PRESENTATION TO THE CABINET
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80M00165A002500110013-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 5, 2004
Sequence Number:
13
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 19, 1977
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 339.89 KB |
Body:
STANSFIELD TURNER
Approved For Rele3 2002/5905 I C A-RDP8&4b6165AOW0110013-2 F9-..
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche
FROM : Admiral Turner
SUBJECT : Presentation to the Cabinet
19FEB1977
1. The President has reaffirmed to me briefly the report we r&lj
in the press that he wants me at an early date to make a presentation
to the Cabinet on the capabilities of the Intelligence Community and
what support we may provide to the Cabinet. I would like to be
prepared to do that as soon as possible.
2. I have in mind a maximum of ten minutes. I believe we must
do this without viewgraphs or such visual aids, although a one or
two page handout might be very helpful. I think we could distribute
that around the table.
3. I would like particularly to point out the kinds of support
we might provide to officers other than State, Defense, and Treasury,
who are our regular customers. In this connection, I would like to
propose a formalized liaison system between us and each Cabinet officer.
I would envision this system being such that there would be just enough
interchange that we would always be sure we knew the primary activities
and concerns of these Cabinet officers. We could search our data bank
to see if we have materials useful to this particular concern. I told
the President that I intended to volunteer support to the Cabinet in
this way rather than just expect them to call on us. I'm not clear
in my mind as to whether the best point of contact for Cabinet officers'
staffs should be in the IC Staff or the Agency staff.
4. Please work together in putting a presentation together.
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02500110013-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. 1 w x7
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02500110013-2
17 February 1977
25X1
25X1
JA~ ftV~.--Vv /J/-- -
04~
AIVP4
AA kt~-~74
JET [J'
.,.n~~ 4r~"n /~. Wyk
P)V V 1 "hP 1 d N? vi V- V
. 00114U~4's'iU
r ~i~p r ed&Vr aQ4.e 2 Y
NOTE FOR: Mr. Knoche
1/
40^'Attached is a paper prepared by with an addendum
from Andrew Falkiewicz which contains proposed remarks by Admiral
Turner at the first Cabinet meeting he attends. I think both papers
are right on target.
Would you like to give this to Admiral Turner yourself or
should I send it to him in the normal manner through Commander
McMahon? You may also prefer to hold on to this until Admiral
Turner returns from his farewell visit abroad.
(This paper is responsive to Item #13 of my memorandum of
9 February to Morning Meeting participants.)
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 CIA-RDP80M00165AO02500110013-2
15 February 1977
PROPOSED REMARKS BY ADMIRAL TURNER AT THE. FIRST CABINET SESSION HE ATTENDS:
As one who comes so new to the profession of intelligence, I
welcome the invitation of the President to share a few of my thoughts
with the members of his Cabinet.
The intelligence business differs markedly from the work of the
other major departments and agencies of our Government.
-- Our customers are primarily top-level officials
within the Federal Government itself.
-- Your customers are primarily outside the Federal
Government--individual American citizens or local
governments, or industries, or international
organizations or foreign governments.
In today's world almost every area of human activity has the
potential for impacting on our national security So, in a very true
sense, I am meeting today with my major customers, the primary users
of the intelligence we devote so much attention to collecting and
analyzing.
. I am told that we only spend about seven cents of each intelligence
dollar on analysis and production--and that the bulk of our resources
are expended on highly sophisticated technical collection and processing
systems.
But it is the end product--the estimates, the current reporting,
the analytic memoranda--on which the Intelligence Community is judged.
The President and members of the National Security Council are going
to assess my performance as DCI in large measure on how well I see to it
that you are provided with the intelligence you need.
-- On how adequately you are warned concerning upcoming
crises;
-- On how responsive our estimates are to your planning
needs;
Approved For Release
DF$ ftO02
I
Approved For Release 5/?5: CIA-RDP5 002500110013-2
-- On how comprehensively our foreign technical data
meets your needs in the planning and development
of U.S. weapons systems;
-- On how well our information prepares you concerning
foreign positions in international negotiations.
My reason for mentioning this is to solicit your support.
I have been reminded again in the course of my briefings and
reading to prepare for my new job that the communications link is
critical to the policy-intelligence relationship. There is a failure
in communication:
If the policymaker fails to make his needs known,
even to his own staff, and the intelligence officer
has to guess. He may miss.
-- If U.S. objectives or actions are so closely held
that intelligence officers, unaware of what their
own Government is seeking to accomplish, misinterpret
evidence of a foreign reaction.
I solicit your thoughtful assistance.
As I settle into the job, I will be evaluating how
well my National Intelligence Officers and other
senior intelligence officials are doing in main-
taining liaison with the users of intelligence
products and identifying customer needs.
-- It would be helpful if you would review your own
procedures for acquainting your intelligence
officers or other officials with your needs for
intelligence support.
- What problems are you most concerned about now?
- What do you expect will be key problem areas for
attention in three months? In six months?
I put this emphasis on our ability to provide timely, high quality,
very responsive intelligence because, while problems and challenges
remain, I am convinced that I am inheriting the senior post in an
Intelligence Community composed of talented and dedicated people whose
capabilities have served this country well.
Approved For Re a e 2004/05105: CIA-` ~ef' 00165AO02500110013-2
~a'S3'~' d a 9 ~ ~ I.'.1
Approved For Releas 2QQ4/05/05 :-CI\4RDRR8OM 1. 5AO02500110013-2
-- I make this assessment despite the resource limitations
and the reduced manpower that the Community has had to
adjust to over the past several years.
-- And despite some adverse developments arising from the
recent investigations and the consequent publicity
given to intelligence activities.
-- The impact of the recent investigations is still being
felt, but progress is being made:
to restore our damaged overseas liaison
relationships;
- to redevelop sources who withdrew their
support for fear of publicity;
- to rebuild the morale of U.S. intelligence
personnel, and
- to strengthen Congressional and public confidence
in the way intelligence activities are conducted.
The time has come to deal with the present and plan for the
future--not look back on the past.
In the collection field:
-- An outstanding advance in technical collection has
resulted from the recent introduction of a new system
that we consider will have major long-term importance.
-- All three of our major collection sources--signals'
.intelligence, imagery, and human resources--are making
major contributions to our information base.
Nevertheless, there are serious gaps. Our information
on some of the countries that potentially pose threats
to U.S. interests is not as good as I would like. The
coordination of the community's efforts to collect a
wide range of economic information needs to be improved.
We must find ways to sustain the aggressive and creative
qualities which have been fundamental to so many of the
intelligence successes of the past, while strengthening
the institutional controls that must characterize the
conduct of the intelligence business in a democratic
society.
Approved For Rele ` x4/0'5/?5 MA K& 65A002500110013-2
-4-
r
-j~ AL
Approved For Release 014/45/0 CIQ F QP~86 A002500110013-2
to:
In the production field, I intend to devote particular attention
Establishing and monitoring priorities by
geographic region, by topic and by type of
product to assure we are covering the most
important needs within available resources,
Facilitating interdisciplinary approaches to
analytic problems,
Testing new and experimental techniques of
analysis, and
-- Making better use of computerized data bases
in support of our analysts.
One example of the challenges confronting the Intelligence
Community reinforces the need for improvement in all of these areas.
The recent controversy over the long range strategic designs of the
Soviet Union demonstrates once again that --although we have a vast
data base from which to draw conclusions about Soviet capabilities--
we are unlikely ever to know all we would like about the intentions
of the Soviet decision makers. I will give the highest priority to
those actions which strengthen our analytical capability so that we
might better understand and even anticipate Soviet intentions.
I already am aware of the serious resources problems the
Intelligence Community has. Manpower is down 46 percent since the
peak of 1969. Purchasing power is down nearly a third from what it
was in 1964. The seed money for new initiatives, such as have been
the lifeblood of collection improvements over the past two decades,
is now almost nonexistent.
These are the kind of resource problems that confront all of
us. I have mentioned a few of the things to which I will give special
attention in an effort to improve our performance despite these con-
straints. As I mentioned earlier, I will need your help and assistance,
and look forward to learning more about your specific requirements for
intelligence support.
Approved For Reea~e 2004L.05/0 ; CIA-F P L00165A002500110013-2
`et v ~ m is a
71 A
Approved For ReleaseY 0/65m I'A=b0dO
A002500110013-2
L WIA
18 February 1977
With reference to our suggestions for topics that
Admiral Turner might take up in a presentation to the
Cabinet, I would urge him to include a call for a change
in the way in which the relationship between the CIA
and the rest of the Federal Government is perceived in
public, here and abroad, on the basis of statements and
actions by members of the Cabinet and their representatives,
All. too often, as we very well know, in spoken and written
word the Federal Departments convey to the public the
impression not simply of secrecy of CIA operations but also
of some sinister isolation and alienation of CIA from the
rest of the Federal Government.
I am not suggesting a call for a great upsurge of
character testimonials at home and propaganda abroad in our
favor. I am convinced, however, that the incoming DCI
will have an opportunity to influence the currently
distorted and erroneous perception of the CIA that flows
directly from the way in which the rest of the Government
has grown accustomed to refer to us An public.
Andrew-T, Falkiewicz
Assistant to the Director
cc:
25X1
25X1
Approved For Relea a 0O4/0540$;,: CIA-'1-Rb 165AO02500110013-2