Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 29, 2013
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 15, 1963
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9.pdf1.38 MB
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 14265 Only about 25 percent of them are liter- ate. Less than a fourth of the children of school age are in school, and less than 2 percent ever complete secondary education. Pupil-teacher ratios of 100 to 1 are common, compared to about 25 to 1 in the developed countries. To help meet this challenge, the United States, through the Agency for International Development has estab- lished cooperative educational programs In 58 nations. In each the goal is the same: To train people who in turn can train teachers, prepare suitable texts and teaching aids, and themselves devel- op a strong educational program in their respective countries. Assistance is pro- vided for all levels of eduction?primary, secondary, and higher education; for all age groups and types of schools?voca- tional and technical as well RS general education; and for construction and equipment as well as for technical assist- ance. In 1962, AID obligated $93 million in U.S. funds plus an additional $98 million in U.S.-owned local currencies to assist the developing nations in meeting acute educational problems. . In Bolivia, AID projects are being car- ried out to improve commercial educa- tion. Libya, a program in vocational training for farmers, tradesmen, and handicraft artisans is in progress. In Iran, U.S. aid helped to establish an en- tire vocational education system for the Iranian armed forces. In Pakistan, an AID team taught Pakistani railwaymen?few of whom spoke the same language or dialect?. how to operate diesel locomotives. With independence approaching in Kenya, an AID-assisted special project has begun to train 47 local government officials for positions of high respons bility in the government when indepen ence is granted. A fascinating example of an AID ect covering several levels of edu is the program in Nepal. Nepal's first teacher-training enter was established in 1954 under t ? direc- tion of the University of Or on. In 1956 mobile teaching teams re orga- nized to carry teacher trai g to the remote provinces. A college of education w established and a staff trained to edu te up to 2,000 teachers a year. A bur u of textbook publication was establi ed and several of its Nepalese staff mbers were sent to the United States special training. The 'bureau printe 55 different titles and 225,000 pieces ? educational litera- ture in its first 5 y ars of operation. More than 2, 0 part-time teachers were trained fo teracy education, and they in turn ught more than 1,000 adults to ma. and write in their first year in the fl d. Nepal's -fi t national university was established ith colleges of liberal arts and sciences, agriculture and forestry, education, law, nursing, and medicine. Before the AID program began, Nepal had no national university, no teacher- training institutions. Only 1 child in 200 was in school, and only 2 percent of the Nepalese people could read and write. At the end of the first 5 years of the on education project, more than 1,500 new primary classrooms had trained teach- ers, 200 new schools were receiving fi- nancial aid, and 20 new primary texts had been published. Nearly 200 second- ary teachers had received bachelor of education degrees and 45 high school teachers had undergone a 1-year course for the improvement of English instruc- tion. In addition, Nepal's entire second- ary school curriculum had been re- vamped to include vocational instructio urgently required in agriculture, horn economics, commercial education, Industrial arts. A program similar to the one in epal is now being carried out in In with the assistance of U.S.-AID cation teams from Ohio State Univ ity and the Teachers College of Col bia Uni- versity. In Cambodia a teacher aining pro- gram has been under w for 5 years. Prior to 1958 Cambodi students with a sixth-grade educe ? were given a summer of trainin: nd then pressed into service as ele tary school teach- ers. Under the A OP contract Cambodia's first teacher p .aration center was established an. aas already become the largest educ:_?4 I nal institution in the country. E, year the center trains 200 eleme s.?: ry school teachers. An- other s' institution is now being establis with AID assistance to train second.. school teachers. Tel 4 ion represents a potentially valu: e educational medium for the de- vel ng nations. In Nigeria, for ex- a.. e, AID has provided an experienced erthan educational television execu- e as an adviser to the Nigerian staff f a new educational television station. From 1960 to 1962 the station has tele- cast more than 700 different programs for a total of 350 hours of instruction to 100 village schools equipped with tele- vision sets supplied by the Nigerian Ministry of Education. Not only teachers, but also classrooms are in short supply in most underdevel- oped nations. AID has encouraged the building of new schools and classrooms in many countries by providing techn cal help and materials while local r dents provide the construction la ? on a volunteer basis. The Guatemalan G ernment launched a self-help school construction program in partnership with AID in 1960. AID and the Guatemalan Government agreed to share equally any costs not absorbed by the local communities. At the beginning of the project, it was ex- pected that volunteer labor would cover about one-third of the cost of construc- tion. In fact, it has accounted for nearly 44 percent of construction costs. During the 3 years since the pilot project began, self-help schools have been built and are now operating in every province of Guatemala. More than 1,100 class- rooms in 300 schools have been com- pleted. The enthusiastic turnout of vil- lagers for each school dedication symbol- izes the impact of such AID assisted proj- ects on the lives of the people. Self-help school construction programs like the one in Guatemala are now un- derway in Chile, Liberia, El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras. Another serious educational problem facing manyldeveloping nations is that of adult literacy. In Turkey. a unique approach the problem has been insti- tuted wi U.S. aid. Literacy training has be given to more than 150,000 Tur soldiers and an additional 120,1 "I are expected to complete train- in ach year. n addition, more than 3,000 primary hool teachers have gained literacy teaching experience at the military cen- ters. This group will form the teaching nucleus of a planned civilian literacy program. The goal is to reduce illiter- acy in Turkey from 70 to 30 percent by 1975. In the Turkish project, as in most lit- eracy projects, U.S. experts help local educators prepare training materials, texts, and followup reading materials for use by the newly literate. As of 1962, the Agency for Interna- tional Development had undertaken projects to increase the supply and im- prove the quality of primary and sec- ondary school teachers in 33 Latin Amefican, African, and Asian nations. In Afghanistan, U.S. aid is the only bi- lateral assistance permitted by the Gov- ernment in the sensitive area of educa- tion. Be cause English has become the near- est thing to an international language in many underdeveloped nations, AID has been providing technical assistance for the teaching of English in 14 Asian and African countries. Finally, 75 American universities and colleges are working under AID contracts in the establishment and improvement of facilities for higher education in more than 26 Asian, African, and South Amer- ican countries. Of the many needs of the developing countries none is more critical than the need for education, in the broadest sense of the word d of the many parts of our forei, A d program none is more in keepin:. th American ideals, an the asp Ins of Americans for their f ow m 'round the world, than educatio 1 istance. INTRODUCTION OF RESOLUTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOR- EIGN INFORMATION AND INTEL- LIGENCE The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ROY.. BAL) . Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. LINDSAY] is recognized for 60 minutes, 10 minutes of which have already been consumed by the previous presentation of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. FRASER]. (Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce a resolution for the establishment of a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence. I propose that the committee be con- stituted roughly along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and that it have its own funds and staff re- sources. I propose also that it make continuing studies in the whole area of Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 14266 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE our foreign information and intelligence programs. In my remarks this afternoon, how- ever, Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to dwell at great length on the precise terms of this particular resolution. I think it is a good resolution but I am perfectly ready to be persuaded that a better one might be devised. The question of the exact structure and composition of this committee seems to me significantly less important than the more general ques- tions of principle involved. I rise today, not to make propaganda on behalf of a particular proposal of mine, but rather to raise a matter which I think is in need of the widest possible and most intelli- gent public discussion. As most Members are aware, the pro- posal of a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence is not a new one. In one form or another it has been introduced into this House in each of the last 10 sessions; in 1955 it was the subject of a 2-day hearing by the Rules Committee. In the Senate the Committee on Rules and Administration reported on it favor- ably in 1956, and for 2 days it was de- bated on the floor of that body. Nor is it partisan in nature. Back in 1959 res- olutions similar to mine were sponsored In the House by eight Democrats and four Republicans. Earlier this year the matter was brought to our attention by a member of the other party, the dis- tinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. ROGERS]. Moreover, when Mr. MANS- FIELD'S resolution came to a vote in the Senate in 1956, the minority in favor included many Members on both sides of the aisle. On that occasion one of those who voted in favor was the then junior Senator from Massachusetts, now the President of the United States. If the proposal for a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence has come up so often and been supported by so many Members, why has it never been adopted? Frankly I do not find that question easy to answer, particularly since some of the arguments against it seem to me so feeble. Take, to begin with, the argument about secrecy. It is an argument that has been advanced every time the proposal has been dis- cussed. During the Senate debate in 1956 the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Rus- SELL, went so far as to say that, rather than have a committee set up and in- formation made available to Members of Congress, "it would be better to abolish the Central Intelligence Agency and, by doing so, to save the money appropriated and the lives of American citizens." A former Vice President, Mr. Barkley, took the same view in the same debate. Now no one denies that CIA and other intelligence agencies must conduct a very high proportion of their operations in secret. Secrecy is of the essence of their work; without it they could not function, and the security of our country would be jeopardized. No one denies that. But what is true of the intelligence commu- nity is also true in many other areas of government: in the fields of atomic en- ergy, weapons development, and foreign policy, for example. But does this mean that Congress is to have no effective au- thorny in these areas? Of course it does not. Congress has always asserted its right to concern itself with even the most sensitive areas of Government. And, where matters of the highest secrecy have been involved, Members of both Houses have shown themselves perfectly capable of exercising the utmost re- straint. This was never more clearly demonstrated than by the experience of the Manhattan project during World War II, when members of the two appro- priations committees were kept fully ap- prised of the progress of the project without on any occasion breaking secu- rity. And I am sure all Members of the House will agree that the record of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in this connection has been impeccable. As in the case of the Atomic Energy Committee, I take it for granted of course that much of the work of the new committee?perhaps almost all of it? would be conducted in private and that the results would be made public only after a close screening by the appropriate Government agencies. Nevertheless, I admit that particular concern might still be felt about CIA, since breaches of security involving CIA might endanger the lives of American operatives in other countries, and also the lives of agents of other nations working in cooperation with us. I think this is a legitimate con- cern, but I hope to show later in my speech that there are many important aspects of intelligence work which could usefully be studied without any need to inquire in detail into the activities of particular persons and units in the field. So much for the moment for secrecy. I find myself in even less sympathy with another argument that has also been ad- vanced frequently in discussions of this question?namely, that the intelligence community exists solely to serve the President and the National Security Council, and that therefore we in the Congress have no right to seek a juris- dictional? position. This doctrine was stated in an extreme form in 1956 by Mr. HAYDEN in the Senate. He Said at. that time: The Central Intelligence Agency is an arm of the President. Under the Constitution, I feel we have no right to attempt to regulate an agency which is designed solely to pro- vide the President, who, under the Consti- tution, is responsible for our foreign rela- tions, with information to enable him to make decisions. I, for one, cannot accept that doctrine. As every Member knows, these two branches of our Government, the execu- tive and the legislative, are not water- tight compartments separated by steel bulkheads; the material between them is flexible and porous. There are any num- ber of congressional committees which keep a watch over the executive agencies. In this House we have, to name only two, the Foreign Affairs Committee which in- quires constantly into the policies and actions of the President and his agents, and the Government Operations Com- mittee which closely scrutinizes the en- tire organization of the executive branch. The Senate has a subcommittee whose area of operations borders on the very area I am discussing: the Subcom- Ategust 15 mittee on National Security Staffing and Operations. If we are going to refrain from looking into the affairs of executive agencies, even agencies which report directly to the President, than I fear we are going to have to disband a large number of our committees, or at least to curtail severely their activities. Of course we in the legislature cannot and should not inter- vene in areas beyond our competence. But in my view we have not only a right but a duty to maintain a general surveil- lance over agencies like the Central In- telligence Agency, which are established by statute and sustained by funds voted by the Members of these two Houses. These arguments?concerning secrecy and the exclusively executive nature of the intelligence community?are at least consistent. But strangely enough those who oppose resolutions similar to this have often attempted to maintain, not that for these reasons Congress should abstain entirely from overseeing the in- telligence community, but that on the contrary congressional oversight is al- ready more than adequate. Senator RUSSELL made this claim in the debate already quoted, and it was reiterated by Mr. Allen Dulles, the former Director of Central Intelligence, in his recent article in Harper's magazine. What is in fact the extent of congressional surveillance at the moment? In both the House and Senate the bodies responsible for overseeing the in- telligence community are small subcom- mittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. Neither the House Foreign Affairs Committee nor the Sen- ate Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction in this area despite their obvious interest in intelligence matters. This might not matter were it not for the fact that the surveillance exercised by the four existing subcommittees is almost certainly both cursory and sporadic. For example, last year during adebate in the Senate the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts, my friend, Mr. SALTONSTALL, was asked how much time the Armed Services Subcommittee de- voted to the CIA affairs. Mr. SALTON- STALL was perfectly frank. He said: I say on the floor of the Senate that we spend several hours and go into many details of operations, of expenses; of 4administration, and so on. I ask Members to note the phrase "several hours"?not weeks or even days, but hours. .The members of one of the most important committees in the other House devote only hours to the affairs of one of the most important agencies of our Government. The reasons for this are surely clear. The members of the four subcommittees lack any staff spe- cialized in these matters; they them- selves can have little time or thought to devote them. But even if these subcom- mittees do have more time for intelli- gence, nevertheless the disadvantages of having responsibility for the intelli- gence community divided up among four different subcommittees would, I think, be obvious to everyone. I maintain that congressional surveillance of the intelli- gence community is not now adequate, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE and cannot be adequate as long as it continues to be organized as it is at present. A moment ago I referred to the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency as one of the most important agencies of our Govern- ment. What is true of CIA is, of course, even truer of the intelligence commu- nity as a whole. Yet from time to time those who maintain that intelligence op- erations fall exclusively within the execu- tive sphere?those, in other words, who are opposed to the establishment of a joint congressional committee?try to persuade us, despite all we have heard and seen during the past few years, that nevertheless CIA is a purely advisory body, that that it is not directly con- cerned with the making of national pol- icy. Mr. Allen Dulles himself remarked several years ago: CIA is not a policymaking Agency: we furnish intelligence to assist in the formula- tion of policy. Senator RUSSELL during a debate in the other body was even more blunt: Some Senators who addressed themselves to the resolution on Monday last, seemed to hold the opinion that the CIA was a policy- making agency. That theme ran all through the remarks which were made in advocacy of the adoption of the resolution. Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is far from being a policymaking agency. It makes no policy. The distinguished Senator went on to say that CIA was merely a coordinating and information-gathering body whose function was simply to present its-find- ings to the actual policymaking body, the National Security Council. Senator RUSSELL said all this in 1956. In my view it was scarcely plausible even then. Now in 1963, after our experi- ences in Cuba, Laos and elsewhere, to say that CIA is in no sense a policymak- ing body is to say something that is pal- pably untrue. The National Security Act, under which CIA operates, does not, of course, formally assign it policymak- ing functions. But CIA is a policymak- ing body, and we all know it. The rea- sons have been well put by Prof. Harry Howe Ransom, our leading lay student of intelligence affairs. In his study "Central Intelligence and National Se- curity," published as early as 1958, he has this to say: Certainly the CIA has no policymaking responsibility. Yet policy making is not a simple static action. Rather it is a dynamic process. A key element in this process is the Information available to policymakers. The man, or group, controlling the information available to policymakers does in fact play a major if indirect role in policymaking. A few pages later Professor Ranson' adds: It would be unrealistic to suggest that the bright young men of CIA, by training, talent, and personality, do not hold strong views on controversial issues of national security policy. If it is granted that knowledge is indeed power, it will be recognized that in reality the CIA, through an increasing ef- ficiency?and consequently rising credit with responsible decision makers?has come to play a major role in creating national secu- rity policy. No. 127-4 Surely those statements can no longer be regarded as anything but the simple truth. In fact even Senator RUSSELL appears to have come round. Last year, during the hearings on the confirmation of Mr. John McCone to be Director of Central Intelligence, Senator RUSSELL remarked: In this period through which we are pass- ing, this office is perhaps second only to the Presidency in its importance. A few moments later he repeated the point. I am inclined to agree with Sen- ator RUSSELL. And I submit to you that one does not describe a man as holding an office "second only to the Presidency in its importance" if the agency of which he is the head is not itself a policymak- ing agency of the very first order of importance. Up to this point, Mr. Speaker, I have been mainly concerned to clear the ground, as it were?to state as clearly as I could my objections to the argu- ments most commonly used by opponents of the proposal I am supporting. Only by implication have I suggested positive reasons why I think a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence should be established. I want now to ad- dress myself to the central questions: why do I think such a joint committee is necessary? and, equally important, what work do I think it might usefully undertake? But first I have to make one further point. The Central Intelligence Agency, and indeed the entire intelligence com- munity, is highly?and necessarily?se- cretive in its mode of operations. For this reason outsiders like myself have no alternative but to rely for their informa- tion on newspaper reports, on the oc- casional published hearings on House and Senate committees, on the work of scholars like Professor Ransom, and on a miscellaneous variety of other sources. In the very nature of things our com- ments and criticisms cannot be authori- tative. We are working in the dark, or at least in the semitwilight. Neverthe- less, I think we do know enough to have reasonable grounds for supposing that all is not well within the intelligence community. Even more important, I think we know enough to be certain that we need to know more?and by "we," of course, I mean not necessarily the general public nor even every Member of Congress, but those Members who would serve on the kind of committee I have in mind. Why, then, do I think such a com- mittee should be established? I have two general reasons. The first concerns the extraordinary number of specific criticisms that have been leveled over the years against the Central In- telligence Agency and, by implication, against the intelligence community as a whole. Admittedly, as Mr. Allen Dulles recently pointed out: You cannot tell of operations that go along well. Those that go badly generally speak for themselves. And I would not want for a moment to deny that the Central Intelligence 14267 Agency has scored a number of quite spectacular successes?the U-2 over- flights, for example, and the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime in Iran. On balance it is almost certainly true to say that the intelligence community has served the Nation well. But the fact does remain that on occasion the com- munity has blundered seriously, and that for its blunder the citizens of the United States have paid a heavy price. Let me refer to just a few instances. Back in 1950, as Mr. Dulles himself has tacitly admitted, the intelligence com- munity failed to anticipate the Chinese Comninnist intervention in Korea. We are still living with the consequences of that particular failure. A few years later an incident involving the CIA caused us serious embarrassment in the Middle East and may have contributed indirectly to the Suez affair. In July 1956 President Nasser of Egypt claimed in a speech at Alexandria that he had been strongly advised by a U.S. Govern- ment official to ignore an important mes- sage that he was about to receive from the State Department. It was subse- quently confirmed that the official in question had been the regional repre- sentative of CIA. More recently, of course, we had the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. Chief respon- sibility for that lamentable affair must rest with the President of the United States. However, there can be no ques- tion but that the Central Intelligence Agency was deeply involved in the whole affair, and that its actions and advice had a decisive effect on the eventual outcome. Surely most Members of the House will agree that it would be in the national interest to know whether such incidents were merely particular aber- rations or whether,`in fact, they form a pattern that is likely to be repeated in the future. My second general reason for pressing for the establishment of this committee I can state quite briefly. It is this. I abhor government by secrecy. I regard it as inimical to the effective function- ing of our institutions. I regard it as alien to our American way of life. Above all, I regard it as a threat to our funda- mental liberties. I fully realize, of course, it should be clear from what I have said already that a high degree of secrecy is essential to the workings of the intelligence community. But I fear that with respect to the intelligence community we are often the victims of secrecy for secrecy's sake. Things are done to us and in our name which we know nothing of. I do not wish to see the legitimate secrets of the intelligence community reported in the press and on the air. Of course I do not. But it does seem to me of enormous im- portance that a few selected representa- tives of the people, chosen by the two Houses of Congress, should be continu- ously aware of what the intelligence community is doing and of the way in which it is going about doing it. The American people have at stake, not merely their liberties but their lives. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29 : CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 14268 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 4uyust 1(6 Despite all I have said so far, there would, of course, be little point in estab- lishing this joint committee unless we had some fairly clear idea of what we thought it should do, of what subjects we thought it should study. I propose, therefore, to continue by discussing four questions, all of high importance, which I think might usefully be investigated: first, the relations between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State De- partment, especially overseas; second, the relations between intelligence-gath- ering on the one hand and so-called special operaticins on the other; third, the selection and training of intelligence Personnel; and fourth, the whole ques- tion of intelligence evaluation. I pro- pose to deal briefly with the first three of these questions and to say rather more about the fourth. First, the relations between CIA and the State Department. The problem here has been posed suc- cinctly by Henry Howe Ransom in the book I have already cited. On page 216 he writes: The operation by the U.S. Government of a farflung secret apparatus for intelligen gathering and political action could ha widespread diplomatic ramifications. Ther may be basic incompatibility between the maintenance of accredited diplomatic mis- sions in some 78 foreign posts (as of 1958)? The number would be considerably greater now? and the existence of American secret agents in most of these same foreign areas. Great- est care must be exercised in keeping U.S. diplomacy separated from spying and back- stage political maneuvering, at least on the surface, yet the diplomats probably should not be completely in the dark as to the activities of American secret agents. The possibly disruptive effect of hav- ing, on the premises of American em- bassies abroad or in the field, agents who owe allegiance to someone other than the ambassador and to an organi- zation other than the State Department and who may be engaging in activities running counter to expressed State De- partment policy, scarcely needs spelling out in detail. Nor are these dangers merely specu lative. It seems, for example, that to ward the end of the Chinese civil war remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Na- tionalist Army moved into parts of northern Burma. These troops claimed to be eager to harass the Communists across the border, and CIA accordingly supplied them with large quantities of money and arms. But according to available reports the Chinese had long since tired of fighting. Instead of at- tacking the Communists, they proceeded to settle down, to occupy much of the best agricultural land in northern Burma, and to cultivate opium?all with the assistance of U.S. funds. . This would have been a melancholy episode in any case. But what made it worse was the fact that our Ambassador in Rangoon apparently had not the faintest idea of what CIA was doing. When the Burmese Government formally complained to the United States, the Ambassador issued a categorical denial; he said the United States had nothing to do with the activities of the Nation- alist Chinese. Our Ambassador of course believed he was telling the truth. But what he was saying was in fact not true, and naturally the Burmese were shocked by this apparent evidence of American duplicity. What was the upshot of this episode? The American Ambassador re- signed, the U.S. Government was deeply embarrassed, and the Government of Burma threatened for a time to break off diplomatic relations. Admittedly, this incident was particu- larly ludicrous. But it .is not without parallel. Our policy in the early stages of the Laotian crisis appears to have been constantly bedeviled by a lack of ? effective coordination between the CIA and the State Department. Similarly with Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs in- vasion. Mr. Tad Szulc and Mr. Karl Meyer,int,hei'x....a,,ple ascount_qf that affair, describe how:621M own initiative, CIA established close working relations with exiled supporters of the former dic- tator Batista. They add: This decision marked the inauguration of what, in effect, became its independent for- eign policy toward Cuba, in cavalier disre- gard of the thinking in the White House and the State Department. Note that all this occurred despite the efforts of an earlier Secretary of State, Mr. Christian Herter, to regularize rela- tions between the State Department and CIA. Since then the Herter-Allen Dulles agreement on the relations between Am- bassadors and CIA personnel in the field has been reaffirmed by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McCone. And by now we have reason to hope that the responsible foreign policymakers?the President and the National Security Council?have reas- serted their authority over the Central Intelligence Agency. I agree that to a considerable extent this is a problem of particular persons and particular situa- tions. But it is also the case that, as long as both State Department and CIA personnel are working in the field, as long as both aggncies are responsible for the collection of information, and?per- haps most important?as long as CIA continues to be responsible for special " operations, the problem of integrating the Central Intelligence Agency into our general foreign policy apparatus will re- main difficult and will remain worthy of close and continuous examination. The exercise of surveillance in this field I conceive to be one possible function of a Joint Congressional Committee on For- eign Information and Intelligence. A moment ago I alluded to the con- duct by the CIA of so-called special op- erations; that is, the fomenting of oppo- sition against hostile governments, the arming of insurgents, the provocation of enemy action, and so on. The question of housing these special operations?or additional services or other functions or whatever you want to call them?under the same roof as the CIA's purely intel- ligence-gathering operations has, of course, long been a matter of controversy, and it is this question that I suggest might usefully be the second of the new joint committee's areas of study. I do not suppose we need to be re- minded of the importance of this ques- tion. The Bay of Pigs invasion was only the most spectacular and best publicized of CIA's special operations. There was the Iranian affair in 1953, and the fol- lowing year the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. CIA also appears to have had a hand in the main risings in Eastern Europe, in East Berlin and Hungary. Operations of this sort, unless carefully supervised and controlled by responsible political officers, could un- wittingly involve the United States in a major international crisis, possibly in war. If this was not clear before the Bay of Pigs, it ought to be clear now. The institutional danger here is read- ily apparent and has often been stated. As Professor Ransom puts it: To mix the two functions?. That is, of information gathering and special operations? involves the danger that foreign agents col- lecting facts and trying at the same time to bolster or cause the overthrow of a foreign government in America's apparent interest may develop a less than objective sense for distinguishing between fact and aspiration. Messrs. Szulc and Meyer make the same point apropos of Cuba: The CIA men were not only shaping, in effect, foreign policy, but were exempt from any meaningful outside checks on their ac- tivities. Indeed, they were in the enviable position of both organizing a clandestine op- eration and preparing the intelligence data through which the validity of the venture could be judged. The obvious solution to this problem would, of course, be to deprive CIA en- tirely of its special operations function. Unfortunately the people in the most fa- vorable position ? to collect clandestine information are often also the people best placed to engage in subversive polit- ical activities. In addition, a total di- vorce between the two functions might lead, in Ransom's words, to "competi- tfliioen,duplication, and even outright con- t.,, For a time the Maxwell Taylor Com- mittee, appointed by the President to in- quire into the Bay of Pigs affair, ap- pears to have toyed, at least, with an alternative idea?the idea of transfer- ring the bulk of CIA's special operations to the Defense Department. But this solution would have had the equally ob- vious disadvantage of ensuring that the uniformed military?and hence the credit and prestige of the U.S. Govern- ment?would become involved as soon as any paramilitary operation became a matter of public knowledge. In the event, it seems that routine covert operations have been left in the hands of CIA, with control to be trans- ferred to the Pentagon only if a particu- lar project becomes so big as to warrant open military participation. Mr. Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times summed up the matter thus: The general rule of thumb for the future is that the CIA will not handle any pri- marily military operations, or ones of such size that they cannot be kept secret. How- ever, each case will apparently be judged on its merits; there is no hard-and-fast formula that will put one operation under the CIA and another under the Pentagon." Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 1933 ` CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE All of us, I think, will agree that this is an area in which hard-and-fast for- mulas are not appropriate and in which, in the nature of things, organizational gimmicks cannot solve the major diffi- culties. As in the case of relations be- tween CIA and the State Department, much depends on particular people and particular situations. But largely be- cause the problem is of this sort, because it is a problem which can never finally be solved, I feel very strongly that con- tinuing congressional surveillance is urgently required. If a joint committee had been in existence in the early stages of the first Cuban crisis, and if it had had cognizance of this matter, would the Bay of Pigs fiasco have occurred? I think it is at least possible that it would not. Discussion of the Bay of Pigs leads me naturally to the third of the questions I think a joint committee might investi- gate: the whole question of recruitment and personnel within the intelligence community. For it seems to me perfect- ly clear that one of the things that went wrong with the abortive Cuban inva- sion?not the only thing, but one of the things?was that much of the CIA per- sonnel responsible for the operation con- sisted of the sort of people who could not distinguish between the reactionary and the democratic elements in the anti- Castro camp, between the opponents of Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban people and those who, as former sup- porters of Batista, were anathema to. them. Let me quote again from Szulc and Meyer. In their book, "The Cuban In- vasion," they write; Thus the CIA established contacts in 1M- arai with pro-Batista organizations and with exile groups whose entire political philosophy was dedicated to the return to the pre-Castro status quo in Cuba. ? ? ? These factions were placing themselves not only against Cas- tro but against history; whether or not the CIA operatives were aware that total regres- sion is impossible, the contacts with the rightist factions ran counter to official U.S. policy, aimed at encouraging social reform in Latin America." A few pages later they remark that the activities of the CIA agents reflected a desire to promote anti-Castro groups which they could manipulate. They con- tinue: It also reflected an attitude of hostility to left-of-center exile groups by second-rate field operatives. This in turn affected the top level of the agency and resulted in a lack of understanding at the top. It is not clear to what extent the CIA attitude was ideolog- ically motivated or was simply a response based on the agent's view of what was prac- tical or realistic. This tendency on the part of the CIA to seek out and support the most anti- Communist groups in the field, regard- less of whether or not such groups are politically viable, has of course been manifested on a number of other occa- sions?in Laos as well as in Cuba, and apparently in Algeria and the Congo as well. It is a persistent tendency, and one that on occasion has had a damag- ing effect on our policy. I suspect it has something to do with the kinds of people the Central Intelligence Agency gets to work for it. Is it wise, for example, to rely to the extent CIA seems to do on the services of retired service officers? One would suppose that retired service officers, though almost always men of great abil- ity, would have an instinctive tendency to take a rather narrow, strictly "opera- tional" view of the problems confronting thent. Similarly, is it wise to rely too heavily on the services of political exiles and refugees? It seems reasonable, for example, to suppose that an exile from Ruritania, especially someone who has passionate convictions about what course events in his homeland ought to take, may not be the best person to assess what course events in his homeland actu- ally are taking, especially if what is actu- ally happening is not to his taste. Please do not misunderstand me. I do not mean to impugn the enormous amount of valuable work being done by retired service officers and by exiles and refugees in the CIA. Without their help, the organization simply could not func- tion. Altogether the Central Intelli- gence Agency undoubtedly commands some of the ablest minds in the U.S. Gov- ernment. And of course I do not mean fora, moment to suggest that CIA should be staffed with "soft-liners" or people who have had no personal experience of the countries in question. That would be absurd. But what I do think is that we have to be sure that what we are getting are ? actually the facts, and not what we would like to be the facts. This is not a matter of personal preference one way or the other. It is a matter of finding out what is actually taking place?and personal preferences enter only as they may color one's judgment. I suspect that the judgment of the CIA is some- times colored by the preference of its employees. I suspect that CIA ought to take special care to recruit and employ men and women of widely differing back- grounds, temperaments, and opinions. I suspect that in these kinds of situations one gets at the truth only when a wide variety of inclinations is brought to bear. But remember that these are my feelings only. I have little data at my command. All I am saying is that I have a hunch that CIA recruitment policy has had an effect on CIA's performance. I may be wrong, but I submit that the only way we in Congress can find out is by our- selves conducting an inquiry into the subject. The whole question of personnel and recruitment is, then, the third of the areas I would like to see a joint com- mittee study. I would only add that of course no investigation need inquire into the names and histories of particular individuals involved; there need be no breaches of security or secrecy. The matter we are concerned with is one of general policy. Finally, I want to turn to what is perhaps the most difficult of the four questions I referred to earlier: the ques- tion of how best to organize the evalu- ation of the enormous amount of ma- terial collected every day by the various agencies of the intelligence community. Obviously evaluation of some sort takes place at every echelon within the com- munity, but I am particularly concerned 14269 with the top-level U.S. Intelligence Board and its auxiliary bodies. Probably a few words are in order on how these agencies are organized. I think the following description is roughly accurate, though the Central Intelligence Agency refused to provide me with au- thoritative information so I have had to rely on data from published sources. By the phrase "intelligence com- munity" I mean the numerous agencies within the executive branch concerned with intelligence collection and evalua- tion: the CIA, the new Defense Intelli- gence Agency, the State Department, RAND, and so on. The community as a whole is responsible for producing the national estimates?described by Profes- sor Ransom as "these vital building blocks of national security policy." With the exception of the ultrasecret net esti- mates which are produced by special ma- chinery within the National Security Council, most estimates are prepared un- der the aegis of the so-called Board of National Estimates. This Board consists of a small number of intelligence experts?soldiers, diplo- mats, and scholars?who, to quote Ran- som again, "preside as a kind of planning general staff for the intelligence com- munity." The Board can initiate the preparation of an estimate, though it usually does so only on request from the President, the Director of Central Intel- ligence, or some other member of the Na- tional Security Council. In all cases, the Board of National Estimates sets the terms of reference, breaks the problem up into feasible components, and assigns appropriate tasks to the various agencies. The resulting staff studies are collated by the small Office of National Estimates. The Board then drafts either a straight estimate?that is, one which attempts to assess a foreign nation's intentions or fu- ture policies with implicit assumptions as to future U.S. policy?or a general esti- mate?that is, one involving stated as- sumptions concerning possible changes in U.S. policy. After the draft estimate has been returned to the participating agen- cies for their comments and criticisms, it is submitted, possibly with dissents, to a committee which used to be known as the Intelligence Advisory Committee but is now named the U.S. Intelligence Board. If the Board of Estimates is the plan- ning board for the intelligence com- munity, the Intelligence Board is its board of directors. As Ransom puts it, it is the "final forum for the professional intelligence community." It resolves jurisdictional disputes within the com- munity and is finally responsible for for- warding the national estimates to the National Security Council. Invariably the attempt is made to produce agreed estimates, and usually the attempt is suc- cessful; but on occasion dissenting opin- ions will be submitted. The Intelligence Board meets usually once a week. It consists of the leading intelligence offi- cials of the community and is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. Two aspects of this process in particu- lar are worth noting. The first is the central role of the Central Intelligence Agency. A high proportion of the intel- ligence community's fact gathering is done by CIA. The Board of National Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 14270 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE Estimates functions as a part of CIA. The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board is Director of CIA. And, of course, the intelligence community's spokesman on the National Security Council itself is also the CIA Director. The second thing worth noting, however, is the duality of CIA's role. Under the Na- tional Security Act the agency is not only one of the participants in the in- telligence community, it is also the chief agency responsible for coordinating it. In other words, at many points in the process of evaluation, CIA is both player and umpire, both witness and judge. This ambiguity is implicit in the title of the Director who is formally not the "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" but simply "Director of Central Intelligence." Now the danger here is clear. It is that the Central Intelligence Agency will become?perhaps it has already be- come?not merely the chief intelligence agency but the dominant intelligence agency, and that it will develop persistent institutional tendencies, biases, and even policies. This type of problem is, of course, not peculiar to the American in- telligence community but is character- istic of any complex administrative ap- paratus. That is the reason it has con- stantly to be guarded against. Sherman Kent, a Yale professor and a World War II intelligence officer, put the point this way: Almost any man or group of men con- fronted with the duty of getting something planned or getting something done will sooner or later hit upon what they consider a single most. desirable course of action. Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under du- ress, it is a snap judgment of the top of the head. I cannot escape the belief that under the circumstances outlined, intelligence will find itself right in the middle of policy, and that upon occasions it will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst. Szulc and Meyer, writing of the Bay of Pigs, conclude: Yet CIA was not behaving idiotically; it was in many senses responding to the insu- lated rationalism that infects a sheltered bureaucracy. Indeed, if there is an institu- tional villain, it is bureaucracy itself?that hulking, stubborn giant that seemingly can only look where it has been and not whither it is tending. Professor Ransom calls it simply the problem of "feedback." Naturally in the early months of 1961 the administration addressed itself to this problem. After the Bay of Pigs it could scarcely do otherwise. In particu- lar it reactivated a watchdog group set up by President Eisenhower in 1956, originally called the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac- tivities and now named the President's .Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Board, under the chairmanship of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of the Massa- cuhetts Institute of Technology, studied the question of evaluation and appar- ently forwarded one or more reports to the President in the course of the year. These reports have not been made pub- lic, but I think it is possible to piece to- gether from newspaper reports roughly what happened. It seems that the Kil- lian committee, or at least some of its members, were unhappy about the dual role being played by CIA. They proposed that in future the Director of CIA should be more of a technician, and that a new post should be created, probably at- tached to the White Houses, with some such title as "Coordinator of Intel- ligence," the new coordinator would be in a position to analyse and assess the results achieved by the intelligence com- munity without having any bias in favor of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared frequently in the press in June and July 1961. In August Mr. Cabell Phillips of the New York Times stated that the new post had actually been offered to Mr. Fowler Hamilton. Either these reports were inaccurate, of the administration changed its mind, or they could not find anyone to occupy the new post, because in September 1961 the President announced that Mr. John A. McCone had been named Director of Central Intelligence without any major change being made in the structure of the intelligence community. Subse- quently, however, in January 1962 one such change was announced. Hence- forth the Director of Central Intelligence was not to function both as Chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board and also as CIA member of the Board. Instead, al- though the Director was to remain Chair- man of the Board, his deputy was to act as representative of the CIA. In a letter to Mr. McCone, the President noted this change with approval. He added: As head of the Central Intelligence Agency, while you will continue to have overall re- sponsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency as you may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as Director of Central Intelligence. Clearly there was a dilemma here. On the one hand, it was evident that CIA's intelligence gathering and operational functions could conflict with its coordi- nating function?and, of course, what was true of the Agency was also true of Its Director. On the other hand, the President and his advisers were almost certainly aware that an independent co- ordinator, who was not himself the head of a major agency, might find himself weak, even powerless, in the face of the vast intelligence bureaucracies. Inde- pendence in theory might mean im- potence in practice. So a compromise was struck, and the duties of the Di- rector of Central Intelligence merely redefined. How successful this compromise has been it is probably too early to say. But from all that I have said, it ought to be obvious that the problem of evaluation, like the other problems I have already mentioned, is a- continuing one, and not one that can be spirited out of existence by merely institutional gimmickry. It is also obvious that the problem of evalu- ation is an enormously important prob- lem, probably the most important con- fronting the intelligence community. For these reasons, I think that it, too, should be a continuing subject of scru- tiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed committee of Congress. Au&ust >5.5 Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to detain the House further. I have spoken at considerable length, yet I am only too well aware that I have only skimmed the surface of this extraordinarily compli- cated and difficult subject. There are any number of further questions that I might have posed?for example, concern- ing the apparently increasing concentra- tion of authority within the intelligence community, or about the role of the U.S. Information Agency. And, of course, I must repeat that this has been essentially an -outsider's analysis. I have been trying merely to suggest what kinds of inquiry a joint committee might undertake, not to anticipate what the results ,of those inquiries would be. Nor as I remarked at the outset, do I wish to insist that the resolution I am introducing today provides the only pos- sible way of proceeding. Perhaps the joint committee should be given rather different terms of reference. Or perhaps a body should be established comprising private citizens as well as Members of Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic about this. My purpose in speaking to- day has been to reopen public discussion of an issue that has too long been dor- mant, and moreover to reopen it at a time of relative tranquillity; when the intelligence community is not in the public spotlight, at a time therefore when these matters can be considered soberly and dispassionately. But we in Congress should not be too timid about putting ourselves forward. I wonder how many Members of this House are aware of the enormous body of opinion in favor of the creation of a congressional joint committee. Both the Hoover Commission and its special intelligence task force favored congres- sional intervention. The New York Times has consistently supported the idea in its editorial columns. Two years ago the distinguished military analyst, Mr. Hanson Baldwin, stated that one of the lessons to be drawn from the Bay of Pigs was "the necessity of keeping all secret intelligence activities and opera- tions under constant top-echelon sur- veillance and review." He noted that the machinery for achieving this would be greatly strengthened by the creation of a joint congressional watchdog com- mittee. Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to quote just once more from the writings of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who, as I have already said, is our country's leading lay student of intelligence affairs. I think his comment deserves all the greater consideration because it comes from a member of the political science profession?a profession which, as we all know, has always had a strong bias in favor of the executive branch of gov- ernment. On page 206 of "Central In- telligence and National Security" Pro- fessor Ransom remarks: It is common experience for security policymakers, military and civilian, to find their fear of congressional interference changed into gratitude for congressional support, frequently more effective support than has been accorded on the executive side of Government. No executive agency today reveals everything to congressional com- mittees with jurisdiction over its operations. Officials of central intelligence may be ex- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 1968. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 14271 pected to reveal even less. But more ad- vantages are to be gained than lost from establishing a more institutionalized sys- tem for congressional surveillance. I agree with that, Mr. Speaker, and I hope that what I have said today will-be given earnest and thoughtful attention by my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LINDSAY. I yield to the gentle- man from Oregon. Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself with the gentleman's remarks. I think we should have had a joint committee to monitor the CIA when it was first established. I have had a little experience in the matter as a member of the Committee on Armed Services. As you may know, we have a subcommittee on the CIA. I was a mem- ber of that committee for either 2 or 4 years. We met annually?one time a year, for a period of 2 hours in which we accomplished virtually nothing. I think a proposal such as you have made is the answer to it because a part-time subcommittee of the Armed Services Conunitte, as I say, which meets for just 2 hours, 1 day a year, accomplishes nothing whatsoever. I want to compli- ment the gentleman on his proposal. Mr. LINDSAY. I thank the gentleman from Oregon and appreciate the con- tribution he has made. He knows where- in he talks. He is an expert on the subject and is a member of the Commit- tee on Armed Services and was a member of the subcommittee supervising the CIA?in theory?and what he says dove- tails entirely and agrees with the experi- ence, and the statements made in the other body as well. (Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) (Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr. LINDSAY) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.) Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to commend my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. LINDSAY], on the step he has taken in introducing his resolution. The gentle- man from New York [Mr. LINDSAY] has taken the initiative in remedying a seri- ous inadequacy in our .foreign policy making process. His efforts merit our thoughtful attention and solid support. I have joined the gentleman from New York [Mr. LINDSAY] in filing a com- panion resolution which, by establishing a Joint Committee on Foreign Informa- tion and Intelligence, would fill what is now a gaping hole in the congressional mechanism for the formulation of for- eign policy. At present, intelligence matters are handled simultaneously by several committees on both sides of Cap- itol Hill. Not only confusion but omis- sion as well result from this decentral- ization of supervision. Our proposals, which would apply to any intelligence or information agency, not only the CIA, would remedy this situation. First, the proposed joint committee would give Congress the machinery it must have to exercise its responsibility for the oversight of the Nation's intelli- gence activities. The present lack of congressional supervision in this area is itself a serious omission in view of the' work required of the foreign policy com- mittees of both Houses. A variety of congressional committees now handles the Nation's everwidening range of in- telligence activities. Effective coordina- tion of congressional supervision is im- possible. The proposed committee would have a comprehensive view of the intelligence and information aspects of foreign af- fairs. A single committee of this nature would provide the existing foreign policy committees with more direct and effi- cient service. The agencies under its supervision would benefit as well. A prime target of the joint committee's efforts would be the improvement of their operations and policies. Studies of the agencies' problems and programs would, of course, be considerably more extensive and complete when conducted by a committee with single responsibility of intelligence oversight. Ultimately, I believe, both Houses of Congress would benefit from the estab- lishment of the proposed joint commit- tee. The Senate and House would be afforded a broader opportunity for care- ful consideration of foreign information and intelligence matters. The agencies involved would similarly benefit from the committee's studies and recom- mendations. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hope the House may act promptly on our proposal. It would fill a vital gap in our foreign policymaking process. It would stream- line existing efforts in the areas of for- eign information and intelligence. This is an area in which congressional re- sponsibility is long overdue. ESTABLISHING MINIMUM STAND- ARDS FOR OPERATION OF CIVIL SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT The SPEAKER pr, tempore. (Mr. ROYBAL). Under prey us order of the House, the gentleman om Illinois [Mr. Puctusta] is recognize for 30 minutes. Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. peaker, I have today introduced legisl on designed to deal with a most seriou problem which will confront our Nation the very near. future. Specifically, Speaker, my legislation would establi certain limits of tolerance associated th the advent of the supersonic civil ransport plane now being developed by aircraft manu- facturers in France a England and being purchased by s eral American airlines. Similar effor to develop supersonic transport ar now underway in the United States. This is a problem w h we no longer can ignore. I have int uced this leg- islation at this particul r time, in order to give airplane manu turers both in our own country and a road ample op- portunity to make sufli 'ent changes in the design of their pow ?lants to avoid future distress to millio of Americans. The supersonic jet po erplant of the future must be develop and designed with appropriate consid ation for noise abatement. This is far-reaching 1 slation, But I submit, Mr. Speaker, ? at we can no longer ignore this problem. The United States and the entire world failed to pro- perly plan ahead in tlie development of our present subsonic ,jt transports and, as a result, millions oftpeople throughout the world have had their lives drastically changed by the unbeitrable noise which today's jet transpor0 produce at air- fields near large urbati areas. My own district liesfjust east of O'Hare Field, the world's ltusiest airport. It would be literally it ossible for me to E fully describe the de ening noise which thousands of my nstituents suffer everyday from conveittional subsonic jets either arriving or ideparting O'Hare Field. It cannot be 46,id that these peo- ple shouldn't have bu t near the airport; these people were t 'e before the air- port was built. I believe it is tr,gic that airplane manufacturers of th world did not take these consequences unto consideration when they develop the subsonic jet transport during th past decade. I was not a Mei4ber of Congress in those days, but I f 1 it is not only my duty but the duty Df every Member of this Congress both the House and in the Senate to recogize the fact that we cannot repeat this eror on the threshold of the supersonic 4r transport era. We must do ever thing possible to in- sure that this ne4 type of supersonic aircraft?which is being developed from scratch?does not xpeat the tragic mis- take of its subsonic et predecessor, FAA. The legislation hich I have intro- duced today woul prohibit the opera- tion of any civil personic aircraft in air transportation rough the navigable airspace of the nited States which would generate so4c boom overpressures exceeding 1.5 potus per square foot on the ground directT beneath the flight path. This legislation Tould further make it unlawful to opera any civil supersonic aircraft into or o4 of U.S. airports un- less it can be de nstrated that ground noise level genera d by such civil super- sonic aircraft is sstantially lower than that generated b long range subsonic jet aircraft. I am not at all ersuaded by the argu- ment that you 4annot stop progress. Certainly we all 4re for progress. But we cannot blindl state that we are for progress when we now that such prog- ress can seriously Jmpair the health and emotional stabilit of great numbers of Americans. Nor Ian we say blindly we are for progress w en we are faced with the prospect of feeing huge belts of destruction crisscrossing the United ni booms States from so bms generated by supersonic aircraff. It is my belief,1 that unless Congress deals with this sUbject matter at this time, we may conceivably see such havoc wrought upon this country from sonic booms that millions of dollars in dam- age to property and a serious threat to the health of marly of our people may ensue. My bill limits ionic boom overpres- sures not to exceed 1.5 pounds per square foot on the ground directly beneath the flight path. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9 ? 14272 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE August. 16" The best available information on sonic booms indicates that anything un- der 1 pound per square foot in overpres- sure by a supersonic aircraft flying at an altitude of 70,000 feet creates no dam- age to ground structures and no signifi- cant public reaction. Anything under 1.5 pounds per square foot in overpres- sure creates no damage to ground struc- tures but does produce some probability of public reaction to moderate sonic booms. Overpressures between 1.5 pounds per square foot and 2 pounds per square foot produce significant public reaction day and night but no damage to ground structures. - I hope my colleagues from the rural areas will take into account the fact that sonic booms which create significant public reaction day and night in this category Will also have significant re- action on farm livestock. Overpressures exceeding 2 pounds per square foot but under 3 pounds per square foot at an altitude of 70,000 feet create damage to glass and plaster and produce widespread public reaction day and night. Overpressures exceeding 3 pounds per square foot produce wide- spread window and plaster damage, mi- nor structural damage to frame and walls, and profound public re-action. The U.S. Air Force can produce signif- icant figures showing damage claims paid by our Government for losses due to sonic booms created by our military air- craft. You will note that my bill does not apply to military aircraft because we can certainly recognize the fact that in the area of national defense, we must be prepared to suffer some discomfoit. Furthermore, the Air Force has car- ried on an intensive program of rigid con- trol in the production of sonic booms so that every effort has been made to keep the damage to a minimum. I am sure this will not be the case when private air- lines begin competing against each Other with supersonic air transports. The other part of my proposal today would prohibit flights of civil supersonic aircraft into or out of U.S. airports un- less it can be demonstrated that groun noise generated by such supersonic a craft is substantially lower than t generated by present long-range b- sonic jet aircraft. At first blush this may seem ike a harsh and unreasonable prop al, but I hope those who would cri ize this proposal will take into consid ation the fact that we are now only o the thres- hold in the development supersonic airframes and powerplan . Unlike the development of the sub- .nic jet trans- port, which was develo ? d in the first in- stance as part of th military defense system when no con aeration was given to noise levels in e development of powerplants, in e development of supersonic power ants we have time and we know from xperience the necessity for taking no into consideration in the developme of such powerplants. This le lation is designed to put the whole airplane industry, both in the United States and in other nations of the world, on notice that the people of the United States do not intend to perpetuate the folly of permitting air transports to be developed with no consideration being given to noise abatement. There is no logical reason why the de- velopment of supersonic air transports for civilian use must be based on some foolish notion that a race exists between developer nations. I am more interested in which nation will be first to develop a supersonic civilian transport which meets the standards of noise abatement rather than which nation develops a supersonic transport which will actually knock the world's brains out with deafening noise. I am convinced the nation which develops a relatively quiet supersonic transport will ultimately get most of the world's business. ? The city of San Francisco recently rec- ognized the tremendous noise problems that supersonic air transports will pro- duce. Belford Brown, manager of the San Francisco International Airport, in ating requirements which will oontrol the noise levels of aircraft operating in and out of San Francisco International Airport. ? Mr. Speaker, I should like to call par- ticular attention to the statement which indicates that supersonic aircraft are ex- pected to create a noise level approxi- mately 16 decibels higher than now being experienced by Ame jet aircraft. This is 16 decibel increase is 1 next to a 22-caliber if Congress fails tion or some si degree of nois ate at our sonic aircr solutely sands In th fiel 164 an subsonic redible. Tis firing a cannon e. I submit that adopt this legisla- ar restrictions on the vel which we will toler- jor airfields from super- we will be creating an ab- uman situation for thou- n thousands of families living vicinity of America's major air- I submit, Mr. Speaker, that a ecibel increase over the present level a letter dated July 18, 1963, to Mr. Robert cf noise generated by a landing jet, will Murray, Jr., vice president of Pan Amer- ,treate conditions which will be corn- lean World'Airways, stated San Francis4 plenty unbearable to the human ear co's concern regarding the supersoniE and brain. I submit this situation, if aircraft noise problem. This 1 r true, could have serious psychological should be of particular interest sine an effects on vast numbers of Americans. Francisco has in the past adheri to a Subsonic jets now operating in this policy of no operational restri ons on country produce noise levels both on de- air carriers. Mr. Brown wrote as folio Recent publications withi portation industry and n paper reporting indicate World Airways is cont chase of Concorde s transports which h the Anglo-French department at 8 from the planne sonic airport tion of this it is expec proximatel being exp aircraft As p Abat e air trans- onwide news- t Pan American plating the pur- rsonic commercial been developed by ombine. The airport Francisco understands of one European super- t the landing configura- ticular aircraft is such that to create a noise level ap- 16 decibels higher than now ienced by American subsonic jet ident of the San Francisco Sound ent Center you are aware of the noise pro ms and community resistance to the air ?rt's operation at San Francisco Inter- onal Airport and of the legal actions w pending and in the hands of our legal ounsel. You are also aware that San Fran- cisco International Airport has never insti- tuted an operational restriction on the air carriers or aircraft operating into and out of San Francisco International Airport. We have relied wholly upon our preferential runway systems, airport runway extensions, and community enlightenment on noise through the sound abatement center. On July 9, 1963, the Public Utilities Corn.. mission of the City and County of San Francisco passed Resolution No. 23074 (copy attached hereto) setting forth the city's of- ficial position concerning supersonic trans- port planning. In effect, it states (1) that supersonic jet transports should be able to operate from the existing and currently planned major civil air terminals; (2) that the design of these, transports should re- quire no greater landing or takeoff distances than present-day subsonic jet aircraft; and (3) that the ground level noise created by supersonic jet transports should be no great- er in the airport environs than the levels now being experienced. The purpose of this communication is to advise Pan American World Airways of the city's official position in this matter, and further, to inform you that if facts stated in this communication as to the noise char- acteristics of the Concorde are correct, we will have to forgo our previous policy and give serious consideration to imposing oper- parture and arrival dangerously close to the maximum human tolerance of per- ceived noise decibels. To permit the operation of supersonic transports which will produce noise 16 decibels higher than now being experienced by Ameri- can subsonic jet aircraft is, in my judg- ment, Mr. Speaker, to invite disaster for large segments of our American popula- tion. I submit, Mr. Speaker, this is a prob- lem which must be dealt with by the Federal Government. It is not fair to leave to the individual airports of Amer- ica the responsibility of developing their own respective standards. Such a policy could bring about a wide divergence of rules and regulations and standards which could affect the entire configuration of air tzavel in America. I believe in fairness to all the major air- fields of this Nation. The Congress should establish one uniform standard. This would insure against unnecessary economic pressures upon the individual airport "operators. Mr. Speaker, this is a matter which we can no longer ignore. Continental Airlines recently signed a $30 million- plus contract to purchase three British- French mach 2.2 jet airliners which, when delivered, will provide the first supersonic service within the United States. These supersonic transports would be capable of flying from Los Angeles to Chicago in less than 2 hours. This is the second supersonic air transport order placed by an American firm. Pan American World Airways or- dered six similar planes for use on its oversea routes. It is estimated that the first Concord ordered by Continental should make its maiden flight in 1966, with delivery date in 1969. The Concord is a joint venture between France's Sud Aviation and Eng- land's British Aircraft Corp. It will carry 104 passengers at speeds up to 1,450 miles per hour. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050023-9