LETTER TO GENERAL DIXON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001700090006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 26, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved F.elease 20
26 6 T 07?
i,IUIORRNML I FOR: NIO/Conventional Forces
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Letter to General Dixon
1. Attached is a draft letter to General Dixon on pushing to
revive the Mitre study (which I believe I have in my files) which
tried to move from static indicators towards more dynamic ones
regarding the balance of air capabilitie~-in Europe. I'd appreciate
your looking at whether we could or should employ Mitre or anyone
else to improve on that methodology and use the latest information
available.
2. I appreciated the efforts in your paper for me to do some-
thing of that, such as the employment of the Soviets "combat capability
rating." We don't know how they got that but they must have done
something such as I'm talking about. (I do wonder how you go from
their capability rating chart which shows the F-4E superior to anything
but Flogger and Fencer, the F-104/105 equal to everything else, and
the F-14/F-15 at least 2 1/2 times better than anything the Soviets
have to a "sunned combat effectiveness" in which the Soviets have
passed us-) Clearly, you've done the mathematics properly but we
must have an awful lot of F-100s aroind, which is the only aircraft
on the chart of lesser capability than some of the Soviets'.
i tanks.
(XE UmsE ST Y f !
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 Approved F0eleasiF)2(,04t0505p: qIA-RDP80M001 A001700090006-2
General Robert J. Dixon, USAF
Commander, Headquarters Tactical
Air Command
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665
Dear Bob,
At the risk of having my head chopped off (!), I'm enclosing a
very brief study memorandum that just came across my desk and which
brought to mind one of the comments in your famous letter to me of
9 August. You said in the third paragraph, "For example, they fly
more training sorties than our pilots and.--receive more simulator
training." The attached study does not dispute that but does contend
that the individual duration of training flights is shorter and that
there are fewer "combat-related training events."
On another point you make about devoting more attention to a
short/no-warning Pact attack, we are about to complete a fairly
extensive study on this subject. It considerably downplays the
emphasis we've had in recent years on the short or no-warning
attack. l-ge simply believe that the disadvantages to the Soviets of
going off in 24-48 hours are not compensated by the initial surprise
and gains that they might make. I believe Dutch Huyser's recent work
has come to a similar conclusion. I'll send you a copy of that study
when it is finally printed. (NOTE FOR Please make a tickler
on that.)
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Finally, in terms of the overall balance of capabilities, I must
say that I still have the impression that we are considerably ahead
in the potential for delivering ordnance on targets and enemy territory.
I simply believe that despite their improved avionics, range/payload
and weapons, most of the Warsaw Pact's tactical aircraft would have
considerable difficulty delivering ordnance against NATO targets in
a hostile air defense environment without being under positive grotmd
control. Clearly, this would be very inhibiting to them. Perhaps I
am overly influenced by the Mitre study we discussed because it stressed
this point of positive control and of accuracy of delivery. I'm still
of the feeling that it would be wise to update that study or do one
using similar methodology. It seems to me we need some more dynamic
indicator of the comparative capabilities of NATO and Pact air forces
than just the usual static indicators of numbers of aircraft tempered
with data on range/payload, avionics and weaponry.
As always, all the best.
Yours,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Enclosure
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