NATO/WARSAW PACT DEFENSE SPENDING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002300060027-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 1, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M00165A002300060027-5
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M00165A002300060027-5
 Approved. For Release 2006/11/21?:.C.IA-RDP80M00165A00230006 027-5-
r0
Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
Department of Justice.
Washington, D.C. 20530
early in the 95th Congress.
is a need for such legislation, and I seek your support to` the-end that an
appropriate bill, endorsed by the Justice Department, might be introduced
disclosure. This proposal was subsequently introduced as H.P.. 12006, but
no similar legislation was introduced in the Senate. I feel strongly that there
legislation 'to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
As you know, the President, in his message of 18 F ebruary 1976, proposed
Dear Air. Bell:
which is the subject of the prosecution-. Given the difficulties of proof, and
the understandable reluctance to incur the add tional-da-~-age occasioned by
such proof, the existing laws are seldom' invoked and their deterrent value
foreign power, or a tendency of the leaked information to produce such harm
or give such aid. The evidence required to establish these elements commonly
requires the revelation of additional sensitive information in open court or, at
the very least, the further dissemination and confirmation of the information
must prove either an affirmative intent to harm the United States or aid a
resulted from the unauthorized disclosure of information related to intel-
ligence sources and methods. In most cases, the sources of these leaks have
been individuals who acquired access to sensitive information by virtue of a
special relationship of trust with the United States Government. Current law,
in our opinion, does not adequately cover situations where a deliberate
breach of this relationship of trust occurs. In most instances, the Government
Over the years, serious damage to our Foreign ir_`.elligence effort has.
is slight.
Presently, Section 102 (d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, places a responsibility on the Director of c astral Intelligence to.
prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sturces and methods.
:,a'n4rA, r1 Fnr E2aI c 2felt ~91t "1...(:IA-RfPR.O /IM~.Fr,AQC23Q.QQ UQ27.- -
 Approved For Rel use 2006/11121 : CIA-RDP80M001.65A00230006002775
in the 94th Congress, would close this gap to the limited degree necessary to
carry out a foreign intelligence program, but at the same time give full recognition
to our American standards of freedom of information and protectioA of individual
disclosure. Legislation along the lines of H. R R. 12006 as introdu'c'ed in the House
However, this responsibility is not backed up by statutory penalties for unauthorized
rights.
disclosure is threatened and serious damage to the intelligence collection effort
persons. It also provides for injunctive relief in those instances where unauthorized
designate certain information as relating to intelligence sources and methods and
provides a criminal penalty for the disclosure of such information to unauthorized
ligence, and the heads of other agencies expressly authorized by law or by the
President to engage in foreign intelligence activities for the United States, to
H. R. 12006 acknowledges the authority of the Director of Central Intel-
would result.
is acting as an agent for someone subject to the sanctions of the legislation.
publications they represent, except in a case such as Marchetti where a publisher
criminal action or injunctive relief against representatives of the press or the .
relationship with the United States Government . It would not permit either .
to it by virtue of their position as officer, employee, contractor, or other special
with the sensitive information described in the legislation or who gain access
. The sanctions set forth in H. R. 12 006 are limited to individuals entrusted
very safety and welfare of those who may be providing us intelligence at a
methods of collecting intelligence continue to occur, the end result is a loss
of faith in the system designed to protect such matters. It also threatens the
If disclosures of our most guarded secrets and our most sensitive sources and
? Public disclosure of classified intelligence gives foreign powers keen
insight into the capabilities and limitations of our intelligence system. It
also undermines the attitude toward security at all levels of Government.
substantial personal risk.
actions designed to insure against further U. S. access to data of the type
information is acquired stimulates and enables the target country to take counter-
monetary costs to the United States Government. These costs are often difficult
to measure, but the fact remains that disclosure of the manner in which certain
risks to national security, such public disclosures can also result in sizeable
Another factor that is often not considered is that, in addition to the
disclosed.
reports verbatim without regard to possible damage to sensitive collection
It is'`a tragedy to see articles in the news media quoting our intelligence
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0 , .
programs. The inevitable result of such disclosures can only mean a sharp
curtailment of the effectiveness, if not the disappearance, of some-of our most
important intelligence sources, human as ,-el'_ as technical .
The legislation proposed by the President and introduced as H. R. 12006
statute was basically satisfactory-from the standpoint of the Department's concerns.
"Intelligence that, with certain relatively minor' amendments, the proposed
- 31 December 1975, the Deputy Attorney General advised the Director of Central
within the executive branch. We have worked particularly- closely with the
Department of Justice to come up with an effective and satisfactory bill. On
Legislative proposals to protect intelligence sources and methods were
initiated several years ago by. this Agency and have been extensively reviewed.
incorporated those amendments.'
personal interest in the matter and the readiness of my General Counsel and his-
staff to meet with your designated representatives .at any time to work out a
I sincerely believe that passage of a bill that follo -s the general pattern
of H. R. 12006 would be a strong deterrent to exposure of intelligence sources
and methods. by persons who have such information by virtue of their relation-
ship with the U. S. Government. I hope that you will support the introduction
of such protective legislation in the 95th Congress, and I can assure you of my
mutually satisfactory pill. -
Sincerely,
r ;? ry- rrr lle
E . H. Knoche
Acting Director
OGC: JDM: lsh
Original : Addressee
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