(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002400040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
27 JUL 1977
Dear Al,
How thoughtful. of you to send me a copy of
Beaufort of the Admiralty. It looks like an.
exciting book and most appropriate for a grounded
sailor! I look forward to diving into it at an
early opportunity when I get the mound of official
papers whittled down a little bit! Serious ay, it
will be just the-thing for the first-air trip I
have and I do look forward to reading it.
I hope we can get together again before long.
In the meantime, many thanks.
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r 1 UNCLASSIFIED NFIDENTIAL SECRET
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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 Executive g?gi3trp
You may recall my briefing for you and
your AFSOUTH Staff last October on the
subject of Allied economic cooperation
in armaments.
I don't know whether your new duties
have involved you in this standardization
and burden-sharing issue but (with
respect) they should. There is no
economic reason why Allied conventional
forces should be inferior to those of
the Warsaw Pact.
The President's initiative at the NATO
Summit is an excellent start. But the
scale of our cooperative standardization
efforts continue to be far less than
is needed. These points are made in
the attached statement.
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The Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University/1800 K Street Northwest /Washington DC 20006 /Telephone [phone]
Cable Address: CENSTRAT
STANDARDIZATION: Lessening the Danger of Nuclear War
Legislation and National Security Subcommittee
Government Operations Committee
House of Representatives
21 July 1977
by
Thomas A. Callaghan Jr., Director
Allied Interdependence Project
Georgetown Center
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MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE:
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee to discuss
standardization, Allied economic cooperation in armaments, and lessening the
danger of nuclear war.
In my statement, I will deal first, with what standardization means; second,
with the military, economic and political price the North Atlantic Alliance
pays for the lack of standardization; third, with the major structural and
atitudinal obstacles to standardization; and fourth, with'-the magnitude of
the effort required to achieve economic cooperation in armaments between
Europe and North America.
WHAT STANDARDIZATION MEAiS.. Unfortunately, the term standardization connotes
a technical military procurement problem. It is not. There is a military,
an economic, and a political dimension to standardization. Taken together,
they involve policy issues that merit the continuing attention of the Congress.
Militarily, standardization means at least the same calibers, the same
ammunition, the same fuel, the same frequencies, the same data transmission
rates, the same identification schemes -- in short, it means that Allied
forces should at least be able to operate together.
There are those in Europe and in the United. States who say we should focus
only on the military dimension of standardization -- on interoperability..
It is sufficient, they say, for Allied forces to rearm, refuel and communicate
with one another, without being concerned about the economic and political
dimensions of the problem. But why settle for so little, when the attainable
economic and political dimensions of standardization offer so much more?
Economically, standardization means the efficient utilization of Allied
re-earch, development, procurement, logistic and manpower resources.. It means'
no unnecessary duplication of development effort. It means longer production
runs, larger weapon quantities and lower unit costs. It means the same repair
parts, the same depots, the same maintenance and training facilities and
equipment. It means the more effective use of Allied manpower by combining
the 14 national logistics systems for 39 armed forces into a single NATO
Logistic System for NATO's land, sea and air forces.
It means plowing those duplicative (indeed, multiplicative) logistics resources
back into Allied weapons development and production. Thus, standardization
can (in its economic dimension) mean many more jobs for the high technology
defense industries of Europe and North America. It also makes it possible to
share equitably the financial burdens of Allied defense, as well as the economic
benefits (jobs, technological progress) of defense development and production.
It means adequate defense, within reasonable defense budgets.
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e money w aste in uplication could muc' better be
spent in providing our troops with fewer different weapons
in greater numbers, and in developing weapons which
improve the ability of our forces to work and fight
together. (Emphasis added)
The fourteen armed nations of the North Atlantic Alliance are together spending.
over $110,000,000,000 per year -- more than $9,000,000,000 every month -- on
general purpose forces. This sum should provide a credible, collective,
war-fighting capability, sufficient to maintain the conventional force
balance with the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. It does not!
The fact that it does not is less a matter of what the massive, conventional
force build-up of the Warsaw Pact is doing to NATO, than it is the consequence
of what the nations of the Alliance are doing to each other. It's not that
the. Russians are ten feet tall. They just seem that way -- because we and
the other nations of the North Atlantic Alliance have cut ourselves off at
our knees.
Today, for example, we Americans, the British, the Dutch, the Germans, the
Italians -- and the French and Belgians working together - seven Allied
nations are developing six different tactical communications systems. None
of these six systems can communicate with the other; nor can any of them
communicate with the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS). At the
NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels in May, Defense Secretary
N BOLD BROWN offered to re-direct the American Tri-Tac System, if our Allies
would do likewise, to see if together we could evolve a common inter-communicable
system.
This is a good start, but much more needs to be done. We must reclaim 15 years
of Allied failure to cooperate in armaments development, production and
support, if we are to begin to match the 10-year build-up of the Warsaw Pact's
conventional forces. NATO's Integrated Military Command today commands
almost nothing that is integrated: neither its tactical doctrine for the
defense of Europe; nor its military equipment requirements; nor its weaponry,
its ammunition, nor its repair parts; not its "days of supply"; nor its
logistics, its communications, nor its operational training. This must not
be permitted to continue.
Meanwhile, most Allied military and political leaders concede that a Warsaw
Pact attack would have to be met by early recourse to theater nuclear weapons,
with all the danger of nuclear escalation. One must ask:
Do the heads of government, and the parliaments, of the
fourteen armed nations of the Alliance have the moral
right to place an annual $110.0 billion tax burden upon
their people, to produce conventional forces collectively
so weak, that the day could come when the only difference
between NATO and The Alamo is that :we':would _have& the option:
of calling down a nuclear holocaust, before being over-run?
The answer, obviously is NO, they do not have the moral right! Then why do
they? There are no easy scapegoats here. Concepts of sovereignty and indepen-
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 Politically, ri~a~-~~/~~~R$o44~4t.
Internally, standardization requires Allied partnership in armaments. It
requires a degree of political cohesion within the Alliance that would glue
Europe and North America together with bonds of military-economic self-interest
so strong as perhaps never to be sundered.
Externally, standardization would say to the Soviet Union that the enormous
economic, technological and industrial resources of Europe and North America
are now combined for our common defense:
You can not drive a wedge between us; you can not
out-produce us; you can not blackmail us; you can not
overwhelm us; but you can begin talking to us about
meaningful reductions in mankind's armaments burdens.
That day, unfortunately, is some time into the future. Today, for the lack
of standardization, the North Atlantic Alliance is in serious trouble.
COST OF DE-STANDARDIZATION. Let us look at the price the North Atlantic
Alliance now pays for its de-standardization and non-interoperability. It is
a heavy price. Incredibly, Europe and North America, the two richest, most
technologically advanced industrial economies in the world, treaty-bound
together for mutual security, are being out-produced and out-deployed in almost
every conventional weapons area by the more backward economies of the Warsaw
Pact.
Yet successive Secretaries of Defense have estimated that NATO and the. Warsaw
Pact are devoting approximately the same resources to the development, produc-
tion, training, maintenance, operation and support of general purpose forces.
What do these roughly equal defense resource commitments produce?
For the Warsaw Pact it produces a massive, standardized
collective force, capable of operating effectively
together.
* For NATO it produces a de-standardized collection of
forces, qualitatively uneven, quantitatively inferior,
unable to fight for the same period of time at the
same munitions expenditure rates, and with only a
limited ability to rearm, refuel, repair, support,
supply or even communicate with one another.
Why is NATO getting so little, and the Warsaw Pact so much, from the same
resource expenditures? OLIVER C. BOILEAU, President of Boeing Aerospace
Co., recently explained to a Financial Times Conference in London, that
The weapons planners in the communistic nations are
capitalizing on what we in the free enterprise system
proved long ago -- that one large production run is
cheaper and more efficient than many small ones. They_'
are beating us at our own game.
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 Legis. & Natl. Security
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dence resist the abvious need for Allied interdependence and cooperation.
President JIMMY CARTER made a dramatic departure from the prepared text of
his address to the NATO Ministerial meeting in London to make the point that:
In each of our countries, economic and political factors
pose serious obstacles. None of our countries, especially
the United States, has been free from fault. (Emphasis added)
OBSTACLES. There are many obstacles to Allied economic cooperation in arma-
ments, but certain attitudinal and structural problems are perhaps the most
intractable.
In the United States, public and political attitudes impact upon Pentagon
policies, and vice versa. "We still see ourselves as the Arsenal of Democracy.
We have been slow to realize that even the United States is resource-limited.
We prefer to go it alone, to meet any challenge, and so forth.
For more than two years now, we have been engaged in a great national defense
debate on "Who is Number One -- the Soviet Union, or the United States?" The
debate is reflected in the annual Posture Statements of successive Defense
Secretaries, in which fulsome comparisons are made of American and Soviet
strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and general purpose forces.
Policy-makers have been slow to realize that this is both the right and the
wrong issue for national debate. It is the right issue if one is comparing
strategic nuclear capabilities.`.-Only-the United States has the resources to
maintain the strategic nuclear balance with the Soviet Union.
But it'is the wrong national defense issue if one is comparing conventional
force capabilities. The United States does not provide the majority of NATO's
conventional forces. Europe does. This means that no matter how large the
American defense budget, nor how superior the American weapons technology,
the United States can not, its resources alone, maintain the conventional
force balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The military-industrial
effort required is a NATO effort -- a combined European/North American
armaments effort. And there is no such effort!
The media has not reported the need for Allied cooperation. The public is
unaware of it. The Congress has not demanded it. Neither the legislation
that passed the Congress last year, nor the President's initiatives at the
NATO Summit, reflect a broad, strong public or political consensus that we
can no longer go it alone. Little wonder then that the FY '78 Defense Posture
Statement lists "the role of Allies" in a chapter entitled "Other Considerations".
No wonder also, that the Pentagon justifies each weapons development project
in terms of. its one-on-one superiority over Soviet weaponry -- not on how it
would mesh with complementary developments in Europe, and thereby strengthen
the conventional force of-the Alliance.
If neither the media, nor the public, nor the Congress is concerned as to
"Why NATO is Not Number One?" we should not be surprised that the Pentagon
isn't too concerned either. The standardization legislation requires the.
Pentagon to report annually on the progress that is being made in implementing
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 Callahan Testimony (5)
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the legislation. This year the Congress received the Third Annual Rationali-
zation/Standardization Report -- a 104-page, double-spaced document. Seemingly,
much is being done. But if the Congress were to study the 386-page single-
spaced FY'78 Defense Posture Statement, they would find standardization
mentioned on only 6 pages.
In other words, standardization and cooperation with our. Allies is for the
Pentagon -- as for the nation -- a:thing apart.
But putting Allies aside for the moment, even the United States itself pays
a high price for trying to go it alone. The Senate Armed Services Committee
Report on the FY '78 Authorization bill makes the following points:
Between 1965 and'1975 the funding for technology base
programs remained essentially constant, but because of
inflation this amounted to an almost 50 percent reduction
in real level of effort. (p. 76)
There are strong indications that the Department of
Defense tries to keep twice as many projects alive as can
be reasonbly funded at a full level of effort. The
result is that many programs crawl at such a slow rate
that they are obsolete well before they are deployed to
the forces or are overtaken by subsequently developed
technologies. (p. 75)
Over-extended, doing everything ourselves, the Senate Armed Services Committee
observations are confirmed in the same FY '78 Defense Posture Statement,
which acknowledges that:
The main constraint on the United States, ironically
enough, is not trained manpower but military equipment
and supplies. (p. 113)
Allied burden-sharing through standardization means technology base deficiencies
in the United States could be reinforced by complementary technology base
efforts in Europe. Under-funded development projects in the United States
could be undertaken in Europe, so that complementary projects on each side of
the Atlantic were funded at a full level of effort, and would be moving
rapidly towards early production and deployment. With longer production runs,
neither the United States, nor Europe, would be constrained by insufficient
military equipment and supplies. If our ability to help one another in war-
time is to have credibility, then we must demonstrate an ability to work
together in peacetime. -
This is what the Congress intended when it passed the standardization legis-
lation last year. But it won't just happen. Somebody must be put in charge.
Last year, Mr. CARL D.A~Mi , a member of the Bundestag, and the'Chairman-of -the
Defense Cooperation Subcommittee of the North Atlantic Assembly, asked me what
the Pentagon would do with this new standardization legislation. I answered
not very much until they put somebody in charge. He asked me what I meant.
I answered that if we were to count down through the echelons below the
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Secretary of Defense, we would have to reach the seventh management level
before we would find the first official with full time r.esponsibility'for
implementing the statutory standardization policy of the United States. And
that seventh level official has no management control, no policy control,
and no money control.
Mr. DAM commented: "It is the same in every defense ministry in the Alliance!"
Senators SAM NUNN (Dem. Ga.) and DEWEY F. BARTLETT (Rep. Okla.), in their
excellent report on "NATO and the New Soviet Threat","-addressed this problem
as follows:
Serious consideration should be given to establishing
within each ministry of defense powerful bureaucratic
constituencies committed solely to achieving standardi-
zation and interoperability. For the Department of
Defense, this might entail creation of an office of
standardization in both the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and with each service. The institutionalization
of the impetus toward standardization would provide a
major counterweight to contrary parochial political and
economic interests.
The Congress itself could "institutionalize the impetus toward standardization"
by establishing a subcommittee to review our collective NATO posture.
During the annual procurement authorization process, the subcommittee
could require the Pentagon to present its conventional weapons projects in
the context of complementary European projects. The Congress could then
assess whether the combined European/North American weapons acquisition programs
were designed to maintain the conventional force balance with the Warsaw
Pact -- and if. not, why not.
The subcommittee could do other things as well:
It could insure that the cargoes intended for our
planned ten-to-twenty billion-dollar increased airlift-
sealift capability are standardized, so that we could
"reinforce our Allies";
* It could inquire as to how many standardized Warsaw
Pact divisions, wings, etc. our MBFR negotiators
believe must be eliminated to improve the balance
with Allied divisions and wings which can not (for the
time being) operate effectively together.
This subcommittee would, for the first time in 28 years, provide the Congress
with an institutional mechanism and procedure for annually assessing the
acquisition, deployment, support, readiness and reinforcement of the Alliance
as a collective force. MBFR negotiations could be reviewed for their impact
on. the collective posture of the Alliance versus the Warsaw Pact. The sub-
committee would inevitably focus media attention upon Alliance needs and
capabilities. The public would be better informed. The Pentagon would
respond to this Congressional interest and concern. And our European Allies
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would also respond, fW_V they would want to be seen b e mer1ca ic
to be carrying their fair share of the Allied defense.burden.
But burden-sharing can not be separated from benefit-sharing. If. Europe is
to carry its fair share of the financial burdens, then Europe has the right
to expect its fair share of the economic benefits: of the jobs and the
challenge and the pride associated with large, technologically significant
weapons projects.
It is particularly important that the United States be prepared to meet
Europe half-way, or perhaps a little more than half-way. We must recognize
that Allied economic cooperation in armaments will be virtually impossible
until Europe aggregates its defense procurement efforts, and rationalizes
its defense industrial base.
With the Chair's permission, I would like to introduce into the record at the
end of my statement an article I wrote for the NATO Review of October, 1976
entitled: "Standardization: Le Defi American. a 1"Eu.rope" ("The American.
Challenge to'Europe"). Simply stated, this article explains why the European
nation-states are too small for cooperation with the United States; why
European defense markets are too small to sustain healthy defense industries;
ll to develop and produce,
and why European defense industries are too sma
competitive systems to a transatlantic scale.
The Congress recognized this European structural problem in the legislation
it passed last year, declaring it to be
...the sense of the Congress that standardization of
weapons and equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance
on the basis of a "two-way street" concept of cooperation
in defense procurement between Europe and North America
could only work in a realistic sense if the European -
nations operated on united and collective basis. Accord-
ingly, the Congress encourages the governments of Europe
to accelerate their present efforts to achieve European
armaments collaboration among all European members of the
Alliance.
President CARTER made much the same point at the NATO Summit when.he emphasized
that:
A common. European defense production effort would help
to achieve economies of scale beyond the reach of national
programs. A strengthened defense production base in
Europe would enlarge the opportunities for two-way trans-
Atlantic traffic in defense equipment.
I hope that European and the North American members of
the Alliance will join in exploring ways to improve
cooperation in the development, production and procure
went of defense equipment. This joint examination could
involve the European Program Group as it gathers strength
and cohesion.
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 Callaghan Testimony (9)
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strong Allied conventional forces, and thereby lessen the danger of nuclear
war, is but a first step towards fashioning a world our youth will want to
live in. They will expect us to aim high, for the stakes are high-
MAGNITtrDE OF EFFORT REQUIRED. Aiming high means we must move rapidly towards
economic cooperation in weapons development, production and support. We need
to mobilize the already committed resources of this Alliance. But how?
It is instructive to turn back the clock to April, 1941, when Canadian Prime
Minister MACKENZIE KING and President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT met at Hyde Park
to discuss a similar problem: how to mobilize the resources of the North
American continent.
These were two successful and practical politicians. What they didn't do
is every bit as significant as what they did do. They didn't get lost in
the bartering of individual projects. They didn't haggle over the resolution
of problems. They were much too practical. They knew they could not mobilize
the resources of this continent without a valid concept, and a basic structure.
They knew also that if the concept and the structure were right -- the projects,
and a host of problems associated with the projects, would sort themselves out.
The concept was simply that each country would produce and provide the other
with the defense eqiupment it was best able to make. The structure was
also simple: military trade. The weapons and equipment which Canada produced,
and sold to the United States -- in turn provided Canada with the dollars it
needed to buy weapons and equipment from the United States.
To show they meant business, President ROOSEVELT and Prime Minister KING
established dollar purchase goals to be met by each country. Each country,
they said, would (in the twelve months following the Hyde Park Agreement)
place orders with the other for between $200.0 million and $300.0 million of
military equipment. The purchase targets may seem small until we translate
them into 1977 dollars: between $800.0 million and $1.2 billion in orders
from each other in twelve months!
In the 36 years since the Hyde Park Agreement, there has been a North American"
Defense Market between Canada and the United States. No similar trading
structure exists within the North Atlantic Alliance. If we are to mobilize
the resources of the Alliance, then Europe and North America must establish
a new two-way transatlantic structure which recognizes that standardization
is macro-economic problem, which can only be solved by military trade.
A 15-year backlog of deferred cooperative effort will not permit us to focus
on new development projects only. Short-term results must also be sought.
We must achieve the optimum interoperability of current inventories. We must
bring our days of supply to agreed uniform levels. There must be procurements
from on another, and a start made on common logistic support. Employment
and other political benefits must begin to appear within the terms of incumbent
Congressman and Parliamentarians.
But long term goals must also be established, so that the Alliance will never
again find itself fielding forces that-can not operate together.
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 a ag an Testimony
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Mr. Chairman, in your address to the Economic Committee of the North Atlantic
Assembly in May, following the NATO Summit, you made the telling point that
While the European members of the Alliance will reach
their own conclusions about how the work of the European
Program Group should be coordinated with the United States
and Canada, I do not think that we can afford a leisurely
approach to this problem. (Emphasis added)
You have stated the dilemma we face. On the one hand, Europe will not make
the extensive institutional changes and investment which military trade between
Europe and North America entails, unless and until they become convinced that
the United States is prepared to meet them half-way. On the other hand, the
standardization legislation, the President's NATO Summit initiatives, your
statement, and these hearings, should make the point that while the United
States is prepared to meet Europe half-way -- Europa in turn must meet us
half-way -- must achieve European armaments collaboration on a united and
collective basis.
How then can we move together? We must recognize that Europe can not (with
the best of good will) make these changes by itself. American leadership must
play the catalytic role. We must be prepared to offer Europe something that
the countries of Europe can not offer one another. The goals I will propose
at the end of my statement will indicate how this can be done.
But first, we must face one final attitudinal obstacle found on each side of
the Atlantic. It must be overcome, or a credible, collective conventional
deterrent will never be possible.
Allied economic cooperation in weapons development, production, trade and
support is no small nor easy task. It involves the combined Allied expenditure
of more than $30.0 billion per year on weapons development and procurement --
and an even larger sum on support. Some say the Alliance is too fragile to
face up to the task. They see the magnitude of the effort required in all
its difficulties. They argue for small, achievable mini-steps. Seemingly,
they are satisfied that one or-two standardized projects a year represents
progress in a more than $30.0 billion a year weapons acquisition process. But
small efforts will not maintain the conventional force balance in Europe in
the face of the massive and relentless build-up of Warsaw Pact forces. As the
British economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill put it:
For a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small
result; it simply does not produce any results at all.
It is time to abandon the small remedy approach, and face up to the magnitude
of the political and economic cooperation required to sustain the military
effectiveness of this Alliance. Cooperative structures, macro-economic in
scale and demonstrated to be necessary, are bound to garner public and political
support. They will also have an appeal to the imagination and idealism of our
youth. That in itself is of critical importance. The least-noticed weakness
of the North Atlantic Alliance is of the spirit -- its lack of relevance to,
and support from, the youth of Europe and North America.
The cooperative and effective utilization of Allied defense resources to create
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how do we do this? In my view, the President of the United States, with the
bipartisan support of the United States Congress, should propose a macro-
economic transatlantic bargain to Europe. The United States would:
Offer to match every defense dollar Europe spent in
the United States with a dollar spent in Europe.
* Offer to match the cost of every system developed in
Europe for NATO use by an American defense development
also for joint use, and commit itself not to duplicate..
Thus the more that Europe contributed to NATO's general purpose forces, the
more the United States would contribute. In return Europe would agree:
To offset fully America's balance of payments deficit
on military account.
* To establish an institution within the North Atlantic
Alliance (and we hope this would be the role of the
European Program Group) which would permit Europe
collectively to plan, finance and manage bilateral,
non-duplicative, multi-annual, multi-project defense
research, development, production and support programs
with the United States and Canada.
Full offset would be delayed during a transition period since many of the
foreign exchange costs now borne entirely by the United States would auto-
matically become a shared NATO cost in a NATO Logistic System.
Then, taking a leaf from the statesmen who negotiated the Hyde Park Agreement,
Europe and North America would agree to the following interim and long-range
goals for each other:
Current Inventories and.Days of Supply: A goal of $2.0
billion per year, over and above current defense budgets
to be spent each year for the next five years by Europe
and by North America (a) to achieve optimum interoperability
of current weapons, equipment and communications, and (b)
to reach agreed uniform "days of supply" throughout the
Alliance.
Equipment Standardization Agreements (STANAGs): Imple-
mentation each year of at least 20% of the 300 material
STANAGs already agreed, and implementation within a year
of all new material STANAGs.
Research: A three year goal for harmonizing all defense
basic research, and establishing the widest possible NATO
technology base.
Development: An initial three year goal of $4.0 billion
of complementary development projects underway on each side
of the Atlantic.
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Procurement: A three year goal of $3.0 billion of defense
procurement orders from one another.
Logistics: A four year goal for common logistic support of
all common weapons and equipment now in Allied inventories.
North Atlantic Defense Market: By successive development,
procurement and logistic support goals, Europe and North
America would (by the twelfth year) achieve complete military-
industrial interdependence within a fully-functioning North
Atlantic Defense Market.
The short term goals will correct our most glaring conventional force
deficiencies. They will also provide jobs to speed the transition from fourteen
national defense markets to a North Atlantic Defense Market with a continental-
scale producer and consumer base in Europe and-in North America. The
political cohesion, the public confidence and the real and measurable results
obtained in the early years, will guarantee the political commitment to
sea the job through.
Chairman, these goals are demanding, but so is the response required by
the Warsaw Pact challenge. The goals are attainable, unless we are prepared
to concede that the free political institutions of the North Atlantic Alliance
are not the equal of the authoritarian institutions of the Soviet-led Warsaw
Pact-. The goals must be met. Today, far more than fifteen years ago when
President KENNEDY first made the point: we must be able to offer our people
something more than a choice between surrender, or nuclear war.
But when Europe and North America, the two richest, most technologically
advanced industrial economies in the world, are seen by the Soviet Union to
have at last the political will to'join their enormous resources for their
common defense, the day may be near (and long before all goals are met) when
we can begin to make detente a fearless reality.
THOMAS A. CALLAGHAN JR., Director
Allied Interdependence Project
Georgetown Center for Strategic and.
International Studies
Supplement: Article entitled, ?STANDlXZATION: Le Defi American a 1'Europe"
NATO Revieslt~Ca Qx
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 The Director
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y ecaat:v Poq t y
2 5 JUL 1977
Mr. Gerald Sullivan
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Gerry,
Thanks for keeping me informed of pertinent developments
in the Georgetown arena.. In coping with the problem you mention,
I can use all the help and advice I can get. Your comments
are always welcome.
A/DCI/PAO/HEH/kss/11 July
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - A/DCI/PAO
1 - 7DCI/PAO(' i6lLiiack) ti
_--STANSFIELD TURNER
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The Oceanic Nueational l oundation
July 23, 1977
Dear Stan,
It was good. hearing from you and I very much appreciated
your thoughtful note.
Despite your inordinately heavy load these days, which
I must say you appear to be handling with marked wisdom, I
felt the educational effort as projected by the attached
would be something you would wish to encourage.
regards.
Sincerely.; 7!s
Ni. Slonim
Admiral Stansfield Turner.U.S. Navy
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
GMS/ fs
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The Oceanic Educational Foundation
Vice President Mondale announced to the NEA in Minneapolis, Minnesota
in early July of this year that this Administration was willing to invest
an additional billion and a half dollars in the education of American youth.
Where. better- to allocate these funds productively than in the emerging.
Oceanic Educational process aiming, as it does, to bring American education
into balance, at all levels, between land and sea! As we have been told on
numerous occasions, we know far more about the backside of the moon than we
do about-the drop of water upon which each of us, as all living organisms,
depend for. survival. Nowhere is the need for education more critical than
in the spectrum of-disciplines termed sea-study which advances our knowledge
of "the human stake" in negotiating the World Ocean as man's Great Frontier
of the Future.
Horace M-. Kallen the venerable philospher-educator accentuated this need,
prior to his death, in a letter to the President of the University of Virginia,
a fellow member of the Board of Directors of the newly formed Oceanic
Educational Foundation:
"In principle, I had believed from the beginning that such an
action would need to be planned as a nuclear part of the
Foundation's purpose to educate the American people as citizens
of a free society of free men with ineluctable global relations".
"In view of the little that had then been known of the role of
the oceans in the formation, ongoing evolution and struggle for
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reliable knowledge-in-depth of the oceans would have, at least
an equal, and with considerable likelihood a higher, survival
value for the future of mankind than man's knowledge of the
land".
"In this climate of opinion, it is as a contribution to mankind's
survival that Oceanic Education must be conceived and developed.
This calls for the orchestration of culture and vocation in such
wise that "vocation" is recognized as a cultural discipline and
"culture", as the intellectual and esthetic insight into vocation.
The -curricular of Oceanic Education from kindergarten through
professional and adult schools must consist of such orchestrations,
and be accepted as the content if liberal education".
Nowhere does major investment whether in research or in education, promise
to pay such profitable dividends as in this oceanic thrust. Unfortunately,
people are hardly educated to their dependence upon the great ocean - - what
the seas means in the provision of resources, increasingly in short supply art
the land, to meet their mounting needs; what they mean in the development of
dynamic leisure patterns of oceanic enjoyment; what they mean to an under-
standing of the Blue Planet upon which they live; what they mean to their very
future quality of life. Homo sapiens, as Kallen suggests, simply are not
educated, as-yet, as to-how--the seas can reenforce human values, nor how the
oceanic world can strengthen the entire fabric of modern society.
Most significant, by far, is the promise of the sea for youth, once fuller
education relating to the oceanic domain is afforded. Unfolding professional
Opportunities for progressive young people, earnestly endeavoring to make
their creative contribution to society, loom as nearly limitless. Already
these young people, sensing the prospect of the oceanic world, are turning in
ever increasing numbers to probe the professional potentials of the sea.
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For the most part, they are stimulated by their enjoyment of water, their
thrilling, yet exacting seacreational experiences. Challenged by the
disciplines demanded by this tough task master, to enjoy - to survive - to
develop a reassuring confidence in the water, they accept the demands for
both training and education to learn how to water-ski, how to scuba dive
and to sail, to surf - - all of the fascinating leisure recreational outlets,
which, already have lured most of the American population toward the seashore.
They are vital. They are alive. Buoyant. in their enjoyment of this tantaliz-
ing environment, through healthful action in the surf, sand and sun, they
become sensitive to the issues of the sea, the promise of the ocean. They
commence to realize what this vast oceanic expanse, some 328,000,000 cubic
miles of water, can mean for people in the centuries which lie ahead, if we
learn to protect, to preserve, indeed, to enhance this expansive environment.
They recognize the mysteries, the majesty, the beauty of this vital body of
water we term the World Ocean. Indeed, the "Humanities of the Sea" forge
into the forefront through the dynamic involvement of people with the sea,
as a master teacher-of-the-more profound human values, the philosophic
overtones of life. --And, as people of all ages now commence to seek more
knowledge of this fascinating dimension of our universe, unfortunately, they
suddenly realize how shockingly limited our oceanic understanding remains.
But whether young people filled with hopes, ambitions, dreams of the
future are uncertain as to what they want to do with their lives, or whether,
once having sailed the seas, they have charted fairly well laid courses of
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future endeavor, the World Ocean beckon their nimble minds as it plays upon
their emotions, their feelings. For they are among the first to learn the
place of the sea in their lives. In mounting numbers, the maritime magnet
attracts American citizens to an unprecedented relationship with the world
of water. Whether it is the curiosities aroused, the quest for self preser-
vation or the 15% discount offered by marine insurance companies for those
taking required boat handling courses ,the interest curve in Oceanic Education
spirals steeply upward. Just as small boats have become big business with a
yearly expenditure-by sportsmen of nearly five billions of dollars, colleges
sensitive to this "Think Deep" educational trend show a peaking in student
enrollments rather than the normal decline. The creativity stimulated by
the surge in sea-study-, which treats the World Ocean properly as a holistic
entity of globe girding oceans, seas, lakes and rivers, shows the affirmative
attitudinal values-the seas infuse within human thought. It was this same
sea thinking forged by uses of the sea, through century long demands before
the mast, which according to Buckminster Fuller "has changed our world".
Whether these young people-plan to be scientists, educators, statesmen,
industrialists, architects, creative writers, doctors, nurses, artists,
journalists, musicians, or composers, a myriad of unfolding fields of compar-
able contribution emerge through sea-study, at-sea experience, and new oceanic
knowledge. Some can become seacrobe hunters in a new field of tremendous
promise, medicines from the sea. A cancer cure looms as the most tantalizing
challenge for their scientific sea search. Their aqua lungs for scuba diving
can be turned to another new field, the aqua police who are needed to protect
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the hordes of people now moving toward the sea frontiers to build their
futures, or for mere enjoyment. In the realm of those seeking the seas for
futurisitc professional accomplishments, they will join with the designers
of swifter ships driven by exotic, new fuels, who wait in the wings of this
symphony of the sea to capture, to capitalize upon the wonders of the
modern oceanic world.
For those with a leaning toward the Bar, Law of the Sea frustrations, the
decade long decisionless dialogues of the United Nations, emphasize the
urgency of finding finely honed minds trained to deal with the oceans with a
firm global grasp. The-same sense of the sea Hugo Grotius revealed in his
Mare Liberum doctrine of the 17th Century, beyond mere legalistic negotiating
positions, is needed now in drafting a modern constitution of the sea. The
new dimension of understanding infused through at-sea experience will lead to
the balanced long, iong_view. _ As-man, beset by the tensions and torments of
his swiftly spinning modern world, grasps,--for restorative oceanic space, a
new class of innovative youth trained to orchestrate the growing global
oceanic struggles through generalists sea-study, will conceptualize policies
toward tomorrow's futuristic world beyond even the 21st Century. While
probing for solutions to perplexing problems of today, this expansive outreach
toward oceanic' potential promises an entirely new order of future living.
How oftern President Carter, the first oceanically educated President in
American history, calls upon his background of seafaring to condition his
conceptual policy thought. How easily he moves within the policy arena. In
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enjoining his administration to the quest for enlightened policy, he called
upon colleges and universities for creative thought, emphasizing with
convincing clarity the criticality of education capable of undergirding the
emerging Oceanic Policy process he encouraged. The insight seems strikingly
significant. For had there been realization that the frustrations of failure
ever since the.post war period to deal adequately in National Oceanic Policy
stemmed primarily from the landed thought, the landed education, the lack of
actual seafaring experience of-most American citizens, unquestionably, there
would have been discernment of the necessity for expanding Oceanic Education.
But, unfortunately, the Baconian dictum of knowledge being power, only now
reaches the sea. The realization of the educational imperative to fire
national policy - - to negotiate the New Oceanic Frontier is of recent
discovery.
Just as the "Tall Ships" with the dramatic directness of Walter Cronkite's
interpretation reminded citizens of the maritime heritage of these United States,
a new but compelling certainty emerges in the wake of the Bicentennial celebra-
tion that America's future will be inextricably tied to the oceanic world.
How well the Nation rises to this challenge of the sea will depend ultimately
upon the enlightenment, the determination, the direction of its policy drive.
This, perforce, is a function of how well its people understand the sea.
Not merely in terms of the oceanographer's technological-scientific study of
the tides, the currents, the solar fire power, the physical, the biological,
the geologic attributes of the sea, but every single substantive aspect of
the global sea's influence upon the human condition.
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In advance of this progression, there is an evident need for oceanic
knowledge; a comprehensive educative process; a resolute research requirement,,
spanning basic, as well as applied scientific investigation, reenforced by
all human dimensions of scholarly disciplines through the integrative humanities
of our world sea.
With the will of the people now being expressed oceanward, the demographic
trend is toward the sea. The 1970 census already shows 83% of the American
people residing in Coastal States. In pragmatic terms, this Nation's political
axis once again reposes squarely,-and undeniably within the Coastal-Oceanic
Zone. With public education, the emergence of an oceanic constituency appears
inevitable.
. To serve the--preponderant portion of the American people, to fire the
American Oceanic Policy process,-the President has expressed his commitment
toward launching the first intellectual attack on the World Ocean. For
America must invest. its -energies and ingenuity, as well as additional educative
resources, in the multi-cultural, multi-disciplinary Oceanic Education to
sharpen its citizen's understanding of the World Ocean. Once knowing their
profound stake in the sea, their new knowledge will enrich their sense of the
future destiny of this great nation which manifestly remains oceanic.
Vice President Mondale has moved in the wake of the Presidential mandate
to enlighten our people as to their destiny through new investments in
education. With acceptance for directing resources toward the intellectual
no-man's water covered land, the maritime domain, new vistas of far reaching
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goals will evolve which can bring our world within a global grasp. a heightened
sense of purpose, as we move with the maturity of well seasoned seafarer's
policy thinking. buttressed by well structured sea-study toward new plateaus of
innovative progress. Patently, with reenforced knowledge to negotiate the
New Frontier of the Future, America's destiny, now etched with unmistakable
certainty upon the distant horizon, serves to uplift the spirit with the fresh
start, the inspiration one finds in pioneering toward a more fulfilling
tomorrow.
Gilven M. Slonim
President
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 Thank you again.for your thoughtful-words.
Yours,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
4000400
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&.Wl-
Washington. D. C 20505
28 April 1977
Dear Gil,
Your warm letter of 1 April 1977 was much
appreciated. It is gratifying to have your
expression of understanding and support. I
will do my best to live up to your expectations.
I am glad to see you are still carrying on
your own fine work as a lecturer on ocean subjects.
The work of your foundation to foster education
on ocean matters at the secondary school and
junior college levels is important and I wish
you well in your endeavors.
Mr. Gilven M. Slonim
President
The Oceanic Educational Foundation
3710 Whispering Lane
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
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 The f " for of Central Intelliue i
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Washington. D. C. 20505
Your warm letter of 1 April 1977 was much appre-
ciated. This Administration does indeed face major
problems in the world, those associated with the oceans
not least among them. It is gratifying to have your
expression of understanding and support.
I am aware, in this regard, of your own fine,work
as a lecturer on ocean subjects and of the work of your
foundation to foster education on ocean matters at the
secondary school and junior college level. I ,wish you
well in these endeavors.
Thank you again for your thoughtful/words.
STANSFIELD TURNER
AT
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
The Oceanic Educational Foundation
3710 Whispering Lane/.
Mr. Gilven M. Slonim
President
Deputy Dl~ector for Intelligence
Z.
Dis trifution :
Orr g - addressee
,1-DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
I D/OGCR
1 - DDI File
.1 - DDI Chrono
OGCR.
AT . ODDI/kss (22 Apr 77)
2 2 APR 1977
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-'Admiral, U. S. Navy
.~~07!- 771
 A p
F
ORM No. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67
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BLP
11 Aug 77
Jack Blake did discuss this matter with the DCI,
and the DCI asked that a meeting with Mr. Cline be
arranged.
On 11 August, I called Mr. Cline's office to set up
the meeting. He is out of the city until 1 September;
meeting set up for 1615 on Tuesday, 6 September, at
E9-13~(Cline works just a couple of blocks away).
c\,,f,-3 ; .A C. ,\") \_3()5
MEMORAPDUM FOR: The Recor