HISTORY OF THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES, PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL OF THE PROBLEM (PART TWO)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002900010109-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 109
• Publication Date: May 21, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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TWO
21 May 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Staff
UBJECT History of the Clandestine Services
Preliminary Appraisal of the
Problem (Part Two)
My Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated
14 May 1964
. In the first of these related memoranda, I mad
proposals which I consider a si.niswn response to Task 1-b of
HN 1-46. This somerrandwn will discuss ways is which a useful
orical structure might be erected upon this groundwork.
is based upon the assumption that there in a valid require-
ment for a Clandestine Services history adequate to fulfill
purpose described in your note of 13 October 1963:
"To consolidate a record of problems and solutions,
failures and accomplishments which wFi l 1 put the past
into historical perspective an background for the cur-
rent direction of central intelligence and provide a
reservoir from which particular requirements for his-
torical material can be satisfied."
25X1
That pie, with which I agree,, will necessitate a. good deal
of thoughtful, time-consuming work.
2. Within that framework, however, there is still need
for swat more precise requirements in order to arrive at
even a rough Judgment of how such time and how such work.
Reliable gauges are hard to find. Most ordinary histories
are pretty such beside the point. Massive institutional
histories such as the combat records of the armed services
would provide a model far beyond the capabi l:i ty
or present concept of a CIA Historical Staff.
effort for 1946-49 and that of and or 1930- 25X1
3 deal with quite a different quality of rkmxez ause they
are concerned almost entirely with the domestic and non-action
components of the agency; additionally each of them, in its
own way, has inadequacies for the purpose you have not forth. 25X1
The a8S 'ear Report and the present South Vietnam study are
not directly comparable, either to each other or to the press-
-ant probles. but they are more to the point.
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3. 'Me Wig Report covered a period of somewhat more than
four years. It was begun in July* 1946 and submi t ted in fin-
ished form 3 September 1947. During that tine it engaged the
services of seven officers, six researchers, six consultants
and part-timer writers, and two clerk-stenographers, ding
a total of roughly 20 person-years. When printed in 1949 it
occupied 718 double-soloed pages, plus illustrations, exhibits
and appendices. Yet it was admittedly Incomplete and partly
sketchy. It suffered from the problem of coping with source
material which in some respects was nearly overwhelming in
volume and in other respects inadequate or lacking. 'there was
no sense of continuity on the task force; it was a job to do
and be gotten over with. It benefited f rma the fact that
umories were fresh and the time span to be covered was
relatively short.
4. The Vietnam study illumines from quite a different
angle. Initially one experienced and more than usually artic-
officer, with part time clerical assistance, was given
months to complete an account of the agemy's activities
in Vietnam. 1930 was taken tho yes corncement, that
being the time when the first (Clandositinee 8-ervy-
icen) representatives mare . The deadline v
set to match that of a comparable State-Defense study. The
job required poring through thousands of docueuts, inter-
viewing several hundreds of persons, many of them abroad,
sorting and balancing massee of often conflicting material
and ultimately will require, of course, the writing of the
finished product. The impossibility of the task, with its
limitations an set, quickly became apparent; after two months
one CS researcher was detailed almost full-time to assist the
Officer originally assigned. Later at t3ie request of this
officer the DDI assigned an assistant to assemble the con-
tributive material free, his offices, and another CS reseacbor
began working part time. As of this writing, the original
deadline in 45 days away and the probable actual completion
late at least four months more. Fortunately the State-
Defense historians appear to be no better off.
. it in clear that neither the 088 nor the Vietnam
pie, although pertinent, offers a solution to the over-
tory problem. The task form approach would be
i ly disruptive and probably would not produce it
product. The Vietnam approach, applied to the
root of the world, would reach astronomical proportions.
I t seems to se equally clear that there is rationality in
expecting that a single person, whatever his experience and
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ts, could produce anything that night honestly be dens-
a "history" of the CS in your definition. What then
done short of resigning oneself to responsibility for
r+? eably inadequate job? Perhaps something, given a will
he right places.
6. I propose that h of the original drafting be done
by selected officers of the several CS components, under the
general guidance tut not the direct jurisdiction of the ital.stori.-
cal Staff--topics to be chosen and draftsmen to be suggested
by a small CS historical board which would have to meet no
oftener than perhaps four tissue a year.
I. This proposal, has a number of advantages, the most
important of which in that it stands some chance of getting
the job done. In addition:
a. i t is flexible; it would provide both for the
compilation over time of an accurate general history of
the CS and for more detailed appendices; it also would
accommodate and make use of such special studies as
might be required f ros time to time by I and DCI ; its
Scope and pace could be adjusted an circumstances re-
qui red .
b. It would insure that each topic or area was
tested by a person well qualified to deal with it; a
the sane time It should not unduly overburden any one
draftsman.
It would not be organizationally disruptive
and would not expand the Historical Staff beyond the
modest proposal of reference.
. It should provide the important elements of
continuity and a sense of participation on the part
the CS components.
addition to country histories, any number of eubjec
suggest themselves, including (in no order of Import-
anew): proprietary organisations, cover generally, relations
with other agencies, especially military, State, FBI; defec-
tors, enigma generally, uses and problems of aircraft,
foreign liaison, the records problem, labor activities, etc.,
etc.
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8. y4.nally, it would leave the responsible officer of the
Historical Staff with a job which would be neither a sinecure
nor a ludicrous impossibility. Among his tasks:
Preparation of an over-all historical outline and
posals for consideration by the historical board;
!>. B'di tong, rewriting and rechecking first drafts
necessary and generally preparing them for a place
a finished work;
c. Writing intermediate chapters and other connec-
tive or prefatory material to provide coherence to the
finished work; personally preparing such other contri-
butions an might not be better assigned elsewhere;
,1. Interviewing such historical personages as Allen
and frank wiener, e.g., for intimate insights
unobtainable elsewhere;
1 '3.
Supervising the work of the research group recast-
mended in reference and assuring that it supports, as
well as p sible, other work currently in progress while
purauing its longer goal of organising true historical
f. ? ndertaking such evaluative functions as may
considered suitable for historical purposes; (there soma
to have been considerable conflict and confusion an to
whether this is an historical staff function and, if no,
#w to go about it).
0. It must be enphaaiZ*d that this proposal will work
only if it a the clear and unequivocal endorse nt of IMP.
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