FY-75 KIQ PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00636A000100010008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 13, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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DCI/IC 76-1913
12 January 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
FY-75 KIQ Performance Evaluation Summary
REFERENCE
A.
USIB/IRAC
Subject:
Reporting
D-22.1/38, 9 June 1975
Guidance and KIQ Performance
Instructions
B.
C.
Memo to DCI, 31 December 1975
Subject: FY - 75 KEP from DIA
Memo to DDI, 13 January 1976,
Subject: Method of Costing KIQ-Related
Intelligence Products signed
25
Memo to D/DCI/IC, 13 January 1976
Subject: FY 1975 KEP, signed
25
1. This memorandum provides a rationale for the title
and cover design for the subject report and discusses the
comments by DIA and DDI concerning KEP methodology.
2. The covers of all KIQ/KEP documents distributed to
the Community in 1974 and 1975 have had identical layouts--
"Director of Central Intelligence"--and a title. The purpose
and use of the KEP was set forth in Reference A. The content
of the subject report was outlined, and approved, (by inference)
as part of the IC action culminating in the DCI's dispatch
on 28 November of individualized letters to each NFIP manager
concerning individual program performance on FY-75 KIQs.*
The title of the subject document was an integral part of
all working drafts provided the D/DCI/IC and DCI beginning
on 19 December. No comments or recommendations with respect
to title or text were received prior to the D/DCI/IC's
release of the document for printing on 31 December.
3. Reference B, DIA's response to the DCI's 28 November
individualized memoranda, which was based on preliminary
data, takes issue with KEP methodologies and expresses
reservations over the aggregation and use of DIA provided
data.
This action was in accordance with DCI commitments made at the
IRAC meeting of 10 November in which selected interim FY75 KEP data was
presented.
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? With respect to product counts, KEP reporting
instructions (Reference A) requires a the identification
of NFIP production elements engaged in KIQ-related
production activities and the title of KIQ-related
products emanating from the activites of those elements;
and b the KIQ-related operations expenditures of those
activities at the end-of the performance period (supplied).
By its own volition D1A initiated a quarterly reporting
system and required that reports be provided by all DIA
divisions and offices. While these procedures may have
well served management needsl, the lack of verification
and consolidation of these data within DIA before
forwarding them to ICS made it impossible (as pointed
out in the summary report) to eliminate double-counting
or to "relate individual products (and activities) to
individual KIQ production commitments." The opportunity
for double-counting through lack of consolidation was
materially increased by DIA's decision to forward data
sheets from each office and section quarterly. In-
ternal DIA procedures (no consolidation and no review
before forwarding to ICS) rather than KEP methodology
is the root of the problem addressed by DIA.
? Similar comments are applicable with
respect
to
Encountered Problems. There is no rational
explanation
for
problems identified as manpower in tabular
presentations
to
be explained in amplifying remarks as being
related
to
lack of data or processing methods.
? I 'The costing concepts criticize y
DIA's memo were developed on the basis of FY-74 KEP
pilot program experience. They were discussed at
length with committee members (DIA included) in February
and March of 1975; specifically addressed at the USIB
meeting of 2 April; and elaborated at length in Reference
A which was personally approved by the DCI. DIA comments
relating to aggregation and CIRIS are incomprehensible.
CIRIS is a management information system in which each
DIA production division--DIA, DT, DE--is a reporting
entity and in which reporting entities aggregate to DIA
program totals. Any problems relating KEP activities
to DIA program totals is an internal DIA management
problem, not a methodological problem relating to KEP.
? 'DIA's comments on supervisory management
costs are unreal--one-third of a man year of effort for
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editing, calculating and annotating data due on 1 August
but delivered finally on 20 October.*'
? The protest on the lateness of completion of
strategies and promulgation of performance reporting
guidelines are well taken. USIB review of strategies
was not completed until early March, and NIO/ICS
differences on the NIOs role in assessing performance
delayed issuance of reporting instructions until 9
June.
4. Reference C, two internal DDI memoranda addressing
the DCI's 28 November letter to the DDI, rationalize
DDI costing methodology, and provides a proposed response to
some of the DCI's questions which were based on aggregate
analysis of DDI provided KEP data.
? DDI costing of KIQ-related expenditures, by
its own election, was based narrowly on products found
only in PSS, and did not include--as requested in the 9
June KIQ Performance Reporting Instructions--"New. or
unique products stimulated by the KIQ, and all other
KIQ-related products eventuating from on-going production
activities." This instruction was amplified in a
following paragraph to include "--finished intelligence
with respect to any aspect of the KIQ." These particulars
were further expanded in a KIQ costing attachment to
the Instructions which explicitly defined KIQ costs as
costs deriving from operations and operations support
activities carried out, or undertaken in KIQ-related
activites. It would appear, that DDI reservations on
KEP costing derive from internal subjective interpretation
of KEP instructions, rather than from deficiencies in
KEP methodology.
? DDI's rationalization of apparent imbalances
in KIQ efforts is an elaboration of the results of the
costing approach taken of the DDI. The question asked
in the Instructions (and the personalized note) was not
why was so much spent on some KIQs, but rather was it
necessary to spend so much on a very few KIQs, when
spending a little more on some might well significantly
enhance the degree of consumer satisfaction on the KIQs.
taken as a whole. As pointed out in the 9 June paper
on methodology," as KEP findings raise questions about
relative weights of effort, collector contribution, and
Subsequent claims that by ICS assuming a data scrub responsibility
would save DIA 20,000 man hours of labor are equally preposterous. ICS
spent 1 1/2 weeks of two secretaries's time to police this data and complete
the entry sheets for computer processing.
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efficiency of collection and production methods and
effort, studies will be initiated to seek explanations
of apparent disparities in cost-effectiveness, or to
demonstrate actual cost-benefit relationships." It
would appear from the DDI response, that the process
was succeeding admirably.
5. On balance, it seems clear that in the main, the
KEP has provided insights into resource utilization and
identified apparent anomalies and inefficiencies in NFIP
program execution at a reasonable management cost. One
might well conclude that the approach and methodology set
forth in the FY-75 Guidance and Instructions was a useful
first step in an evolutionary approach to evaluating Community
performance on a substantial and very important portion of
Community effort.
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28NOV 1975
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT : FY-7S KEP
1. In response to my request, the Intelligence
Community Staff has provided an interim report on the
status of the FY-75 KEP (copy attached).
2. The preliminary conclusion, based on NIO
subjective-performance assessments, and performance data
provided by Community producers and collectors, is that
about two-thirds of the FY-75 1:IQs were satisfactorily
answered--on 42 KIQs the IC essentially, achieved the
production and collection goals set forth- in. applicable
strategies--at a cost of about one-third o the 'iC''s.O;M .
operating budget for FY-75.
Committees shows t.a these two programs-accounted-for ?a
data. provided 25X1
provided by DIA shows that while ;IQ-related GDIP expendi-
tures represent 44% of total Community effort, 25
involved are less than 15% of total production expenditures
for the year. The GLIP/SRV collection/processing performance
expenditures these programs devoted to KIQ-related
activities; 10% and 13%, respectively.
4. Considering production alone, performance data
it seems clear that the process is workable and that
useful findings will emerge. Recognizing that GDIP/SRV
? ... must- address . les-s.er priority national. and .departmental/
tactical needs as well'as KIQs, it is, nonetheless, a
little surprising to note the low percentage of O&M
3. While there were, as expected in such a 'first'
':effort, d nunbei of'ambigui?ties and some inconsistencies,
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of the Community's KIQ-related
expenditures. (I was
interested to note that in NIO eyes., the relative contribu-
tion of the military attaches was one-sixth that of the
Foreign Service and one-half that of non-NFIP organizations
Treasury-, Agriculture, ERDA, Commerce, etc..) While
providing the full range of production performance data
requested by KEP reporting instructions, the information
on products and producers was often ambiguous, sometimes
repetitious, and frequently inconsistent. This situation
in part resulted from DIA's decision to acquire data
quarterly.,. and the manner in which individual data sheets
were edited, which provided opportunities for 'double'
counting and delay in meeting suspense dates.
S. Since the concept of evaluating Community
performance by relating outcome and performance to
priorities and resource expenditures appears sound, we
must continue to put the effort and discipline into the
process that success demands.
. the development of KIQ collection and production
6. To firmly.establ.ish the KEP as a viable and
productive, eitforl :r.'equires;.
a; continued ..active DIA..participation in.
strategies--both directly and... through:-appropriate
USIB committees--to ensure a common approach and
structure, consistency of detail in the identi-
fication of internal goals and objectives, and
pr'eci'sion in` spec if , ying the' tasks for-which-
commitments are to be sought;
b. continued examination of DIA intelligence
production schedules to assure that the scope
and detail of publications pertinent to KIQs are
in consonance with the production goals and tasks
set forth in KIQ strategies;
c. care be exercised to identify all KIQ-
related products, services and support;
d., timely responsiveness?to reporting
.guidance. and instructions;
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e. review of the practices described in
paragraph 3, above, to enhance the credibility
of production data;
f.. precision and consistency in reporting
titles/subjects, types of products, and pro-
ducing organizations/offices; and
g. recommendations for 'measuring' intelli-
gence production and procedures for insuring an
appropriate share of basic intelligence activities
and support are attributed to KIQ efforts.
7. The KEP continues to be an important endeavor,
one that must be established and regularized as soon as
possible. I am counting on your continued suppor.t.in
this effort.
? -.'Attachment ..
copy '5 . of .20
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Addee w/att
....2. _..DCI., w/o=`?att- . , , ?.,?~-,_.
3 - DDCI w/o att
4 - ER w/o att
5 - IC REG w/o att
b - D/DCI/IC w/o att
7 - AD/DCI/IC w/o att
`` 8 - MPRRD/RE,A Subject w/o.att
9 -.MPRRD/R&A Reading w/o att
~.- 10 - AGH Chrono w/o att
IC/MPRRD/R$A/I
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13 January 1976
ACTION.
NOTE FOR: Mr. Proctor
FROM
SUBJECT : Method of Costing KIQ-Related
Intelligence Products
Attached are two pages of suggested instructions issued
by the IC Staff for costing KIQ Production Performance. The
purpose of these instructions is to solve for man hour salary
costs for each KIQ then add to that figure an estimate of O&M
-costs that is related. No one in the production offices liked this
. suggested methodology. We used a softer more judgmental. approach
and probably came up with better numbers than we would have by
using the IC guidance. It was our understanding that the production
costing for KEP 1975 was to be based on product. If you had no
product then you could not play this costing game. These costs
were to be based on what the direct operating costs were for the
entity to produce their.product.
The Agency used a product listing from the Coverage. and
Sources Survey modified by the offices to add products which were.
not originally included. I then discussed with each office the products
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related to the specific KIQs using".their gross operating expenditure
for FY 75 that was provided by the ' CIRIS. The approach was
relatively unscientific but it did develop a "best estimate" of
what we spent by office to produce on each of the KIQs.
Since we did this job the IC Staff has developed a production
expenditure statement that is broader than strict product*relationship.
8 of the KEP 75 performance report summary, we probably would
If we used the recently stated definition which is starred on page
.have allocated dollars for which there was no.. identifable product
I have made a few marginal notes on the summary which
probably are of no consequence since the data can be analyzed and
in FY 75.
intrepreted in ways different than that chosen by the IC Staff,
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13 January 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
ATTENTION : Chief, Collection and Processing
Assessment Division
SUBJECT : FY 1975 KEP
REFERENCE : DCI Memo to DDI, same subject,
dated 28 November 1975
1. The'DCI transmitted to the DDI an interim. report on
the status of the FY 1975 KEP. In the coverii,o memorandum
transmitted as reference, the DCI raised several questions about
the DDI/DDS&T production data inputs which were described as
being difficult to rationalize. Since the DCI did not ask for a
response, and it was quite obvious the IC Staff raised the questions
for Mr. Colby, a comment on each is herewith provided to
clarify some of the data.
2. These comments have been discussed with Mr. Proctor
and have his concurrence. He also understands that they are
being provided directly to the IC Staff and not back through
Mr. Colby. ' If there are other questions, we will be pleased to
attempt to provide answers or explanations.
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CIA FY 1975 KEP Production Monitor
Attachment:
Comments on KEP 1975 Questions
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Q. (a) Why were only 1/3 of DDI FY 1975 intelligence production
expenditures related to KIQs ?
A. DDI O&M dollars provided by the IC Staff using FY 1975
CIRIS data were used as a basis. CGAS using the product
listings by KIQ from the Publications Source Survey, con-
sulted with each office to determine what O&M dollars were
applicable to each of the KIQs on which they produced intel-
ligence products. This is a key factor - our allocation of dollar
costs were related to product. The 1/3 used in the question
included CRS and OGCR. Much of OGCR's work in support of
U. S. negotiations were not included as a "product" because of
its highly restricted dissemination. In addition, OGCR's work
on ::::::became an input to OER's product and no
accounting was made for OGCR's input. Similarly, other OGCR
work results in inputs to the final product of other production
offices of the Agency without accounting for OGCR cost, CR
ser'~s primarily as support and services organizations
to the CIA production process. In other words, these two offices
are not high rate intelligence producers in the KIQ/KEP sense.
For the major production offices of the DDI and DDS&T, 69%
of their O&M dollars were KIQ related; OCI, OER, OSR, and
OPR expended 53. 5% of their aggregated O&M dollars on KIQ
related products: These figures show only that by best estimate
this is what we expended on KIQ production during FY 75. It
appears reasonable that the major producers in the DDT spend
about 1/2 of the production dollars on KIQs. Less than 1/3 or
more than 2/3 would seem to be open to question or difficult to
rationalize.
From this it is clear that better "accounting procedures are nec-
essary to obtain the full costs of product by accounting for the costs
of major contributions (i. e. , intermediate products) from one
office into the products of some other office.
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Q. (c) While it seems appropriate that three-quarters of OCI's
FY 75 KIQ effort (34% of OCI's total O&M budget)' was
focused on the 20 KIQs related to assessment of political
and security situations -- Substantive Objective IV -- it
is difficult to understand why those current intelligence
expenditures for this Substantive Objective.
A. The objective most appropriately fits OCI's current intel-
ligence production responsibilities because political and
security type situations represent highly dynamic event-
oriented intelligence problems. It would be difficult to
rationalize an OCI expenditure of less than 50% for these
KIQs.
Considering the allocation of O&M dollars for these 20 KIQs
relative to what each office spent for production on all the
KIQs: OCI/72%, OER/13%, OSR/15%, OPR/21%0. Office
expenditures on these KIQs relative to the total O&M budget
shows: OCI/34%. OER/6%, OSR/10%, OPR/19%. Frankly,
the DDI is surprised that the figures for OER, OSR, and OPR
are so high for this category of KIQs which is the primary =
responsibility of OCI.
These four offices expended a total oil on these 20
KIQs. This represents 31% the total KIQ related expenditures
for these offices and 17% of their aggregated O&M budgets.
OCI as expected accounted for 64% of .the O&M dollars expended
on these 20 KIQs.
This looks like a reasonable trend in office expenditures for
the types of problems addressed in Objective IV.
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 mission of reference service and the mix of CRS's activities
are considered.
KIQs. This is a reasonable expectation when the primary
office, the analysis showed an expenditure of less than 1%
on CRS finished intelligence reports directly related to
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Q. (d)
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Why was less than 1% of CRS's activity during the year
considered to be KIQ related?
A. CRS and the Cartography Division in OGCR are essentially
support type units important to the production process but
a vast majority of their activities do not fit into the KEP
production report.
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Q. (c) Why were nearly half of all CIA KIQ production expenditures
made by DDS&T with only 1/3 of CIA's production resources?
A. It is not possible to directly correlate dollars and man-
power in some intelligence production environments. It
naturally costs the DDS&T, particularly OWI, more to get
their product because of the need for contractor assistance.
It would be prohibitive from a dollar and manpower stand-
point to develop in-house capabilities to do the complex systems
research for which they are charged. The OSI and DDT research
operations are heavily in-house analyst-oriented. The OWI
expenditure of about 3011/'o of the production offices total is a
very understandable break out of Agency production costs
for major S&T research.
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Q. (b)
on slightly more than 1/ 3 of the KIQs ?
Why were .1/2 of CIA's KIQ production expenditures concentrated
A. A detailed analysis is unnecessary to make the point tl3'?
"some KIQs cost more to produce on than others. " fhe
DDS&T spent 49% of their O&M dollars on 10 KIQs for which
for which OWI registered a production cost amounted to 7% of
their production expenditures.
each consumed The remaining 12 KIQs
The DDI produced on 91% of the KIQs and spent 53. 5% of their
O&M dollars.
The high cost intelligence research on foreign weapons
systems which are covered by relatively few KIQs accounts
for the bunching of,dollars. (Also see the comments on
Question c. )
Appiraved For'.Rel'eas