INTRODUCTION OF RESOLUTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 15, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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1963
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 14265
Only about 25 percent of them are liter-
ate. Less than a fourth of the children
of school age are in school, and less than
2 percent ever complete secondary
education. Pupil-teacher ratios of 100
to 1 are common, compared to about 25
to 1 in the developed countries.
To help meet this challenge, the
United States, through the Agency for
International Development has estab-
lished cooperative educational programs
In 58 nations. In each the goal is the
same: To train people who in turn can
train teachers, prepare suitable texts
and teaching aids, and themselves devel-
op a strong educational program in their
respective countries. Assistance is pro-
vided for all levels of eduction?primary,
secondary, and higher education; for all
age groups and types of schools?voca-
tional and technical as well RS general
education; and for construction and
equipment as well as for technical assist-
ance.
In 1962, AID obligated $93 million in
U.S. funds plus an additional $98 million
in U.S.-owned local currencies to assist
the developing nations in meeting acute
educational problems.
. In Bolivia, AID projects are being car-
ried out to improve commercial educa-
tion. Libya, a program in vocational
training for farmers, tradesmen, and
handicraft artisans is in progress. In
Iran, U.S. aid helped to establish an en-
tire vocational education system for the
Iranian armed forces.
In Pakistan, an AID team taught
Pakistani railwaymen?few of whom
spoke the same language or dialect?.
how to operate diesel locomotives.
With independence approaching in
Kenya, an AID-assisted special project
has begun to train 47 local government
officials for positions of high respons
bility in the government when indepen
ence is granted.
A fascinating example of an AID
ect covering several levels of edu
is the program in Nepal.
Nepal's first teacher-training enter
was established in 1954 under t ? direc-
tion of the University of Or on. In
1956 mobile teaching teams re orga-
nized to carry teacher trai g to the
remote provinces.
A college of education w established
and a staff trained to edu te up to 2,000
teachers a year. A bur u of textbook
publication was establi ed and several
of its Nepalese staff mbers were sent
to the United States special training.
The 'bureau printe 55 different titles
and 225,000 pieces ? educational litera-
ture in its first 5 y ars of operation.
More than 2, 0 part-time teachers
were trained fo teracy education, and
they in turn ught more than 1,000
adults to ma. and write in their first
year in the fl d.
Nepal's -fi t national university was
established ith colleges of liberal arts
and sciences, agriculture and forestry,
education, law, nursing, and medicine.
Before the AID program began, Nepal
had no national university, no teacher-
training institutions. Only 1 child in
200 was in school, and only 2 percent of
the Nepalese people could read and write.
At the end of the first 5 years of the
on
education project, more than 1,500 new
primary classrooms had trained teach-
ers, 200 new schools were receiving fi-
nancial aid, and 20 new primary texts
had been published. Nearly 200 second-
ary teachers had received bachelor of
education degrees and 45 high school
teachers had undergone a 1-year course
for the improvement of English instruc-
tion. In addition, Nepal's entire second-
ary school curriculum had been re-
vamped to include vocational instructio
urgently required in agriculture, horn
economics, commercial education,
Industrial arts.
A program similar to the one in epal
is now being carried out in In with
the assistance of U.S.-AID cation
teams from Ohio State Univ ity and
the Teachers College of Col bia Uni-
versity.
In Cambodia a teacher aining pro-
gram has been under w for 5 years.
Prior to 1958 Cambodi students with
a sixth-grade educe ? were given a
summer of trainin: nd then pressed
into service as ele tary school teach-
ers. Under the A OP contract Cambodia's
first teacher p .aration center was
established an. aas already become the
largest educ:_?4 I nal institution in the
country. E, year the center trains
200 eleme s.?: ry school teachers. An-
other s' institution is now being
establis with AID assistance to train
second.. school teachers.
Tel 4 ion represents a potentially
valu: e educational medium for the de-
vel ng nations. In Nigeria, for ex-
a.. e, AID has provided an experienced
erthan educational television execu-
e as an adviser to the Nigerian staff
f a new educational television station.
From 1960 to 1962 the station has tele-
cast more than 700 different programs
for a total of 350 hours of instruction to
100 village schools equipped with tele-
vision sets supplied by the Nigerian
Ministry of Education.
Not only teachers, but also classrooms
are in short supply in most underdevel-
oped nations. AID has encouraged the
building of new schools and classrooms
in many countries by providing techn
cal help and materials while local r
dents provide the construction la ? on
a volunteer basis.
The Guatemalan G ernment
launched a self-help school construction
program in partnership with AID in 1960.
AID and the Guatemalan Government
agreed to share equally any costs not
absorbed by the local communities. At
the beginning of the project, it was ex-
pected that volunteer labor would cover
about one-third of the cost of construc-
tion. In fact, it has accounted for
nearly 44 percent of construction costs.
During the 3 years since the pilot project
began, self-help schools have been built
and are now operating in every province
of Guatemala. More than 1,100 class-
rooms in 300 schools have been com-
pleted. The enthusiastic turnout of vil-
lagers for each school dedication symbol-
izes the impact of such AID assisted proj-
ects on the lives of the people.
Self-help school construction programs
like the one in Guatemala are now un-
derway in Chile, Liberia, El Salvador,
Haiti, and Honduras.
Another serious educational problem
facing manyldeveloping nations is that
of adult literacy. In Turkey. a unique
approach the problem has been insti-
tuted wi U.S. aid. Literacy training
has be given to more than 150,000
Tur soldiers and an additional
120,1 "I are expected to complete train-
in ach year.
n addition, more than 3,000 primary
hool teachers have gained literacy
teaching experience at the military cen-
ters. This group will form the teaching
nucleus of a planned civilian literacy
program. The goal is to reduce illiter-
acy in Turkey from 70 to 30 percent by
1975.
In the Turkish project, as in most lit-
eracy projects, U.S. experts help local
educators prepare training materials,
texts, and followup reading materials for
use by the newly literate.
As of 1962, the Agency for Interna-
tional Development had undertaken
projects to increase the supply and im-
prove the quality of primary and sec-
ondary school teachers in 33 Latin
Amefican, African, and Asian nations.
In Afghanistan, U.S. aid is the only bi-
lateral assistance permitted by the Gov-
ernment in the sensitive area of educa-
tion.
Be cause English has become the near-
est thing to an international language in
many underdeveloped nations, AID has
been providing technical assistance for
the teaching of English in 14 Asian and
African countries.
Finally, 75 American universities and
colleges are working under AID contracts
in the establishment and improvement
of facilities for higher education in more
than 26 Asian, African, and South Amer-
ican countries.
Of the many needs of the developing
countries none is more critical than the
need for education, in the broadest sense
of the word d of the many parts of
our forei, A d program none is more in
keepin:. th American ideals, an the
asp Ins of Americans for their f ow
m 'round the world, than educatio 1
istance.
INTRODUCTION OF RESOLUTION
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOR-
EIGN INFORMATION AND INTEL-
LIGENCE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ROY..
BAL) . Under previous order of the House,
the gentleman from New York [Mr.
LINDSAY] is recognized for 60 minutes,
10 minutes of which have already been
consumed by the previous presentation
of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr.
FRASER].
(Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise
today to introduce a resolution for the
establishment of a Joint Committee on
Foreign Information and Intelligence.
I propose that the committee be con-
stituted roughly along the lines of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and
that it have its own funds and staff re-
sources. I propose also that it make
continuing studies in the whole area of
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14266 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
our foreign information and intelligence
programs.
In my remarks this afternoon, how-
ever, Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to
dwell at great length on the precise terms
of this particular resolution. I think it
is a good resolution but I am perfectly
ready to be persuaded that a better one
might be devised. The question of the
exact structure and composition of this
committee seems to me significantly less
important than the more general ques-
tions of principle involved. I rise today,
not to make propaganda on behalf of a
particular proposal of mine, but rather
to raise a matter which I think is in need
of the widest possible and most intelli-
gent public discussion.
As most Members are aware, the pro-
posal of a Joint Committee on Foreign
Intelligence is not a new one. In one
form or another it has been introduced
into this House in each of the last 10
sessions; in 1955 it was the subject of a
2-day hearing by the Rules Committee.
In the Senate the Committee on Rules
and Administration reported on it favor-
ably in 1956, and for 2 days it was de-
bated on the floor of that body. Nor is
it partisan in nature. Back in 1959 res-
olutions similar to mine were sponsored
In the House by eight Democrats and
four Republicans. Earlier this year the
matter was brought to our attention by
a member of the other party, the dis-
tinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr.
ROGERS]. Moreover, when Mr. MANS-
FIELD'S resolution came to a vote in the
Senate in 1956, the minority in favor
included many Members on both sides
of the aisle. On that occasion one of
those who voted in favor was the then
junior Senator from Massachusetts, now
the President of the United States.
If the proposal for a Joint Committee
on Foreign Intelligence has come up so
often and been supported by so many
Members, why has it never been
adopted? Frankly I do not find that
question easy to answer, particularly
since some of the arguments against it
seem to me so feeble. Take, to begin
with, the argument about secrecy. It is
an argument that has been advanced
every time the proposal has been dis-
cussed. During the Senate debate in
1956 the chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Mr. Rus-
SELL, went so far as to say that, rather
than have a committee set up and in-
formation made available to Members of
Congress, "it would be better to abolish
the Central Intelligence Agency and, by
doing so, to save the money appropriated
and the lives of American citizens." A
former Vice President, Mr. Barkley, took
the same view in the same debate.
Now no one denies that CIA and other
intelligence agencies must conduct a very
high proportion of their operations in
secret. Secrecy is of the essence of their
work; without it they could not function,
and the security of our country would
be jeopardized. No one denies that. But
what is true of the intelligence commu-
nity is also true in many other areas of
government: in the fields of atomic en-
ergy, weapons development, and foreign
policy, for example. But does this mean
that Congress is to have no effective au-
thorny in these areas? Of course it does
not. Congress has always asserted its
right to concern itself with even the most
sensitive areas of Government. And,
where matters of the highest secrecy
have been involved, Members of both
Houses have shown themselves perfectly
capable of exercising the utmost re-
straint. This was never more clearly
demonstrated than by the experience of
the Manhattan project during World
War II, when members of the two appro-
priations committees were kept fully ap-
prised of the progress of the project
without on any occasion breaking secu-
rity. And I am sure all Members of the
House will agree that the record of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in
this connection has been impeccable.
As in the case of the Atomic Energy
Committee, I take it for granted of
course that much of the work of the new
committee?perhaps almost all of it?
would be conducted in private and that
the results would be made public only
after a close screening by the appropriate
Government agencies. Nevertheless, I
admit that particular concern might still
be felt about CIA, since breaches of
security involving CIA might endanger
the lives of American operatives in other
countries, and also the lives of agents of
other nations working in cooperation
with us. I think this is a legitimate con-
cern, but I hope to show later in my
speech that there are many important
aspects of intelligence work which could
usefully be studied without any need to
inquire in detail into the activities of
particular persons and units in the field.
So much for the moment for secrecy.
I find myself in even less sympathy with
another argument that has also been ad-
vanced frequently in discussions of this
question?namely, that the intelligence
community exists solely to serve the
President and the National Security
Council, and that therefore we in the
Congress have no right to seek a juris-
dictional? position. This doctrine was
stated in an extreme form in 1956 by
Mr. HAYDEN in the Senate. He Said at.
that time:
The Central Intelligence Agency is an arm
of the President. Under the Constitution, I
feel we have no right to attempt to regulate
an agency which is designed solely to pro-
vide the President, who, under the Consti-
tution, is responsible for our foreign rela-
tions, with information to enable him to
make decisions.
I, for one, cannot accept that doctrine.
As every Member knows, these two
branches of our Government, the execu-
tive and the legislative, are not water-
tight compartments separated by steel
bulkheads; the material between them is
flexible and porous. There are any num-
ber of congressional committees which
keep a watch over the executive agencies.
In this House we have, to name only two,
the Foreign Affairs Committee which in-
quires constantly into the policies and
actions of the President and his agents,
and the Government Operations Com-
mittee which closely scrutinizes the en-
tire organization of the executive
branch. The Senate has a subcommittee
whose area of operations borders on the
very area I am discussing: the Subcom-
Ategust 15
mittee on National Security Staffing and
Operations.
If we are going to refrain from looking
into the affairs of executive agencies,
even agencies which report directly to
the President, than I fear we are going to
have to disband a large number of our
committees, or at least to curtail severely
their activities. Of course we in the
legislature cannot and should not inter-
vene in areas beyond our competence.
But in my view we have not only a right
but a duty to maintain a general surveil-
lance over agencies like the Central In-
telligence Agency, which are established
by statute and sustained by funds voted
by the Members of these two Houses.
These arguments?concerning secrecy
and the exclusively executive nature of
the intelligence community?are at least
consistent. But strangely enough those
who oppose resolutions similar to this
have often attempted to maintain, not
that for these reasons Congress should
abstain entirely from overseeing the in-
telligence community, but that on the
contrary congressional oversight is al-
ready more than adequate. Senator
RUSSELL made this claim in the debate
already quoted, and it was reiterated by
Mr. Allen Dulles, the former Director of
Central Intelligence, in his recent article
in Harper's magazine. What is in fact
the extent of congressional surveillance
at the moment?
In both the House and Senate the
bodies responsible for overseeing the in-
telligence community are small subcom-
mittees of the Appropriations and Armed
Services Committees. Neither the House
Foreign Affairs Committee nor the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee has
jurisdiction in this area despite their
obvious interest in intelligence matters.
This might not matter were it not for the
fact that the surveillance exercised by
the four existing subcommittees is almost
certainly both cursory and sporadic. For
example, last year during adebate in the
Senate the distinguished senior Senator
from Massachusetts, my friend, Mr.
SALTONSTALL, was asked how much time
the Armed Services Subcommittee de-
voted to the CIA affairs. Mr. SALTON-
STALL was perfectly frank. He said:
I say on the floor of the Senate that we
spend several hours and go into many details
of operations, of expenses; of 4administration,
and so on.
I ask Members to note the phrase
"several hours"?not weeks or even days,
but hours. .The members of one of the
most important committees in the other
House devote only hours to the affairs
of one of the most important agencies of
our Government. The reasons for this
are surely clear. The members of the
four subcommittees lack any staff spe-
cialized in these matters; they them-
selves can have little time or thought to
devote them. But even if these subcom-
mittees do have more time for intelli-
gence, nevertheless the disadvantages
of having responsibility for the intelli-
gence community divided up among four
different subcommittees would, I think,
be obvious to everyone. I maintain that
congressional surveillance of the intelli-
gence community is not now adequate,
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
and cannot be adequate as long as it
continues to be organized as it is at
present.
A moment ago I referred to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency as one of the
most important agencies of our Govern-
ment. What is true of CIA is, of course,
even truer of the intelligence commu-
nity as a whole. Yet from time to time
those who maintain that intelligence op-
erations fall exclusively within the execu-
tive sphere?those, in other words, who
are opposed to the establishment of a
joint congressional committee?try to
persuade us, despite all we have heard
and seen during the past few years, that
nevertheless CIA is a purely advisory
body, that that it is not directly con-
cerned with the making of national pol-
icy. Mr. Allen Dulles himself remarked
several years ago:
CIA is not a policymaking Agency: we
furnish intelligence to assist in the formula-
tion of policy.
Senator RUSSELL during a debate in
the other body was even more blunt:
Some Senators who addressed themselves
to the resolution on Monday last, seemed to
hold the opinion that the CIA was a policy-
making agency. That theme ran all through
the remarks which were made in advocacy
of the adoption of the resolution.
Mr. President, the Central Intelligence
Agency is far from being a policymaking
agency. It makes no policy.
The distinguished Senator went on to
say that CIA was merely a coordinating
and information-gathering body whose
function was simply to present its-find-
ings to the actual policymaking body, the
National Security Council.
Senator RUSSELL said all this in 1956.
In my view it was scarcely plausible even
then. Now in 1963, after our experi-
ences in Cuba, Laos and elsewhere, to
say that CIA is in no sense a policymak-
ing body is to say something that is pal-
pably untrue. The National Security
Act, under which CIA operates, does not,
of course, formally assign it policymak-
ing functions. But CIA is a policymak-
ing body, and we all know it. The rea-
sons have been well put by Prof. Harry
Howe Ransom, our leading lay student
of intelligence affairs. In his study
"Central Intelligence and National Se-
curity," published as early as 1958, he
has this to say:
Certainly the CIA has no policymaking
responsibility. Yet policy making is not a
simple static action. Rather it is a dynamic
process. A key element in this process is the
Information available to policymakers. The
man, or group, controlling the information
available to policymakers does in fact play
a major if indirect role in policymaking.
A few pages later Professor Ranson'
adds:
It would be unrealistic to suggest that the
bright young men of CIA, by training, talent,
and personality, do not hold strong views on
controversial issues of national security
policy. If it is granted that knowledge is
indeed power, it will be recognized that in
reality the CIA, through an increasing ef-
ficiency?and consequently rising credit with
responsible decision makers?has come to
play a major role in creating national secu-
rity policy.
No. 127-4
Surely those statements can no longer
be regarded as anything but the simple
truth. In fact even Senator RUSSELL
appears to have come round. Last year,
during the hearings on the confirmation
of Mr. John McCone to be Director of
Central Intelligence, Senator RUSSELL
remarked:
In this period through which we are pass-
ing, this office is perhaps second only to the
Presidency in its importance.
A few moments later he repeated the
point. I am inclined to agree with Sen-
ator RUSSELL. And I submit to you that
one does not describe a man as holding
an office "second only to the Presidency
in its importance" if the agency of which
he is the head is not itself a policymak-
ing agency of the very first order of
importance.
Up to this point, Mr. Speaker, I have
been mainly concerned to clear the
ground, as it were?to state as clearly
as I could my objections to the argu-
ments most commonly used by opponents
of the proposal I am supporting. Only
by implication have I suggested positive
reasons why I think a Joint Committee
on Foreign Information and Intelligence
should be established. I want now to ad-
dress myself to the central questions:
why do I think such a joint committee
is necessary? and, equally important,
what work do I think it might usefully
undertake?
But first I have to make one further
point. The Central Intelligence Agency,
and indeed the entire intelligence com-
munity, is highly?and necessarily?se-
cretive in its mode of operations. For
this reason outsiders like myself have no
alternative but to rely for their informa-
tion on newspaper reports, on the oc-
casional published hearings on House
and Senate committees, on the work of
scholars like Professor Ransom, and on
a miscellaneous variety of other sources.
In the very nature of things our com-
ments and criticisms cannot be authori-
tative. We are working in the dark, or
at least in the semitwilight. Neverthe-
less, I think we do know enough to have
reasonable grounds for supposing that
all is not well within the intelligence
community. Even more important, I
think we know enough to be certain that
we need to know more?and by "we,"
of course, I mean not necessarily the
general public nor even every Member
of Congress, but those Members who
would serve on the kind of committee I
have in mind.
Why, then, do I think such a com-
mittee should be established?
I have two general reasons. The first
concerns the extraordinary number of
specific criticisms that have been leveled
over the years against the Central In-
telligence Agency and, by implication,
against the intelligence community as
a whole. Admittedly, as Mr. Allen
Dulles recently pointed out:
You cannot tell of operations that go
along well. Those that go badly generally
speak for themselves.
And I would not want for a moment
to deny that the Central Intelligence
14267
Agency has scored a number of quite
spectacular successes?the U-2 over-
flights, for example, and the overthrow
of the Mossadegh regime in Iran. On
balance it is almost certainly true to say
that the intelligence community has
served the Nation well. But the fact
does remain that on occasion the com-
munity has blundered seriously, and that
for its blunder the citizens of the United
States have paid a heavy price.
Let me refer to just a few instances.
Back in 1950, as Mr. Dulles himself has
tacitly admitted, the intelligence com-
munity failed to anticipate the Chinese
Comninnist intervention in Korea. We
are still living with the consequences of
that particular failure. A few years
later an incident involving the CIA
caused us serious embarrassment in the
Middle East and may have contributed
indirectly to the Suez affair. In July
1956 President Nasser of Egypt claimed
in a speech at Alexandria that he had
been strongly advised by a U.S. Govern-
ment official to ignore an important mes-
sage that he was about to receive from
the State Department. It was subse-
quently confirmed that the official in
question had been the regional repre-
sentative of CIA.
More recently, of course, we had the
fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. Chief respon-
sibility for that lamentable affair must
rest with the President of the United
States. However, there can be no ques-
tion but that the Central Intelligence
Agency was deeply involved in the whole
affair, and that its actions and advice
had a decisive effect on the eventual
outcome. Surely most Members of the
House will agree that it would be in the
national interest to know whether such
incidents were merely particular aber-
rations or whether,`in fact, they form a
pattern that is likely to be repeated in
the future.
My second general reason for pressing
for the establishment of this committee
I can state quite briefly. It is this. I
abhor government by secrecy. I regard
it as inimical to the effective function-
ing of our institutions. I regard it as
alien to our American way of life. Above
all, I regard it as a threat to our funda-
mental liberties. I fully realize, of
course, it should be clear from what I
have said already that a high degree of
secrecy is essential to the workings of
the intelligence community.
But I fear that with respect to the
intelligence community we are often the
victims of secrecy for secrecy's sake.
Things are done to us and in our name
which we know nothing of. I do not
wish to see the legitimate secrets of the
intelligence community reported in the
press and on the air. Of course I do not.
But it does seem to me of enormous im-
portance that a few selected representa-
tives of the people, chosen by the two
Houses of Congress, should be continu-
ously aware of what the intelligence
community is doing and of the way in
which it is going about doing it. The
American people have at stake, not
merely their liberties but their lives.
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14268 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 4uyust 1(6
Despite all I have said so far, there
would, of course, be little point in estab-
lishing this joint committee unless we
had some fairly clear idea of what we
thought it should do, of what subjects
we thought it should study. I propose,
therefore, to continue by discussing four
questions, all of high importance, which
I think might usefully be investigated:
first, the relations between the Central
Intelligence Agency and the State De-
partment, especially overseas; second,
the relations between intelligence-gath-
ering on the one hand and so-called
special operaticins on the other; third,
the selection and training of intelligence
Personnel; and fourth, the whole ques-
tion of intelligence evaluation. I pro-
pose to deal briefly with the first three of
these questions and to say rather more
about the fourth.
First, the relations between CIA and
the State Department.
The problem here has been posed suc-
cinctly by Henry Howe Ransom in the
book I have already cited. On page 216
he writes:
The operation by the U.S. Government of
a farflung secret apparatus for intelligen
gathering and political action could ha
widespread diplomatic ramifications. Ther
may be basic incompatibility between the
maintenance of accredited diplomatic mis-
sions in some 78 foreign posts (as of 1958)?
The number would be considerably
greater now?
and the existence of American secret agents
in most of these same foreign areas. Great-
est care must be exercised in keeping U.S.
diplomacy separated from spying and back-
stage political maneuvering, at least on the
surface, yet the diplomats probably should
not be completely in the dark as to the
activities of American secret agents.
The possibly disruptive effect of hav-
ing, on the premises of American em-
bassies abroad or in the field, agents
who owe allegiance to someone other
than the ambassador and to an organi-
zation other than the State Department
and who may be engaging in activities
running counter to expressed State De-
partment policy, scarcely needs spelling
out in detail.
Nor are these dangers merely specu
lative. It seems, for example, that to
ward the end of the Chinese civil war
remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Na-
tionalist Army moved into parts of
northern Burma. These troops claimed
to be eager to harass the Communists
across the border, and CIA accordingly
supplied them with large quantities of
money and arms. But according to
available reports the Chinese had long
since tired of fighting. Instead of at-
tacking the Communists, they proceeded
to settle down, to occupy much of the
best agricultural land in northern
Burma, and to cultivate opium?all with
the assistance of U.S. funds. .
This would have been a melancholy
episode in any case. But what made it
worse was the fact that our Ambassador
in Rangoon apparently had not the
faintest idea of what CIA was doing.
When the Burmese Government formally
complained to the United States, the
Ambassador issued a categorical denial;
he said the United States had nothing
to do with the activities of the Nation-
alist Chinese. Our Ambassador of course
believed he was telling the truth. But
what he was saying was in fact not true,
and naturally the Burmese were shocked
by this apparent evidence of American
duplicity. What was the upshot of this
episode? The American Ambassador re-
signed, the U.S. Government was deeply
embarrassed, and the Government of
Burma threatened for a time to break off
diplomatic relations.
Admittedly, this incident was particu-
larly ludicrous. But it .is not without
parallel. Our policy in the early stages
of the Laotian crisis appears to have
been constantly bedeviled by a lack of
? effective coordination between the CIA
and the State Department. Similarly
with Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion. Mr. Tad Szulc and Mr. Karl
Meyer,int,hei'x....a,,ple ascount_qf that
affair, describe how:621M own initiative,
CIA established close working relations
with exiled supporters of the former dic-
tator Batista. They add:
This decision marked the inauguration of
what, in effect, became its independent for-
eign policy toward Cuba, in cavalier disre-
gard of the thinking in the White House
and the State Department.
Note that all this occurred despite the
efforts of an earlier Secretary of State,
Mr. Christian Herter, to regularize rela-
tions between the State Department and
CIA. Since then the Herter-Allen Dulles
agreement on the relations between Am-
bassadors and CIA personnel in the field
has been reaffirmed by Mr. Rusk and Mr.
McCone. And by now we have reason
to hope that the responsible foreign
policymakers?the President and the
National Security Council?have reas-
serted their authority over the Central
Intelligence Agency. I agree that to a
considerable extent this is a problem of
particular persons and particular situa-
tions. But it is also the case that, as
long as both State Department and CIA
personnel are working in the field, as
long as both aggncies are responsible for
the collection of information, and?per-
haps most important?as long as CIA
continues to be responsible for special
" operations, the problem of integrating
the Central Intelligence Agency into our
general foreign policy apparatus will re-
main difficult and will remain worthy of
close and continuous examination. The
exercise of surveillance in this field I
conceive to be one possible function of
a Joint Congressional Committee on For-
eign Information and Intelligence.
A moment ago I alluded to the con-
duct by the CIA of so-called special op-
erations; that is, the fomenting of oppo-
sition against hostile governments, the
arming of insurgents, the provocation of
enemy action, and so on. The question
of housing these special operations?or
additional services or other functions or
whatever you want to call them?under
the same roof as the CIA's purely intel-
ligence-gathering operations has, of
course, long been a matter of controversy,
and it is this question that I suggest
might usefully be the second of the new
joint committee's areas of study.
I do not suppose we need to be re-
minded of the importance of this ques-
tion. The Bay of Pigs invasion was only
the most spectacular and best publicized
of CIA's special operations. There was
the Iranian affair in 1953, and the fol-
lowing year the overthrow of the Arbenz
regime in Guatemala. CIA also appears
to have had a hand in the main risings
in Eastern Europe, in East Berlin and
Hungary. Operations of this sort, unless
carefully supervised and controlled by
responsible political officers, could un-
wittingly involve the United States in a
major international crisis, possibly in
war. If this was not clear before the
Bay of Pigs, it ought to be clear now.
The institutional danger here is read-
ily apparent and has often been stated.
As Professor Ransom puts it:
To mix the two functions?.
That is, of information gathering and
special operations?
involves the danger that foreign agents col-
lecting facts and trying at the same time
to bolster or cause the overthrow of a foreign
government in America's apparent interest
may develop a less than objective sense for
distinguishing between fact and aspiration.
Messrs. Szulc and Meyer make the
same point apropos of Cuba:
The CIA men were not only shaping, in
effect, foreign policy, but were exempt from
any meaningful outside checks on their ac-
tivities. Indeed, they were in the enviable
position of both organizing a clandestine op-
eration and preparing the intelligence data
through which the validity of the venture
could be judged.
The obvious solution to this problem
would, of course, be to deprive CIA en-
tirely of its special operations function.
Unfortunately the people in the most fa-
vorable position ? to collect clandestine
information are often also the people
best placed to engage in subversive polit-
ical activities. In addition, a total di-
vorce between the two functions might
lead, in Ransom's words, to "competi-
tfliioen,duplication, and even outright con-
t.,,
For a time the Maxwell Taylor Com-
mittee, appointed by the President to in-
quire into the Bay of Pigs affair, ap-
pears to have toyed, at least, with an
alternative idea?the idea of transfer-
ring the bulk of CIA's special operations
to the Defense Department. But this
solution would have had the equally ob-
vious disadvantage of ensuring that the
uniformed military?and hence the
credit and prestige of the U.S. Govern-
ment?would become involved as soon as
any paramilitary operation became a
matter of public knowledge.
In the event, it seems that routine
covert operations have been left in the
hands of CIA, with control to be trans-
ferred to the Pentagon only if a particu-
lar project becomes so big as to warrant
open military participation. Mr. Hanson
Baldwin in the New York Times summed
up the matter thus:
The general rule of thumb for the future
is that the CIA will not handle any pri-
marily military operations, or ones of such
size that they cannot be kept secret. How-
ever, each case will apparently be judged
on its merits; there is no hard-and-fast
formula that will put one operation under
the CIA and another under the Pentagon."
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
All of us, I think, will agree that this
is an area in which hard-and-fast for-
mulas are not appropriate and in which,
in the nature of things, organizational
gimmicks cannot solve the major diffi-
culties. As in the case of relations be-
tween CIA and the State Department,
much depends on particular people and
particular situations. But largely be-
cause the problem is of this sort, because
it is a problem which can never finally
be solved, I feel very strongly that con-
tinuing congressional surveillance is
urgently required. If a joint committee
had been in existence in the early stages
of the first Cuban crisis, and if it had
had cognizance of this matter, would the
Bay of Pigs fiasco have occurred? I
think it is at least possible that it would
not.
Discussion of the Bay of Pigs leads me
naturally to the third of the questions I
think a joint committee might investi-
gate: the whole question of recruitment
and personnel within the intelligence
community. For it seems to me perfect-
ly clear that one of the things that went
wrong with the abortive Cuban inva-
sion?not the only thing, but one of the
things?was that much of the CIA per-
sonnel responsible for the operation con-
sisted of the sort of people who could not
distinguish between the reactionary and
the democratic elements in the anti-
Castro camp, between the opponents of
Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban
people and those who, as former sup-
porters of Batista, were anathema to.
them.
Let me quote again from Szulc and
Meyer. In their book, "The Cuban In-
vasion," they write;
Thus the CIA established contacts in 1M-
arai with pro-Batista organizations and with
exile groups whose entire political philosophy
was dedicated to the return to the pre-Castro
status quo in Cuba. ? ? ? These factions
were placing themselves not only against Cas-
tro but against history; whether or not the
CIA operatives were aware that total regres-
sion is impossible, the contacts with the
rightist factions ran counter to official U.S.
policy, aimed at encouraging social reform
in Latin America."
A few pages later they remark that
the activities of the CIA agents reflected
a desire to promote anti-Castro groups
which they could manipulate. They con-
tinue:
It also reflected an attitude of hostility to
left-of-center exile groups by second-rate
field operatives. This in turn affected the
top level of the agency and resulted in a lack
of understanding at the top. It is not clear
to what extent the CIA attitude was ideolog-
ically motivated or was simply a response
based on the agent's view of what was prac-
tical or realistic.
This tendency on the part of the CIA
to seek out and support the most anti-
Communist groups in the field, regard-
less of whether or not such groups are
politically viable, has of course been
manifested on a number of other occa-
sions?in Laos as well as in Cuba, and
apparently in Algeria and the Congo as
well. It is a persistent tendency, and
one that on occasion has had a damag-
ing effect on our policy. I suspect it has
something to do with the kinds of people
the Central Intelligence Agency gets to
work for it.
Is it wise, for example, to rely to the
extent CIA seems to do on the services
of retired service officers? One would
suppose that retired service officers,
though almost always men of great abil-
ity, would have an instinctive tendency
to take a rather narrow, strictly "opera-
tional" view of the problems confronting
thent. Similarly, is it wise to rely too
heavily on the services of political exiles
and refugees? It seems reasonable, for
example, to suppose that an exile from
Ruritania, especially someone who has
passionate convictions about what course
events in his homeland ought to take,
may not be the best person to assess
what course events in his homeland actu-
ally are taking, especially if what is actu-
ally happening is not to his taste.
Please do not misunderstand me. I
do not mean to impugn the enormous
amount of valuable work being done by
retired service officers and by exiles and
refugees in the CIA. Without their help,
the organization simply could not func-
tion. Altogether the Central Intelli-
gence Agency undoubtedly commands
some of the ablest minds in the U.S. Gov-
ernment. And of course I do not mean
fora, moment to suggest that CIA should
be staffed with "soft-liners" or people
who have had no personal experience of
the countries in question. That would be
absurd.
But what I do think is that we have
to be sure that what we are getting are
?
actually the facts, and not what we
would like to be the facts. This is not a
matter of personal preference one way
or the other. It is a matter of finding
out what is actually taking place?and
personal preferences enter only as they
may color one's judgment. I suspect
that the judgment of the CIA is some-
times colored by the preference of its
employees. I suspect that CIA ought to
take special care to recruit and employ
men and women of widely differing back-
grounds, temperaments, and opinions. I
suspect that in these kinds of situations
one gets at the truth only when a wide
variety of inclinations is brought to bear.
But remember that these are my feelings
only. I have little data at my command.
All I am saying is that I have a hunch
that CIA recruitment policy has had an
effect on CIA's performance. I may be
wrong, but I submit that the only way
we in Congress can find out is by our-
selves conducting an inquiry into the
subject.
The whole question of personnel and
recruitment is, then, the third of the
areas I would like to see a joint com-
mittee study. I would only add that of
course no investigation need inquire into
the names and histories of particular
individuals involved; there need be no
breaches of security or secrecy. The
matter we are concerned with is one of
general policy.
Finally, I want to turn to what is
perhaps the most difficult of the four
questions I referred to earlier: the ques-
tion of how best to organize the evalu-
ation of the enormous amount of ma-
terial collected every day by the various
agencies of the intelligence community.
Obviously evaluation of some sort takes
place at every echelon within the com-
munity, but I am particularly concerned
14269
with the top-level U.S. Intelligence
Board and its auxiliary bodies.
Probably a few words are in order on
how these agencies are organized. I
think the following description is roughly
accurate, though the Central Intelligence
Agency refused to provide me with au-
thoritative information so I have had to
rely on data from published sources.
By the phrase "intelligence com-
munity" I mean the numerous agencies
within the executive branch concerned
with intelligence collection and evalua-
tion: the CIA, the new Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the State Department,
RAND, and so on. The community as a
whole is responsible for producing the
national estimates?described by Profes-
sor Ransom as "these vital building
blocks of national security policy." With
the exception of the ultrasecret net esti-
mates which are produced by special ma-
chinery within the National Security
Council, most estimates are prepared un-
der the aegis of the so-called Board of
National Estimates.
This Board consists of a small number
of intelligence experts?soldiers, diplo-
mats, and scholars?who, to quote Ran-
som again, "preside as a kind of planning
general staff for the intelligence com-
munity." The Board can initiate the
preparation of an estimate, though it
usually does so only on request from the
President, the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, or some other member of the Na-
tional Security Council. In all cases, the
Board of National Estimates sets the
terms of reference, breaks the problem
up into feasible components, and assigns
appropriate tasks to the various agencies.
The resulting staff studies are collated by
the small Office of National Estimates.
The Board then drafts either a straight
estimate?that is, one which attempts to
assess a foreign nation's intentions or fu-
ture policies with implicit assumptions as
to future U.S. policy?or a general esti-
mate?that is, one involving stated as-
sumptions concerning possible changes in
U.S. policy. After the draft estimate has
been returned to the participating agen-
cies for their comments and criticisms, it
is submitted, possibly with dissents, to a
committee which used to be known as the
Intelligence Advisory Committee but is
now named the U.S. Intelligence Board.
If the Board of Estimates is the plan-
ning board for the intelligence com-
munity, the Intelligence Board is its
board of directors. As Ransom puts it, it
is the "final forum for the professional
intelligence community." It resolves
jurisdictional disputes within the com-
munity and is finally responsible for for-
warding the national estimates to the
National Security Council. Invariably
the attempt is made to produce agreed
estimates, and usually the attempt is suc-
cessful; but on occasion dissenting opin-
ions will be submitted. The Intelligence
Board meets usually once a week. It
consists of the leading intelligence offi-
cials of the community and is chaired by
the Director of Central Intelligence.
Two aspects of this process in particu-
lar are worth noting. The first is the
central role of the Central Intelligence
Agency. A high proportion of the intel-
ligence community's fact gathering is
done by CIA. The Board of National
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
Estimates functions as a part of CIA.
The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence
Board is Director of CIA. And, of course,
the intelligence community's spokesman
on the National Security Council itself
is also the CIA Director. The second
thing worth noting, however, is the
duality of CIA's role. Under the Na-
tional Security Act the agency is not
only one of the participants in the in-
telligence community, it is also the chief
agency responsible for coordinating it.
In other words, at many points in the
process of evaluation, CIA is both player
and umpire, both witness and judge.
This ambiguity is implicit in the title
of the Director who is formally not the
"Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency" but simply "Director of Central
Intelligence."
Now the danger here is clear. It is
that the Central Intelligence Agency will
become?perhaps it has already be-
come?not merely the chief intelligence
agency but the dominant intelligence
agency, and that it will develop persistent
institutional tendencies, biases, and even
policies. This type of problem is, of
course, not peculiar to the American in-
telligence community but is character-
istic of any complex administrative ap-
paratus. That is the reason it has con-
stantly to be guarded against.
Sherman Kent, a Yale professor and
a World War II intelligence officer, put
the point this way:
Almost any man or group of men con-
fronted with the duty of getting something
planned or getting something done will
sooner or later hit upon what they consider
a single most. desirable course of action.
Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under du-
ress, it is a snap judgment of the top of the
head. I cannot escape the belief that under
the circumstances outlined, intelligence will
find itself right in the middle of policy, and
that upon occasions it will be the unabashed
apologist for a given policy rather than its
impartial and objective analyst.
Szulc and Meyer, writing of the Bay
of Pigs, conclude:
Yet CIA was not behaving idiotically; it
was in many senses responding to the insu-
lated rationalism that infects a sheltered
bureaucracy. Indeed, if there is an institu-
tional villain, it is bureaucracy itself?that
hulking, stubborn giant that seemingly can
only look where it has been and not whither
it is tending.
Professor Ransom calls it simply the
problem of "feedback."
Naturally in the early months of 1961
the administration addressed itself to
this problem. After the Bay of Pigs it
could scarcely do otherwise. In particu-
lar it reactivated a watchdog group set
up by President Eisenhower in 1956,
originally called the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac-
tivities and now named the President's
.Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
This Board, under the chairmanship of
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of the Massa-
cuhetts Institute of Technology, studied
the question of evaluation and appar-
ently forwarded one or more reports to
the President in the course of the year.
These reports have not been made pub-
lic, but I think it is possible to piece to-
gether from newspaper reports roughly
what happened. It seems that the Kil-
lian committee, or at least some of its
members, were unhappy about the dual
role being played by CIA. They proposed
that in future the Director of CIA should
be more of a technician, and that a new
post should be created, probably at-
tached to the White Houses, with some
such title as "Coordinator of Intel-
ligence," the new coordinator would be
in a position to analyse and assess the
results achieved by the intelligence com-
munity without having any bias in favor
of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared
frequently in the press in June and July
1961. In August Mr. Cabell Phillips of
the New York Times stated that the new
post had actually been offered to Mr.
Fowler Hamilton.
Either these reports were inaccurate,
of the administration changed its mind,
or they could not find anyone to occupy
the new post, because in September 1961
the President announced that Mr. John
A. McCone had been named Director of
Central Intelligence without any major
change being made in the structure of
the intelligence community. Subse-
quently, however, in January 1962 one
such change was announced. Hence-
forth the Director of Central Intelligence
was not to function both as Chairman of
the U.S. Intelligence Board and also as
CIA member of the Board. Instead, al-
though the Director was to remain Chair-
man of the Board, his deputy was to act
as representative of the CIA. In a letter
to Mr. McCone, the President noted this
change with approval. He added:
As head of the Central Intelligence Agency,
while you will continue to have overall re-
sponsibility for the Agency, I shall expect
you to delegate to your principal deputy,
as you may deem necessary, so much of the
direction of the detailed operation of the
Agency as you may be required to permit you
to carry out your primary task as Director
of Central Intelligence.
Clearly there was a dilemma here. On
the one hand, it was evident that CIA's
intelligence gathering and operational
functions could conflict with its coordi-
nating function?and, of course, what
was true of the Agency was also true of
Its Director. On the other hand, the
President and his advisers were almost
certainly aware that an independent co-
ordinator, who was not himself the head
of a major agency, might find himself
weak, even powerless, in the face of the
vast intelligence bureaucracies. Inde-
pendence in theory might mean im-
potence in practice. So a compromise
was struck, and the duties of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence merely
redefined.
How successful this compromise has
been it is probably too early to say. But
from all that I have said, it ought to be
obvious that the problem of evaluation,
like the other problems I have already
mentioned, is a- continuing one, and not
one that can be spirited out of existence
by merely institutional gimmickry. It
is also obvious that the problem of evalu-
ation is an enormously important prob-
lem, probably the most important con-
fronting the intelligence community.
For these reasons, I think that it, too,
should be a continuing subject of scru-
tiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed
committee of Congress.
Au&ust >5.5
Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to detain
the House further. I have spoken at
considerable length, yet I am only too
well aware that I have only skimmed the
surface of this extraordinarily compli-
cated and difficult subject. There are
any number of further questions that I
might have posed?for example, concern-
ing the apparently increasing concentra-
tion of authority within the intelligence
community, or about the role of the
U.S. Information Agency. And, of
course, I must repeat that this has
been essentially an -outsider's analysis.
I have been trying merely to suggest
what kinds of inquiry a joint committee
might undertake, not to anticipate what
the results ,of those inquiries would be.
Nor as I remarked at the outset, do
I wish to insist that the resolution I am
introducing today provides the only pos-
sible way of proceeding. Perhaps the
joint committee should be given rather
different terms of reference. Or perhaps
a body should be established comprising
private citizens as well as Members of
Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic
about this. My purpose in speaking to-
day has been to reopen public discussion
of an issue that has too long been dor-
mant, and moreover to reopen it at a
time of relative tranquillity; when the
intelligence community is not in the
public spotlight, at a time therefore when
these matters can be considered soberly
and dispassionately.
But we in Congress should not be too
timid about putting ourselves forward.
I wonder how many Members of this
House are aware of the enormous body
of opinion in favor of the creation of a
congressional joint committee. Both
the Hoover Commission and its special
intelligence task force favored congres-
sional intervention. The New York
Times has consistently supported the
idea in its editorial columns. Two years
ago the distinguished military analyst,
Mr. Hanson Baldwin, stated that one of
the lessons to be drawn from the Bay of
Pigs was "the necessity of keeping all
secret intelligence activities and opera-
tions under constant top-echelon sur-
veillance and review." He noted that
the machinery for achieving this would
be greatly strengthened by the creation
of a joint congressional watchdog com-
mittee.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to
quote just once more from the writings
of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who,
as I have already said, is our country's
leading lay student of intelligence affairs.
I think his comment deserves all the
greater consideration because it comes
from a member of the political science
profession?a profession which, as we all
know, has always had a strong bias in
favor of the executive branch of gov-
ernment. On page 206 of "Central In-
telligence and National Security" Pro-
fessor Ransom remarks:
It is common experience for security
policymakers, military and civilian, to find
their fear of congressional interference
changed into gratitude for congressional
support, frequently more effective support
than has been accorded on the executive side
of Government. No executive agency today
reveals everything to congressional com-
mittees with jurisdiction over its operations.
Officials of central intelligence may be ex-
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1968. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 14271
pected to reveal even less. But more ad-
vantages are to be gained than lost from
establishing a more institutionalized sys-
tem for congressional surveillance.
I agree with that, Mr. Speaker, and I
hope that what I have said today will-be
given earnest and thoughtful attention
by my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle.
Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. LINDSAY. I yield to the gentle-
man from Oregon.
Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker, I want
to associate myself with the gentleman's
remarks. I think we should have had
a joint committee to monitor the CIA
when it was first established. I have had
a little experience in the matter as a
member of the Committee on Armed
Services. As you may know, we have a
subcommittee on the CIA. I was a mem-
ber of that committee for either 2 or 4
years. We met annually?one time a
year, for a period of 2 hours in which
we accomplished virtually nothing. I
think a proposal such as you have made
is the answer to it because a part-time
subcommittee of the Armed Services
Conunitte, as I say, which meets for just
2 hours, 1 day a year, accomplishes
nothing whatsoever. I want to compli-
ment the gentleman on his proposal.
Mr. LINDSAY. I thank the gentleman
from Oregon and appreciate the con-
tribution he has made. He knows where-
in he talks. He is an expert on the
subject and is a member of the Commit-
tee on Armed Services and was a member
of the subcommittee supervising the
CIA?in theory?and what he says dove-
tails entirely and agrees with the experi-
ence, and the statements made in the
other body as well.
(Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
(Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr.
LINDSAY) was given permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to
commend my distinguished colleague,
the gentleman from New York [Mr.
LINDSAY], on the step he has taken in
introducing his resolution. The gentle-
man from New York [Mr. LINDSAY] has
taken the initiative in remedying a seri-
ous inadequacy in our .foreign policy
making process. His efforts merit our
thoughtful attention and solid support.
I have joined the gentleman from New
York [Mr. LINDSAY] in filing a com-
panion resolution which, by establishing
a Joint Committee on Foreign Informa-
tion and Intelligence, would fill what is
now a gaping hole in the congressional
mechanism for the formulation of for-
eign policy. At present, intelligence
matters are handled simultaneously by
several committees on both sides of Cap-
itol Hill. Not only confusion but omis-
sion as well result from this decentral-
ization of supervision. Our proposals,
which would apply to any intelligence or
information agency, not only the CIA,
would remedy this situation.
First, the proposed joint committee
would give Congress the machinery it
must have to exercise its responsibility
for the oversight of the Nation's intelli-
gence activities. The present lack of
congressional supervision in this area is
itself a serious omission in view of the'
work required of the foreign policy com-
mittees of both Houses. A variety of
congressional committees now handles
the Nation's everwidening range of in-
telligence activities. Effective coordina-
tion of congressional supervision is im-
possible.
The proposed committee would have a
comprehensive view of the intelligence
and information aspects of foreign af-
fairs. A single committee of this nature
would provide the existing foreign policy
committees with more direct and effi-
cient service. The agencies under its
supervision would benefit as well. A
prime target of the joint committee's
efforts would be the improvement of
their operations and policies. Studies
of the agencies' problems and programs
would, of course, be considerably more
extensive and complete when conducted
by a committee with single responsibility
of intelligence oversight.
Ultimately, I believe, both Houses of
Congress would benefit from the estab-
lishment of the proposed joint commit-
tee. The Senate and House would be
afforded a broader opportunity for care-
ful consideration of foreign information
and intelligence matters. The agencies
involved would similarly benefit from
the committee's studies and recom-
mendations.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hope the
House may act promptly on our proposal.
It would fill a vital gap in our foreign
policymaking process. It would stream-
line existing efforts in the areas of for-
eign information and intelligence. This
is an area in which congressional re-
sponsibility is long overdue.
ESTABLISHING MINIMUM STAND-
ARDS FOR OPERATION OF CIVIL
SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT
The SPEAKER pr, tempore. (Mr.
ROYBAL). Under prey us order of the
House, the gentleman om Illinois [Mr.
Puctusta] is recognize for 30 minutes.
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. peaker, I have
today introduced legisl on designed to
deal with a most seriou problem which
will confront our Nation the very near.
future. Specifically, Speaker, my
legislation would establi certain limits
of tolerance associated th the advent
of the supersonic civil ransport plane
now being developed by aircraft manu-
facturers in France a England and
being purchased by s eral American
airlines. Similar effor to develop
supersonic transport ar now underway
in the United States.
This is a problem w h we no longer
can ignore. I have int uced this leg-
islation at this particul r time, in order
to give airplane manu turers both in
our own country and a road ample op-
portunity to make sufli 'ent changes in
the design of their pow ?lants to avoid
future distress to millio of Americans.
The supersonic jet po erplant of the
future must be develop and designed
with appropriate consid ation for noise
abatement.
This is far-reaching 1 slation, But
I submit, Mr. Speaker, ? at we can no
longer ignore this problem. The United
States and the entire world failed to pro-
perly plan ahead in tlie development of
our present subsonic ,jt transports and,
as a result, millions oftpeople throughout
the world have had their lives drastically
changed by the unbeitrable noise which
today's jet transpor0 produce at air-
fields near large urbati areas.
My own district liesfjust east of O'Hare
Field, the world's ltusiest airport. It
would be literally it ossible for me to
E
fully describe the de ening noise which
thousands of my nstituents suffer
everyday from conveittional subsonic jets
either arriving or ideparting O'Hare
Field. It cannot be 46,id that these peo-
ple shouldn't have bu t near the airport;
these people were t 'e before the air-
port was built.
I believe it is tr,gic that airplane
manufacturers of th world did not take
these consequences unto consideration
when they develop the subsonic jet
transport during th past decade.
I was not a Mei4ber of Congress in
those days, but I f 1 it is not only my
duty but the duty Df every Member of
this Congress both the House and in
the Senate to recogize the fact that we
cannot repeat this eror on the threshold
of the supersonic 4r transport era.
We must do ever thing possible to in-
sure that this ne4 type of supersonic
aircraft?which is being developed from
scratch?does not xpeat the tragic mis-
take of its subsonic et predecessor, FAA.
The legislation hich I have intro-
duced today woul prohibit the opera-
tion of any civil personic aircraft in
air transportation rough the navigable
airspace of the nited States which
would generate so4c boom overpressures
exceeding 1.5 potus per square foot on
the ground directT beneath the flight
path.
This legislation Tould further make it
unlawful to opera any civil supersonic
aircraft into or o4 of U.S. airports un-
less it can be de nstrated that ground
noise level genera d by such civil super-
sonic aircraft is sstantially lower than
that generated b long range subsonic
jet aircraft.
I am not at all ersuaded by the argu-
ment that you 4annot stop progress.
Certainly we all 4re for progress. But
we cannot blindl state that we are for
progress when we now that such prog-
ress can seriously Jmpair the health and
emotional stabilit of great numbers of
Americans. Nor Ian we say blindly we
are for progress w en we are faced with
the prospect of feeing huge belts of
destruction crisscrossing the United
ni booms States from so bms generated by
supersonic aircraff.
It is my belief,1 that unless Congress
deals with this sUbject matter at this
time, we may conceivably see such havoc
wrought upon this country from sonic
booms that millions of dollars in dam-
age to property and a serious threat to
the health of marly of our people may
ensue.
My bill limits ionic boom overpres-
sures not to exceed 1.5 pounds per square
foot on the ground directly beneath the
flight path.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9
?
14272 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE August. 16"
The best available information on
sonic booms indicates that anything un-
der 1 pound per square foot in overpres-
sure by a supersonic aircraft flying at
an altitude of 70,000 feet creates no dam-
age to ground structures and no signifi-
cant public reaction. Anything under
1.5 pounds per square foot in overpres-
sure creates no damage to ground struc-
tures but does produce some probability
of public reaction to moderate sonic
booms. Overpressures between 1.5
pounds per square foot and 2 pounds per
square foot produce significant public
reaction day and night but no damage to
ground structures. -
I hope my colleagues from the rural
areas will take into account the fact that
sonic booms which create significant
public reaction day and night in this
category Will also have significant re-
action on farm livestock.
Overpressures exceeding 2 pounds per
square foot but under 3 pounds per
square foot at an altitude of 70,000 feet
create damage to glass and plaster and
produce widespread public reaction day
and night. Overpressures exceeding 3
pounds per square foot produce wide-
spread window and plaster damage, mi-
nor structural damage to frame and
walls, and profound public re-action.
The U.S. Air Force can produce signif-
icant figures showing damage claims
paid by our Government for losses due to
sonic booms created by our military air-
craft. You will note that my bill does
not apply to military aircraft because
we can certainly recognize the fact that
in the area of national defense, we must
be prepared to suffer some discomfoit.
Furthermore, the Air Force has car-
ried on an intensive program of rigid con-
trol in the production of sonic booms so
that every effort has been made to keep
the damage to a minimum. I am sure
this will not be the case when private air-
lines begin competing against each Other
with supersonic air transports.
The other part of my proposal today
would prohibit flights of civil supersonic
aircraft into or out of U.S. airports un-
less it can be demonstrated that groun
noise generated by such supersonic a
craft is substantially lower than t
generated by present long-range b-
sonic jet aircraft.
At first blush this may seem ike a
harsh and unreasonable prop al, but
I hope those who would cri ize this
proposal will take into consid ation the
fact that we are now only o the thres-
hold in the development supersonic
airframes and powerplan . Unlike the
development of the sub- .nic jet trans-
port, which was develo ? d in the first in-
stance as part of th military defense
system when no con aeration was given
to noise levels in e development of
powerplants, in e development of
supersonic power ants we have time and
we know from xperience the necessity
for taking no into consideration in the
developme of such powerplants.
This le lation is designed to put the
whole airplane industry, both in the
United States and in other nations of the
world, on notice that the people of the
United States do not intend to perpetuate
the folly of permitting air transports to
be developed with no consideration being
given to noise abatement.
There is no logical reason why the de-
velopment of supersonic air transports
for civilian use must be based on some
foolish notion that a race exists between
developer nations. I am more interested
in which nation will be first to develop a
supersonic civilian transport which meets
the standards of noise abatement rather
than which nation develops a supersonic
transport which will actually knock the
world's brains out with deafening noise.
I am convinced the nation which develops
a relatively quiet supersonic transport
will ultimately get most of the world's
business. ?
The city of San Francisco recently rec-
ognized the tremendous noise problems
that supersonic air transports will pro-
duce. Belford Brown, manager of the
San Francisco International Airport, in
ating requirements which will oontrol the
noise levels of aircraft operating in and out
of San Francisco International Airport. ?
Mr. Speaker, I should like to call par-
ticular attention to the statement which
indicates that supersonic aircraft are ex-
pected to create a noise level approxi-
mately 16 decibels higher than now
being experienced by Ame
jet aircraft. This is
16 decibel increase is 1
next to a 22-caliber
if Congress fails
tion or some si
degree of nois
ate at our
sonic aircr
solutely
sands
In th
fiel
164
an subsonic
redible. Tis
firing a cannon
e. I submit that
adopt this legisla-
ar restrictions on the
vel which we will toler-
jor airfields from super-
we will be creating an ab-
uman situation for thou-
n thousands of families living
vicinity of America's major air-
I submit, Mr. Speaker, that a
ecibel increase over the present level
a letter dated July 18, 1963, to Mr. Robert cf noise generated by a landing jet, will
Murray, Jr., vice president of Pan Amer- ,treate conditions which will be corn-
lean World'Airways, stated San Francis4 plenty unbearable to the human ear
co's concern regarding the supersoniE and brain. I submit this situation, if
aircraft noise problem. This 1 r true, could have serious psychological
should be of particular interest sine an effects on vast numbers of Americans.
Francisco has in the past adheri to a Subsonic jets now operating in this
policy of no operational restri ons on country produce noise levels both on de-
air carriers.
Mr. Brown wrote as folio
Recent publications withi
portation industry and n
paper reporting indicate
World Airways is cont
chase of Concorde s
transports which h
the Anglo-French
department at 8
from the planne
sonic airport
tion of this
it is expec
proximatel
being exp
aircraft
As p
Abat
e air trans-
onwide news-
t Pan American
plating the pur-
rsonic commercial
been developed by
ombine. The airport
Francisco understands
of one European super-
t the landing configura-
ticular aircraft is such that
to create a noise level ap-
16 decibels higher than now
ienced by American subsonic jet
ident of the San Francisco Sound
ent Center you are aware of the noise
pro ms and community resistance to the
air ?rt's operation at San Francisco Inter-
onal Airport and of the legal actions
w pending and in the hands of our legal
ounsel. You are also aware that San Fran-
cisco International Airport has never insti-
tuted an operational restriction on the air
carriers or aircraft operating into and out
of San Francisco International Airport. We
have relied wholly upon our preferential
runway systems, airport runway extensions,
and community enlightenment on noise
through the sound abatement center.
On July 9, 1963, the Public Utilities Corn..
mission of the City and County of San
Francisco passed Resolution No. 23074 (copy
attached hereto) setting forth the city's of-
ficial position concerning supersonic trans-
port planning. In effect, it states (1) that
supersonic jet transports should be able to
operate from the existing and currently
planned major civil air terminals; (2) that
the design of these, transports should re-
quire no greater landing or takeoff distances
than present-day subsonic jet aircraft; and
(3) that the ground level noise created by
supersonic jet transports should be no great-
er in the airport environs than the levels
now being experienced.
The purpose of this communication is to
advise Pan American World Airways of the
city's official position in this matter, and
further, to inform you that if facts stated
in this communication as to the noise char-
acteristics of the Concorde are correct, we
will have to forgo our previous policy and
give serious consideration to imposing oper-
parture and arrival dangerously close to
the maximum human tolerance of per-
ceived noise decibels. To permit the
operation of supersonic transports which
will produce noise 16 decibels higher
than now being experienced by Ameri-
can subsonic jet aircraft is, in my judg-
ment, Mr. Speaker, to invite disaster for
large segments of our American popula-
tion.
I submit, Mr. Speaker, this is a prob-
lem which must be dealt with by the
Federal Government. It is not fair to
leave to the individual airports of Amer-
ica the responsibility of developing their
own respective standards.
Such a policy could bring about a wide
divergence of rules and regulations and
standards which could affect the entire
configuration of air tzavel in America. I
believe in fairness to all the major air-
fields of this Nation. The Congress
should establish one uniform standard.
This would insure against unnecessary
economic pressures upon the individual
airport "operators.
Mr. Speaker, this is a matter which
we can no longer ignore. Continental
Airlines recently signed a $30 million-
plus contract to purchase three British-
French mach 2.2 jet airliners which,
when delivered, will provide the first
supersonic service within the United
States. These supersonic transports
would be capable of flying from Los
Angeles to Chicago in less than 2 hours.
This is the second supersonic air
transport order placed by an American
firm. Pan American World Airways or-
dered six similar planes for use on its
oversea routes.
It is estimated that the first Concord
ordered by Continental should make its
maiden flight in 1966, with delivery date
in 1969. The Concord is a joint venture
between France's Sud Aviation and Eng-
land's British Aircraft Corp. It will
carry 104 passengers at speeds up to
1,450 miles per hour.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9