PFIAB REPORT, 'INTELLIGENCE FOR THE FUTURE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002300050014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 5, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: PFIAB Report, "Intelligence for the Future"
1. The Report of the PFIAB on Intelligence for the
Future is one of the most thoughtful and perceptive papers
to be produced on the intelligence community and intelli-
gence activities. It. is practical as well as far-reaching
and imaginative and comprehensive in scope, dealing with
sincere concern with the most fundamental and basic problems.
facing intelligence today. This Directorate joins the
Directorate for Intelligence and the Directorate for Science
and Technology in strongly endorsing most of the Board's
recommendations.
2. The section on human sources (pages 12 and 13 of
the report) is on target from the point of view of this
Directorate. The PFIAB takes on "the American conclusion
that technology can solve most problems" and points out the
need for human sources. We are particularly struck by the
conclusion that "we have developed an intelligence culture
which relies so heavily on technical collection that it is
uncomfortable with intelligence acquired from human sources
unless they confirm technically acquired information. Techni-
cal collectors are indispensable, but judgments based on the
information they provide can be seriously misleading unless
the data is interpreted with an understanding of the culture
which created it. Human sources can. provide such insight."
This is borne out in our dealings with other elements of
the Agency and of the intelligence community. We suggest
the following wording for the DCI's letter to the President'
on Recommendation 7 which deals with human source collection.
Although this recommendation is broadly
stated, the point made by the PFIAB is well
taken. A vigorous effort to acquire more and
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better placed human sources has been underway
within CIA for several years. This increased
emphasis has borne significant fruit and,
hopefully, the impetus will continue. The
acquisition of quality human sources requires
considerable manpower outlay though well
justified. It is, however, difficult to
explain in terms of cost effectiveness. Yet
it is on this very issue of cost effectiveness
that we find ourselves most vulnerable to
Congressional budgetary restrictions. If
this trend is not reversed, we shall be forced
to devote fewer, rather than more, resources to
the acquisition of human sources.
3. Another item of particular interest is the Board's
listing as an important innovation to pursue "a means of
seeing that which is hidden as we face increasingly sophisti-
cated methods to conceal and deceive." The identification of
efforts of adverse governments to deceive the U.S. Government
on strategic defense matters is certainly of concern from more
than one point of view. An argument in this area can have an.
effect on contrasting views of intelligence agencies. In some
cases, proponents of a view on a strategic matter have iden.ti-
fied the evidence used by opposing analysts as being deliberate
deceptions on the part of a foreign government. Another facet
of this problem--although probably outside the purview of the
DCI to comment on--is that while remaining alert to efforts
of foreign governments to deceive us about their strategic
developments, the U.S. Government should be engaged in a
broad and aggressive project to incorporate concealment and
deception in their own strategic weapons and reconnaissance
development and deployment programs.
4. The observations on security vulnerabilities and
secrecy are certainly confirmed-by our experience. We con-
cur in the PFIAB endorsement of Deputy Secretary of Defense
Ellsworth's suggestion "that a blue ribbon commission examine
these changed values in American society with a view to
determining how to restore adherence to the principles of
confidential service to the government."
cc: IC Staff
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