LETTER TO HONORABLE JOHN M. HARMON FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001900160040-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: August 5, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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Cen'n'"ttc._.
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Honorable John M. Harmon
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
25X1
25X1
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Dear Mr. Harmon:
OCC 77--5038
5 .. ust 1977
On July 7, Attorney General Bell forty- ded to the Director of
.Central Intelligence draft guidelines governing dissemn~.aticn by the _
Federal Bureau of Investigation of information obtained through the
use of electronic surveillance and requested comments :-jn these guide--
lines before putting them into effect. We appreciate the opportunity to
respond to his request on behalf of the Di-rec-or.
.
Although the procedures are acceptab=e forte --o,-:;t part, we
have several suggestions for modifications which ,:,e would like you
to consider. These suggestions are spelled out in detail in the attached
memorandum. If you have any questions, p' ase conta-zt me or
of this Office on
Yours sincerely,
Acting General. Counsel
Attachment
cc: ERJ
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ECE
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SUBJECT: Draft Guidelines Governing Dissemination by FBI of
Information Derived from Electronic Sur~vei'=ance
1. Part II of the guidelines provides that " [i] n formation dis-
seminated to other Federal agencies in the intelligence community which
have a direct counterintelligence interest in the information may identify
or permit identification of United States persons," and that "information.. .
of interest to, but ... not relat[ing] to the direct responsibilities of the
receiving agency," may not identify U.S. persons. We are concerned that
this formulation, in particular the limitation to agencies with a direct
counterintelligence interest, may inhibit the dissemination to CIA of
information important to its foreign counterintelligence mission. CIA needs to
be apprised on a timely basis of the interests, activities and contacts,
including U.S. persons, of foreign intelligence services in the United States
if CIA is to deal effectively with similar activities and contacts abroad. In
virtually every case in which a U.S. person is in contact with a non-U.S.
person who is the subject of a foreign counterintelligence inquiry, or is
known or reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power, CIA
has a direct counterintelligence interest in information which may identify
or permit identification of that U. S U.S. person. Executive Order 11905 does not
restrict the dissemination to, and acquisition and retention by. CIA of such
information, ??4(g) (4), 5(b)(7) (i) and (v). We strongly believe that all such
information should be provided to CIA and suggest that Part II be amended
'o explicitly permit, if not mandate, its dissemination to CIA. One way this
-night be done is to insert the words "CIA and" between "disseminated to"
and "other Federal agencies" in the sentence quoted at the beginning of
this paragraph.
2. Part.IV limits the "dissemination of information relating to criminal
activity which is acquired ... during counterintelligence investigations
or the collection of foreign intelligence information." We are concerned
with this part insofar as it might restrict the dissemination to CIA of informa-
tion relating to international terrorism or other foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence information that would be considered as information relating to
criminal activity. We suggest that this section be amended to specify such
information should be disseminated to CIA. This can be done by adding a.
subparagraph E. to this section which would read as follows:
Any foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information
which may relate to criminal activity, including information
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concerning international terrorism, shall he disseminated to
the Central Intelligence Agency .
3. Part V, in establishing guidelines L r the dissemination of informa-
tion concerning the trustworthiness of Federal employe _s and persons granted
access to classified information, does not take into account that the CIA may have
interests in former as well as current individuals in con-.act with the Agency.
We suggest that the first sentence in Part V be modified =s follows:
Information which raises a question about the trustworthiness
of a current or former Federal employee, a person who held
or is holding a security clearance or a person who has been
or is granted access .. .
Moreover, CIA has a need to investigate individuals for logistical service
reasons and for operational reasons who will not be employees of the
Agency or formally granted security clearances. GS1 e-nployees, GSA
employees and telephone company employees assigned to Agency buildings
have a facility access without being employees of the Agency or without
having been granted a security clearance. Also, information required for a
security decision will be required on employees of a prcorietary organization
even if they are not to be briefed. To preclude any possibility that information
concerning these individuals may not be disseminated to CIA, we recommend that
the following subparagraphs be added to Section V:
Information which raises a question about the trust-
worthiness of competitive service applicants, or current
or former employees assigned or detailed to a Government
agency in a staff capacity or in a position with staff-like
access or with facility access may be disseminated to that
agency or another Federal agency having responsibility to
investigate the trustworthiness of the individual. The
information disseminated may identi y the individual.
Information which raises a question about t_l"ie trustworthiness
of a current or former contractor of a Government agency or a
current or former employee of such contractor who has or
had access to sensitive information or facilities may be
disseminated to that agency or another Federal agency having
responsibility to investigate the trustworthiness of the
individual. The information disseminated may identify the
individual.
Information which raises the question abou: the trustworthiness
of individuals who are to be used in support of CIA operations
or were used in support of Agency operations, or are or were
given security approval because of their access to information
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about CIA activities, should not be disseminated until the
FBI has verified the CIA's official interest in the individual
concerned. The information disseminated may identify the
individual.
4. Part VII. A. states that the "dissemination of foreign intelligence
information to foreign governments'is not within the responsibility of the
FBI" and that other agencies must obtain prior Attorney General approval
before they may disseminate foreign intelligence obtained from the FBI about
U.S. persons to foreign governments. Under Executive Order 11905, the
Bureau may disseminate foreign intelligence to coopera`ve foreign governments
pursuant to Attorney General procedures (?4(g) (4)) but in keeping with CIA's
responsibility for the conduct of liaison with foreign intelligence services
under NSCID No. 5 and related Directives, such dissemination should.
be made through CIA. We suggest that this part be amended to provide that the
FBI may disseminate information which identifies or permits identification
of U.S. persons to CIA for further dissemination to foreign governments, under
specific standards if necessary, rather than to pro=ride solely for an ad hoc
approach:
.5. Part VII. B . would permit the FBI to disseminate counterintelligence
information to foreign governments in certain circumstances. Although the
Executive Order authorizes the FBI to disseminate counterintelligence informa-
tion to cooperating foreign governments, we cuestion whether the FBI
may disseminate unilaterally_ for ei an counterintelligence information to foreign
governments, since CIA is the primary foreign counterintelligence authority
abroad, see NSCID No. 5. The authorities outlined in the subparagraphs
of this section, therefore, should be amended as follows: .
B. Counterintelligence Information.
Counterintelligence information may be disseminated
to foreign intelligence or security agencies when such.
dissemination is in the interest of the security or foreign
policy of the United States. Foreign counterintelligence
information and information on international terrorism
may be disseminated to CIA for further dissemination to
foreign intelligence or security agencies. Any dissemina-
tion of such information to foreign agencies is subject to
the following conditions:
* * x
6. Part VII. C . regulates the dissemination of criminal information to
foreign governments. For the reasons mentioned in our comments on Part
IV, we suggest that the following paragraph be added to this subsection:
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5. Foreign intelligence and counterintzlL~ nce information,
including information relating to international terrorism and
requests by foreign intelligence and security services for
information relating to international terrorists , may be
disseminated to CIA for dissemination to appropriate agencies
of a foreign government.
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