significance of intelligence
acquired as a result of system saturation is endemic, but is greatly
compounded by uncertainty at the analytical level caused by lack of
sufficient guidance and group pressures.
-- Psychological inhibitants to effective warning operations, the
tendency toward preconception, tunnel vision and the desire to avoid
being wrong are inherent in human nature and cannot be eliminated.
However, their effects can be controlled by effective management of
uncertainty.
-- To the extent Community operations are influenced by the aforementioned
uncertainty--producing factors, ambiguity inherent in intelligence being
evaluated is compounded and the combined effect passed on to consumers
in reporting. This tends to reduce the credibility of warning, if
issued, and delay consideration or implementation of deterrent hedge
action.
SUMMATION
-- The Community can (and should) increase its collection and
analytical assets to improve W/CM capabilities. However, to the extent
that such measures produce even higher data volumes and a greater number
of players, the need for coordination and management of uncertainty is
increased.
-- Obtaining more data and analysts will do little if the Community
confuses itself and those it supports. Historically, warning failures
have occurred not for lack of sufficient information, but as a result of
-- To manage uncertainty effectively:
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o The Community must a~ A rn gently.:
-- There must be a systematic (as opposed to ad hoc) interconnection
of components participating in W/CM operations as well as a set of
common procedures and instruments (NOIWON, CONTEXT);
-- This system must have a e from which
its status, capabilities, problems and level of performance can be
determined at any given time and through which information and guidance
from senior Community and National decisionmaking levels can be rapidly
and effectively disseminated;
-- The system must be bidirectional, in that those entities and
officials being supported must, in turn, actively synchronize the system
to support changing policy/decisionmaking requirements as the situation
being addressed develops.
o The Community must address the consumer coherently:
-- Decisionmakers and their immediate staffs should not be inundated
with redundant paper;
-- Legitimate uncertainty and divergence of view within the Community
must reach the decisionmaker, but in an integrated perspective so that
latter does not wrongly assume a higher level of uncertainty than really
exists, thus distorting the credibility of warning recommendations made;
-- The recipient of Community intelligence reporting should not
have to play analyst in attempting to correlate separate agency reporting
on the same substantive situation;
-- Formal y-esponsibiltty for issuing warnin should ~p assi ne to
specific indivi ua s e DCI and the J-2 JCS) rather than to agencies
or their subelements. To the extent such responsibility is diffused
and, in practice, unclear, uncertainty will persist among Community
components and between the Community and decisionmakers being supported.
In short, were allare perceived to be res oonsible forwaxning, in_
effect no on_e_~.
ISSUES
-- An action program is required to develop the organizational and
procedural components of the system outlined above. -
o It is logical that the DCI sponsor such a program.
o No significant change in Community organization or division
of responsibility required.
o Cost would be relatively low since most changes would be
procedural.
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-- Does the DCI have the authority to effect changes affecting
Community operations (other than CIA)?
o Mission as "principal intelligence advisor to the President"
under E.O. 11905.
o Presidential action rPS0ti nn fr. DDM_1 1
-- Potential system approaches:
o Enhanced NIO capability
o DCI Crisis Advisor
o Use CIA as "system center"
o Independent Community entity under DCI
o Standing Commit e
o Enhanced SWS capability
LOCATION OPTIONS
o Where will DCI operate from in action W/CM periods
IMPLEMENTATION
o Memo to SECSTATE, SECDEF and Brzezinski outlining problems
and needs.
o Issue conceptual system design/action plan.
o Direct Community planning/implementation of system.
o Put someone in charge of the system ideally he should
also manage system development.
WHAT DO NEXT?
o Complete tour of physical facilities
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o Guidance on DCI physical location/support
o Guidance on implementation approach
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