MEMO TO COMMANDER MCMAHON FROM LYLE L. MILLER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002200040015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 8, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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FAEVAltiVC Rol,i4
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OLC 77-0800
Office of Legislative Counsel
8 March 1977
TO: Commander McMahon
For Admiral Turner's meeting at the
White House, attached is background and
an action plan changing the structure of
oversight in the Congress.
Deputy Legislative uounsel
Distribution:
Orig - Add'e
1 - OLC Subject
1 - OLC Chrono
1 - ER
OLC:LLM:ndl (8 March 1977)
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ACTION PLAN - CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNIT Y
I. OBJECTIVE
A. Executive Branch - Achieve an oversight structure in the
Congress having the best prospects for safeguarding sensitive
intelligence details which must be shared with the Congress.
13. Congress - Assure that the Intelligence Community is app .opri..iety
subject to the congressional powers of appropriations, legislation, over apht,
and investigation.
II. PROBLEM
A. Fractionation of congressional committee jurisdiction and
the absence of uniform House and Senate rules restricting access
to and disclosure of sensitive intelligence details leads to extensive
proliferation of such information to congressional committees,
committee staff and other Members.
1. House -
a. Oversight - Under House rules legislation,
oversight, and special oversight authority for CIA alone
vests in the four committees (Armed Services, Appropriaiionl:,
House International Relations, and Government Operation).
Moreover, any other committee of the House can assert jt risch, i
over the CIA for any activity or matter which such commii tee
asserts falls within their jurisdiction.
b. House Rule XI - Provide to all Members of the Bons,
access to all committee records and, unless specifically
excepted, to all committee hearings.
c. Appropriations - Appropriation hearings are heli
by the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the House Bu
Committee is entitled to budget figures. During the Appropriat :ns
hearings an extensive and sensitive record of budgetary hearing.;
is made and is available to all Members of the House.
d. Covert Action - Pursuant to the Hughes-Ryan Amcndri
covert action findings are reported to the oversight Subcorimittes
of the House Armed Services, Appropriations, and Internation.)
Relations Committees.
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2. Senate -
a. Oversight - Despite an assertion of exclusive jurisdiction
over CIA and the DCI, S. Res. 400, establishing the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, provides that any other committee
may study and review any intelligence activity to the extent
that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise within
the jurisdiction of such committee. Moreover, except for
legislation concerning the CIA and DCI, any legislation
reported by the SSCI shall be referred to another standing
committee if the matter relates to the jurisdiction of that
committee and referral is requested.
b. Appropriations - Appropriation hearings are held
by the Appropriations Committee; the Senate Budget Committee
is entitled to budget figures, and there is an authorization
requirement for appropriations which may require sequential
-eferral to standing committees other than the SSCI.
c. Covert Action - Pursuant to the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
covert action findings are reported to the SSCI, to Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the Senate Appropriations Committee,
and currently the Senate Armed Services Committee, although
the latter committee does not hold hearings on covert actions
and its interest in this matter may atrophy.
B. What is at stake is the credibility of the Congress in carrying
out its legitimate functions and that of the Executive Branch in protecting
sensitive operational details.
III. PROPOSAL PRINCIPLES
A. Establish either one joint committee for both Houses or
if that is not acceptable to the Congress, a select committee in the
House parallelling the SSCI. This could be accomplished either by
resolution or by a statute similar to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
B. Provide the new committee with exclusive jurisdiction
for all legislative functions, except for appropriations (withdrawals of
appropriations from the Treasury to support the Intelligence Community
will require some role for the Appropriations Committees). Such jurisdiction
should include all covert action reporting, legislation, oversight and
hive stigations.
C. Limit to the committee access to Information on sensitive
operational details provided by the Executive Branch to the new committee
and the Appropriations Committees.
D. Provide firm rules for nondisclosure of such information by the
new committee and the Appropriations Committees.
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vest exclusive Jurisdiction in the committee :for
covert actions, a statute would be required to repeal or amend tl o
Hughes-Ryan Amendment.
F. Assure the appointment to the committee of Members of a wid
spectrum of political persuasion and competence in those areas of ab ie which
are of the greatest concern to the public.
G. Require the committee to investigate any complaint it reeeiv.
from any Member or committee and to make a record of its findings
available to the appropriate leadership of the Congress. This woild flure
the complaining Member or committee that appropriate action ha ,3 be
taken without, in the process, requiring disclosure of sensitive
operational details outside of the committee or the leadership.
H. Adopt Such other provisions currently found in S. Res. 400
which are not in conflict with the above principles.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. In the interest of establishing a positive tone at the outset,
authorize Admiral Turner, with the President's blessing, to make the
rounds of those congressional committees who most profit from the
Intelligence Community foreign intelligence product. This would De in
keeping with Admiral Turner's plan to volunteer on a continuing basis
such substantive intelligence information as would be helpful to such
committees in their legislative responsibilities. The offer would inc1-10
making available that which can be unclassified without degeneration
of either intelligence sources and methods or national security int,..re:t
Classified briefings would be provided with the understanding that stri2..
rules would be enforced against unauthorized disclosure. In the proce21.
Admiral Turner will be in a sound position for explaining the absotute
essentiality of protecting intelligence sources and methods and to -licit
support for this fundamental principle.
B. The President should host a series of meetings with the lc ade hip
of both Houses and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of co T ittees
presently exercising some type of oversight responsibility with respect
the Intelligence Community, and particularly, the CLA (Tab A).
Other Members who are influential because of their leadership position
on committees should also be included (Tab B). Finally, Member; noi
included in the above lists but who are most concerned about possi)le ;11,uses
by the Intelligence Community should be sought out to determine the eti nt
to which the principles set forth in the Proposal would satisfy their int ests
that abuses would not be tolerated and would be appropriately
investigated and acted upon (Tab C).
C. Intelligence oversight legislation introduced in the House ;s
of 28 February 1977 is commented upon in Tab D.
3
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Senate Appropriations Intelligence Operations Subcommittee
John L. McClellan (D., Ark.), Chairman
Milton Young (R. , N. Dak. ), Ranking Minority Member
Senate Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee
John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), Chairman
Barry Goldwater (EL, Ariz.), Ranking Minority Member
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Daniel K. Inouye (D., Hawaii), Chairman
Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), Ranking Minority Member
Senate Judiciary Committee
James 0. Eastland (D., Miss.), Chairman
Strom Thurmond (R., S. Car.), Ranking Minority Member
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
John Sparkman (D., Ala.), Chairman
Clifford P. Case (R., N. J.), Ranking Minority Member
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.), Chairman
Charles Percy (R. , Ill. ), Ranking Minority Member
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House A_ppropriations Committee
George H. Mahon (D., Texas), Chairman
Jack Edwards (R. , Ala.), Ranking Minority Member
Elford Cederberg (R., Mich.), ex-officio member
House Armed Services Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear
Energy Subcommittee
Melvin Price (D., Ill.), Chairman
Bob Wilson (R., Calif.), Ranking Minority Member
House International Relations Committee
Clement J. Zablocki (D., Wis. ), Chairman
William Broomfield (R., Mich.), Ranking Minority Member
House Government Operations Committee
?Tack Brooks (D., Texas), Chairman
Frank Horton (R., N. Y.), Ranking Minority Member
House Judiciary Committee
Peter W. Rodino (D., N. J.), Chairman
Robert McGlory (R. Ill,), Ranking Minority Member
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40.
SENATE
HOUSE
Leadership of the House and Senate
and Other Important Members
James 0. Eastland (D., Miss.), President pro tempore
Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.), Deputy President pro tempore
Robert C. Byrd (D., W. Va. ), Majority Leader
Alan Cranston (D., Calif.), Majority Whip
Daniel K. Inouye (D., Hawaii), Secretary, Democratic Con.iere3t,
Howard H. Baker (R., Tenn.), Minority Leader
Ted Stevens (R., Alaska), Minority Whip
John G. Tower (R., Texas), Policy Committee Chairman
Thomas P. O'Neill (D., Mass.), Speaker of the House
James Wright (D., Texas), Majority Leader
John Brademas (11)., Ind.), Majority Whip
Tom Foley (D., Wash.), Chairman Democratic Causus
John J. Rhodes (R., Ariz.), Minority Leader
Robert H. Michel (R., Ill.), Minority Whip
John B. Anderson (R., Ill.), Chairman Party Conference
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Other Important Members
Including Those Most Concerned About Abuses
Representative John E. Moss (IJ., Calif. ) - Father of the F -eedo [1
of Information Act and an outspoken advocate of openness in Government_
He is an articulate spokesman in opposition to overclassification and
executive privilege. He is a plantiff in the AT&T litigation regarding
access to details of National security wiretaps.
Representative Donald M. Fraser (D., Minn.) - Chairman of th.!
International Organizations Subcommittee of the House Internationa,
Relations Committee, and a long time advocate of human rights. He wjL
be having an investigation of foreign intelligence services' activitie 3 in ti
U.S.
Representative Lee Hamilton (D., Id.)
Representative Lester Wolff (D. , N. Y.)
Representative Morris Udall (D. , Ariz. )
Representative Paul McCloskey (R., Calif. )
Representative John McFall (D., Calif.) - Former Majority W L
Although not presently a member of the House leadership, he is a N./ell
respected senior member.
*Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (D., Wis. )
*Representative Jonathan Bingham (D., N.Y. )
Representative Leo J. Ryan (D., Calif.)
*Representative Robert Giaim.o (D., Conn.)
* The above Representatives are critics of intelligence abuses am am
members held in high esteem by their colleagues.
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Representative Dante Fascell (D., Fla.) - He is an active member
of the House International Relations Committee and Chairman of its
Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee.
Representative Edward Derwinski (R., Ill.) - A senior Republican
member who has been an outspoken supporter of the Intelligence Community
in the House.
Representative Les Aspin (D.. Wis. )
..? Representative Ronald Dellurns (D., Calif.)
Both are critics of the Intelligence Community and have authored reform
legislation in this Congress. Mr. Aspin is a member of the House Armed
Services Committee and therefore familiar with intelligence products.
Mr. Dellurns was a member of the Pike Committee and is presently a
member of the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee.
Representative Michael Harrington (D., Mass.)
Representative John Erlenborn (R., Ill.) - Influential Republican
member of the House Government Operations Committee. He is held in
high esteem, more so than Mr. Horton, Ranking Minority Member of the
Committee.
Representative Parren Mitchell (D., Md.) - Chairman of the
Congressional Black Caucus.
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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATION
INTRODUCED IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AS OF
28 FEBRUARY 1977
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CONTENTS
I. Joint Committee Oversight Legislation
A. H.R. 291 - Mr. Conte
B. H.R. 370 - Mr. Frenzel
C. H.R. 1099 - Mr. Gary A. Myers
D. HR. 2990 - Mr. Frenzel
E. H. Con. Res. 9 - Mr. Boland
H. House Committee Oversight Legislation
A. H. Res. 82 - Mr. Bennett
B. H. Res. 204 - Mr. Aspin
C. H. Res. 335 - Mr. Pike
D. H. Con. Res. 10 - Mr. Boland
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HOUSE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATION
as of 28 February 1977
Since the opening of the 95th Congress, several bills, joint
resolutions and simple resolutions dealing with House oversight cY the
Intelligence Community have been introduced. All are pending in the
Rules Committee and no immediate action on them is expected. 'Mei/
major provisions are outlined below.
I. Joint Committee Oversight Legislation
A. H.R. 291 - Mr. Conte
--Would establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight
--18 members; five from majority and four from minority in
each House; must include a majority and minority member fro-n
Armed Services, International Relations Committee in the House
and from Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Appropriaticns
Committees in the Senate.
--Conduct oversight of foreign intelligence activities of CIA,
DIA, NSA, INR, all military intelligence and the foreign intelLgen,!, ?
activities of any other department, bureau or agency.
--Exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the legislative authori-
zation for the organizations above and all matters relating primaril
to their functions would be referred to the Committee.
--Heads of the above organizations would be required to keep
the Committee fully and currently informed with respect to all
foreign intelligence activities and operations and the Committee
could order reports regarding matters within its jurisdiction.
--The Committee would establish guidelines in accordance
with those of the Executive branch for classification of all
information originating within it and would establish guidelines
for access to its records for all Members of Congress or thei)
designees who have the appropriate clearances.
--No provision for declassifying information.
--Committee would keep a record of all actions including any
votes.
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B. H.R. 370 - Mr. Frenzel
-Would establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight.
14 members, four from the majority and three from the
minority in each House.
--Committee will study and investigate activities of CIA, FBI,
Secret Service, DIA, NSA and the activities of any other Government
organization which pertain to intelligence gathering or surveillance.
- -The heads of the above organizations will keep the Committee
fully and currently informed of matters within its jurisdiction, and
the Committee can require reports.
?-- All bills, resolutions, etc., dealing with the above
organizations will be referred to the Committee and no bill, etc.,
will be considered by either House until reported by the Committee.
--No funds may be appropriated for intelligence or surveillance
activities unless authorized by legislation passed after enactment
of the bill.
- -Committee could classify information originating within it
in accordance with Executive branch standards.
--No provision for declassifying.
- No provision for making records available to other Members
of Congress.
-Committee would keep a record of all actions including votes.
C. H.R. 1009 - Mr. Gary A. Myers
--This bill is identical to H.R. 291.
D. H.R. 2990 - Mr. Frenzel
--Would create a Joint Committee on Intelligence Operations.
---18 members; five from majority and four from minority in
each House; must include a majority and minority member from
the House Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations and
Appropriations. No member may serve more than six years.
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--Committee would have exclusive legislative and oversig
jurisdiction over the foreign intelligence activities of CIA, DIA,
NSA, INR, all military intelligence and any other agency or
department to extent it engages in foreign intelligence aetivitis.
--The DCI would keep the Committee fully and currently
informed about the activities of any of the above organizations, but
the Committee could order a report from any agency.
--Committee would set up classification guidelines consis.ent
with those of the Executive branch.
--Committee would establish guidelines for making recorcs ape
data available to any Member of Congress or his designee whc ha:,
appropriate security clearances.
--Establishes a criminal penalty for disclosure of committee
material or foreign intelligence information without Committee
approval.
--Committee would keep a record of all actions, including vot
--Bill would amend Hughes-Ryan to provide for reporting anly
to this Committee and give the Committee a veto over the actiDn.
--No authorization requirement for appropriations.
E. H. Con. Res. 9 - Mr. Boland
--Would establish a Joint Committee on Information and
Intelligence.
--14 members; Speaker of the House and President of Senate
would appoint seven each, but no more than four from each Ilcuse
may be from the same party.
--Remainder of Resolution is a duplicate of H. Con, Res. 10.
H. House Committee Oversight Legislation
A. H. Res. 82 - Mr. Bennett
--Would establish a Select Committee on Intelligence.
--15 members; one from majority and minority on Approp s,
Armed Services, International Relations and Judiciary Committee:4
plus four majority and three minority at large. Majority and ninity
leaders are ex officio members.
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--No member can serve more than eight years.
--Committee would make periodic reports to House, but in
so doing would not make any unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
--DCI, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and Director
of the FBI would make an annual report to Committee on their
intelligence activities and on foreign activities directed against
the United States. An unclassified version which would not require
revealing sources and methods of finding may be made public.
--Committee would give its views and estimates to the Bureau
of the Budget.
--Would require all employees to agree in writing to abide by
Rules of the House and the Committee and obtain proper security
clearance before being granted access to classified information.
-The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct would investi-
gate unauthorized disclosures of classified information and recommend
appropriate action.
-Head of each department will keep the Committee currently
and fully informed of all intelligence activities, including anticipated
ones. This is not a condition precedent for implementation.
--No funds can be appropriated for intelligence activities for any
fiscal year after September 1977 unless authorized by a bill or joint
resolution passed by the House in the same or preceding year.
--Committee would study Community's analytical capability,
charter question, Community organization, cover and clandestine
activities, improving protection of intelligence secrets, and
providing for disclosure when secrecy not necessary, establishing a
standing committee on intelligence or a joint committee, authori-
zation of intelligence funds and the desirability of disclosure of
amounts.
-Does not contain any provisions permitting authorization of
disclosure of sensitive information.
B. H. Res. 204 - Mr. Aspin
--Would establish a standing Committee on Intelligence.
4
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--13 members; one-third from Armed Services, one-third frolr.
International Relations, and rest from membership of other stmdi-t
committees; may serve six years in a ten-year period.
--Jurisdiction over matters including authorizations, pert ininR
to the DCI, the CIA and the intelligence activities of rest of
Government; exclusive jurisdiction over DCI and CIA, shared with
other committees for remainder.
--Committee would make periodic reports to the House on
intelligence activities.
--DCI and Secretaries of State and Defense and the Directo,- of
the FBI would make annual reports to the Committee, an uncla.4sifl
version of which could be made public; head of each agency engagect
in intelligence activities would keep Committee fully and currently
informed of such activities, but this is not a condition precedeht
to the activity.
--All employees of Committee would be required to sign secrec7;
oaths; Committee would adopt rules insuring the protection of raater,als
in its care; Committee would establish rules of access for other
Members.
--Would establish procedure for public disclosure of informatior
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct would investigate
unauthorized disclosures.
--Would require an authorization passed by the House in sae ol
preceding fiscal year before money can be appropriated for int(41-
igence activities.
--Committee would study intelligence analysis capabilities, char-er
question, organization of intelligence activities, conduct of covert
and clandestine activities and procedure for informing Congres.;,
protection of necessary intelligence secrets and shall recommeld
needed legislation in these areas.
C. H. Res. 335 - Mr. Pike et al
--Establish a standing committee of the House on Intelligence.
--9 to 13 members appointed by Speaker of the House in consultiori
with minority leader, membership should reflect the political ratio
of the House.
--No Member may serve for more than six continuous year; ; no
staff members shall serve for more than six years.
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--All matters concerning the CIA, DCI and the intelligence
activities of all other agencies and departments of the Government
would be referred to the Committee; the Committee would have
exclusive jurisdiction over matters regarding the CIA and DCI and
overall authorizations.
--No funds shall be appropriated for intelligence activities unless
authorized by a bill 9,r joint resolution passed by the House in the
same or preceding year.
--DCI, Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the
FBI would make annual reports on intelligence activities to the
Committee, an unclassified version of which could he made public;
Committee shall make periodic and regular reports to the House.
--All employees must have signed a secrecy oath and received
a security clearance from the DCI before they have access to any
classified information.
--Establishes a procedure for Committee to disclose information ?
classified by the Executive branch.
--Committee may make classified information available to other
Members, but it must keep a record of it and the Member may not
disclose the information.
--Committee on Standards of Official Conduct will investigate
unauthorized disclosures.
--Head of each department or agency shall keep Committee fully
and currently informed about intelligence activities, including significant
anticipated ones, but this is not a condition precedent for implementation.
--Committee will study and report on U.S. intelligence analytical
capabilities, charter question, organization of Intelligence Community,
conduct of covert and clandestine activities and method of reporting
them to Congress, protection of valid intelligence secrets.
D. H Con Res. 10 - Mr. Boland
--E3tablishes a Committee on Information and Intelligence.
---Speaker of the House appoints Members; no more than half
from same party, cannot serve for more than six years.
?CIA, USIA and any other agency or department within the
Executive branch conducting information and intelligence activities
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would give to the Committee any information regarding its
activities that the Committee would require to carry out its
duties.
--Committee would study and make recommendations conc-crni i;:
the activities of information and intelligence agencies, the relatior -
ship between these agencies and U.S. based corporations abroad,
problems of gathering information and intelligence inforrnatior amc
its proper utilization.
--Committee would be able to classify information origina i-ng
therein, in accordance with Executive branch standards.
--Committee would establish safeguards for protecting classift:.
information.
--All bills, resolutions, etc., relating primarily to any inforr 1- ion
or intelligence agency of the U.S. shall be referred to the Corunif e.
7
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7 March l9.
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT
: Follow-up to the President's 5 March Me no-
randurn to Various Addressees Including
Admiral Turner (ER 77-3644)
L The Vice President will chair a meeting at 1645 hours, 8 M- t:h,
and the agenda is substantially as follows, and attendees will be Secretary
Vance, Attorney General Bell, Dr. Brzezinski, Admiral Turner. Cou,,--el
to the President Lipshutz, and Dr. Schlesinger.
a. A brief discussion of the JOB. Purpose is to review the
-operation of the SOB in order to get a fresh recommendatiot in
the form of a note to the President on the functions of the IOB,
with the objective to strengthen the role of the IOB oversiet
function.
b. Vice President's general discussion of the same issues
raised at his press conference. See Washington Post article
of 5 March, "Mondale Eyes Civil Penalties for Leaks," (attach..
c. Who gets what intelligence information in the Executive
Branch, what remedies there are and improprieties on pari of
the Intelligence Community. What penalties there are now lr
could be developed for unauthorized disclosure.
d. Who gets what in the Legislative Branch and how to cut
down on the number of people who get this information and it
same tithe how do we continue to shape our legislative reeu re-
ments. now to be responsive; i.e., get through our neces; arv
appropriations, oversight committee hearings, and legislative
requirements and still cut down on the number of people whtl ha
access. BCE Note: Mr. Knoche's letter to Vice President
Mondale may be relevant (attached).
2. The purpose of the meeting is to undertake general disc tssi-)
of the guidelines that might be developed to cover sanctions for discic ire
and whether one needs additional criminal penalties. It is the Pr
desire to obtain some resolution of what appears to be a difference of
opinion between Vice President Mondale and Admiral Turner and he
Executive Branch.
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3. It will be useful to Admiral Turner if we can provide h m m, it h
facts about incidents of disclosure within the Intelligence Commt nity.
how often specific cases, etc.
Attachments
Internal Distribution:
1 - ER w/atts
1 - ES Chrono w/o
Hurriedly,
B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary
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CONFIDENTIAL
rag 4...? s.1.1?Na. WI. I ??.I ?J I ?1..IlA LOA I W. j? .6, ? ? ??-? ? ? ? ? ? ??? ?
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? . ?
VICE PRESIDEIsl_'11110NDALE
e?-? eyes civil ,penalties'..FLi",
-
'
eceiLthJii
T '4C2- m`?
-at Cr/ina
londale- Sa
,---By-. lialrla"--SA3rOders^--,
TrashInsto4rost'Stafr Wiitei7:::':7 4
Di sagreeingewith-th eelteVilyT Te
,..;: ? alai:heel .direetorfhe--Central --te`
Intelligence Agency.. Vice res- e4-
ident eNlondale-Sairteyesterday. -
he'. , is..1"personally, opppsedl to
,7 the imposition' of , any criminal- .
; penalties on government offi-
cial -e who allow national secue,
---- rity secrets to become public. e
:.Mor_dale said lie would. super
"port some form of 'civil rem- ?
--yedies for unauthorized disclos- -:
'.ure," but -disagreed with the
suggestion by-Adm. Stansfield:.
'..:Turner, the. new:. CIA director',
? -??
.for criminakepenalties Ort: nee .
tienal-securityJeaks. -A' ,???,. r???;,' . ...c.,?
-;:>.. q would. findieit , very diffi, - '...
? ' ctilt to accept. 'the !Systerrteof-
'' criminal- penalties,"::Mondalee
..said ? in an interView- With-The -
. eWashington ..;.Poste...4."I
? ? 7.think it works-,and I jecion'te:
i- think it should.work.";e: e? ? ? - ,-?:,:le. .;
-:g,..:'!".?;,Referring.:toelais ' study Of
. .. .
fez:past abuses -.:11-Yeeentelligenceeee
?-.:re agencies when he :wee asmerze: -
?;-4bere of' a Senate. investiga tiner'
?-;,i,;Comneittee, Mondale said elle,? -
had concluded-et:hat, "the best
'protection the President has
i: ''''''' abuse , -.....- of his author-- . ?
ity by subordinates is the:. . ....,....
-?-? fear that they -may'- be caught- ,
-.: and they may: read about it in:
the press." ., e: -e. ? - ?
Mondale was-' the highest- e...
. ? ranking administration official 11
- tO discuss the subject of- eecu. z
erity leaks since,-Turner -told e
'senators at, hid-econfirmation. _
'. hearing that he ,would "cen, ?
e tainly, be ..very ,e amenable" to
,'.developing .. and .,., -advocating -,
-,- criminal : legislation ;:to stop;
e leaks by security offieeri:.;?:,..i:,F( .z.,t
eer IVIONDAT.*;A4; Cot 5.:.
.:,,-...!-4.;: , ---e. --::,;ip'rg-i; -4.4161,4:',!1,,47,-etIrt
AT-
?
c)rit
4 ? ? 4
?
ena les or
.'-i.s, ? 7',, !:-. - ,rls ---1;:):- ?.'1'.i.; 1 i'':.:--.7 ' '.1. .:?".--' ' r'''''.: "11?::' u :-z-
7 ' ' MONDALE,?From.:Ar.' ,-' '.:1 f. - ? major Corps of Engineers e:el Bureau
. . , ''???7 . !7?.??.4 ''.'". of Reclamation. p ? njeet. E.7am his
, ? -:.:The .Vice-Peesidentsaid he-had not. ). budget, provoking eries 4 riin and
discussed the issue with Turner. or , . outrage from the..leeislatent i a the efr ?
last press conference that-he believed'_ -T --
e. Some members have e :eculated
.-.. such -leaks could be -"extremely- dam- e.:
e, _ ,.s,,.. ' : i,. e . that Carter would,nie the )- -ejects as
eaging -"-- - - - - - ''.' H...'s,`.-':' '- - ..7 'bargaining chips.. to net. ,e, 4,:ey and
?,,., .The discussion was provoked by the -'? other, . controversial. ._, I lislation
--. publication by The lVashington Post e'-- ihroUgh.. Congress,' I.ut 114 le life- said
'of information that--the CIA had:sup- ::"T. know- for a fact' that 3 . note the
epliedelordan's King. Hussein With mile'. e.:case
hone of dollars over a period of years .- , eI went to him p?rson e ;Viler-) ,, r.
,.'for ' ?both ' personal and intelligence
"Ii.ses: 'i. .-' - " _ : ? - heard what he was plann.e ., I said,
- .?e ? - 'This is going to be -:ough e, laically?.
Mondale, who had previouslyesaid ?..-lere said, 'I know It, .but- ' t el very
"-he Was 'unaware of -those- paymentseeedeeply about jt:;; enclee''. :0 eeee
,when he was a member .of the .197546e-..e7..control 'waste--; of- this, kir d I. don't-.'
Senate "committee-, investigating.; the: e- know how -you can, ii-et, a r it' f' el the.
CIA, told 'Post reporters' and .editorsle'elaudget.'_,..., ,..,-; --?--; - e. eel. -e- e. :?-?"' '..:-
fAhat- his -memory may hayo.::-.;!-,ef1,-,Fli's7,-e-ie. 'Mondale :said Carter "doe s 14 want
taken.. .... . . - ? :. - -. 7..:-.: ,r=:r .-, , e .1.-.....1e -", to- get . into . governr aent-t e : leo the -
- "I 'did. not 'recall:hearing about the.7._..way. we had it . .. wider sq.-- e 'efethe '
:Hussein. thing," he said 'but -I- have ...; previous Presidentsrhut th;tt ; a rem.
-.checked since, and i' ane fold- but at?e?,-..., edy that is available it het 4 Jfleply .
'least the records show that. r Was at a ? - ''-about -something.", 7 -. -'-'' .;:,,.1 .... :_ :.." =. '?
. -meeting where that was reported
' - ' But, despite this ,tireate ,e . i action,
' I just plain don't remember it": , -....e '''.'';.?.'I'Mondale - said he thouiht the ''. l.jective
- ?
Mondale . said he thought'.."many-..,,,criteria":- of .: 'execut ve-cot g a ssional .
-.functions" ': subsidized . through- isuch'. --relations are good.. Cil inre 0., at eicro.e-
payments were "perfectly legitimate," ries on reorganizatioe gale., i e_ the i
-- but ? said-he- was-not--fully - briefed- on-7- bedget and the - coo norni-e - i :eul us !
"the specific grant or whatever you package and a series of ncre rations,'
:call it' to Hussein.. ee., ":, re-e, - . --,. the Vice ',President, 1. aid::: tit ..es: ire '.
- Ile said . he supported the. Presi- . "moving qUitewell.';e, - '!"?-.? . ,
.' dent's efforts to reduce the number of
? .. He also an._ cip' im-ist e ',f'ev r of :
-eexecutiee. branch employees with ac- ?-...' the appointments prce.ess, a. -ding'
- cess to such information and hoped - that "it's taken us Ion .,,er tel ee ex- ,
Congress would _reduce the numbers. pected" to fill departn-ental ie. i:e, but
, of its members' who received, such ''' .: 'predicting that "two motte3 from
' briefings. ? ? ? :-.- :.?,--.. . - ? : -, now -. . . rin not sure,...ee-e, h w- seri-'.
Mondale said a reduction in the T-' ous it will be -' A'e
The Vice President iali't-1,e? e were -
number of officials given such infor- ' ' ,
.ination 'could 'be' achieved ' without * '
several reasons for the ?-ove ).en le
damaging the principle of 'pOlitical..ace_
. ountability_ky the intelligence agen-
sending nominations te Poe ee a ;3.1011'7'
t:
confirmation., -- e.:-:
des to the President and Congress. -. -.
? . He also said he would- have no ob- - .- "We'vez si . . :
mply, swamped" I. . , FBI. ?
? jections . to dismissal from office- or, -, with names, he said stewing teF .typp?
- -other civil penalties-being :invoked re,-- cal clearance -period tarn IP r 4 V4 AO '
-four or five weeks. Steict c? Jr- lee-of- :
, against officials who _violate a pledge
, of confidentiality, on secretmaterials interest '-standardS:hav eereq air ed- "a -:
? but he ruled ouf criminal pe.Pialtiesot,"..e_.good.cleal of time for ?ome-a lc a , leek '
.,,, !--,.-..;,-442 to "rearrange their affairs " -;. ' _ .. : -..,'
. any kind ;..- ..: -- - .:,- ,..;:e.',.,-
.? , In the interview, the Vide President'',".:::t: The President's. dest'i to, g? a his.:
. ., . . _
3 strongly-.-- defended -----Carters--Cabinet 'appOiriteei a enajor- le,ies in ,.
: "human f eights" campaign as both et:T?.-e.;.( staffing!" their . departments ae.:-:.. .the
- fective and principled. -e --:: : e :' ..e..",:''Search fOr.e-qualified w-.:?men a
i "There, have: been several , examples, e.: nority:',:applicants have also e; i Wed
'.i ar ound the world of political prison ? `',. delays; Mondale said. .. e, e, '? e ',.;?: !-
el's being released and emigres being: --".' Fihaily, "consultation i"- wi b Inern
, .
: permitted to leave," he said. "I think ?,, ..-bers . of Congress have"; often taken
, there is evidence that when this coun-e; . "unbelievable amounts of , .ti ft - .
. , .
. try speaks in , meaningful, consistente-, said.
.. ..
ways about human rights and the peoee -7:. "I was Oven one part artier j()
'
pie around the world get the idea that 'es.... and at the end of threfeweeli s '. ',..old -
' we. might mean it, there..zare very .drite-:e: the President I thouget- we - a-mid
\
-slt-able reactions The a '-"host :qa.feseCie-
- , , '-?.-abolish he oll.ce:7N c-mitteers-%.1
ties 'te: recommended-there:wasen,,,l io'Ard_iylt
On dornestieelssues1-7`.M6ndale said''.: else that' didn't.like hint..; ''',--';'; Z.- : .. e?:;
-
he thought relations between the- new '..;?-?::. But, .Mondale said ,',.:' 'lie -It m ea' 4
? - ea ministration., and . Congress - are,..e.,. picking up much`,..more4..ipidly -.: r . z p. z
: , "better than the press-reports-."' Buti-:e Poi ntments,, and :the ',rat:shim
lae.i. also said-- Carter.e."-feelseverye,:griiminish.'?-?..ie;;.e.),:e_1:;i ''N,t,.
-..-deeply!' about. the '19 viate'epio:jects:..,-.-As for his own-roleT. ewlerid h,, Telia-,
he cut from the-budget-and might be. ,that. despiteetheeprohIems .. bet eeen,
s willineertcrrisle,-a, vet otteattl ere with. Canevce:past:y.ice Rgesidents.-Ahli..7-Pr e ,i,,eet,ee,
,gresa on tile Issue. e e e4-1 e.e?,,,,e.,..e.,),.:,:e...... President Carter aridTietaloue -.).er....,
T_ The President omitteditindsloil.e..,..fectlYeas..far as r can led "4
? . .,.. " - 5 -, : - ! ......il..1. 6 "-rtiiior**41:1. :',` i -4.5",.,.4 , v... ", > '-'6,' ..:',4.4.1.4.isse....' -,....f.' M..--
'with President Carter, who said at his ' fected states. , ?
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?
THE WHITE HOUSE
NtASIIING1 ON
17aoixe.
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fraA:12.
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diet/e CycJf ec-dit
.041 .
C:7E4,21,
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STAT Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002200040015-1
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N..." 1.1.. 1. , S 1.3. J. 1.-) ILL y
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WA SH 1 NGTON, D.C. 20505
25 February 1977
The Vice-President
The White House
Washington, D. C.. 20500
Dear Mr. Vice-President:
- In accordance with your suggestion, we have reviewed the-
problems arising from the unauthorized disclosure e4-4 publica-
tion of information relating to clandestine Agency' operations.
We believe there are several areas where modifications in the
manner and form in which the Agency reports on highly sensitive
clandestine operations to reviewing authorities in the Executive
and Legislative Branches of government could immeasurably improv,,
the security of this information without materially affecting
oversight of the Agency.
The two enclosed memoranda suggest changes in the pro-
cedures under which we transmit sensitive information outside
the Agency, -changes we believe will help prevent further un-
authorized disclosures of sensitive information. One concerns
proposals relating to Agency reporting to Congressional authorit :es
and the other relates to Agency reporting within the Executive Brandi_
have taken the liberty of sending a copy to Dr. Brzezinski.
Respectfully,
E.H. Knoche
Acting Director
Enclosure
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re-vr nffirip.1 TTqf=.
vit TJLU 1$
?
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Wavy *risk
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Proposals to Improve Security of Sensitive Informati )n
Disseminated Within the Executive Branch
Proposals Affecting Re--Porting_ to the Special Coordination
Committee (SCC), the SCC Special Activities Working Group
(SCC/SAWG), and. the National Security Council (NSC)
A. Currently the Agency is required to report to these
? groups periodically on covert action operations and
sensitive intelligence collection programs. The
following options would limit the flow of sensitive
documentation through these channels and establish
? tighter and more effective controls over sensitive
? documents:
1. Limit to the maximum extent possible compendim -
reports that place into a sing,le document detailed
information on all ongoing covert action and.
sensitive intelligence collection programs.
.Specifically, eliminate the requirement for a
comprehensive written semi-annual report to the
NSC on ongoing covert action and sensitive intel-
ligence programs. A more flexible requirement
might call for the NSC to determine in the case
of each program the timing of periodic reviews.
2. Adopt a procedure whereby, at the discretion of
the National Security AdviSor, the SCC/SAWG can
.be bypassed on highly. sensitive programs. In
these cases, proposals would be distributed
directly to the SCC principals on an Eyes Only
. basis. .
3. Discontinue the practice whereby working drafts
of SCC papers are distributed in advance to
merrbers of the SCC/SAWG. Future working drafts
would be under the control of the SCC/SAWG staff
secretary at all times. Under this arrangement -
working drafts would be distributed in the nite
House Situation Room prior to the SCC/SAWG meeting
and returned to the SCC/SAWG secretary for retention
or destruction at the end of the meeting.
. Number, assign by name, and log all papers sent to
the SCC and. the SCC/SAWG..
0M00165A002200040015-1
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, . . . .
5. Require that all documents sent to SSC principals
other than the DCI be returned to the NSC for
retention/destruction upon completion of the
review/approval process.
v.
6. Adopt amandatory rule that SCC documents will
not be copied.
7. Adopt standards to-minimize the amount ofsensitiv
operational detail to be included in SCC proposals
such as the- identity of persons, organizations, an1.- -
sensitive technical data.
8. Consider establishing anew category of compartmen-.:ed
clearance for information on covert action and
sensitive collection operations.. Require separate
secrecy agreements for all persons within'the
Executive Branch who haVe this clearance, establish
a "bigot" list (a list of persons cleared) for the :
new category, and restrict access to such information
to an absolute "need-to-know" basis. Strictly enforce
procedures to require prior 'clearance and executioA
of a secrecy agreement before permitting access to
documents or attendance at meetings for the discus;ion
of such information.
B. Under E.O. 11905, the intelligence agencies are required to
report known or possible illegalities and improprieties to
the Intelligence Oversight Board. There appears to be no
problem at present in the initial reporting channels. How-
ever, the MB does report to the President, and on occasion
may feel it necessary to consult with other government
agencies/depal-baents, which in turnmay report to the
President through- additional Channels. Steps should.
taken to review these Channels of reporting, following
initial submissions by the Intelligente agencies, to
ensure restricted access to documents.and proper arrane-
ments for their-protection.
C. Consideration should be given to providing reports to
10B orally in instances of great sensitivity..
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Proposals to Improve the Security of Sensitive
?. Information Provided to. Congress
I. The greatest problem with regard to providing sensitive
information to Congress is the large and growing lumber
of congressional committees, and Members of Congress and
staff personnel who have access to many of this nation's most
sensitive intelligence secrets. For example, under the tens
of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and Senate Resolution 400, seven
comittees of Congress now receive varying degrees and. types
of sensitive operational. intelligence information. Some SS
Members serv-e on these committees and some 15 coma:tit-tee
staff members are cleared to receive information- Further.
House rules provide that all 435 members of the House of
-RepresentatiVes can technically demand access to sensitive
intelligence information and to attend committee briefings
at which intelligence matters are discussed.
? Changes -which Could be Implemented by Simply Altering
Procedures Under Existing Laws :
A. Agree that all reporting to Congress on sensitive
intelligence matters be oral with no transcripts.
This may not be feasible with regard to
appropriations matters or to Case Act
-reporting, subjects which require written
notification to. Congress and transmittal
of the relevant documentation itself.
. Restrict the amount and specificity of written budget
.material provided Congress.
- ,
. Make more uniform than at present the procedures
governing access by congressional staff personnel
to sensitive briefings and material, and reduce the
number of congressional staffers granted access
thereto.
The rules of the Senate Select Committee, which
spell out procedures on non-disclosure, establish
secrecy oaths, and place tight controls on paper .
flow, afford sane guidelines in this area..
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D. Establish 'a Joint Congressional, Intelligence Committee
to reduce present Congressional access to sensitive.
intelligence information. This would minimize pro-
liferation of such information while meeting legitimate
Congressicinal requirements for oversight of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program. The Joint Committee shoald
have exclusive jurisdiction over budget and appropriations
matters.
Establish an Intelligence Committee in the House with
exclusive oversight and legislative responsibility over
the CIA until such time as a Joint Congressional Comma thee
can be established.
Obtain Congressional acceptance of jurisdictional
exclusivity of the Senate Select Committee and. the
proposed House Intelligence committee. . .
G.. Modify House.. and. Senate rules on procedures to specifically
provide protection for intelligence information.
I. In the House, such rules should allow the intelligence
oversight committee or committees to go into executive
session at the cormittee's option; to limit attendrnce
as necessary to protect against disclosure or furtIer
dissemination of sensitive intelligence informatior;
and to allow these committees discretion on access
to their records.
2. Make the rules and. procedures adopted by the Senate
.Select Committee on Intelligence applicable to the
entire Senate.
?
- ? H. Obtain acceptance by the Senate and House oversight
committees of a procedure for the joint signature by
designated Members or their staff and the appropriate
Executive Branch officers of ExeCutive/Congressional
communications involving sensitive intelligence matters.
This would create a new category of documents which would
technically constitute neither Committee records (thus
being unavailable to other Members under House Rule 11)
nor Agency records subject to Freedom of Information -
Act requests.
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ILI!! 2 ? --11? ?
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Options Requiring Changes in Existing Law
. ? ? ? ?
A. Repeal or amend. the Hughes-Ryan Amendment in recognition.
? that the inclusive oversight responsibilities of the
Senate Select -Corkmittee- and the proposed House Intellig:ence
- Committee would provide that those committees receive
reports on operations other than activities intendea
solely for obtaining necessary intelligence..
B.: Amend the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to Specifically provide
that only a single Joint committee or single committees,?
in each house---depending on changes- to the present
oversight committee structure?would-receive the reports
? currently required.
C.. - Enact legislation to provide criminal penalties--for
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence .soufCes and
- methods by any person in authorized possession of
such information as a result of an. official relation-
ship with. the U.S. Government. Such legislation would
act as a deterrent to public disclosure of sensitive
intelligence information but, of course, should not
extend to disclosures pursuant to lawful Congressional
demand.
- .
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0
Letter to: The Vice President
Distribution:
ADCI
?ADM
C/CAS
D/IG
C/PCS
D/LC
AIDD0/0
Bolten
Clarke
ER
cc: Dr. B.-rielinski
A/DDCI:
if (25 Feb 77)
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