NATO/WARSAW PACT DEFENSE SPENDING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001800100022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 1, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG
ENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Harold Brown
The Secretary of Defense
1 SOAR 1977
SUBJECT NATO/Warsaw Pact Defense Spending
1. Thank you for your thoughtful letter of
15 February. We are pleased that you see our compara-
tive analysis of US and USSR defense activities as
being important. This analysis is the result of a
high priority effort which has been underway for more
than a decade involving a substantial amount of both
collection and analytical resources.
2. Further, i hasten to accept your assessment
that similar comparative costing of NATO and Warsaw
Pact military activities is of particular interest and
importance today. I believe that we can meet your
deadline of mid-April with rough comparisons of the
dollar costs of total defense activities of the non-US
NATO and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) nations. The
estimates for the NSWP countries would have to be based
on their announced defense budget figures, however, and
thus would be subject to a much wider range of uncer-
tainty than our estimates for the USSR. The estimates
for NATO would also have to be based on budgetary data
but would have a smaller range of uncertainty than those
for the NSWP countries. We could also do a direct cost-
ing of pay and allowance costs based on available
estimates of military manpower within the required time
frame.
3. To develop more confident estimates of the costs
of total defense activities and useful comparisons of
military investment and non-personnel operating costs will
require a sizable research effort. Unfortunately the
physical data bases on deployed forces, weapons production,
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operating practices, and military research and develop-
ment necessary for such a study do not now exist in the
required detail. Though it will mean reprogramming re-
sources, if it is considered necessary we are willing to
undertake the effort to collect the data which is needed.
Even so, the task will take some time as well as effort
both now and in the future if. interest in this topic con-
tinues. We could probably develop an initial, preliminary
comparison by late fall.
4. I should caution you that devoting extensive re-
sources to this task will have to be at the expense of
ongoing work on US/USSR comparative analysis and other
priority tasks, since the work will fall on the units now
engaged in those activities. In addition we would need
your assistance in developing the NATO data base. This
would entail your making personnel with knowledge of NATO
forces and budgets available to work with us in the pre-
paration of the initial estimate.
5. In view of the complexity of the task and the
amount of resources involved, I propose that your spe-
cialists and mine get together to work out the details
of where we go from here. If this meets with your
approval please have your point of contact notify Mr.
Chairman of the CIA/DIA Military Costing
Review Board, on and we will begin the work.
747 F. A. R E;
E. H. Knoche
Acting Director
Copies furnished:
Secretary of State
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
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SUBJECT: NATO/Warsaw Pact Defense Spending
2 8 FEB 1977
Deputy Director for Intelligence Date
Distribution:
Orig. + 1 -- Addressee
D/OSR
1 -- Secretary of State
1 -- Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
1 -- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
1 -- ADCI
1 -- Executive Registry
1 -- DDI
1 -- D/DCI/IC
1 -- D/DCI/NI
2 -- D/OSR
2 -- D/SR/PA
(28 February 1977)
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
.1 1
EXECUTIVE SECR.ETA1UAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
, i FO
DATE
INITIAL
1
4 DCI
2
DDCI
3
D/DCI/IC
4
DDS&T
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/NI
9
GC
10
LC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/Pers
14
D/S
15
DTR
16
Asst/DC,
17
AO/DCI
18
C/IPS
19
DCI/SS
20
D/EEO
21
22
3637 (7.76)
ty 17'e Dot.
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STAT
 ` .E. Approved For Release 2004/08/30: CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800100022-1
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 0. C. 20301
FEE 1 5 i7 /
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: NATO/Warsaw Pact Defense Spending
This memorandum reaffirms the importance the Department of Defense
attaches to both the continuation of the CIA's recent efforts to system-
atically compare U.S. and Soviet military programs and to the expansion
of such efforts to include other countries important to U.S. national
security planning. Comparative costing of NATO and Warsaw Pact military
programs is of particular near term importance. -
CIA's dollar cost comparisons of U.S.and Soviet defense activities have
become a focal point of attention in the current public discussion of
trends in the military balance. Unfortunately one result of this high-
lighting of U.S. and Soviet efforts has been a de facto de-emphasis of
the relative defense contributions of the non-US NATO and non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact nations.
In line with the Carter administration's stated intention of increasing
the U.S. commitment to NATO I believe it is important that we start to
place examination of the military balance into better perspective by
ensuring adequate attention to NATO vs. Warsaw Pact. Accordingly, I
request that you initiate work to develop a dollar cost comparison of
total NATO and total Warsaw Pact defense activities using a methodology
as similar as feasible to that employed for the US/USSR analysis.
I recognize there are some difficult methodological and data problems
associated with this effort. Aside from the difficulties of cost
comparisons in different economic systems and the question of how cost
-translates into effectiveness in a given country, any use of the results
would also have to examine questions of additivity of capability in each
alliance.' Among other matters this involves the degree of common planning,
interoperability, and reliability of the forces. Nevertheless, it would
be most desirable to have an interim report, even if its conclusions are
tentative, completed by mid-April 1977 for use in preparing for the
Spring NATO ministerial meetings. My staff will of course make available
to you any relevant data on allied forces which may be in hand.
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If this deadline is too constraining for a complete analysis, initial
efforts should be focused on comparisons of military investment (RDT&E,
procurement of weapons and equipment, and construction of facilities),
with personnel and other operating costs to follow by mid-clay,
.cc: Secretary of State
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Chariman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
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