USIB SECURITY COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002900090134-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 134
• Publication Date: May 16, 1974
• Content Type: MF

SECRET
ApprovedWor Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80MM1165A002900090134-7
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN USIB-D-S. 1/24
16 May 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals
SUBJECT : USIB Security Committee
1. It is timely, in my view, for USIB to revamp its
Security Committee, give it expanded authorities and charge
it with more responsibility in security policy matters than
has been the case in the past.
2. To this end, the present Security Committee has
drafted a new DCID 1/11, copy of which is attached for your
review. The Committee is to be supported by permanent sub-
committees for technical surveillance countermeasures (re-
placing the present USIB TSCC), for special security compart-
mentation and for computer security.
3. To implement the provisions of the proposed new
DCID 1/11, I consider that:
a. The Committee should be chaired by a senior
officer whose background includes experience-in sub-
stantive intelligence and policy matters rather than
solely a security specialist. I would expect the
chairman to devote two to three days per week to com-
mittee business.
b. The Committee should have a full-time secretary
at the GS-15 or GS-16 grade level who possesses a
strong background in security matters. I prefer that
the secretary be a CIA officer since a major element of
his support will be from the CIA Office of Security.
25X1
X1
Approved For Releas MrIff 2 7 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02900090134-7
 USIB-D-5. 1 /24
? 'SECRET
U i May 1974
Approved ForV6Iease 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M0016 002900090134-7
c. The Director, Office of Security, would be
the CIA member of the Committee. I would like each
USIB principal to provide senior representation on the
Committee, preferably at the civilian supergrade or 06
military level.
4. In order to assure continuing policy guidance to
the Committee, I believe that active USIB participation-is
needed, and would expect the Committee chairman to seek such
guidance. Close interface between the Committee chairman
and the Intelligence Community Staff should enhance the
chairman's awareness of policy matters calling for Security
Committee attention.
5. I. propose that reorganization of the Security
Committee be discussed at an executive session of the USIB
on 23 May. Each of you is requested to provide me at that
time your concurrence and/or comments on the proposed new
DCID 1/il, and I invite each of you to nominate a proposed
chairman for my consideration.
Attachment:
Draft DCID 1/11
Approved For Release 2004/1O/.. ? ~yDP80M00165A002900090134-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02900090134-7
Next 15 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02900090134-7
 SECRET
Approved FW'Release 2004/10/27: CIA-RDP80M00445A002900090134-7
9 AUG 3
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy Director for
Management and Services
rQ
1
1
FROM :
SUBJECT
Director of Security
Security Committee and
1
ro
NIO/USIB Interface
0
1. Action Requested: It is requested that you
generally agree with the basic contents of General Lew
Allen's memorandum of 7 August 1973 on the interface of
the National Intelligence Office with the United States
Intelligence Board, particularly in the establishment of
a Security Committee headed by a full time Chairman who
woul4 serve as a DCI representative.
2. Basic Data: In his neriorandum of 7 August 1973,
the Deputy to ?Fie DUI for the Intelligence Community Staff
has recommended the establishment of a new Security Committee
which would have a representative from each USIB agency and
would respond to DCI.and USIB on matters of protection of
.methods, foreign releases., compartrientation, and those .
matters previously handled by the Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures Committee.
By way of-background, the existing Security
Committee was established in 1959 and is composed of
representatives from CIA, State, NSA, DIA, ABC, FBI,
USAF, Army, Navy and Treasury. The primary mission of
the Security Committee is to promote means by which the
intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized dis-
closure of intelligence sources and methods. The Committee
was established for the purpose of advising and assisting
USIB; it provides policy guidance on security matters, as
it pertains to the intelligence community; and it makes
25X1
Approved For Release :CIA-RDP80M00165~002900090134-7
 Approved For Release 2004/10/2r. CIA-RDP80M00165A002900090134-7
recommendations concerning security standards, practices
and procedures. In the recent past the Committee has ad-
dressed such issues as UCID 1/14 on "Uniform Personnel
Security Standards and Practices Governing Access to
Sensitive Compartmented information"
25X1
inn proolea of e revelation o classified n ormat on In
1
the news media was the continuing concern of the Security
Committee in recent
With respect to "foreign releases", it is presumed
that General Allen is referring to the "Release of Intel-
ligence to Foreign Governments" which was studied in great
detail by the IC Staff on 4 June 1973 (TAtA). That review
focused attention on the need for a reporting system to
provide the DCI with a clear indication as to what was
being provided particular countries. It stressed that the
release of intelligence should be in accord with existing
United States policy and there should be a net advantage"
to the U.S. This implies an executive role for a Security
Co mittee,in addition to that of providing a record keeping
function. As of June 1973, the suggestion was made that
the Bureau of ' Intelligence and Research, Department of
State should explore with the CIA and other agencies the
development of a mechanism by which offices responsible for
the release of intelligence could be kept current on changes
in U.S. foreign policy and international objectives. Members
of the-National Military Information Disclosure Policy Com-
mittee (NDPCj and the intelligence community had expressed
their concern through the years over this lack of policy
guidalice on foreign policy matters.
On the "compartmentation" problem, this issue was
under intensive recent review by th and 25X1
considerable effort has been made to develop a package of
simplified policies and procedures. In my memorandum of
18 May 1973, TAB B, I indicated that the existing Security
Committee could assume this responsibility.
-2-
Approved For Release 2004/10/27: EW-01V100165A002900090134-7
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002909090134-7
Concerning the Technical Surveillance Counter.
measures Committee, I have also addressed the TSCC in the
recent past. My memorandum of 8 June 1973, TAB C, reviewed
the attributes of the TSCC from a user's point of view, I
noted that the TSCC provided an effective community focal
point for audio-countermeasures information, procedures and
policy J
propose a reorgan as on or re ocat on o the
ould permit retention of as many of its significant
functions as possible and noted that the bulk of the present
TSCC work is carried out by its two "working level groups",
the Research and Development Subcommittee and the Audio-
Countermeasures Subcommittee. I proposed in June and re-
iterate now that these two Subcommittees can be effectively
merged into one. I concluded with the opinion that the
USIB Security Committee could assume the responsibilities
of the TSCC. I continue to be of that opinion.
3. Staff Position: The present Security Committee
has been tra Tt`lonjlly chaired by the CIA Director of
Security; meetings are normally held once a month; and a
report is submitted annually to the United States Intel-
ligence Board. This Office feels that there would be
obvious built-in advantages in having a full time chairman
who could address ongoing security problems in the intel-
ligence community, particularly in such areas as leaks to
the news media; computer security; co,partnentation in the
co=unity; release of intelligence and other classified
materials to foreign governments; audio-countermeasures
information, procedures and policy.
In adopting this positive position concerning a
chairman who would have this function as his sole duty,
this Office also feels quite strongly that the appointee
should have a background of experience and knowledge in
the field of security, preferably a member of the intel-
ligence community who has given attention to a wide
spectrum of security responsibilities. This Office would
obviously expect to establish a close working relationship
with the nominee, and it would be expected that the
Director of Security would have the prerogative of selecting
the CIA representative to the new Security Committee.
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002900090134-7
 SECIET
Approved For Release-2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002900090134-7
Otherwise, there would be some risk that conflicting security
policies might develop from what could be construed as "two
Security Offices."
Presumably the Deputy Director for Management and
Services is offering overall comments concerning ?positions
and management." With respect to the new Security Committee,
the Office of Security would stress that the designated chair-
man should have his own support staff and not otherwise be
dependent on us for personnel, secretarial assistance, or
other resources. This is particularly important at the
present time, when we are experiencing such severe cuts in
personnel strength and financial resources.
4. Recommendations: In view of the above, it is
recommends tat
(a) You concur in the basic concept relating
to the establishment of a Security Committee
headed by a full time Chairman, serving as a
DCI representative.
(b) As a general policy, the responsibilities
of the designated Chairman would focus on overall
security problems in the intelligence community,
which are of direct concern to the DCI and the
National Security Council. This Office would
retain basic responsibility for personnel,
physical, and technical security of CIA.
(c) You make every effort to press for the
selection of a well qualified professional
Security Officer from the intelligence community.
(d) You strongly urge that the Director of
Security be responsible for the selection of an
Agency representative to the Committee.
(e) You establish the clear understanding
that this Office is not responsible for providing
personnel or other resources in direct support
of the new Security Committee,
SIGNED
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Attachments ~g
Approved For Release 2004/10/27: CIA180M00165A002900090134-7
 Approved,For Rea se 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A2900090134-7
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND aO T TOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
Director of Security
4E 69 H
s
2
q
3
4
5
_
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECO11EMOATIONI
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
I?IFOR,'>I.UTION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Oz:
We have just received this memo from Lew Allen
with a very close'suspense date, COB 9 August.
Therefore, we need your input by early afternoon
9 August to be included in the overall response
from DD/MFRS.
In addition to the 7 August Allen paper, we
have also attached various background documents
that may be of use to you in commenting on the
Security Committee concept.
While DD/M&S has some overall comments about
positions and management, I believe F~'our comments
should primarily address the Secur~-y Committee
idea.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Executive Officer to the DDM&S
7D 26 Hs
Auc7 73
UNCLASSIFIED
-SECRET
FOi4 1 O. -937
1-67
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02900090134-7
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A'2900090134-7
Sc O ? WILL CHECK _ASSIFICA T I0.'- TDP. \NO 30T_^'. i
UNCLASSIFIED f.:Oti:'?11~\~I.kL Sr(~ DEL`
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP ttt
TO
NAM= AND ACDR:SS DA-=
; 1 T i t-S
1
DOI
DD/SaT...::.
DDO,
DD/M&S
6
ACTION
DIRECT-REPLY
PR_?.'!RE REPLY
A?PRO`lAL
DISP iCri
?=Cu;n!?E:iO~.TIO:t
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Rem r s:
SUBJECT: PMIO/USIB Interface.
Your comments on the attached memorandum to
DCI are requested by COB 9 August.
FOLD fI --i?F' To r2=TUr ;\i TO scNO-=R
FTOM: NAME.
ADDRESS AND ?HONE ND.
Maj Gen Le,a Al Ien., .Jr., D/DCI/IC, !7 Aug 73
r) 7
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02900090134-7
25X1
 A~ G 1973 Approved For Re ease 2004/10/27: CIA-RDP80M'00165A 290 90134-7
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: NIO/USIB Interface
1. Your decision to establish NIOs will undoubtedly
raise-,questions in the community concerning interface
with USIB. Specifically, there will be a question of the
relationship of the NIO concept to the earlier proposal on
the USIB committee structure.
2. Basically, the NIO concept subsumes and voids key
aspects of the USIB Committee restructure proposal. ICS
has completely reviewed the USIB committee proposal and
revised the recommendations to accord with the NIO concept.
Our review took into account the proposed charges to the
NIOs in your memorandum to USIB and the USIB substantive.
objectives paper (key intelligence questions) which you
approved in principle.:. It. was our intent to retain the
valuable aspects-of community coordination in the current
USIB structure while 'reinforcing USI2's ability to deal
with 'a new emphasis on the prime function of establishing
requirements' and priorities for its collective production
and collection resources
3. Primary''committees. Nine committees should be formed
corresponding to the NIOs proposed, with the NIO as chairman.
The NIO, plus representatives-of the primary producing agen-
cies--CIA, DIA and INR--should form the basic committee
membership with additional membership appropriate to subject
matter at the option of the NIO. A tenth primary committee
should be?a Security Committee with a representative from
each USIB agency chaired by a DCI representative. (As in.
the case of NIOs, the chairman should have this function as
his sole duty.)
4. These committees would respond to NSCIC and DCI
guidance in the production of estimates-(NIEs, NIAMs; and
NSSM inputs) . The NIO would utilize the committee to assign
responsibilities to USIB members for inputs and oversee the..
coordination of products and reports. The committees would
also respond to key intelligence questions (KIQs) levied
by NSCIC and DCI, evaluating USIB application of production,
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02900090134-7
 Approved For Rease 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A2900090134-7
processing and collection resources against substantive'
problems. Overall, however, the most important function
of these committees would be to make periodic.reports,
perhaps quarterly, on the effectiveness and sufficiency
of resources applied to intelligence problems in their
areas.of responsibility. The Security Committee would
respond to DCI and USIB on matters of protection of
method's, foreign releases, compartmentation, and those
matters previously handled by TSCC.
S. USIB Support Groups . ' The functions of the cur-
rent collection system oriented USIB committees (COMIREX,
SIGINT Committee, and Human Sources Committee) would be
retained. However, the functions of these committees
is fundamentally different from those of the primary
committees. Under the proposed NIO/USIB committee concept,
the functions of the collection system oriented committees
would be supportive of the primary committees. The support
would be essentially in the area of advice on collection
strategies, in consolidation of requirements and'priorities
by collection system, and on specific security problems.
The day-to-day interface with collection system managers
(NSA, etc.) would not change appreciably. As a result
of these differences, we propose that the current committees
be renamed as support groups, i.e., I REX Supports 'Group,
SIGINT Support}Group and Human Sources Support Group. The
latter would subsume the functions of the IPC and the DRC
as subelements of the human resources management function.
6. We propose'one additional support group to provide
foreign scientific and technical support to the primary
committees--the Foreign S&T Support Group. This group would
subsume *the functions of GMAIC, JAEIC and SIC. It would
respond primarily to the needs of the Strategic Weapons/SALT
NIO, but to the other NIOs as well. (In the case of JAEIC,
a minor change to an NSCID would be required.)
7. The USIB Support Groups can be organized in two
fundamentally different ways: they can be headed up by
'sole duty" DCI representatives similar to 11110S with staff
provided by. the USIB members and the O/DCI, or they can
be made functions of appropriate Agency offices.- In the
latter case, COMIREX can be 'administered and operated by
DDI,'SIGINT Committee by NSA, Human Sources by DDO, and
Foreign Science and Technology by DDS&T or OSI.
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02900090134-7
 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80Nf00165A2900090134-7
8. A choice need not be made soon with regard to
COMIREX and the SIGINT Committees. Their names can be
changed and their relationships to the primary committees
clarified, leaving matters of chairmanship, manning re-
sponsibility and reporting chain for future decision.
The merging of the various human resource committees
into one Support Group with'a DDO'chairman and the merging
of the technical committees under a DDS&T chairman can
also be accomplished without further decision at this time.
9. ' Other Committees'., The above actions (or options)
can be adopted without specific disposition of other current
USIB Committees. If the 'general concept is adopted, the
disposition of other comnittees'-can be 'worked out in detail
so as to retain useful features of the 'current structure.
In that light, the'following suggestions are less recom-
mendations than observations:..'.
a. Economic 'Intel'ligence Committee: The functions of
this committee are absorbed in the NIO structure.
b.. Watch Comdittee The 'eventual disposition of this
committee will be 'contingent upon the .results 'of ongoing
actions to improve warning and crisis reporting systems.
c. NISI 'Committee:' In light of recent disestablishment
of the NIS program by USIB, this committee *'cari be--termi.n' a-Ee-c-F.
d. Intelligence 'Information Handling Committee:' The
function of this committee'requires-such close coordination
with DCI/IC that its permanent staff could be 'transferred to
ICS. However, USIB member representation should continue.'
e. 'Critical Collection Prob'lems' Committee: Since 'the-
primary NIO USIB committees will examine collection problems
in their areas of responsibility, there will be-'no further
need for a separate .CCPC.
for NIOs.
impact on responses 'to your invitation of nol-ninations
10. If the 'above 'expansion on your NIO concept -is
acceptable to you, I recommend that a follow-up memorandum
to USIB be forwarded soon, as it could have 'considerable .
S. It)., ,
rp a,
tea j or General
USE`
J.
,J
,.lk -to J h Deputy to the DC1
for the Intelligence
Community Staff
Approved For Release 2004/10/2 CIA-RDP80 0165AO02900090134-7
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/10/27: CIA-RDP80MOOl65AO02900090134-7
V
~+~ '~ _ ?~ 0:E LY I Lt_ CHECK CL S c -.ION TO? A,~,i o EicrT70`2
OFF.IC1AL RL?1J:t_t_'1?G SU1.111
TO
riyvi= AND A130Re:yS
L A*i'F-
1N1TtAL
Members, CIA Management
Co~lmitte
F
9
3
4
6
t
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PIEPARE REPLY
APPROYAL
DISPATCH
RECOTI',IEHOATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Attached is a more fully developed outline of a
National Intelligence Office- It is built on Mr. Colby's
key concepts -- and designed
as well
to cope with
,
,
wh=it is sure to be a heavy and challenging work load.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENOER
FROM: 7) Mi . AVDRESS AND PHONE NO.
D1TZ
Acting D/NE
10 Jul 73
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
r3dK 7fQ.
use previous editions
1-b7 237
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO02900090134-7
 ' Ek_~``t:`?' a,,:':`7
(FIDENTIAL/INTERNAL USE 0;.
Approved For Release 2004/10/27: CIA-RDP80M00165A 19000901 P- 3 ,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
1. The.National Intelligence Office 1.s establishes as an indcp ndi.*
office reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence:. It will replace
the Office and Board of National Estimates, SAVA, and possibly other
selected units.
2. The National Intelligence Office will be made up as follows :
a. There will be someONational Intelligence Officers
(NIOs~. At least some of these individuals will be on non-permanent
assignment; their tours of duty will be staggered, as the Director
shall determine, so that.each year there will.be some turnover.
Most of the NIOs will specialize in particular geographical areas
or functional subjects of major importance. A few will be
generalists, focusing their efforts on projects which cut across
various geographic/functional spheres; on special projects laid
on by the Director or outside requests accepted by him; on assisting
other NIOs in carrying through the time-consuming tasks of ILI
Approved For Wohfi&)Ab /i6it7'! MPO$bO)Bf0ANbhh6Qi 0 900090134-7
. 25X1
/ cc /) - //tf G
 Cr qc 1DEN CI