LETTER TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER FROM RICHARDSON PREYER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001800030008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 10, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

RICHARDSON PREYER. N.G., CHAIRMAN PAUL N. MC CLOSKEY, JR., CALIF.
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RLENeORN, ILL.
THEODORE S. WEIRS, N.Y.
PB H. . PA. ~COngr~E of the nttei &tatc
BARBARA JORDAN, , TEX.
90ouoe of Eteprezeutatibeo
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM B-349-B-C
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20513
June 10, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, Q.C. 20505
?7- /--/
In connection with its oversight responsibilities for the Freedom
of Information Act, the Privacy Act and government records policies, this
subcommittee is concerned with security classification management practices,
and with the use of administrative markings and other identification codes
which restrict access to documents.
To assist us in evaluating such practices and restrictions, would
you please furnish the subcommittee the following information. Even if
some questions do not apply to your agency, please respond to all those
which do.
1. Is your agency authorized to classify documents under terms of
Executive Order 11652? If so, what terms are used within your agency,
either formally or informally, officially or unofficially, to indicate
gradations or extensions of the term "top secret", "secret", or "confi-
dential"? "secret-sensitive", "
dential11? (For example, "top secret--grade I", top
secret--eyes only", "noforn", "official use only", or "non public''-', etc.)
Please list such terms only if used in combination with the standard E.O.
11652 designations.
2. What legend or legends are used by your agency to identify
records which are not classifiable under Executive Order 11652 but which are
not to be made available outside the department and/or outside the govern-
ment? For each such term, please list:
(a) Its specific name.
(b) Its application.
(c) The manner in which it was put into use (e.g.,
agency circular, formal regulation) and by whom (e.g.,
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department head, general counsel). Please enclose a copy
of the document putting the term into use.
(d) The authority under which the term was put into
use (e.g., statute, executive order). Please include a
copy of the statute, executive order, or other document
furnishing the authorization.
(e) The date it was put into use.
(f) The last occasion on which the need for such-a
particular designation was reviewed.
(g) The procedure used to remove the marking after
some period of time. (I.e., does the restriction auto-
matically expire? Undergo review?) Simply note if this
information is included in the material furnished under
(c)
(h) The procedure used to evaluate materials with this
marking when they are requested under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (e.g., is marked material automatically withheld
from being furnished under FOIA? Can anyone other than the
person who initially marked the material remove the marking?)
(i) Whether this marking has ever either generally or in
a specific case been challenged in court? If so, what was
the result and what is the case citation?
(j) The number of agency officials who are authorized
to determine that a document or record should be marked
with this term.
(k) The criteria by which officials are given authority
to determine that a document or record should be marked with
this term.
(1) Whether this marking has ever been used on documents
which also qualify for security classification under Execu-
tive Order 11652. If so, why?
(m) Compared to E.O. 11652 security classifications and
from a standpoint of document sensitivity, would you say
materials carrying this mark are about as sensitive as materi-
als marked confidential, marked secret, or marked top secret?
(I.e., how restrictive is this marking supposed to be?)
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(n) Whether you consider material marked with this
designation to be freely available when it is sent to
the National Archives?
3. Have you stopped using any such legends during the past three
years? If so, please list the same details as requested in (a) through
(e) of item 2 above, and also state why the legend is no longer used. If
some documents still carry this mark from when it was used, please also
answer for it questions (g) through (i) and (1) through (n) of item 2 above.
4. How many formal investigations were conducted by your agency
at the seat of government between July 1, 1971 and June 30, 1976 into
possible violations of your agency's regulations concerning the protection
of information which was
t
(A) Classified under E.O. 11652 or its predecessor,
E.O. 10501?
(B) Administratively restricted by use of some term
described in your response to question 2 above?
(Do not include routine "desk checks" or similar routine
supervision or information protection procedures in tabulating
responses to this question
Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) above,
(a) How many of those investigations concerned improper
physical protection of information?
(b) How many of those investigations concerned failure
to assign a high enough security designation to information?
(c) How many of those investigations concerned the assign-
ment of too high a security designation to information?
5. Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) of question 4,
in how many instances from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1976, were
(a) Criminal charges filed, or recommended to be filed,
based on failure to protect information?
(b) Administrative hearings held on the same basis?
(c) Administrative penalties, ranging from reprimands,
to loss of pay for specified periods, to dismissal,
assessed on the same basis?
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6. Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) of question
4, in how many instances during the same five year period were charges
filed or recommended, administrative hearings held, or penalties of any
sort assessed on the basis of over-classification or other excessive re-
striction on access to information?
7. If your agency conducts investigations for other agencies of
the Federal government, state how many formal investigations into possible
violations of E.O. 10501 or E.O. 11652 were conducted for those agencies
at the seat of government during the five year period.
(a) How many of those investigations concerned'
improper physical protection of information?
(b) How many of those investigations concerned
the failure to assign a high enough security
designation to information?
(c) How many of those investigations concerned
the assignment of too high a security designation
to information?
We appreciate your efforts of compiling this material. Would you
please have responses in the hands of the subcommittee by July 15, 1977.
If you have questions in the meantime, please contact Richard L. Barnes
of the subcommittee staff at 225-3741.
Sincerely,
Richardson Preyer Y
Chairman
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. I /71.
CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
(Effective 5 October 1975)
Pursuant to provisions of Subsection 102(d) of the National Security Act of
1947, as-amended, and other authorities vested in the Director of Central In-
telligence by the National Security Council, certain controls on dissemination of
foreign intelligence and related material2 (hereafter referred to as foreign in-
teiugence) are
1. Purpose
This directive establishes certain common controls and procedures for the
use and dissemination of foreign intelligence to ensure that, while facilitating
the intercbange.of information for intelligence purposes, there will be adequate
protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods. This directive restates
applicable portions of National Security Council Directive of 17 May 1972 im-
plementing Executive Order 11652, and prescribes additional controls applicable
The controls and procedures set forth in this Directive shall be uniformly
applied by all member departments and agencies of the intelligence community
in the handling of all materials containing foreign intelligence originated by
to the U. S. foreign intelligence mission.
2 Applicability
the Central Intelligence Agency `or by the intelligence components of other
a. National Security Council Directive of 17 May 1972 implementing Execu-
tive Order 11652 stipulates that, except as otherwise provided by Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947, classified information or material origi-
nating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other depart-
ment to which, it has been made available without the consent of the originat-
ing department.- This restriction on dissemination is commonly described as
the -third agency kule."
b. The NSC Directive stipulates that the dissemination of classified infor-
mation, including intelligence and intelligence information, orally, in writing
or by any other means, shall be limited to those persons whose official duties
or contractual obligations require knowledge or possession thereof. This is
commonly referred to as the "need-to-know" principle. -
1 Supersedes DCID 1/7, effective 5 October 1970. - -
2 For purposes of this directive, "related material- includes: information describing U. S.
foreign intelligence sources and methods, equipment and methodology unique to the acquisi-
tion or exploitation of foreign intelligence, foreign military hardware obtained for e.cploitation,,
and photography or recordings resulting from U. S. foreign intelligence collection efforts.
USIB departments or agencies.
3. National Security Council Directive
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c. The NSC Directive also states that documents or portions of documents
containing TOP SECRET information shall not be reproduced without the
consent of the originating office. All other classified material shall be repro-
duced sparingly and-any stated prohibition against reproduction shall be
strictly adhered to.
d. The NSC Directive further requires that the marking, "WARNING
NOTICE-SENSITIVE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED," be prominently displayed on all information and materials re-
lating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods; and, that materials so
marked will not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels
without the permission of the originating department and an assessment by
the senior intelligence official in the disseminating department as to the po-
tential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods
involved.3 For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation, communica-
tions, or automatic data processing, this marking may be abbreviated
WNINTEL.
4. Advance authorization
a. To facilitate the dissemination and different uses made of classified
foreign intelligence within and among USIB departments and agencies, to
assure the timely provision of intelligence to consumers and to handle the
CD,
volume of such materials in a practical way, it is necessary to provide con-
trolled relief to the "third agency rule" within the intelligence community in
addition to that provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947.
Accordingly, USIB departments and agencies have been given advance au-
thorization to use each other's classified foreign intelligence in their respective
intelligence documents, ;publications or other information media, and to dis-_
seminate their products to third agencies or foreign governments,4 subject
to limitations and procedures prescribed in this Directive.
b. Classified foreign intelligence documents, even though they bear no con-
trol markings, will not be released in their original form to third agencies or
foreign governments without permission of the originator. Information con-
tained in classified foreign intelligence documents of another department or
agency may be extracted or paraphrased and used by the recipient USIB
Agency in classified foreign intelligence reports and released to third agencies,
except as specifically restricted by control markings prescribed in this direc-
tive. For purposes of this authorization, "WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be
considered a restrictive marking. -
s Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with USL3
or as agreed to between originating and recipient agencies, authorized channels include the
intelligence components of USIB departments and agencies and within each department
and agency (including their contractors and consultants) as determined by the recipient senior
intelligence official. -
4 Excepting RESTRICTED DATA and formerly RESTRICTED DATA, which is prohibited
from foreign d.ssem'.aaion under Sections 123 and 144 of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended. -
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c. Information contained in classified foreign intelligence documents of
another department or agency not bearing any control markings may.be ex-
tracted or paraphrased and used by the recipient USIB Agency in reports
disseminated to foreign governments provided.'
(1) No reference is made to the source documents upon which the re-
leased product is based. ,
(2) The source and manner of acquisition of the information are not
revealed.
(3) Foreign release is made through established foreign disclosure chan-
nels and procedures.
d. Any department or agency disseminating foreign intelligence beyond
the departments and agencies of the USIB shall be responsible for ensuring
that recipient departments and agencies understand and agree to observe
the restrictions prescribed by this directive and maintain adequate safeguards.
e. No release of a classified foreign intelligence document, whether or not
bearing a control marking, shall be made to foreign nationals and immigrant
aliens, including U. S. Government employed, utilized or integrated foreign
nationals and immigrant aliens, without the permission of the originating
agency:
5 Additional authorized control markings
a. In addition to the WARNING NOTICE prescribed by NSC Directive
any of the following additional markings may be used on foreign intelligence
wvhenever, in the opinion of the originating department or agency, extraordi-
nary circumstances related to the intelligence source or methods require more
specific dissemination restrictions. Use of these markings shall be limited to
foreign intelligence, the disclosure of which, could: compromise the status of
collaborating foreign governments or officials or otherwise seriously damage
U. S. relations with foreign governments; subject U. S. citizens or others to
the possibility of personal danger or incarceration; seriously impair the con-.
tinuing cooperation of private individuals providing foreign intelligence; se-
riously affect the continuing viability of vital technical collection programs;
or, result in the possible compromise or loss of some unique foreign intelli-
gence source or method. These control markings will be individually assigned
at the time of preparation of the completed document and used in conjunc-
tion with classification and other markings required by Executive Order 11652
and the implementing NSC -directive and, unless otherwise indicated in oa
below, carried forward to any new format in which that information is in-
corporated, including oral and visual presentations.
(1) "DISSEINMIN ATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CON-
TROLLED BY ORIGINATOR"
This marking shall be used when unique source sensitivity factors, known
to the originator, require strict compliance with third agency rule procedures,
in addition to a continuing knowledge and supervision on the part of the
originator as to the extent to which the original document and information
3
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(4) "CAUTION-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED"
This marling will be used in conjunction with foreign intelligence obtained
from various sources in the U.S. private business sector, and as the informa-
tion may bear upon proprietary interests of the source, or may otherwise
be used to the source's detriment. Recipients of reports bearing this marking
shall take every reasonable precaution to ensure that the information is not
- used to the det-iment of the source. This marking may be used in conjunction
with the "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONSULTANTS"
marling described above. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic
be abbreviated NOCONTRACT.)
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contained therein is disseminated. Documents and information bearing this.
marking will not be disseminated beyond the Headquarters elements of- the
recipient organizations and the information contained therein shall not be
extracted and incorporated into other reports without the permission of and
under conditions prescribed by the originator. (For special purposes, primarily
bibliographic notation, communications and automatic data processing, this
marking may be abbreviated ORCON.)
(2) "USIB DEPARTMENTS ONLY"
Foreign intelligence so marked will not be disseminated to departments
and agencies not represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board without the
permission of the originating agency. Within each USIB department and
agency dissemination shall be as determined by the recipient senior intel-
ligence official, and may include department or agency contractors and
consultants unless specifically prohibited by addition of the "NOT RELEAS-
ABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS" mark-
ing described below. -(For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation,
communications and automatic data processing, this marking may be abbre-
viated USIBONLY.)
(3) -NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/
CONSULTANTS"
Foreign intelligence so marked shall not be disseminated to contractors
or contractor consultants without the permission of the originating agency.
Examples of when this marking may be used include National Intelligence
Estimates and similar national intelligence reports, and other foreign intel-
ligence, which, if disseminated to consultants. or contractors, might seriously
impair the continuing cooperation of contributing private individuals. This
restriction shall not apply to those consultants hired under Civil Service
Commission procedures, or comparable procedures derived from authorities
vested in heads of departments and agencies by law, and who are normally
considered an extension of the office by which they are employed. In apply-
ing this control marking, originators will give consideration to the need of
USIB member Departments and Agencies to use contractor consultants and
contractors to perform services which cannot be adequately performed by
U. S. Government personnel. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic
notation, communications, or automatic data processing, this marking may
4
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notation, communication and automatic data processing, this marking may
be abbreviated PROPIN.)
(5) "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS"
Foreign Intelligence so marked involves special considerations requiring
that it not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals
or non-U.S. citizens without the permission of the originating agency.
Examples of when this control marking may be. used include: the possible-
compromise of the status of relations with collaborating foreign governments,
or officials; or jeopardizing the continuing viability of vital technical col-
lection programs. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation,
communications, or automatic data processing, this marking may be abbre-,
viated NOFORN.) When the originating agency predetermines that infor-
mation can be released to a specified foreign government(s) the following
marking may be used: THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED
FOR RELEASE TO (specified country(s) )." (For special purposes, pri-
marily bibliographic notation, communications, or automatic data process-
ing, this marking may be abbreviated "REL (specified countries).")
6. Procedures governing use of control markings
a. Any recipient desiring to use foreign intelligence in a manner contrary
to the restrictions established by the control markings set forth above shall
obtain the permission of the originating agency. Such. permission applies only
to the specific purpose as eed to by the originator and does not automatically
apply to all recipients of the information as ori ginally disseminated unless the
originating agency removes the control markings for the benefit of the re-
cipients. In those cases where dissemination outside the recipient agency is
desired utilizing lesser or no control markings, the recipient agency should
prepare a sanitized version which may be released with the originators
permission. 0.
b. Control markings authorized in paragraphs 3d and 5 above, shall be
displayed prominently on documents, incorporated in the text of communica-
tion messages, and associated with data stored or processed in automatic data
processing systems. Unless the entire document justifies the protection of the-
control marking(s), each portion requiring the marking(s) shall, to the extent
feasible,. be marked with the appropriate marking abbreviation authorized by
this directive.
c. The standardized restrictions and control markings set forth in this
directive are to be employed uniformly by all departments and agencies in the
intelligence community, thereby assuring like control and restrictions on the
use of foreign intelligence disseminated within the departments and agencies
represented on the USIB. -
d. The substance of this directive shall be published in appropriate regula-
tory or notice media of each agency or department, together with appropriate
procedures permitting rapid interagency consultation concerning utilization
of intelligence and information. For this purpose, each USII3 agency will
designate a primary referent.
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7. Report of unauthorized disclosure "
Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in
unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the foreign intelligence of another
shall be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through the.USIB
Security Committee.
8. Prior restrictions and markings
Questions with respect to the current application of control markings author-
ized by earlier directives on the dissemination and control of intelligence and
utilized on documents issued prior to the date of this directive should be
referred to the originating agency. These markings are: WARNLNTG NOTICE-
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED,- CONTROLLED
DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS
ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM ABRO. D,
BACKGROUND USE ONLY and NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
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 UNCLASSIFIED CO'JFIDENTIAL SECRET
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
D/DCI/IC
4
DDS&T
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/NI
9
GC
10
LC
12
Compt
13
D/ Pers
14
D/S
15
DTR
16
A/DCI/PA
17
AO/ DCI
1?3
C/IPS
19
DCI/SS
20
21
22
f'~'S S *2
CGt
STAT
Dote
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