FY 1975 KEP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00636A000100010007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 13, 1976
• Content Type: MF

CON F'"IDtNTIAL
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13 January 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
ATTENTION : Chief, Collection and Processing
Assessment Division
SUBJECT : FY 1975 KEP
REFERENCE : DCI Memo to DDI, same subject,
dated 28 November 1975
1. The DCI transmitted to the DDI an interim report on
the status of the FY 1975 KEP. In the covering memorandum
transmitted as reference, the DCI raised several questions about
the DDI/DDS&T production data inputs which were described as
being difficult to rationalize. Since the DCI did not ask for a
response, and it was quite obvious the IC Staff raised the questions
for Mr. Colby, a comment on each is herewith provided to
clarify some of the data.
2. These comments have been discussed with Mr. Proctor
and have his concurrence. He also understands that they are
being provided directly to the IC Staff and not back through
Mr. Colby. If there are other questions, we will be pleased to
attempt to provide answers or explanations.
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CIA FY 1975 KEP Production Monitor
Attachment:
Comments on KEP 1975 Questions
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Q. (a) Why were only 1/3 of DDI FY 1975 intelligence production
expenditures related to KIQs?
A. DDI O&M dollars provided by the IC Staff using FY 1975
CIRIS data were used as a basis. CGAS using the product
listings by KIQ from the Publications Source Survey, con-
sulted with each office to determine what O&M dollars were
applicable to each of the KIQs on which they produced intel-
ligence products. This is a key factor - our allocation of dollar
costs were related to product. The 1/ 3 used in the question
included CRS and OGCR. Much of OGCR's work in support of
U. S. negotiations were not included as a "product" because of
its highly restricted dissemination. In addition, OGCR's work
o ecame an input to OER's product and no
accounting was made for OGCR's input. Similarly, other OGCR
work results in inputs to the final product of other production
offices of the Agency without accounting for OGCR cost. CRS
serves primarily as support and services organizations
to the CIA production process. In other words, these two offices
are not high rate intelligence producers in the KIQ/KEP sense.
For the major production offices of the DDI and DDS&T, 69%
of their O&M dollars were KIQ related; OCI, OER, OSR, and
OPR expended 53. 5% of their aggregated O&M dollars on KIQ
related products. These figures show only that by best estimate
this is what we expended on KIQ production during FY 75. It
appears reasonable that the major producers in the DDI spend
about 1/2 of the production dollars on KIQs. Less than 1/3 or
more than 2/3 would seem to be open to question or difficult to
rationalize.
From this it is clear that better accounting procedures are nec-
essary to obtain the full costs of product by accounting for the costs
of major contributions (i. e. , intermediate products) from one
office into the products of some other office.
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Q.
(c) Why were nearly half of all CIA KIQ production expenditures
made by DDS&T with only 1/3 of CIA's production resourc es ?
A. It is not possible to directly correlate dollars and man-
power in some intelligence production environments. It
naturally costs the DDS&TC', particularly OWI, more to get
their product because of the need for contractor assistance.
It would be prohibitive from a dollar and manpower stand-
point to develop in-house capabilities to do the complex systems
research for which they are charged. The OSI and DDI research
operations are heavily in-house analyst-oriented. The OWI
expenditure of about 3011/6 of the production offices total is a
very understandable break out of. Agency production costs
for major S&T research.
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Q. (b) Why were 1/2 of CIA's KIQ production expenditures concentrated
on slightly more than 1 / 3 of the KIQs ?
A. A detailed analysis is unnecessary to make the point that
"some KIQs cost more to produce on than others. " The
DDS&T spent 49% of their O&M dollars on 10 KIQs for which
each consumed about or more. The remaining 12 KIQs
for which OWI registered a production cost amounted to 7% of
their production expenditures.
The DDI produced on 91% of the KIQs and spent 53. 5% of their
O&M dollars.
The high cost intelligence research on foreign weapons
systems which are covered by relatively few KIQs accounts
for the bunching of dollars. (Also see the comments on
Question c. )
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Q. (c) While it seems appropriate that three-quarters of OCI's
FY 75 KIQ effort (34% of OCI's total O&M budget) was
focused on the 20 KIQs related to assessment of political
and security situations -- Substantive Objective IV -- it
is difficult to understand why those current intelligence
expenditures for this Substantive Objective.
A. The objective most appropriately fits OCI's current intel-
ligence production responsibilities because political and
security type situations represent highly dynamic event-
oriented intelligence problems. It would be difficult to
rationalize an OCI expenditure of less than 50% for these
KIQs.
Considering the allocation of O&M dollars for these 20 KIQs
relative to what each office spent for production on all the
KIQs: OCI/72%, OER/13%, OSR/15%, OPR/21%. Office
expenditures on these KIQs relative to the total O&M budget
shows: OCI/34%, OER/6%, OSR/10%, OPR/19%. Frankly,
the DDI is surprised that the figures for OER, OSR, and OPR
are so high for this category of KIQs which is the primary
responsibility of OCI.
These four offices expended a total on these 20
KIQs. This represents 31% the total KIQ related expenditures
for these offices and 17% of their aggregated O&M budgets.
OCI as expected accounted for 64% of the O&M dollars expended
on these 20 KIQs.
This looks like a reasonable trend in office expenditures for
the types of problems addressed in Objective IV.
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Q. (d)
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Why was less than 11/0 of CRS's activity during the year
considered to be KIQ related?
A. CRS and the Cartography Division in OGCR are essentially
support type units important to the production process but
a vast majority of their activities do not fit into the KEP
production report.
office, the analysis showed an expenditure of less than 1%
on CRS finished intelligence reports directly related to
KIQs. This is a reasonable expectation when the primary
mission of reference service and the mix of CRS's activities
are considered.
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