LETTER TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER FROM CHARLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001900010008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 19, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2006/08/09
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
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I have reviewed the draft Management Plan for Test Ban Treaty Imple-
mentation and Monitoring which was circulated for NFIB action on
9 November 1977. The plan is deficient in several respects and, as
written, is unacceptable to this department. Apparently, the working
group which drafted this plan did not invite anyone in this department
with policy or resource management responsibility to participate. The
plan's weaknesses reflect this.
This plan should be withdrawn and not forwarded to the SCC until it is
rewritten and coordinated with the proper offices.
Attached are more specific comments.
SECRET
WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS
MORI/CDF
SE(.; J~.r COiiTR 140.
Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80MOO165AO01900010008-6
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COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR TEST BAN TREATY
IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING
1. The plan proposes that a subgroup of the SCC provide "overall manage-
ment" for test ban monitoring activities. This conflicts with the terms
of Presidential Directive/NSC-2 on the National Security Council System
which states the SCC will be involved in the development of options and
the implementation of Presidential decisions.
2. This plan contains no analysis of any perceived inadequacies in. the
current intelligence community structure which has responsibility for
monitoring foreign nuclear explosions or proliferation. It is impossible 25X1
to determine how the proposed structure in the plan would remedy unstated
problems.
4. On page 3, the Test Ban Monitoring Steering Group is described as con-
sisting of "senior intelligence officers (NFIB level) representing the
DCI, CIA, DoD, DOE and DOS." Why is there a need for a separate group
to deal with the subject of test ban monitoring? Why cannot the NFIB
itself perform this function? This Steering Group would be tasked under
the plan to make resource recommendations to the Budget and Evaluation
Staff. As the NFIB already does that, it is unclear why a different
group is needed.
5. Regarding the judgement expressed on page 14 that the technical. intel-
ligence functions have generally performed satisfactorily, whose judgement
is that? It was not the conclusion of the 1976 Deutch report regarding
proliferation intelligence nor is it the conclusion of the current CCPC
study on proliferation collection problems.
CLASSIFIED BY ODUSD(P)
SUBJ TO G.D.S. OF E.O. 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASS ON 31 DEC 85
SECRET
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Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80MOO165AO01900010008-6