KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUMMARY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00636A000100020002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUMMARY
FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1975
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This report presents a summary analysis of evaluations
of the Intelligence Community's performance with respect to
the FY 1975 Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). It examines
evaluations of Community performance against each KIQ, the
scope and cost of Community collection and production
efforts related to addressing KIQs, and assesses the Key
Intelligence Question Evaluation Process (KEP) methodology
for evaluating Community performance.
? The FY-75 KEP program began on 12 August 1974
with the circulation of NSCIC-approved Key
Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1975.
On 1 July the FY-75 KIQ performance period
ended. The data acquisition phase of the
evaluation program closed on 5 November.
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Page
I. Introduction
II. Performance Analysis (approach and data limits)
III. KIQ Tasks and Commitments
IV. Production Performance Analysis
V. Collection Performance Analysis
VI. KIQ Production and Collection Problems
VII. Information Gain and Relative Contribution
VIII. KIQ Fulfillment
Tab A--Substantive Objectives and Key Intelligence Questions
Tab B--Attachment--Selected NIO Comments
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 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00636A000100020002-7
This report presents a summary analysis of evaluations
of the Intelligence Community's performance with respect to
the FY-75 Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs).' It examines
evaluations of Community performance against each KIQ, the
scope and cost of Community collection and production
efforts related to addressing KIQs, and assesses the Key
Intelligence Question Evaluation Process (KEP) methodology
which evaluates Community performance.
The Key Intelligence Question Evaluation Process (KEP)
was designed to be a simple, iterative process to evaluate
Community performance. Structurally uncomplicated, yet
containing enough data to support a meaningful evaluation of
Community performance, the KEP provides a substantive
foundation for USIB/IRAC discussion concerning the utilization
of NFIP resources. In particular, KEP results are intended
to improve the process by which USIB/IRAC principals become
informed on resource matters by providing information on the
1 DCI/NIO 1751-74 (USIB-D-22.1/26 dated 12 August 1974), DCI FY-75
Substantive Objectives and KIQs. (Extract appended at Tab A.)
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in answering the KIQs. Thus, the KEP informs program
managers about resource expenditures on KIQs, providing a
cross-program input and aid to the resource allocation
procedure. Its design recognizes the complex processes that
enter into formulation of individual NFI programs.
In developing KEP procedures it was necessary to strike
a balance between being overly precise, and being too
general in acquiring cost data. At one extreme, too much
precision would be misleading in light of the credibility of
obtainable data. At the other extreme, overly general and
unsystematized cost data would not be helpful as it would
inhibit comparing and contrasting Community performance
among KIQs and NRI programs.
The more generalized approach was selected because:
? The KIQs encompass only current critical
substantive questions and not the entire
range of Community activities;
the KEP is an information mechanism in
support of the DCI, USIB/IRAC, and not an
operating management tool;
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t
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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES
AND
KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
FY-75
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This report presents a summary analysis of evaluations
of the Intelligence Community's performance with respect to
the FY 1975 Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). It examines
evaluations of Community performance against each KIQ, the
scope and cost of Community collection and production
efforts related to addressing KIQs, and assesses the Key
Intelligence Question Evaluation Process (KEP) methodology
for evaluating Community performance.
? The FY-75 KEP program began on 12 August 1974
with the circulation of NSCIC-approved Key
Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1975.
? On 1 July the FY-75 KIQ performance period
ended. The data acquisition phase of the
evaluation program closed on 5 November.
Performance Assessments Reports on 62 of the 69 FY-75
KIQs were received.
? Reports on four KIQs were not undertaken;
three on Communist China because of the
absence of an NIO for China for much of the
performance period; and
because the question was over acen by events.
? Reports on the remaining three--one on
Eastern Europe, and two on terrorist/extremist
activities--were not completed.
? The subject matter of one KIQ--arms agreements
negotiations--was so broad that two reports
were rendered, one covering SALT, the other
ABM.
The analytical approach in the analysis involves con-
sideration of Community achievements with respect to the
KIQs and the relative contribution each collector/sensor
made to that achievement.
? It thereafter relates collection and pro-
duction efforts, products, costs and problems
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to the tasks and commitments reflected in
the KIQ collection and production strategies
developed at the beginning of the performance
period.
? Data is organized and presented in terms of
the DCI's FY-75 Substantive Objectives.
Two hundred fourteen explicit collection and production
goals involving 21 KIQs were set forth in KIQ strategies.
Two hundred fifty-nine additional joint collection/production
goals were scattered among the 48 other KIQs.
? Objectives set forth in KIQ strategies
elicited 208 specific production commit-
ments--138 by individual agencies, 68 in-
teragency efforts under NIO auspices, and two
by non-NFIP agencies. There were no inter-
agency production commitments on 39 of the 63
KIQs.
CIA made
37%
of
the commitments, DIA 23%.
Overall,
CIA
and
"interagency" commitments
represent
quarter.
70%
of
the total, DIA about one-
Production performance data provided by the four
principal production elements of the Intelligence Community
shows that interagency products were produced on 55 of the
69 KIQs; CIA incurred production expenditures on every KIQ;
the GDIP and the Department of State (INR) on 66 of the 69
KIQs.
The bulk of expenditures (77%) were associated
.with assessments of Soviet capability to
project power outside the USSR (Substantive
Objective II) and assessments of political
and security situations (and crises)--Sub-
stantive Objective IV.
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Page
I. Introduction
II. Performance Analysis (approach and data limits)
III. KIQ Tasks and Commitments
IV. Production Performance Analysis
V. Collection Performance Analysis
VI. KIQ Production and Collection Problems
VII. Information Gain and Relative Contribution
VIII. KIQ Fulfillment
Tab A--Substantive Objectives and Key Intelligence Questions
Tab B--Attachment--Selected NIO Comments
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